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ABSTRACT 
In comparison with the fields of phonology, syntax, and 
semantics, there, is a distinct lack of a comprehensive and critical study 
of morphological theory, particularly modern trends in this sub-branch 
of linguistic theory. There is also a marked lack of interest in the 
underlying methodological and epistemological foundations of 
morphological theory, though this situation also holds for the three 
other areas of core -1 inguistics- mentioned above. The present thesis 
has a modest aim: it is to give a critical and fairly comprehensive study 
of five modern morphological approaches, with particular reference, 
whenever possible, to their underlying methodological and epistemological 
principles. 
This thesis contains six chapters and a short Introduction. The 
Introduction deals with the place and state of morphological studies in 
modern linguistic theory. It also sets out the 'reasons' behind the 
restriction of the scope of the thesis to the following five approaches: 
(I) stratificational grammar, (2) transformational generative grammar, 
Wword and paradigm I (Robins), (4) word and paradigm II (Matthews), 
and (5) axiomatic functionalism. A brief explanation of the format of the 
approach adopted in studying these different trends is also given here. 
No natural or social science can afford to be oblivious of 
methodology and epistemology. Such disciplines as physics and linguistics 
(xiv) 
are inextricably linked with methodology and epistemology. The 
recognition of this inescapable 'fact' of modern linguistics underlies 
ihe decision to consider the various morphological approaches studied in 
this thesis from the point of view of their - explicit or implicit - philosophy 
of science. The first chapter is, therefore, completely devoted to 
expounding the framework by reference to which the above task may be 
achieved. This framework consists of two parts: a methodological part 
and an epistemological one. The former one contains a discussion of 
inductivism in its various forms, the hypothetico-deductive approach, 
, conventionalism and operationalism. 
The latter part contains a. discussion 
of realism (including phenomenalism, naive realism and Popperian realism) 
and instrumentalism (including sceptical instrumentalism and fictionalism). 
Chapter two deals with morphology in stratificational grammar by 
considering (a) its development from Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics, (b) its various models, particularly the Outline model and its 
successor, and (c) its methodological and epistemological principles. 
A critical discussion of the commurhcational, stratificational and cognitive 
nature of this approach is also provided here. 
Morphology in transformational generative grammar constitutes the 
scope of Chapter III. In addition to an introduction concentrating on the 
neglect and emergence of morphology in this approach, and a conclusion 
'ýoncentrating on the problem of productivity and, mainly, the epistemological 
foundations of trans formational generative morphology, - this chapter deals 
with tra nsformationa list morphology in the f6llowing periods: (i) the 
'Syntactic Structures period, (U) the Aspýects of the Theory of Syntax period, 
and (iii) the "Remarks on Nominalisation" period. The first period 
(XV) 
encompasses the following works: Chomsky's Syntactic Structures, 
Lees' The Grammar of English Nominalisations and Zimmer's Affixal 
Negation The second period consists of Chomsky's Aspects and Botha's 
The Function of the Lexicon in Transformational Generative Grammar. In 
addition to "Remarks", which sets out the so-called 'Lexicalist Hypothesis' 
tn transformattonal generattve grammar, the thtrd pertod encompasses 
Halle's morpheme-based theory, jackendoff's fully-entry theory and 
Aronoff's word-based theory. 
A critical investigation of what I have called, for the lack of 
better labels, word and paradigm I (Robins) and word and paradigm II 
(Matthews) is given in Chapter IV. This investigation is preceded by a 
short discussion of the nature of the traditional word and paradigm model 
and of the 'reasons' behind its neglect in the neo-Bloomfieldian era. 
Chapter V deals with morphology in axiomatic functionalism. This 
chapter contains a discussion of the nature of this approach from the point 
of view of its methodology and epistemology, particularly its axiomatic 
character and evaluation criteria. It also deals with the place of 
morphology in systemology and, also, the basis of the distinction between 
morphology and syntax in this approach. A critical investigation of the 
axiomatic functionalist criteria and methodology for morphological analysis, 
as these criteria and methodology are stated in Hervey and Mulder 
" Pseudo- composites and Pseudo-words", is given here. The fairly 
comprehensive study of the methodological and epistemological aspects of 
this theory, given in this chapter, reflects the commendable emphasis placed 
on these issues by its originator. 
(Xvi) 
The last chapter is a Conclusion. It deals with the residual 
issue of static versus dynamic models - applicable to the above-mentioned 
approaches - from an epistemological point of view. These approaches 
are also compared with each other with respect to the following 
considerations: restricted versus universal morphological theories, 
cognition, and philosophy of science, particularly methodology. 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The neo-Bloomfieldian era was undoubtedly the heyday of 
synchronic morphological studies in modern linguistics., In this era, 
morphology took second place only to phonology, leaving syntax far 
behind. However, the advent of Chomsky's transformational 
generative grammar in the late fifties altered this situation radically. 
In the new scheme of things, syntax gained prominence and phonology 
retained its position as an important section of linguistic theory. 
Morphology, as an autonomous section of grammar, disappeared 
completely, with syntax handling the structural properties of morphemes, 
and phonology, or morphophonemics, dealing with the variations in the 
shapes of morphemes, i. e. allomorphy. Roughly speaking, the demise 
of morphology as an identifiable component of grammar in early 
transformational generative grammar resulted in a general neglect of this 
area of linguistic structure in other linguistic approaches. This is 
hardly surprising in view of the fact that transformational generative 
grammar quickly established itself as the dominant linguistic theory in 
this period. 
In recent years there has been a marked change in the status of 
morphology in modern linguistic studies. Transformational generative 
grammar is yet again largely responsible for this state of affairs. 
I 
2 
Phonological studies in this approach revealed that "morphologically 
conditioned variation obeys somewhat different principles' from those 
governing strictly phonological processes" (Anderson 1982: 572). 
Similarly, Chomsky's Lexicalist 'hypothesis' (1970) resulted in a great 
deal of interest in problems of morphological structure. According to 
this 'hypothesis', features of word-formation are thought to be, 
sufficiently significantly different from properties of sentence structure 
to warrant a separate treatment in grammar. Halle's 'morpheme -ba s ed' 
theory (1973), jackendoff's 'full-entry' theory (1975) and Aronoff's 
'word-based' theory (1976) may all be seen as a response to the challenge 
posed by Chomsky's Lexicalist 'hypothesis'. 
However, it would be rather naive to suggest that the recent 
interest in morphology as an autonomous field of study in modern 
linguistics is entirely. due to the work of Chomsky and his disciples. 
In stratificational grammar, morphology has always been of central - 
importance -as an autonomous component of human language. The same 
situation also holds for the two modern word and paradigm models and 
for axiomatic functionalism. No less important'in this connection is 
the contribution of the tagmemicists and that of the two linguists Marchand 
and Uhlenbeck in their valuable and extensive studies of English and 
Javanese morphology, respectively. 
Also important, particularly in the field of English word-formation, 
is the work of Adams (1973) and Bauer. In his book English Word 
Formation, Bauer (1983: 1) points out that the recent sudden interest in 
word-formation by "theoretical linguists of all persuasions" is related to 
3 
the fact that this area of linguistic structure "throws [light] on other 
aspects of language". He also points out (ibid: 6) that the "study of 
word-formation is expanding, and researchers seem to be showing a 
greater willingness to blend various theoretical viewpoints when dealing 
with it: - to blend synchrony and diachrony, morphology and phonology, 
syntax and semantics. In fact it is the "crossroads" nature of word- 
formation ....... where so many facets of linguistics come together 
which seems to be attracting new researchers". 
One difficulty in dealing with morphology in modern linguistics 
is that the term 'morphology' is, more often than not, employed 
indiscriminately to refer to both a sub-section of a particular linguistic 
theory and to an area of human language. This difficulty is compounded 
by the fact that when the term 'morphology' is used to designate an area 
of human language, it. is often indiscriminately applied in both a 
pre-descriptive and a post-descriptive sense, i. e. to refer indiscriminately 
to the inherent morphological structure of a language and to the 
morphological description set up by the linguist for the language in 
question. As a result of this indiscriminate use of the term 'morphology', 
the researcher sometimes finds himself unable to assess- accurately the - 
exact methodological and epistemological import of statements referring 
to morphology and morphological phenomena. 
Another difficulty arises from the fact that different morphological 
theories do not share the same scope. Roughly speaking, differences of 
scope may be either differences of type or extension. The first 
difference may be illustrated by the fact that whereas the phenomena 
4 
covered by axiomatic functionalist morphology are structurally 
significant, those covered by Martinet's orthodox functionalism are only 
realisationally significant, i. e. they are equivalent to allomorphic 
phenomena in the former theory. The second difference may be 
illustrated by the fact that whereas, say, in a description of English 
axiomatic functionalism proposes to deal with so-called inflectional 
phenomena morphologically, transformationalist generative grammar 
deals with them syntactically. 
The above difficulties, and others which will emerge in the 
course of this thesis, render the task of comparing, as opposed to 
contrasting, the different morphological theories to be studied later 
difficult to deal with in a rigorous and systematic manner. Strictly 
speaking, there is very little unity cross -theoretically in those fields 
that are designated by the term 'morphology' in each approach. As 
Bauer (ibid. ) points out concerning the state of word-formation in modern 
linguistics: ". ... there is little agreement on the methodology or basic 
theoretical background for the study of word-formation, so that the field 
is currently a confused one" (p. 1); "There is, at the moment, no single 
"theory of word -formation" , nor even agreement on the kind of data which 
is relevant for the construction of such a theory" (ibid: 1); and "At the 
moment, the study of word-formation is in a state of flux. There is no 
one body of accepted doctrine on the subject, so that researchers'are 
largely having to make up their own theory and procedures as they go 
along" (ibid: 6). 
This situation also existed in the neo-Bloomfieldian era which, 
as has been mentioned above, is generally regarded as the heyday of 
5 
synchronic morphological studies. In his classic paper "Two Models 
of Grammatical Description", Hockett (1954) recognised three models 
of grammatical and, by implication, morphological,, * description: item 
and arrangement, item and process and word and paradigm. These 
models differed from each other in terms of their basic notions and 
methodologies for dealing with the morphological structure of languages. 
To linguists of the day, the field of morphology must have appeared to 
be in a "state of flux". This state of affairs did not only hold inter- 
theoretically, but also intra-theoretically. The latter situation may 
be exemplified by the well-known debate in the item and arrangement 
approach concerning the description of the morphophonemic composition 
of "took" in English. Hockett (1954: 223) mentions the following 
morphophonemic solutions that have been proposed for this example by 
the neo-Bloomfieldians: 
took is a single morpheme, so that there is no 
morphophonemic problem 
took is a portmanteau representation of the two-morpheme 
sequence take and /ed/ . 
3. took is an allomorph of the morpheme which appears 
elsewhere as take, plus a zero allomorph of Ad/. 
4. took is a discontinuous allomorph //t k/ of take, 
and an inf ixed allomorph /u/ of /ed/ 
S. took is take plus a replacive morp /u/( -/e y/ (read Vu/ re places /ey/ 
The aim of this thesis is not to deal with the afore-mentioned 
models of morphological description, particularly item and arrangement 
and item and process, despite the fact that these two models stand in 
some need of comprehensive and critical treatment, particularly from 
the point of view of their underlying philosophy of science and epistemology. 
6 
Nor is its aim to provide a new theory of morphology, for there is an 
abundance of such theories in linguistics. Its aim is a modest one. 
It is to give a critical study of morphology in the following current 
linguistic approaches: stratificational grammar, transformational 
generative grammar, word and paradigm I (Robins), word and paradigm II 
(Matthews) and axiomatic functionalism. The choice of these approaches 
is determined by, amongst other things, the following considerations: 
(a) Stratificational grammar and transformational generative grammar are 
generally regarded as the two most important contemporary, developments 
of the two classic models of item and arrangement and item and process, 
respectively; 
(b) the two word and paradigm models represent modern interpretations 
of the traditional grammarians' model; 
(c) axiomatic functionalism is the theory in which the present author 
has received his main training in linguistics; moreover, this theory 
differs from the other approaches to be dealt with in this thesis in terms 
of its methodological and epistemological foundations. 
This thesis will investigate not only the morphological section of 
each theory it deals with, but also its methodological and epistemological 
foundations, since no proper understanding of these theories can be 
achieved without such an investigation. Moreover, it is in terms of 
these foundations that these approaches can be most fruitfully compared 
with each other. The discussiontn Chapterl is intended to provide us 
with a frame of reference in terms of which the afore-mentioned task of 
investigating the methodological and epistemological foundations of the 
theories to be studied later will be carried out. The decision to devote 
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a whole chapter for investigating this frame of reference is based on 
two main considerations: (a) such a procedure results in a coherent 
statement of those methodological and epistemological issues that are 
relevant for the goal of the thesis, and (b) by virtue of its coherence, 
this procedure is more elegant and neat than its rival, which consists 
of treating these issues piece-meal in different chapters of the thesis. 
In dealing with the different morphological theories studied in 
this thesis I have, rightly or wrongly, restricted myself only to the 
published literature in all instances. I have also adopted the procedure 
of giving a concise presentation of each relevant topic before embarking 
on the task of evaluating that topic and the approach as a whole. 
Furthermore, I have tried to evaluate each approach in its own terms, 
thus avoiding the all too common practice in linguistics of faulting an 
approach for not being. our own, or for not conforming to the major 
assumptions of our approach. It is only if we proceed in this way that 
we can properly assess the 'true' state of our discipline. 
CHAP TE R ONE 
PRELIMINARIES 
CHAPTER ONE' 
PRELIMINARIES 
1. Introduction 
One of the chief objectives of this thesis is the evaluation of 
the morphological theories it sets out to deal with in terms of their. 
methodological and epistemological foundations, insofar as these 
foundations are made explicit, or sufficiently so, in the literature. 
The present chapter has an immediate aim and an ulterior motive. Its 
immediate aim is to deal with relevant issues in philosophy of science 
and epistemology, i. e. relevant to the obove objective, and its ulterior 
motive is to suggest that as long as linguists fail to pay due attention 
to the methodological and epistemological foundations of their theories 
and approaches, they will continue to grope in the dark in their efforts 
to establish linguistics'as a discipline in its own right. 
I, however, do not claim that philosophy of science and 
epistemology can provide us, as linguists, with a ready-made and well- 
defined basis on which the 'secure' foundations of our discipline can be 
built. As the following discussion will show, philosophy of science 
abounds with controversies and disagreements concerning fundamental 
issues of principle and scope. Because of this, the linguistic 
theoretician will be called upon to exercise his critical judgement in his 
choice of an appropriate methodological and epistemological basis on 
which to build his theory. It also should not escape our notice that 
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in the course of trying to achieve this aim, the linguist may contribute 
something of value to philosophy of science itself. 
In other words, the relationship between philosophy of science 
and linguistics is not of an unidirectional, but of a reciprocal nature. 
This is, of course, true of any 'scientific' discipline vis-a-vis philosophy 
of science. In this chapter, we are, however, concerned only with the 
relevance that philosophy . of science has for linguistics. 
2. What Is Philosophy Of Science? 
Despite the fact that there is a fair measure of agreement 
concerning the distinction between philosophy of science, on the one 
hand, and the history, the psychology or the sociology of science 
(1) 
1 
on the other, it is generally recognised that "philosophers and scientists are 
not in accord on the nature of philosophy of science", and that even 
"practising philosophers of science often disagree about the proper 
subject matter of their discipline". (Losee 1972: 1). 
In his excellent 4ntroduction to the history of philosophy of 
science, Losee (ibid. ) recognises four different views concerning the 
nature of ýhilosophy of science as a discipline: 
1. According to the first view, philosophy of science is said to deal 
with the "formulation of world views that are consistent with, and in 
some sense based on, important scientific theories". (ibid. ) 
2. The second view conceives of philosophy of scienqe an "an 
exposition of the presuppositions and predispositions of scientists" 
(ibid. ). such as the belief in a principle of 'uniformity of nature', which, 
incidentally, is explicitly adhered to and advocated by some scientists. 
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3. According to the third view, the task of philosophy of science is 
the analysis and classification of scientific concepts and theories in an 
exact manner. Here, the philosopher of science is said to concern 
himself with the task of "examining the meanings and implications of 
the concepts which the scientist uses" (Theobold 1969: 6), such as 'time',, 
$space', 'causality', 'identity', etc. 
4. The fourth view conceives of philosophy of science as a "second- 
order criteriology" (1972: 2), dealing with such issues as the criteria for 
distinguishing between science and pseudo-science or non-science, the 
criteria for assessing the 'validity' and 'correctness' of scientific 
explanations, the methodology of science and the cognitive status of - 
scientific laws and theories. This 'wide' view of the nature of 
philosophy of science is schematised by Losee (1972: 3) as follows: 
LEVEL DISCIPLINE , SUBJECT-MATTER 
2 Philosophy of Science Analysis of the Procedures and 
Logic of Scientific 
Explanation 
1 Science Explanation of Facts 
0 Fa cts 
It is not my intention here to discuss and evaluate these different 
views of the nature of philosophy of science; for not only would such a 
discussion fall outside the scope of this thesis, but it would also lie 
beyond the competence of the present writer. Suffice it to say that, as 
far as the present work is concerned, the fourth view of the nature of 
philosophy of science will be broadly adopted. The decision to adopt 
this point of view of the nature of philosophy of science is based on the 
11 
fact that considerations of methodology of science and epistemology 
only are -directly relevant to the scope of this work. 
3. Topics In The Methodology Of Science 
3.1 Inductivism: Two Influential Figures 
(3) 
Some of the main features of inductivism were, to the best of my 
knowledge, first explicitly stated by Aristotle who "viewed scientific 
inquiry as a progress from observations to general principles and back 
to observations" (Losee 1972: 6). Aristotle put forward the view that 
the task of the scientist was to "induce explanatory principles from the 
phenomena to be explained, and then deduce statements about the 
phenomena from premisses which include these principles" (ibid. ). 
This method of scientific inquiry is sometimes called the 'inductive - 
deductive' method. It is inductive insofar as it moves from singular 
statements 
(4) 
about particular objects or events in the universe of 
(5) 
phenomena, to universal statements about all objects or events of the 
same type in the entire universe of phenomena; and it is deductive in 
the sense that it leads to the derivation of singular statments from the 
set of universal statements or principles inductively arrived at. 
According to this View of inductivism, scientific explanation resides in 
the deductive process of deriving observation statements from the general 
principles or universal statements. Losee (ibid: 6) represents this 
Aristotelian view of inductivism by the following figure: - 
Observation (2) Explanatory Principles 
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Aristotle distinguishes two types of induction: induction by 
simple enumeration, or enumerative induction, which is the forerunner 
of what is called 'naive inductivism' by Chalmers (1978), and induction 
by "direct intuition of those general principles which are exemplified in 
the phenomena" (Losee 1972: 7). Induction by intuition is considered 
to be a "matter of insight .... an ability to see that which is 'essential' 
in the data of sense experience", as may be exemplified by the "case of 
a scientist who notices on several occasions that the bright side of the 
moon is turned toward the sun, and who concludes that the moon shines 
by reflected sunlight" (ibid: 7-8). 
Another important figure in the history of the development of 
inductivism is the British empiricist philosopher Francis Bacon 
(6) 
* 
Bacon's main contribution to the history of inductivism was his advocacy 
of an inductively based method of scientific Inquiry, which, he believed, 
would establish science on a secure, reliable and objective basis. He 
considered the task of the scientist to be the careful and systematic 
observation and classification of the phenomena of nature, without any 
prejudice or preconception 
(7) 
, and the setting up of general laws and 
principles to explain them. In his book on Bacon, Quinton (lS80: 55) 
sums up Baconian inductivism in this manner: 
"Baconian induction will lead to the most general 
principles, not in one wild generalising swoop, but by 
general ascent .... The proper and regular recording 
of observations will preserve us from all sorts of 
illusions and blind alleys. The deliberate business- 
like nature of the whole undertaking will ensure that it 
is cumulative. The true philosopher, Bacon says, must 
resemble the bee, not the ant, who merely collects, or 
the spider, who merely spins frail construction out of 
itself. He and the bee combine what the others do 
separately and fruitlessly: extracting matter, and 
working and fashioning it as well.,, 
(8) 
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3.2 Naive Industivism: A Brief Outline 
- .., _; 
ýristotelian ihduction by simple enumeration and, particularly, 
Baconian inductivism contain much of the seeds of what is called 'naive 
inductivism' by Chalmers (1978). He (ibid: 2) charactertses naive- 
inductivism as follows: 
"According to the naive inductivist, science starts with 
observation. The, scientific observer should have normal, 
unimpaired sense organs and should faithfully record what 
he can see, hear, etc. to be the case with respect to the 
situation he is observing, and he should do this with an 
unprejudiced mind. Statements about the state of the 
world, or some part of it, can be justified or established 
as true in adirect way by an unprejudiced observer's use 
of his senses". 
Harre' (1978: 42) sums up the main features of this type of 
inductivism in three principles: the "principle of accumulation", the 
"principle of instance confirmation" and the "principle of induction". 
According to the first principle, scientific knowledge is said to 
consist in the "conjuction of well-attested facts, which grows by the 
addition of further well-attested facts, so that the addition of a new fact 
to the conjuction leaves all previous facts unaltered" (ibid. ). On the 
basis of this principle, inductivism may be said to espouse a form of a 
bucket-theory of the growth of scientific knowledge. 
The principle of "instance confirmation" means that belief in 
inductively arrived at scientific laws and general principles, or more 
precisely, in the plausability of suqh laws and principles, is proportional-. 
to the "number of instances that have been observed of the phenomenon 
described in the laws" (ibid. ). 
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The "principle ofinduction", or more precisely, the naive 
inductivist version of such a principle, undoubtedly forms the backbone 
of the naive-inductivist philosophy of science. This principle has, 
b6sically, the status of a rule of inference which is intended to attribute 
to universal statements the 'correctness' predicated of the singular 
statements from, or on the basis of, which universal statements are 
derived. The naive inductivist principle of induction, albeit not always 
under this name, has been stated in a variety of ways in the literature; 
one of the most recent, and most explicit, formulations of this principle 
is given by Chalmers (1978: 6): 
"If a large number of A's have 
, 
been observed undera 
wide variety of conditions, and if all these observed A's 
without exception possessed the property B, then all 
A's have the property B". 
It is clear that, on the basis of this principle; an inductive 
generalisation, to be a legitimate one, must satisfy the following 
conditions: 
(1) The number of observation statements forming the basis of an inductive 
generalisation must be a large one. 
(2) The observations -recorded by observation statements must be 
conducted under a wide variety of conditions. 
(3) All accepted observation statements must be consistent with the 
derived inductive generalisation. 
It should be mentioned, however, that naive inductivism represents 
an 'extreme' form of the inductivist philosophy of science, and that not 
many philosophers of science nowadays would completely subscribe to it. 
The treatment of this type of inductivism here thus stands in need of some 
justification. This is provided on the following grounds. 
is 
On the one hand, naive inductivism contains some of the basic 
features which characterise all forms of inductivism, as shall be seen 
in later sections of this chapter. A discussion of naive inductivism 
therefore serves as a prelude to these more 'sophisticated' versions of 
inductivism to be given later. 
On the other hand, insofar as inductivism is explicitly advocated 
and adhered to in modern lingiiistics, it Is of an essentially naive- 
indictivist type. It seems to me not unreasonable to claim that, within 
the overall context of Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, 
Bloomfield's (1976: 20) famous statement that the "only useful 
generalisations about language are inductive generalisations", and 
Hockett's (1958: 7) similar remark that "linguistic research can accomplish 
nothing unless it is strictly inductive", are basically of a naive 
inductivist 'nature. However, the most explicit and fully-fledged 
statement of an essentially naive inductivist philosophy of science in 
linguistics is, to the best of my knowledge, to be found in Dixon 
(1963: 11-12): 
"We say that the 'raw material' of science consists of 
observations. -The scientist will recognise a certain pattern 
which is common to a number of. observations; in other words, 
he will notice that, in some particular way, the observations 
are similar to each other. Having recognised certain 
patterns he will then compare and correlate them. Pattern 
Correlations can be of several different sorts; the scientist 
can correlate different patterns all of which are noticed in., 
the same set of observations, or else he can correlate 
patterns of a similar sort which can occur in one of a number 
of distinct sets of observations. Generally speaking, he will 
perform pattern correlations of both these kinds. A theory 
is obtained by generalisation upon pattern correlations. Thus 
a theory can be looked upon as an abstraction from a number of 
observations. What is abstracted from each is that pattern or 
patterns which is seen to recur in similar form in other 
observations". 
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The main appeal of naive inductivism lies in the fact that it 
presents a view of. the nature of science according to which it appears , 
to be characterised by extreme overall simplicity, objectivity and strong 
reliance on empirical evidence. Another point which is thought to count 
in its favour is its ability to reflect in a formal manner what might be 
called the 'popular view' of science, i. e. ý the educated layman's 
understanding, albeit an implicit one, of the nature of science and the 
(9) 
conduct of scientific inquiry Chalmers (1978: 1) explains this 
popular view of science in this fashion: "Scientific theories are derived 
in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by observation 
and experiment. Science- is based on what we can see and hear and 
touch, etc. Personal opinion or preference and speculative imaginings 
have no place in science. Science Is objective. Scientific knowledge 
is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven knowledge". 
But the above-mentioned appeal of naive inductivism is more 
apparent than real. Harre" bluntly states that (naive-) inductivism can 
"hardly stand a moment's serious criticism" (1978: 43), and that the 
"real reason why inductivism, is so wrong is that it is so unrealistic,, 
Ei-e. ] it is an attempt to codify a more or less mythical conception of 
science" (ibid: 47). - Similar views about this type of inductivism are 
expressed by many philosophers of science, including Chalmers (1978), 
Magee (1979), Madawar (1974), O'Hear (1980) and in many of Popper's 
publications, especially (1959,1969 and 1974). Before dealing with 
these criticisms, let us, however, deal with the three different types of 
justification of naive inductivism that are found in the literature, namely 
the logical justification, the empirical justification and the psychological 
Justification. 
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3.3 The justification Of Induction 
The problem of the justification of induction is generally known 
as Hume's problem in the history of philosophy of science. In his book 
on Hume, Ayer (1980: 69) expresses this point in this fashion: " [HuMe] 
raises the general and fundamental question how we can ever be justified 
in making factual inferences which carry us beyond the evidence of our 
past and present observations. In raising this question, he posed what 
has come to be known to philosophers as the 'Problem of Induction' ". 
Hume believed that induction cannot be logically justified. A 
logically valid argument or inference is characterised by the property that, 
if its premisses are true, then the conclusion derived from them must also 
be true. Inductive inferences, unlike deductive arguments, are not 
characterised by this property. As Chalmers (1978: 13) points out, it is 
"possible for the conclusion of an inductive argument to be false and for 
the premisses to be true and yet for no contradiction to be involved". 
(10) 
The fact that the sun has been observed to rise after every past day we 
have knowledge of does not logicall entail that the sun will always rise, 
or, for that matter, that it will rise tomorrow. In the same manner, the 
fact that all ravens that have been observed up till now proved to be black 
does not constitute a logical guarantee that all ravens are black or 
(12) 
even that the next raven we observe will be black 
Hume also observed that induction cannot be empirically justified, 
i. e. it cannot be justified by recourse to experience. An empirical 
justification of induction may take the following form: the principle of 
induction is justified because it has been observed to apply successfully 
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in a large number of cases in the past. This justification is presented 
in the following schematic form by Chalmers (1978: 14): 
The principle of induction worked successfully on occasion Xl, 
The principle of induction worked successfully on occasion x2.1- etc, 
The principle of induction always works. 
Clearly, the empirical justification of induction is an inductivist 
justification of induction, as it seeks to justify. induction inductively. 
In other words, by trying to justify induction by the very principles it 
seeks to Justify, the empirical justification of induction is an inductive 
and, therefore, a circular one. 
Attempts to supplement this type of justification by the principle 
of the 'uniformity of nature' do not overcome the above-mentioned problem. 
As Magee (1979: 20) points out, "there is no way in which Fthe principle 
of the 'uniformity of nature'] can be secured. It cannot be established 
by observation, since we cannot observe future events. And it cannot 
be established by logical argument, since from the fact that all past 
futures have resembled past pasts it does not follow that all future 
futures will resemble future pasts". 
(13) 
Furthermore, this principle of 
the 'uniformity of nature' cannot be justified by appeal to experience, as 
such a justification employs the very principle, i. e. the principle of 
induction, it seeks to supplement or support. 
Hume's realisation that induction can be neither logically nor 
empirically justified led him to the conclusion that "although there is no 
way of demonstrating the validity of inductive procedures, we are so 
constituted psychologically that we cannot help thinking in terms of them" 
(Magee 1979: 20). 
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In his book Conjectures and Refutations (1969) Popper devotes 
a fairly large section (pp. 42-46) to dealing with Hume's justification 
of induction. He convincingly argues that Hume's psychological 
Justification, according to which our confidence in induction is based 
on "custom" or "animal habit", leads to infinite regress and, therefore, 
must be rejected. Popper's criticism of Hume's psychological justification 
of induction, to be dealt with presently, is thus of a purely logical 
chara cter. This is a very important point as, due to the highly 
metaphysical nature of Hume's justification,, it is extremely difficult to 
find any conclusive empirical evidence to refute it. 
Popper's rebuttal of Hume's psychological Justification of 
induction falls into two main sections. In the first section, Popper 
reformulates Hume's justification in a more precise manner to make it 
more amenable to critical discussion. He points out that, generally 
speaking, Hume "tries to give a causal explanation of a psychological 
fact - the fact that we believe in laws, in statements asserting 
regularities or constantly conjoined kinds of events - by asserting that 
this fact is due Ii - e. constantly conjoined with 
I custom or habit" 
(1969: 42). Popper also reminds us that the terms "custom" or "habit", 
in their ordinary usage, and as used_ by Hume himself, do not "merely 
describe regular behaviour, but rather .... theorize about its 
origins (ascribed to frequent repition)" (ibid: 43). With this in mind, 
Popper reformulates Hume's psychological justification of induction in 
this manner: like other habits, our habit of believing in laws is 
the product of frequent repetition - of the repeated observation that things 
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of a certain kind are constantly conjoined with things of another kind" 
(ibid. ). 
The second component of Popper's rebuttal of Hume's 
justification of induction is an examination of the logical basis of this 
justification whose "central idea .... is that of repetition based upon 
similarit " (ibid: 44). The main idea put forward by Popper'is that for 
situations or events to be interpreted as repetitions of one another, we 
must be able to recognise them as being equivalent, or similar, in some 
(14) 
sense , and this, clearly, requires or implies a point of View "such. 
as a system of expectations, anticipations, assumptions or interests" 
(ibid: 44-45). From a logical point of view such a system must be 
prior to everything else and, therefore, cannot itself be "merely the 
result of repetition", since "even the first repetition-for-us must be 
based upon similarity-for-us, and therefore upon expectations - precisely 
the kind of thing [which the psychological Justification purports] to 
explain" (ibid: 45). This clearly shows that Hume's psychological , 
justification of induction leads to infinite regress and, therefore, cannot 
be legitimately regarded as'a valid justification of induction, 
(15) 
3.4. Naive Inductivism: A Critical Appraisal 
The preceding discussion shows that induction cannot be logically 
j ustif ied. It also shows that attempts to justify induction either 
empirically or on psychological grounds are fraught with problems of a 
logical nature. In the next few sections I shall deal with some other 
problems facing the naive inductivist philosophy of science. 
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3.4.1 Indeterminacy Of The Principle Of Induction 
The problem of the indeterminacy of the principle of induction 
concerns the status of this principle as a rule of scientific inference. 
This problem is dealt with by Harre' (1978) who believes that a virtually 
infinite number of "equally correct", but "mutually incompatible" universal 
statements can, in principle, be derived from a given set of singular 
statements, by the application of the principle of induction. This is 
especially the case In realistic scientific situations which are often 
characterised by a high degree of experimental and observational 
complexity. But, as Harre" (ibid: 44) explains, a "principle of inference 
is not good if, from the premisses E i. e. singular statements I offered, 
more than one mutually incompatible conclusion can be drawn". 
Attempts to overcome this problem lead some inductivists to 
supplement their 'logical armoury' with a "principle of simplicity", 
according to which the simplest universal statement of a set of competing 
statements, is selected. Harre" (ibid. ) argues that such a principle, 'or. 
rather its legitimacy within the inductivist framework, is "highly dubious". 
The mode of applying this principle in the conduct of scientific inquiry 
is not at all clear within the inductivist philosophy of science. Moreover, 
as Harre" explains, "the history of science shows that the laws of nature 
are always more complex than we originally thoU'ght", and, therefore, the 
principle of simplicity as a "'blanket principle can hardly be'accepted" 
(ibid: 45). He supports this view by giving a number of examples from 
the history of science, including the, example'of how our knowledge about 
the movements of the planets has evolved from the "simple hypothesis of 
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circles or orbits" to the "more complex 
[hypothesis 
of 
I 
curves of 
eliptical form" (ibid. ). 
3.4.2 The Requirement That A 'Large Number' Of Observations Be 
r"=v-v-f, c5, A nill. 
It has been mentioned in section 3.2 that one of the conditions 
which an inductivist generalisation must satisfy is that the number of 
singular statements which form Its basis must be a large one. it is, 
however, not clear how large this number should be. . How many 
instances of 'Ometals expanding when heatedP should one observe before 
one can legitimately, i. e. in terms of the inductive principle, infer the 
universal statement 6A11 metals expand when heatedy ?. Is one instance 
of a metal bar expanding when heated sufficient as a basis for inferring 
the'above -mentioned general principle? It is only a foolhardy 
inductivist who would answer this queition in the affirmative. But does 
this mean that more than one observation statement is always needed as 
a basis for the inferring of an inductive generalisation? Again, it is 
only a foolhardy inductivist who would answer this question in the 
affirmative. As Chaliners (1978: 15) points out, "it would tak ea very 
stubborn inductivist to put his hand in the fire many times before 
concluding that fire burns". Or, in a similar vein, it would take a. very 
stubborn or suicidal Japanese to insist that more than one Hiroshima-type 
incident Is needed to sandtion the conclusion that nuclear warfare can 
cause widespread death, large-scale destruction and immense human 
suffering. In his treatment of the point under discussion here, Chalmers 
(ibid. ) rightly concludes that "if the principle of induction is to be a- 
guide to what counts as a legitimate scientific inference, then the 
'large number' [condition contained in the principle of naive inductivism 
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mentioned above will need to be qualified in full". 
3.4.3 The Requirement That A 'Wide Variety' Of Conditions Be Observed 
The requirement that the observations which form the basis of 
an inductive generalisatibn be carried out and repeated under a 'wide 
variety' of conditions raises some problems in connection with the naive 
inductivist philosophy of science. As is the case with the previous 
requirement, the requirement that observations be carried out under a 
'wide variety' of conditions, as a pre-requisite for inductive 
generalisation, needs further clarification if it is to serve as a 
'meaningful' criterion in the inferring of universal statements. As it 
stands, this criterion is rather vague and, therefore, very difficult to apply, 
But any attempt to clarify and delimit this condition with respect 
to a given observational or experimental set up, must involve, in one 
form or another, the setting up, or specification, of criteria for isolating 
those features of the situation which are relevant for the set up in question, 
from those which are not. This is a crucial factor in the conduct of 
scientific inquiry, because without such a provision observation and 
experiment cannot be carried out in an economical, systematic and 
scientifically meaningful manner. 
It is generally agreed amongst scientists that the task of 
. 
isolating those features of the situation which are relevant for a given 
observational or experimental set up, from those which are not, is 
conducted by reference, no matter how implicit or unconscious, to our 
"theoretical knowledge of the situation" (Chalmers ibid: 15), i. e. to a 
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'point of view' or a 'theory', regardless of how embryonic that theory 
may be. But the naive inductivist cannot afford to admit, while still 
remaining consistent with his own assumptions and principles, that 
something in the nature of a theory plays a role in delimiting those 
features of the situation which are pertinent to a given observational or 
experimental set up, from those which are not, as it is precisely such a 
'theory' that he is trying to construct inductively in the first place. 
.. On the basis of what has been said above, it is clear that the 
clarification of the criterion of a 'wide variety' of conditions, which all 
inductive generalisations must satisfy, requires of the naive inductivist 
to admit that theory is logicall prior to observation and experiment. 
Without recognising this 'fact', the naive inductivist will not be able to 
explain, in a meaningful manner, how scientists, applying the principles 
of naive inductivism, and only those, proceed in their work with respect 
to the isolation of features which are relevant for a given experiment, or 
set of observations about a particular state of affairs, from those which 
are not. But, on the other hand, such an admission on the part of the 
naive inductivist, would be tantamount to philosophical suicide, since 
it, ultimately, results in the rejection of the very foundations upon which 
naive inductivism, and, for that matter, inductivism in general, is built, 
i. e. - the idea that scientific theories are constructed on purel inductivist 
grounds. 
3.4.4 The Naive Inductivist Idea That Science Starts With Observation 
One of the chief tenets of naive inductivism is the idea that 
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science starts with observation. This general feature of inductivism 
has been extensively dealt with in the lit6rature,, for"example Chalmers 
1978, Harre 1978, Hanson 1972,1975, O'Hear 1980 and Popper 1959, 
1969,1975. 
The point that 'theory' is logically prior to obser vation has been 
briefly discussed in the preceding section. According to Popper, "the 
belief that we can start with pure observation alone without anything in 
the nature of a theory is absurd' (1969: 46). He convincingly argues, 
with the help of some very interest I Ing examples, 
(16) 
that"observation 
"needs a chosen subject, a definite task, an interest, a ýoint'of view, 
a problem" (ibid. ). Hanson (1975) reaches more or less the same 
conclusion in his classic and Illuminating discussion of the role and 
nature of observation in scientific inquiry. He, for the sake of 
exemplification, concentrates on the sense of sight as a tool in 
scientific inquiry, and after a long and detailed discussion of this,. 
medium (pp. 4-30), he concludes that "seeing is a theory-laden 
undertaking", and that "observation of X is shaped by prior knowledge of 
X1, 
(17) (ibid: 19). A similar view has been expressed by Saussure at the 
beginning of this century. It is embodied in his famous, and often 
quoted, remark that "far from it being the object that antedates the 
viewpoint, it would seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object" 
(1974: 8). The idea that "there is more to seeing than meets the eyeball", 
and that "theory leads [observation and] experiment by the nose" (Hanson 
1972: 27) constitute a serious criticism of the naive inductLvist doctrine 
that science starts with observation, and observation alone. 
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Harre (1978) reaches more or less the same conclusion via a 
slightly different route. He argues that the inductivist claim that 
science starts with observation, without any recourse to a logically 
prior point of view, or to our theoretical knowledge of the universe of 
phenomena, results in an insoluble dilemma in this approach. , 
The 
source of this dilemma is the irreconcilability of the afore-mentioned 
inductivist doctrine with the universally accepted requirement that 
observation statements be public entities or objects which are inter- 
subjectively testable. This dilemma may be stated in theJollowing manner: 
(a) if, as inductivists claim, science starts with observation alone, 
then such objects cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as 
public, inter-subjectively testable entities, i. e. they are 
private ones; but 
(b) If observations are not public, inter-s 
I 
ýbjectively\testable 
entities, then they cannot be, of any value to scienýe. 
J# These two points are embodied in the'following quotation from Harre 
(1978: 43): 
"The only facts which seem to genuinely independent of 
any scientific theory are those of the present experience of 
touch, smell, hearing and sight that each individual 
scientist is currently experiencing. But such facts are not, 
of course, public facts, they are private to each individual. 
so we have the dilemma, that if facts are truly independent. 
of theory, they are private and do not form part of the public 
domain of knowledge, if they are public facts, they are 
affected by all sorts of influences from previous knowledge". 
But one cannot have one's cake and eat it. It is obvious from what has 
been said above that the inductivist cannot, because of reasons of 
consistency, hold the view that science starts with observation alone 
while, at one and the same time, subscribing to the vital requirement 
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that observations be public, inter-subjectively testable objects or 
entities. The only way we can envisage out of this dilemma is for the 
inductivist to reject the doctrine that science starts with observation, 
i. e. to accept the view that "for science ... there is no knowledge 
independent of theory" (ibid: 44). But such a position, if adopted by 
the inductivist, would be tantamount to accepting the view that induction, 
from a logical point of view, is a mere myth, a figment of the inductivist's 
imagination. 
A word of warning is necessary here, however. The above 
discussion of the role of observation in the inductivist approach is not 
to be construed as an argument for dismissing it as a spurious, or 
unnecessary, element in the conduct of scientific inquiry. Observation, 
and experiment, are vital elements in science, but their real importance, 
and primary role, is not to serve as the starting-points for constructing 
scientific theories, and for gaining knowledge about the universe of 
phenomena. It is, as Popper (1959,1969,1975) convincingly argues, 
to serve as factors in the scientist's attempt to test his theories by 
confronting them with the data they purport to account for. 
3.4.5 The Naive Inductivist Idea That Observation Functions As The 
Secure Basis For Science 
According to naive inductivism, observation, i. e. knowledge 
gained by observation, forms the secure basis from which all reliable 
scientific knowledge can be derived by the application of the principle 
of induction. Naive inductivtgs also believe that "in order to establish 
the truth of some problematic -observation statements we appeal to more 
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secure observation statements, and perhaps laws derived from them, 
but not to theory" (Chalmers 1978: 29). 
The above-mentioned tenets of naive inductivism cannot be 
seriously entertained. As has been pointed out above, observation 
always implies something in the nature of a theory, and, since it is 
generally agreed that theories are fallible, it readily follows that 
observations are, in principl6, as fallible as the th eories they logically, 
albeit implicitly, presuppose. The inductivist doctrine that there are 
'brute facts' which nothing, including a change or shift in theoretical 
context, can alter is an inductivist fiction. As Harreo' (1978: 43) points 
out: "Change in theory can turn seeming facts into falsehoods". . 
The 
import of this claim is so well-documented in the history of science that 
it would be hard to imagine how the above naive inductivist doctrine 
could be immune from it. 
Equally untenable, for very much the same reasons, is the second 
doctrine mentioned above, i. e. the doctrine according to which the truth 
of problematic observation statements can be established by reference to 
more secure observation statements. To this it might be added, that the 
second doctrine, as it stands, leads, in principle, to infinite regress, 
since the naive inductivist must constantly and never-endingly search 
deeper and deeper, as it were, for some 'more secure basis for. his 
observation. 
Similarly, the naive inductivist view that the progress of science 
consists of a continuous process of piling up more and more secure facts 
is also untenable. On the one hand, the very notion of a 'secure fact' 
is, as we have indicated above, a highly dubious one, to say the least. 
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. -Z I-I On the other hand, this view of the progress of science is historically 
anomalous. The history of the development of science teaches us that- 
the "growth of science is a leap-frog process of fact accumulation and 
theoretical advances" (ibid. ). Our observations and theories are 
tentative in nature, and permanently so. There is, contrary to what 
the naive inductivists claim, nothing secure about them. 
3.4.6 Naive Inductivism: A Final Remark 
The trouble with naive inductivism is that it is too naive. The 
previous discussion amply demonstrates that naive inductivism is a 
bankrupt and untenable philosophy of science which cannot be seriously 
entertained, either as a descriptive, or as a prescriptive, view of 
science by seriously minded scientists and philosophers of science. 
And yet, as we have seen above (section 3.2), some linguists appear to 
more than tacitly assume it. 
Among the majority of philosophers of an inductivist cast of mind, 
naive inductivism has given way to 'more sophisticated' forms of 
induction. This is also true of attempts to search for a justification of 
induction. These two points will be briefly dealt with in the next few 
sections. Suffice it to say here that, 'sophisticated' forms of 
inductivism retain at least two of the main features of their predecessor, 
namely the role assigned to observations in the process of constructing 
scientific theories and, laws, and the, albeit tacit, belief in the principle 
of the 'uniformity of nature', i. e. the principle that "things outside the 
spatio-temporal region which we have observed continue to behave within 
that region" (Swinburne 1974: 8). 
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3.5 Inductivism And Probability (1) 
According to this version of inductivism, inductive 
general isations, in their capacity of being universal statements derived 
from a finite set of observation statements, cannot be guaranteed to be 
true, but they are only probabl true. For example, in the light of all 
the evidence available to us all up till now, it is very probable that the 
sun will continue to rise in St. Andrews, and it is also probable, on the 
basis of evidence available to us up till now, that every time a student 
jumps from the top of St. Regulus Tower in St. Andrews Cathedral, he 
(or she) will fall downwards, rather than upwards, so to speak. 
Proponents of this type of inductivism claim that scientific knowledge 
does not. represent certain or true knowledge, but knowledge which is at 
best only probably true. 
One of the main doctrines of this type of inductivism is that the 
probability of inductive generalisations being true increases with the 
increase in both the number of observations they are based upon and the 
variety of conditions under which those observations are carried out. 
Chýilmers expresses this feature of this type of incluctivism in this manner: 
"The greater the number of bbs ervations 'forming the basis of an induction 
and the greater the variety of conditions under which these observations 
are made, the greater the probability that the resulting generalisations 
are true" (1978: 16). 
Obviously, the principle of induction which has been stated in 
section 3.2 stands in some need of revision to accord with the above 
remarks. This is how Chalmers (ibid. ) states the principle of induction 
within this type qf inductivism: 
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"If a large number of A's have been observed under 
a wide variety of conditions, and if all these observed 
A's without exception have possessed the property B, 
then all A's probably possess the property B". 
Like its predecessor, the above principle of induction has the status of 
a rule of inference, it sa'nctions the derivation of universal statements 
0 n the basis of a finite set of singular, observation statements. The 
crucial and fundamental difference between these two principles of 
Induction Is that, whereas the naive inductivist principle of induction 
attributes certainty to inductive generalisation established in accordance 
with it, the present principle of induction attributes probability only to 
such generalisations. The move from certainty to probability, clearly, 
marks a weakening of the basis of induction to overcome some of the 
difficulties which faced naive inductivism. 
3.5.1 Inductivism And Probability (1) A Critical Appraisal 
The claim, in this type of inductivism, that the probability of an 
inductive generalisation being true increases with the increase in the 
number of observation statements which constitute its evidential base, 
is, itself, an inductive generalisation. This implies that, as an 
inductive generalisation, this claim must, itself, be first justified 
before it can be legitimately considered as a tenet of the type of 
inductivism we are dealing with here. But since, as has been explained 
in section 3.3, neither logic, nor recourse to experience or reliance on 
psychological factors, can provide us with the legitimate and proper 
foundations for arriving at an acceptable Justification of a claim of the 
type we are considering now, we must conclude that the claim embodied 
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in the first sentence of this paragraph cannot be seriously entertained 
as a tenet of the present type of inductivism. The above claim will be 
further dealt with later in this section. 
i 
The present type of inductivism also retains some of the 
problematic features of naive inductivism. The requirement that the 
number of observation statements which form the evidential base of an 
inductive generalisation be a Iarge one is as vague in the present type 
of inductivism as it is in its predecessor (section 3ý 4.2). This is also 
true of the requirement, called for in the present type of inductivism, 
that observations must be carried out under a wide variety of conditions 
(section 3.4.3). Similarly, the role assigned to observation as the 
starting point of science and scientific knowledge is as untenable in 
the present type of inductivism as It is in naive inductivism (section 3.4.4). 
However, perhaps the most crucial criticism of the present type 
of inductivism centres around the notion of probability. In his book 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Popper argues that, on any 
standard probability theory, the probability of an inductive generalisation 
being true is always zero, no matter how large its evidential base may be. 
As a universal statement, an inductive generalisation implies an infinite 
number of singular statements which refer to situations, or states of 
affair, of a particular type, while its evidential base is, by definition, 
f inite. Now, the probability of an inductive generalisation being true, 
according to standard probability theory, is the result of dividing-a 
finite number - the number of the observational statements of the 
evidential base - by an infinite one - the number of singular statements 
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implied by such a generalisation - which is, and will always be, zero 
This shows, from a different angle, that the idea of the probability of 
an inductive generalisation being true can be increased by enlarging 
its evidential base is untenable, if not, actually, false. 
It might be argued, however, that the above objection is not 
completely true, as, it may be claimed, there are situations in science 
where the probability of an inductive generalisation being true can be 
demonstrated to be not zero, but one. Such situations, the argument 
will go, occur in cases where an Inductive generalisation concerns a 
large, but finite, set of objects of a particular type, wherein it is, 
both in principle and in practice, possible to observe every single 
object before launching the inductive generalisation concerned. 
There is disagreement amongst inductivists, as to whether or 
not such generalisations can be regarded as inductive generalisations 
proper. Some inductivists, for example Swinburne (1974), refuse to 
confer on such generalisations the status of 'inductive generalisations'. 
Swinburne believes that an inductive generalisation must be capable of 
referring to an infinite set of possible situations or objects of a particular 
type, and, therefore, its probability of being true cannot, in principle, 
be shown to be one. This view is shared by Quinton (1980) who believes 
that inductive generalisations whose probability of being true can be 
shown to be one are "no more than summariesEemphasis ours I of 
particular pieces of informati. on" (ibid: 57). The position of this group 
of inductivists, who are represented by Swinburne, on the issue being 
discussed here, is, in my opinion, a plausible and reasonable one. 
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To this we may add that, it is highly incongruous, to talk about 
the probability of generalisations of the above type being true, as, in 
principle, such generalisations cannot be said to be more likely to be 
true than they potentially are. In other words, 'probability of truth' in 
the context of generalisations of this type is, it does seem, no more than 
a terminological substitute for certainty. 
3.6 Inauctivism And Probability (II) 
According to this version of inductivism, the inductivist does 
not concern himself with the probability of an inductive generalisation 
being true, but he concentrates on the probability of, what might be 
called, individual predictions, that are Inductively arrived at, being 
true. For example, an inductivist of this persuasion concerns himself 
with the probability of the individual prediction 'a given metal bar, at a 
given time 
_t, 
will expand if heated' being true, rather'týan with the 
probability of the prediction 'a given metal bar will always expand if 
heated' being true, or, similarly, with the probability of the inductive 
generalisation 'All metals expand if heated' being true. 
3.6.1 Inductivism And Probability (II): A Critical Appraisal 
Many scientists and philosophers of science would not accept 
the main thesis of this version of inductivism as an appropriate 
characterisation, or statement, of the aim of science. Science is 
essentially and characteristically interested in the setting up of 
scientific laws and theoretical systems for the purpose of explaining the 
universe of phenomena. The interest shown by scientists in individual 
predictions, in their fields of study, is really relevant'only when seen 
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within the much deeper and wider-context of theory construction and 
testing. Therefore, if science were to operate within the limits set 
by the present version of inductivism, a lot of what is generally 
considered to be scientific about science would turn out to be of no 
relevance at all. There is no doubt that if the present version of 
inductivism were to be accepted as a 'manifesto', so to speak, of the 
aim of science, science would be deprived of much of its powers and 
significance, for example its explanatory function. 
Yet, it is not difficult to establish why some inductivists are 
quite prepared to weaken inductivism to the extent proposed in the present 
version of Inductivism. It has been argued in section 3. S. 1 that, on 
any standard probability theory, the probability of an inductivist 
generalisation being true is always zero. The full force of this argument 
is recognised, albeit implicitly, by the proponents of the present type of 
inductivism, and their attempt to weaken inductivism in the manner 
described above is designed to overcome the problem mentioned above. 
In other words, by dealing only with individual predictions, the 
proponents of this type of inductivism believe that they can ascribe 
non-zero probabilities to them, and, therefore, avoid the criticism 
levelled against the previous type of inductivism. 
The claim that non-zero probabilities can be ascribed to 
individual predictions is dealt with, and rejected, by Chalmers (1978). 
He argues that because individual predictions imply theoretical systems 
or universal statements, which refer to infinite sets of possible , 
situations or states of affair, "the probabilities'of the correctness of 
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individual predictions .... threaten to be zero on all standard 
probability theories" (ibid: 18). Clearly, the present type of inductivism 
fares no better than the previous one. 
3.7 Inductivism And Probability (III 
This version of inductivism is given by Swinburne in his 
introduction to a volume entitled, The justification of Induction (1974), 
of which he'is the editor. Swinburne (ibid: 2) defines an inductive 
argument as "an argument which is not deductively valid but one in which 
the premisses make it reasonable for us to accept the conclusion". 
An argument is said to be a valid deductive argument if the 
premisses of such an argument necessarily imply the conclusion, or, 
alternatively, if the conclusion is logically entailed by the premisses, 
such that it would be self-contradictory to assert the- premis: 3es while 
denying the conclusion. * In the following example of a valid deductive 
argument, the conclusion is logically entailed by the premisses, such 
that it would be self-contradictory to assert the premisses while denying 
the conclusion: 
Premisses: If John is not in St. Andrews, he is In London. 
John is not in St. Andrews,. 
Conclusion: John is in London. 
Inductive arguments do not possess this property, i. e. it is not self- 
contradictory to assert the premisses of an inductive argument while at 
the same time denying its conclusions., In the-following example of an 
inductive argument (Swinburne 1974: 6), the conclusion cannot be said 
to be logically entailed by the premisses and, therefore, no self- 
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contradiction would take place if the premisses are asserted but the 
Qonclusion is denied: 
Premiss I: Jane lives in Soho Street., 
Premiss II Ninety per cent of the inhabitants of Soho Street 
are Catholics. 
Conclusion: Jane is a Catholic. -. 
Swinburne points out that one of the defects of inductivism is 
its lack of a pair of-terms similar, with respect to their function, to the 
terms 'valid' and 'invalid' which we need for assessing the logical truth 
of Inferences in the deductive* approach., To remedy this defect, 
Swinburne proposes to use the terms 'correct' and 'incorrect' to assess 
inductive inferences or arguments. On the basis of this; a' correct 
inductive argument is an argument in which the premisses "do 'make, it 
reasonable' for us to accept the conclusion", and an incorrect inductive 
argument is one in which the premisses "do not 
E 'make it reasonable for 
us to accept the conclusion' but it is falsely claimed that they do" 
(ib id. The premisses of a correct inductive argument "do 'make it 
reasonable' for us to accept the conclusion" in the sense that, they 
constitute an evidential base favouring the likelihood of the conclusion 
being 'true'. 
In the above inductive argument the premisses constitute an 
evidential base which favours the likelihood of the conclusion being 
1,1 11-I true, i. e. they do "make it reasonable" -for us to accept the -conclusion. 
This argument may, therefore, be considered as a correct inductive 
argument. In contra -distinction, the premisses of the following 
argument do not "make it reasonable" for us to accept the likelihood of 
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the conclusion being true, and, therefore, this argument cannot be 
regarded as correct inductive argument: 
Premiss I: Jane lives In Soho Street. 
Premiss II : Ten per cent of the inhabitants of Soho Street 
are Catholics. 
Conclusion: Jane is a Catholic. 
'Probable' in this version of inductivism has a different meaning 
from the meaning attached to it, albeit implicitly, in the preceding two 
versions of inductivism. 'Probable' here means "more probable than", 
with the result that a correct inductive argument is an argument whose 
premisses do "make it more reasonable for us to accept its conclusion 
in preference to the conclusion of an 'equally detailed rival' argument" 
(ibid: 5). The two rival inductive arguments given above are equally 
detailed, but the premisses of the first one 'do make it. more reasonable' 
for us to accept its conclusion in preference to the conclusion of the 
second one. Obviously, comparisons of this nature break down when 
the arguments concerned are not 'equally detailed'. The first inductive 
argument, for example, cannot be said to be as equally detailed as the 
following one, and, therefore, the above interpretation of 'probable' 
cannot be said to apply: 
Premiss I: Jane lives in Soho Street. 
Premiss II: Twenty per cent of the inhabitants of Soho Street. 
are Catholics. 
Premiss III: Ninety per cent of the female inhabitants of Soho 
Street are Catholics. 
Conclusion: Jane is a Catholic. 
According to this interpretation of probability, 'probability' in 
the present version of inductivism is a relation between statements as 
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conclusions of "equally detailed" inductive inferences, without either 
being necessarily causal or statistical, or necessarily conforming to 
the "mathematical axioms- of'probability" (ibid: 6)o Swinburne calls 
this interpretation of probability the epistemic interpretation, 
3.7.1 Assessing The Correctness Of Inductive Arguments 
Now, if a correct inductive argument is an argument whose 
conclusion is "more probable than" the conclusion of an "equally 
detailed" rival argument, and if probability is not to be understood in 
its traditional sense, what, then, are the criteria for assessing the 
correctness of inductive arguments? 
In dealing with this'point, Swinburne (1974: 7) states that it is 
a "difficult matter to state the precise criteria for judging 
I the 
corre ctne ssI of inductive arguments" (ibid: 7)9 Nevertheless, he is 
of the opinion that, as rational human beings, we generally agree "when 
an inductive argument is'correct" and "when evidence makes a 
conclusion probable or more probable than some rival" (ibid. ). He 
writes (p. 8): 
"One difficulty is that man's judgements for what makes 
what probable or more probable than something else do to 
small extent vary. But the extent is a very small one, and 
by and large men agree about what makes what probable-or 
more probable than something else. They agree, that is, 
on the criteria which they use for assessing inductive 
arguments. 
But if, as Swinburne explicitly claims, men do often agree "on 
the criteria which they use for assessing ý inductive arguments", then, 
the lack of any specification of these criteria on Swinburne's part, is 
all the more inexcusable. Swinburne seems to be appealing to the 
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'intuitions', or 'common-sense' of men, as criteria for assessing the 
correctness of inductive arguments. But 'intuitions' and 'common-sense$ 
are of a notoriously fickle nature; they vary, sometimes quite radically, 
from one individual to another, and from one culture to another. 
Moreover, by appealing to 'intuitions' and 'com-mon-sensel as 
the only considerations for assessing the correctness of inductive 
arguments, Swinburne effectively gives some kind of 'psychological' 
justification of induction. 
3.8 The justification Of Induction Continued 
In section 3.3 the conclusion has been reached that inductivism 
cannot be Justified either by appeal to logic, or by recourse to experience, 
or on psychological grounds. This state of affairs is recognised by what 
might be called 'modern' inductivist philosophers of science. However, 
such inductivists persist in maintaining the belief that induction can be 
Justified in one form or another. The aim of this section is to examine 
very briefly the three most influential attempts to justify induction, that 
are advanced by members of this group. These attempts are: 1) the 
metaphysical justificati on, 2) the pragmatic justification, and 3) the 
analytic justification, which Madden (1960: 288) calls "the dismissal 
or dissolution of the problem [of the justification of induction] as*itself 
unrealistic". 
3.8.1 The Metaphysical justification Of Induction 
The proponents of the metaphysical Justification of induction 
believe that, by supplementing the inductive principle by the principle of 
I 
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the uniformity of nature, the conclusion of an inductive argument can 
be claimed to follow logically from its premisses. In other words, the 
proponents of the metaphysical justification of induction seem to believe 
that, if the principle 'nature is uniform' is added to the inductivist 
philosophy of science, then induction can be said to be capable of 
being logically justified, in the deductivist sense of the term 'logical'. 
Thus, from the evidence that all metals, have been observed to expand 
when heated in the past, plus the principle of the uniformity of nature, 
the conclusion that All metals expand if heated can be said, according 
to the proponents of the metaphysical justification, to follow logically. 
The principle of the uniformity of nature asserts that if two or 
more events or states of affair have always been observed to correlate 
with each other in the past, then the same events or states of affair 
will continue to behave in the same manner in the future, regardless of 
their locations in space and time. According to the'proponents of the 
metaphysical Justification, the principle of the uniformity of nature is 
neither logically derived from any antecedent set of premisses, nor is 
it inductively inferred from any set of observational statements. In 
other words, it is believed to be a self-evident truth which requires no 
logical demonstration or empirical Justification. As a synthetic a- prior 
statement, it must be assumed if induction is to be made to rest on 
reasonable or rational foundations. Madden (1960: 288) calls it a 
metaphysical assumption because it "purports to state a factual feature 
of our universe and yet is not empirically or experimentially verifiable". 
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3.8.1.1 The Metaphysical justification: A Critical Appraisal 
That 'uniformity of nature' , as an additional principle'of 
induction, cannot provide a viable basis for discriminating between 
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' inductive inferences may be shown by the 
following example. If, for instance, by investigating a large number of 
reasonably large samples of St. Andrews University students for a given 
academic year, we discover that the male to female student ratio has 
consistently turned out to'be 50: 50, then, assuming the principle'of the 
uniformity of nature, we would be justified in extrapolating this ratio to 
the entire student population of St. Andrews University for the year in 
question. If, however, in carrying out more comprehensive and 
detailed investigations, we discover that the ratio of male to female 
students for the same year is actually 40: 60, then, assuming the 
principle of the uniformity of nature, we are justified in extrapolating 
this ratio to the entire student population of St. Andrews University for 
that year. 
But, of course, what we want to establish is the latter conclusion 
only, and not the former one. Clearly, the principle of the uniformity of 
nature cannot provide a viable basis for discriminating between 'legal' 
and 'illegal', or 'correct' and 'incorrect', inductive inferences, but 
actually sanctions both types of inference equally strongly. In other 
words, the principle of the uniformity of nature appears to sanction or 
Justify 'caprice', as much as it does 'uniformity' (c. f. section 3.4.1). 
Moreover, the view that the principle of the uniformity of nature 
must be accepted in advance, in order to make induction rest on reasonable 
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and rational foundations, is an indefensible one. First, as Madden 
(1960) points out, perhaps induction is not reasonable. Secondly, this 
view begs the ý question. We are told that the principle of the uniformity 
of nature must be accepted in advance in order to render induction 
justifiable. But, as the reason for accepting this principle, we are 
asked to accept, albeit implicitly, that induction is a 'legitimate' 
approach of scientific inquiry, i. e. an approach which is worth justifying. 
The above claim appears to be circular, and, therefore, it must be 
rej e cted. 
Finally, despite all disclaimers to the contrary, the principle of 
the uniformity of nature appears to be no more than an empirical 
assumption or inductive inference. The metaphysical justification of 
induction thus appears to be no more than an empirical justification of 
induction in disguise;. it, therefore, is open to the same criticisms as 
those applicable to this type of Justification (see section 3.3). 
3.8.2 The Pragmatic justification Of Induction 
Though the first exposition of the pragmatic justification of 
induction is, to the best of my knowledge, given by the philosopher 
Charles S. Peirce; this type of justification of induction is, however, 
mainly associated with the name of the philosopher Reichenbach and, in 
more recent years, the philosopher Wesley C. Salmon 
(19) 
. The pragmatic 
justification of induction is, sometimes, alternatively called the 
"practicalist justification" (Swinburne 1974, Lenz 1974) and the "practical 
vindication" in order to "contrast it with the logical justifications that 
try to show that induction is a sufficient condition for knowledge of the 
future" (Madden 1960: 289). 
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As their starting point, the proponents of the pragmatic 
Justification assert that Hume's problem of the justification of. induction 
is a genuine philosophical problem, which merits careful study by the 
philosopher. In other words, they believe that, contrary to what -some 
inductivists believe, the problem of the justification of induction Is not 
a pseudo- or linguistic solution. They share with Hume the belief that 
induction cannot be justified either on logical, or on empirical, grounds, 
but they reject his psychological solution for the problem of induction, 
since, according to this solution, the inductivist will have to accept the 
undesirable conclusion that science rests on "animal faith" or "habit"* 
I shall, in what follows, concentrate on Reichenbach's pragmatic 
justification of induction, as this justification is explained in Lenz (1960). 
Reichenbach does not aim to offer a blanket justification of 
induction as a whole; rather, he concentrates on the task of providing 
a justification for a special and specific rule, or principle, of induction, 
which he calls the "straight rule". This rule is formulated in the 
following fashion in Lenz (1960: 299): 
"If in adinitial segment of a series of events the 
relative frequency with which A's have been B's in m/n 
(where n is the number of A's and m is the number of A's 
that are B's)., predict that In the long run, that is, as 
the number of A's gets larger and larger, the relative 
frequency will at some point continue to be approximateli 
m/nol, 
Reichenbach's Justification of his "straight rule" is based on two 
assumptions. Lenz (ibid: 301) states the first assumption in this 
fashion: "if, as the number of A's gets larger and larger, there is some 
point after which the relative frequency with which A's are B's remains 
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fairly constant, then the repeated use of 
[the straight rule]will lead 
to co, . rrect predictions of the relative frequency". As can be seen, this 
assumption is stated in a hypothetical form, asserting that only if 
success if possible, will the repeated use of the straight rule yield the 
correct prediction, i. e. the correct relative frequency with which A's 
are B's. It is, however, not at all possible to know the exact limit at 
which the repeated use of the "straight rule" will lead to successful 
predictions if success is possible. In spite of-this factor, the "straight 
rule" is said to be justified because it is self- corrective, in the sense 
that its repeated application will eventually lead to successful 
predictions if success is possible. 
Secondly, the "straight rule", as a means of predicting the 
future, is said to be justified because It is superior to alý other methods 
which purport to achieve this aim. On the one hand, the "eventual 
success of the repeated use of the E straight rule I is said to be a 
necessary condition of any successful prediction" (ibid. ). This is 
taken to mean that other methods of predicting the future are evaluated 
in terms of whether- or not their predictions agree with the predictions 
established by the repeated application of the straight rule. In other 
words, the eventual success of the repeated use of the 'straight rule' 
constitutes the yard-stick -by which the predictions established by other 
methods of inquiry are judged. On the other hand, it is claimed that 
"only the [straight rule method I can be known in advance, and without 
any prior inductive inference, to lead to success if success is possible" 
(ibid. ). This point will be dealt with in the next. section. 
46 
3.8.2.1 The Pragmatic jast ification: A Critical Appraisal 
According to Madden (1960), - the pragmatic justification of ý 
induction can hardly be said to constitute an advancement over Hume's 
attempt to offer a solution, to what has recently come to be known as, 
the riddle of induction. - The view that the repeated application of the 
Istraight rule' is a necessary ýcondition for reliable knowledge of the 
future'is merely asserted, and not demonstrated, ý Without such a 
demonstration, the above claim by the pragmatists cannot be accepted, 
or, even, taken seriously. 
Madden concentrates on the view, accepted by the proponents 
of the pragmatic justification, that clairvoyance, prevision, soothsaying, 
intuition, etc. are logically possible non-inductive methods for 
'predicting' the future. But such, methods are felt not to be successful 
over a long period of time, and their lack of success in predicting the 
future accurately is thought by the pragmatists to constitute "good 
inductive evidence" for rejecting them as reliable methods of scientific 
inquiry. Madden argues that, by the same token, one can say that the 
success of the repeated use-of the straight rule in successfully predicting 
the future, constitutes, "good inductive evidence" for accepting the 
straight rule as a rule whos, e repeated use can lead to predicting the 
future successfully. In other words, Madden argues that the pragmatists, 
effectively, offer an inductivist justification of their brand of inductivism, 
something which leads-to circularity and is strongly rejected by the 
pragmatists, precisely because it results in circularity. 
According to Lenz (1960,1974), Reichenbach's claim that, if 
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I success is possible in predicting the relative frequency of future events, 
I 
then the repeated use of the 'straight rule' will eventually achieve it, is 
undermined by the fact that there is no way, within the 'straight rule' 
method, of specifying the number of tries which are needed to predict 
the correct relative frequency of future events, even if that frequency 
were io be found in a finite set of tries. The fact that the pragmatists 
admit this point does not, in my view, alter its significance as a 
criticism of their approach. Lenz also argues that even if it was the 
I 
case that the repeated use of the straight rule will certainly lead to 
success, that success may be achieved too late "for every member of 
the human race" (1960: 302). - 
The pragmatic justification of induction is defective in yet 
another way. By completely Ignoring short-run relative frequencies, 
and by, instead, exclusively concentrating on long-run relative 
frequencies, the proponents of the pragmatic justification- of induction 
neglect one of the chief objectives of science. It is generally agreed 
that science is not entirely "content to predict long-run relative 
frequencies of events", but that it, characteristically, also "strives to 
predict the relative frequency of events in the short run" (Lenz 1974: 101). 
This point may be illustrated by the following example from Lenz (1960: 302): 
"An insurance company does not care to know the long run relativý 
frequency with which American males of age 32 die before reaching 60. 
They are, after all, concerned with the next 50 years or so". 
Moreover, even if it was the case that the pragmatists could 
provide some method or procedure for recovering short run relative 
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frequencies from long-run relative ones, the pragmatic justification 
would still be open for the criticism'ihat it does not, and cannot, offer 
any guarantee that such short run relative frequencies are correct, or 
even probably correct. 
The proponents of the pragmatic justification of induction admit 
I 
that not only the 'straight rule', but also an infinite number of possible 
inductive rules, will lead to success in predicting future events, if - 
success is possible. They also admit that there are no criteria for 
choosing between such rules, the 'straight rule' included. Because the 
predictions established on the basis of such rules will "vary tremendously", 
and due to the inherent lack of any criteria for discriminating between- 
rival inductive rules, the predictions made in science "will accordingly 
be almost entirely arbitrary", on the pragmatist account of science 
(Lenz 1974: 99). 
Lenz (1960) argues that the pragmatic justification of induction 
reduces to a "bare tautology". He points out that the core of the 
pragmatic justification is the idea that "there is a limit of the relative 
frequency In an infinite series" (p. 303). The pragmatists try to justify 
this idea by pointing out that "it is true if there is a limit" (ibid. ). This, 
clearly, "reduces'to the hare tautological truth that if there is a limit, 
there Is a limit" (ibid. ). This is one of the most telling criticisms of 
the pragmatic justification of induction. 
Finally, for the 'straight rule' to be properly called self -corrective, 
we must know in advance of the repeated application of this rule, what 
the correct relative frequencies of events are, so that we can properly 
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establish whether or not the repeated application of the rule concerned 
brings us, with every try, closer to the correct relative frequencies of 
which we have prior knowledge. But since relative frequencies are 
not available to us prior to the successful prediction of such -frequencies 
by the repeated application of the 'straight rule', the' claim that the 
straight rule is self corrective is only a posteriori valid. In other words, 
the view that the straight-rule is self-corrective is, so to speak, wisdom 
established only with the aid of hindsight. It looks like an inductive 
generalisation established on the basis of observations of the repeated 
applications of the "straight rule". On the basis of this, we may conclude 
I 
that the pragmatic justification of induction is partly inductive in nature; 
it, therefore, is open for criticism on grounds of infinite regress (see 
section 3.3). 
3.8.3 The Analytic justification Of Induction 
The proponents of the analytic Justification of induction, referred 
to as "common-sense" or "ordinary language" philosophers by Madden - 
(1968: 291), hold that the "traditional problem of induction is a pseudo- 
problem, resulting from conceptual confusion, a puzzle to be dissolved, 
not a problem to be solved in its own terms" (Barker 1974: 57). The 
proponents of this justification attempt to resolve the problem of induction 
by trying to show that the critic's doubts about this approach are "either . 
self-contradictory, mistaken, or vacuous" (Madden 1968: 291). 
There are different versions of the analytic justification of 
induction in the literature (Barker 1974, Edwards 1974, ' Kyburg 1974, 
Strawson 1960 and Swinburne 1974). In'the following two sections I 
so 
shall give a brief outline of the analytic justification, as this 
fustification is explained by, first, Edwards . (1974) and, second, 
Strawson (1960). These two versions are, to the bestof my knowledge, 
the most fully-fledged statements of the analytic justification in the 
literature. 
3.8.3.1 Edwards' Analytic justification Of Induction 
Russell (1974) expresses two main doubts about induction. He 
asserts that without appealing to a non-empirical principle in 
Justifying induction, the inductivist has no reason to suppose: a) that 
laws of science which have been observed to hold in the past will 
continue to hold in the future, and b) that there exists a given number 
of observed instances of a particular law being fulfilled in the past 
which constitute sufficient evidence that the law in question will 
continue to be fulfilled An the future. Edwards formulates his version 
of the analytic justification by considering Russell's two doubts about 
induction, with a view to demonstrating that "without in any way calling 
upon a non-empirical principle for assistance, we often have a reason 
for supposing that a generalisation will be confirmed in the future as it 
has been confirmed in the past, [and I---- that numbers 'of cases of 
a law being fulfilled in the past' do often afford evidence that it will be 
fulfilled in the future" (1974: 29). This demonstration, basically, takes 
the form of examining what people in ordinary life, and scientists in 
science, normally mean by the term 'reason' when they employ it in such 
statements as 'X having a reason to suppose that V, with a view to 
showing that Russell, and other philosophers, are guilty of ignoratio 
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elenchi by redefinition 
(20) 
in their employment of the term 'reason' 
when they criticise induction. 
Edwards argues that what people and scientists ordinarily mean 
when they claim that they have reason for asserting an inductive 
conclusion or prediction is, roughly speaking, that "the past 
observations of [a particular] phenomenon or of analogical phenomena 
are of a certain kind: they are exclusively or predominantly positive, 
the number of the positive observations is. at least fairly large, and they 
come from extensively varied sets of circumstances" (ibid: 38). He 
gives a few examples to explain and support this View, the following 
being one of them. In predicting that a man who jumps from a window 
on the fiftieth floor of the Empire State Building will land on the ground 
rather than move upwards in the direction of the sky, or permanently 
float in a flat plane, the ordinary man, or the scientist, does not appeal 
to any non-empirical principle. He would point out that he has good 
reason to believe that the man's body will fall downwards, rather than 
falling 'upwards' or 'horizontally'. His good reason "consists in the 
fact that whenever in the past a human being jumped out of a window of 
the Empire State Building his body moved in a downward direction; that 
whenever any human being anywhere jumped out of a house he moved in 
the direction of the ground; that, more generally, whenever a human 
body jumped or was thrown off an elevated locality in the neighbourhood 
of the earth, it moved downwards and not either upwards or at an angle 
of 180 0* that the only objects which have been observed to be capable 
of moving upwards by themselves possess certain characteristics which 
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human beings lack; and finally E it consists in all the other observed 
confirmations of the theory of gravitation" (ibid: 27-28). While the 
term 'reason' is sometimes used in the sense of "deductively conclusive 
reason", it is not, or hardly ever, used in this sense in ordinary, normal 
discourse. 
But, according-to Edwards, Russell and other critics of induction 
do not use the term 'good reason, when they criticise induction, in its 
normal sense in ordinary discourse. What they mean by the expression 
"reason for an inductive genera lisation" is logically conclusive, reason, 
and what they mean by evidence is logically conclusive. evidence. 
Therefore, Russell's "assertion that the premisses of an inductive 
argument do not by themselves constitute a logically conclusive. reason 
for an inductive conclusion in no way contradicts the common sense 
assertions that they frequently constitute a reason in the ordinary sens 
of the word" (ibid: 37). 
S 
Edward argues that by using the term 'reason' in the sense of 
"logically conclusive reason", and not in its normal, ordinary sense, 
Russell, and other critics of induction who follow his example, are 
guilty of 
_ignoratio 
elencht by redefinition. They are also guilty of trying 
to impose an alien framework on induction, i. e. of judging induction 
deductively instead of treating it in its own terms. Induction cannot be 
criticised for not being deduction, in the same manner that a cat which 
. 
gets a zero mark in a dog show cannot reasonably be blamed for its poor 
performance - and is none the worse for it. Edwards points out that, 
by trying to assess induction deductively, Russell's first doubt about 
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induction is "no more sensible or interesting than the 'doubt' whether 
we shall ever see something invisible or find an object which is a 
father and also a female or an object which is a man but not a* human 
being" (ibid: 38). In other words, Russell's first doubt about the 
Ireasonableness' of induction stems from a conceptual confusion. 
Edwards employs more or less the same strategy in his attempt 
to counter Russell's second doubt about induction. He argues that, 
from a common-sense point of view, it is the case that the greater the 
number of a particular law being fulfilled in the past is, the stronger 
the reason to suppose that the law concerned will continue to be 
fulfilled in the future. He also argues that despite our inability to 
draw a rigid line between what constitutes a sufficient set of positive, 
confirmatory instances of a given law, and what does not, it does not 
follow, from a common-sense point of view, that no number whatsoever 
of putative instances constitutes a sufficient set. He illustrates this 
point by the following example: "Although we cannot point to a number 
which divides bald people from people who are not bald, we can without 
any hesitation say that a man without a single hair on his head is bald 
while one with a million hairs on his head is not bald" (ibid: 41). 
Edwards concludes that by using the term good evidence, in its logical 
sense, in his second doubt about induction, Russell, and other, critics 
of induction, are, again, guilty of ignoratio elenchi by redefinition, i. e. 
for not using the above-mentioned term in its ordinary sense. Russell's 
second doubt about induction, therefore, results from a conceptual 
confusion. 
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3.8.3.2 Strawson's Analytic justification Of Induction 
Like Edwards, Strawson stresses that induction should be , 
judged not by reference to deduction, but in its own terms. He states 
that "inductive arguments are not deductively valid; if they were, 
they would be deductive arguments. Inductive reasoning must be 
assessed, -for soundness, by inductive standards" (1960: 305). 
Strawson believes that the demand for a justification of induction 
is, in principle, mistaken, because behind it lies the "absurd" wish -116o 
show that Induction is some sort of deduction. The demand for a 
justification normally takes the form of asking for "proof that Induction 
is a reasonable or rational procedure, that we have good *'grounds for 
placing reliance upon it" (ibid: 38). This demand is mistaken because, 
in their ordinary, normal sense, such expressions as "We have very 
good reasons for believing it", "He has every justification for that B", 
"There are good grounds for the view that f' and "There is good evidence 
that r", imply that one claims to have inductive support for holding the 
view he holds, or expressing the generalisation he expresses. 
Strawson also believes that the question 'Is induction a justified, 
or justifiable, procedure? ' is not a proper_or meaningful question. It 
can be properly asked whether a particular belief is Justified or not, i. e. 
whether or not there is good evidence for it, but it cannot be properly 
asked whether induction itself is justified. In the former case, the 
issue can be resolved by investigating the degree of inductive support 
there Is for the belief concerned, whereas in the latter case there is no 
standard by which induction can be assessed for the sake of establishing 
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whether It is justified or not. Strawson illustrates the latter point 
by comparing the question 'Is induction justified? ' with the question 
'Is the law legal? '; he writes (ibid: 309): 
"It makes perfectly good sense to inquire of a 
particular action, of an administrative regulation..... 
whether or not it is legal. The question is answered 
by appeal to a legal system, by the application of a 
set of legal (or constitutional) rules or standards. But 
it makes no sense to inquire in general whether the law 
of the land, the legal'system as a whole, is or is not legal. 
For to what legal standards are we appealing? " 
The question whether induction in general is justified or not is 
said to have no sense, i. e. to be meaningless, because it cannot be 
properly answered. However, one may properly ask whether or not 
people always have adequate evidence for the conclusions they draw. 
Strawson points out that the answer to this question is "easy but 
uninteresting: it is that sometimes people have adequate evidence, and 
sometimes they do not" (ibid. ). 
Strawson also argues that the demand to justify induction as a 
method of finding out about the unobserved on the basis of the observed 
makes no sense because induction itself underlies every "successful 
method or recipe" for finding out about the unobserved. He points out- 
that "to say that a recipe is successful is to say that it has been 
repeatedly applied with success; and repeated successful application of 
a recipe constitutes just what we mean by inductive evidence in its 
favour" (ibid. ). The idea that any successful method for finding out 
about the future necessarily implies induction and is justified by it is 
considered by Strawson to be an analytic Propositiont He (ib id: 3 0) 
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writes: "The phrase 'successful method of finding things out which has 
not inductive support' is self-contradictory. Having, or acquiring, 
inductive support is a necessary condition of the success of a method". 
3.8.3.3 The Analytic justification: Further Remarks II 
One of the principal ideas of the analytic justification of induction 
is that induction must be treated in its own terms, and not by reference 
to deduction and deductive criteria of validity, Salmon (1974) 
reiterates this view in his discussion of the analytic justification. He 
(ibid: 5) states that if "we insist upon a justification for induction while 
we are content to omit the requirement for deduction, weare showing 
unseemly prejudice against one kind of inference. The fact that induction 
is not deduction, does not mean that induction stands in special need of 
Justification". 
A: nother feature of the analytic justification of induction is the 
belief in the ultimate nature of the principle of induction, as without 
attributing such an ultimacy to this principle there is no conceivable way 
of arriving at a satisfactory 'Justification' of induction. According to the 
proponents of the analytic justification of induction, the claim that a 
given inductive argument is a 'correct argument' means that the argument 
concerned has been conducted according to inductive procedures. ' applying 
the criteria which are used for assessing the correctness of inductive 
arguments. The justification for applying the criteria we use is of a 
'logical nature' in the sense the "insofar as those criteria pronounce some 
claim probable, then I of logical necessity I it is probable" (Swinburne 
1974: 10). It is 'rational' to believe that a given inductive argument is 
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correct because of what is ordinarily meant by the term 'rational', 
namely that the argument in question conforms to or satisfies our 
inductive procedures and criteria. 
According to the advocates of the analytic justification "we 
come to understand what Is meant by 'correct inductive inference' and 
frational belief' by being shown standard examples of such inferences 
and beliefs" (ibid: 11). Thus, in calling particular beliefs 'rational', 
one is claiming that the inferences and beliefs concerned approximate 
or resemble the paradigm, standard examples of such inferences and 
beliefs in significant ways. The process is said to be essentially the 
, 
sajne as the process employed by human beings in learning the meaning 
of such terms as 'red'. One learns the meaning of the term 'red' by 
being shown standard examples of red objects. As it makes no sense 
to ask whether the standard examples of 'red' are really red, by the same 
token it makes no sense to ask whether the standard examples of "correct 
inductive inferences" and "rational belief" are really correct and rational. 
It is by reference to standard examples of "correct inductive inference" 
and "rational belief" that a given 'inductive argument' and. a given 'belief' 
are judged as to their correctness and rationality. 
To sum up, the proponents of the analytic justification of 
induction believe that induction requires no Justification, and that the 
problem of the justification of induction Is a pseudo-problem, which needs 
to be dissolved and not to be solved. They believe that the demand for 
a justification of induction springs from the desire to treat induction in 
terms of deduction; it is also the result of a misconception of the 
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ordinary meanings of such terms as 'good reason', 'good grounds', 
'good evidence', etc. which are used in discuýsing induction -or in 
operating inductively in science. 
4.8.3.4 The Analytic Itistification: A Critical Appraisal 
In his critique of the analytic justification of induction, Salmon 
(1974 (a) ) concentrates on the two chief tenets of this approach, namely 
the 'ordinary language' dissolution of the problem of induction and the 
ultimacy of the principle of induction. As far as the first point is 
concerned, Salmon accepts the view, advanced by the proponents of 
this approach, that the meanings of such terms as 'probable', 'correct', 
'rational', etc. , which are employed by the inductivists, are to a large 
extent related to, what he calls, our "inductive intuitions" (ibid: 55). 
But, he argues, this does not rule out other meanings which may be 
attached-to these term's by, for example, definition, or which they may 
have by convention. Thus, the problem which the proponents of the 
analytic justification must resolve, before they can legitimately claim 
to have dissolved the problem of induction, is essentially a* problem of 
providing some plausible criteria for preferring their adopted meanings of 
the above, and similar, terms to other rival meanings of these terms. 
If they succeed in resolving the above problem, then the proponents of 
the analytic justification can claim, according to. Salmon, to have 
successfully dissolved the problem of induction. Everything hinges on 
a successful resolution of the above problem. 
But the proponents of the analytic justification do not consider 
this problem, let alone try to resolve it. This, of course, means that 
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their claim to have dissolved the problem of induction cannot be taken 
seriously. Their adoption of the ordinary meanings of such terms as 
'probable', 'correct', 'rational', etc. , appears to be based on purely 
personal grounds. This cannot serve as an 'objective' basis for 
building any justification of induction on it. 
The idea of the ultimacy of the principles of induction is 
explained by Strawson (1960) by means of an analogy comparing the 
rationality of induction to the legality of the legal system (see 
preceding section). Salmon considers this analogy useful and 
revealing, but only up to a point. He agrees with Strawson that it is 
pointless to inquire whether the legal system in its entirety is really 
legal. But this, he adds, by no means implies that no meaningful 
questions can be asked about the legal system. One may legally, as 
it were, ask whether "adherence to the legal system will achieve the 
ends we seek to reallse, and whether some other legal system would 
achieve these ends more efficiently" (Salmon 1974: 56-57). 
The same situation is more or less true of induction. Salmon 
believes that although it is pointless to question the rationality or 
reasonableness of induction as a whole, it is perfectly legitimate to 
inquire whether adherence to induction will result in achieving the aims 
we have set for ourselves, and whether some other method of scientific 
inquiry would achieve the same ends more efficiently. A similar 
situation applies in the case of the standard examples of 'correct 
inductive inference'. 'probable conclusion', 'rational belief', etc. 
Though, Salmon believes, it makes no sense to ask whether the standard 
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examples are standard, it is -still 'legal' to ask why'ýcertain examples, 
and not equally detailed ones, are selected as paradigm or standard 
examples by the proponents of the analytic justification. 
The 'ordinary language' dissolution of the problem of inducation 
is also criticised by Urmson (1974). He argues that to call a deductive 
inference $valid', or a particular action 'good., involves more than the 
mere classification of the given inference or belief as 'similar' to some 
standard or paradigm examples of 'valid'deductive inference' or 'good 
action'; it signifies some kind of approval, of appraisal and evaluation 
which are absent in the case of calling a certain object 'red', on the 
basis of its resemblance to standard or paradigm examples of 'redness'. 
The same situation applies In induction. " To call an inductive 
inference 'correct', or a particular belief Irational', involv'es'more than 
'the mere classification of the given inference or belief as 'similar' to 
some standard'or paradigm pxamples of 'correct inductive inference' or 
'rational belief'. 
Madden (1960), also, rejects the claim advanced by the 
proponents of the analytic justification to the effect that they have 
succeeded in eliminating the problem of induction. He points out that 
the identification of the meaning of the expression 'correct I inductive 
argument'-with argument arrived at by employing our correct inductive 
procedures, employing the criteria we employ for assessing the 
correctness of inductive arguments, does not mean that we , can give 
as a reason why a given inductive argument is correct the fact that it 
has been arrive_d at and assessed employing inductive procedures and 
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criteria.. To illustrate this point, Madden (ibid: 292), says: 
cannot give as a reason why something is what it is a synonymous, - 
phrase. 'I have given no supportlto my statement 'John is my brother' 
by saying 'John is my male sibling"'. But this is precisely the kind 
of argument the proponents of the analytic justification offer in support 
of their claim that they have eliminated the problem of induction. 
Clearly, the analytic justification of induction reduces to tautology. 
3.9 The Hypothetico-Deductive Approach 
The originator and chief advocate of the hypothetico-deductive 
approach, sometimes referred to as 'falsificationism' in the literature 
(Chalmers 1978, Harre' 1978); is the philosopher of science Karl Popper. A, 
The main principles of this approach to philosophy of science are set 
out in Popper's numerous publications, particularly in his three books: 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Conjectures and Refutations 
(1969) and Objective Knowledge (1975). Though the appro4 as such 
is a modern and recent one, many of its salient features are present, in 
one form or another, in previous and older works on philosophy of science, 
especially the works of Whewell (Losee 1972, ' Medawar 1974). This 
point is dealt with in an interesting and extremely informative article by 
Medawar (ibid. ). Popper (1974: 1031) acknowledges Medawar's findings; 
he writes: "Medawar .... has made me see, to my surprise, how many, of 
my ideas have been anticipated by others; for these ideasInot only came 
to me without my having read or heard about them, but in some cases are 
developed in conscious opposition to my elders and betters". 
It is not my intention here to deal with the history of the 
hypothetico-deductive approach, no matter how interesting that history 
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may be; for, not only does this fall outside the scope of this thesis, 
and is to a great extent beyond my competence'l but, as Popper himself 
informs us, none of these previous 'hypothetico-deductive' ideas has 
had any . 
formative influence on the development of the hypothetico- 
deductive approach as set out by him in his numerous publications. 
_ 
The main purpose of this section is_ to give a general outline of the 
main features of the present approach and, then, to offer a brief 
critical appraisal of it. 
3.9.1 The Hypothetico -Deductive Appr6ach And Inductivism 
Popper rejects the traditional view' of scientific method 
according to which the empirical or factual sciences are said to be 
characterised by the use of the inductivist approach. Consequently, 
he rejects the widely-held view that induction not only can, but also 
does, serve as a viable_ criterion of demarcation between science, 
on the one hand, and pseudo-science or metaphysics, on the other. 
Many of Popper's main arguments against, or criticisms of, the inductivist 
approach have been incorporated, in one form or another, in the critique 
of naive inductivism which has been offered earlier in this chapter. I 
shall, however, mention two of Popper's main arguments here. 
Popper argues that it is highly dubious, ' from a logical point of 
view, that it is possible or legitimate to infer universal statements from 
singular ones. Or, more precisely, he argues that it is logically highly 
dubious to infer the correctness of universal statements from the 
correctness of the evidence or observations they are based on, due to 
the fact that universal statements, by definition, refer to infinite numbers 
of possible situations, and therefore, may turn out to be Incorrect at 
v 
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some point in the future. Popper (1959: 27) expresses this view by 
saying that "no matter how many instances of white swans we may 
have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are 
white". 
Popper also argues that the inductivist account of the relation 
between observation, on the one hand, and theory or hypothesis, on the 
other, according to which the'former is said to precede the latter, both 
in a logical and temporal sense, is, logically speaking, unacceptable. 
He convincingly argues that observation always presupposes something 
in the nature of a theory; and he (1974) fully accepts Medawar's views 
that the "idea of naive or innocent observations is a philosopher's make- 
believe" and that "induction is a myth" (1974: 275). The following 
I 
quotation from Popper (1969: 47) explains his view concerning the 
logical priority of theory, as a set of hypotheses, over observation: 
"The problem, 'which comes first, the hypothesis (H) 
or the observation (0)' is soluble; as is the problem, 
'Which comes first, the hen (H) or the egg (0)'. The 
reply to the latter is, 'An earlier kind of egg', to the 
former, 'An earlier kind of hypothesis'. It is quite true 
that any particular hypothesis we choose will have been 
preceded by observation - the observations, for example, 
which it is designed to explain. But these observations, 
in their turn, presupposed the adoption of a frame of 
reference: a frame of expectations: a frame of theories. 
If they created a need for explanation and thus gave rise 
to, the invention of a hypothesis, it was because they 
could not be explained within the older theoretical 
framework, the old horizon of expectations. There is no 
danger here of an infinite regress. Going back to more 
and more primitive theories and myths we shall in the end 
find unconscious, inborn ideas". 
Popper refers to these 'expectations' or 'inborn ideas' asknowledge', 
and states that though this inborn knowledge is not valid a- priori, it Is 
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I' psychologically or genetically 2, priori i. e. prior to all observational 
experience" (ibid. ). This is an important ingredient of Popper's views 
on the nature of human knowledge including, of course, scientifio 
knowledge. 
3.9.2 The Psychology Of Knowledge Versus The Logic Of Knowle! jEe 
Popper (1959) distinguishes between what he calls the psychology 
of knowledge and the logic of knowledge The former concerns the 
mental processes involved in the act of conceiving a (new) idea or 
constructing a theory; these processes are thought to defy any logical 
analysis and are said to fall within the scope of "empirical psychology" 
(ib id: 3 0). By contrast, the latter concerns the methods employed in 
the systematic and severe testing and criticisms of (new) ideas or 
theories; these methods are susceptible of logical analysis "and 
rational reconstruction" and are, consequently, thought to fall within 
the scope of philosophy of science. 
Magee (1979: 32) points out that the hypothetico-deductivist 
believes that there "can no more be a logic of creation in the sciences 
than there can be such a thing in the arts" 
(21) 
0 New ideas and theories 
are conceived in a variety of ways which defy any attempts to account 
for them in a logical manner. Popper (19S9: 32) states that "there is 
no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical 
reconstruction of this process. My views may be expressed by saying 
that every discovery contains 'an irrational element, or a creatIve 
intuition" 
(22) 
This boils down to saying that scientific, theories have 
no logical source or origin. 
(23) 
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3.9.3 Verifiability As A Criterion Of Demarcation .. I 
The logical positivists, under the influence of Wittgenstein, 
propose'verification as a criterion of demarcation between the empirical 
sciences, on the one hand, and metaphysics or pseudo-scien6e, on the 
other. They distinguish two types of 'significant' proposition. - The 
first type is statements in logic and pure mathematics which do not 
purport to give any information about the empirical world. The 'truth' 
or 'falsity' of such statements is of a logical nature: "the true ones 
are tautoIogies and the false ones I are I self -contradictions" (Magee 
1979: 47). This, of course, means that propositions in logic and pure 
mathematics cannot be judged on grounds of empirical 'truth' or 'falsity'. 
The second type of propositions are statements which purport to 
give factual information about the empirical world and, therefore, are 
said to be capable of empirical verification. ' The verifiability of such 
propositions means that they are 'fully-reducible' to observation 
statements about the empirical world, and that they, via their 
observation statements, can be either proved or disproved on the basis 
of whether or not they "correspond to the facts" in the empirical world. 
Propositions of this type are said to be 'meaningful' propositions. In, 
contradistinction, the propositions of metaphysics are, strictly speaking, 
'non-' or 'pseudo ' propositions because they are neither logical nor 
mathematical propositions, nor are they meaningful, empirically verifiable 
ones. 
Popper rejects 'verifiability' or 'meaningfulness' as a criterion 
of demarcation between empirical science, on the one hand, and pseudo- 
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science or metaphysics, on the other. He argues that this criterion 
pronounces as pseudo-scientific not only metaphysics but also, the 
whole of natural science, due to the fact that scientific laws and 
theories, though they can be disproved, can never, contrary to what 
the logical positivists stipulate, be proved. He also argues that, 
contrary to what the logical positivists claim,.. metaphysics is not 
meaningless gibberish. He points out that metaphysical propositions 
are meaningful statements, but that they are not regarded as scientific 
statements simply because they cannot be tested. For example, the 
metaphysical statement 'God exists' is not a meaningless statement; 
it has a meaning, but because it is -not empirically testable we say it 
is not scientific. Moreover, metaphysical theories and statements can 
be discussed critically and can be evaluated against each other. It 
is in them and in myths that science has its roots. 
3.9.4 The Hypothetico-Deductivist Demarcation Criterion 
Popper proposes falsifiabil! ty or refutability as a criterion of 
demarcation between empirical science and metaphysics. A theory or 
a hypothesis is said to be scientific if, and only if, it'is, in principle, 
refutable by observation or/and experiment. The statement 'God exists' 
cannot be said to be an empirical, scientific statement because it 
simply is not falsifiable. In contradistinction, the statement 'The 
capital of the United Kingdom in the year'1983 is London' is a falsifiable 
statement and, therefore, can be legitimately ý regarded as a scientific 
statement. 
The factor which underlies Popper's decision to adopt 
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falsiflability, rather than verifiability, as a criterion of dernarcation 
is a simple one: it is the logical aiýmmetry between verification and 
falsification which "results from the logical form of universal statements" 
(Popper 1959: 41). This factor may be explained in the following manner: 
although we cannot conclusively'prove statements in science', we can 
disprove them by confronting them with'the facts in the 'universe of 
phenomena. In other words, although'%ýe ýannot, ý from a'logical point 
of view, argue from the 'truth' or correctness of singWar observation 
statements to the 'truth' or correctness-of universal statements, we can 
argue, by logical means, from the- truth'of the former type of statements 
(24) 
to the falsity of statements of the latter type This point may be 
exemplified by saying that although. no number o-f observation statements 
reporting the existence of white swans can logically justify the 
derivation of the universal statement 'All swans are white', one single 
observation statement reporting the existence of, -say, a black swan is 
sufficient to establish the falsity of this universal statement, i. e. to 
falsify or refute it. 
Empirical scientific theories are falsifiable'. ''A falsifiable theorY 
is a theory which classifies the set of all possible basic statements, i. e. 
singular statements which are'inter-subjectively testable, into two 
mutually exclusive and non-empty classes: 'first, the class of all' 
statements it'rules out as false, 'called the class of its potential 
falsifiers, - and,, 'secondly, the class of all those statements'which it 
does not rule out, i. e. all statements'it permits. "As far as statements 
in the second category are concerned, the theory does not say anything 1- 
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about them, for example whether or not they are true,, or whether or 
not they are consistent with each other. - Popper (1959: 86) sums this 
point up by saying that a "theory is falsifiable if the class of its 
potential falsifiers is not empty". 
Popper distinguishes between falsifiability and falsification. 
A theory is said to be falsified if at least one reproducible basic 
statement of the class of its potential falsifiers contradicts the theory 
in question. Popper stresses the importance of the 'reproducibility' 
requirement of falsifying basic statements; he says that "a few stray 
, basic statements contradicting a theory will hardly induce us to reJect 
it as falsified" (ibid. ). 
Roughly speaking, the opposite of flasification in the 
hypothetico-deductive approach is corroboration. A theory is said to 
be corroborated if, and only if, it has been continuously and 
systematically subjected to severe testing over a 'reasonably long' 
period of time, and under a 'wide variety of conditions', and no 
(25) 
falsification of it has taken place as a result of that By the 
corroboration of a theory Popper (1975: 18) means "a concise report 
evaluating the state (at a certain time t) of the critical discussion of a 
theory, with respect to the way it solves its problems; its degree of 
testability; the severity of tests it has undergone; and the way it has 
stood up to these tests. -Corroboration (or degree of corroboration) is 
thus an evaluating report of past performance I without saying anything] 
whatever about future 2erformance, or about the 'reliability' of a theory". 
Logically speaking, corroboration is-not the. exact, opposite of falsification. 
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Whereas the falsification of a theory is regarded by Popper as 
conclusive, Its corroboration is permanently tentative; the theory or 
scientific law may always turn out to*be false. 
rrorn the above discussion, it follows that the scientist must 
have as his aim the construction of highly falsifiable theories and 
statements, i. e. theories with a high informative content. The more 
falsifiable a theory or a statement is, the more it rules out - that is, 
the larger the class of its potential falsifiers - and, - consequently, the 
more testable it is and the higher the probability that it may turn out to 
I 
, be false.. Magee sums this point up neatly by saying that "informative 
content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, ýis in direct 
proportion to testa6ility" (1979: 36). For example, of the two statements 
I It will rain in St. Andrews at 9 a. m. tomorrow' and 'It will rain in 
St. Andrews', the first statement is to be preferred to the second one 
because it has a higher informative content and, therefore, is more 
easily testable. 
The demand for highly falsifiable theories goes hand in hand 
with the emphasis placed on the setting up of bold and novel theories 
and hypotheses in the hypothetico-deductive approach. Rash and 
speculative conjectures are to be encouraged in science provided, of 
course, that they are falsifiable and, if falsified, rejected. The 
'boldness' and 'novelty' of conjectures and theories are "historically 
relative notions" (Chalmers 1978: 53). Theories and conjectures are 
said to be 'bold' and 'novel' if they make claims which are considered 
to be unlikely in terms of the background knowledge of the time. 
Chalmers (ibid. ) characterises the background knowledge of a given 
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theory or conjecture as the "complex of scientific theoriesEthat are] 
generally accepted and well-established at some stage in the history 
of science". This of course means that theories and conjectures which 
may be regarded as 'bold' and 'novel' at some stage in the history of 
science may be regarded as cautious and unrevealing at some succeeding 
stage. 
The importance of this emphasis on bold and novel conjectures 
and theories can be only fully appreciated when seen against the 
background of the hypothetico-deductivist view of the precise role of, 
' falsification and corroboration in the progress of science. This point 
is lucidly dealt with by Chalmers (ibid. ). He points out that significant 
advances in science do not result from the corroboration of cautious 
theories or conjectures or/and the falsification of bold and n*ovel ones, 
but that it results from the falsification of well-established theories 
or/and the corroboration of bold and-novel ones. This point may be 
.1 
spelt out in the following manner: 
(a) The corroboration of a cautious theory is* not very revealing or highly 
informative because all it tells us is that a theory, which has been 
considered to be 'safe' and lunproblematic' in terms of the background 
knowledge has not, as yet, ceased to be so; 
(b) The falsification of a rash and bold theory'is equally unrevealiýg and 
uninformative because all it tells us is that another wild or bold -idea 
has been shown to be wrong, 6 
(c) The falsification of a well -e stabl ished theor is very interesting and 
informative, from the point of view of the growth of science, because 
it demonstrates that a theory which has been thought to be 'safe' 
and 'unproblematic', in terms of the background, knowledge, has been 
Proved to be false; 
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(d) The corroboration of a rash and bold theory is very interesting and 
informative because it shows that a theory which is thought to be 
unlikely in terms of the background knowledge of the day, has 
been corroborated. 
The requirement that theories be highly falsifiable demands that 
theories, in addition to being consistent, must be clearly and precisely 
formulated. Consistency is of paramount importance in the hypothetico- 
deductive approach. Popper (1959: 91-92) points out that "consistency 
plays a special role among the various requirements which a theoretical 
systemFwhether empirical or non-empirical 
I 
must satisfy". He argues 
I that the main objection to a self-contradictory theoretical system is not 
that it is false and useless as a theoretical system, for such a system 
can still be used to achieve results which may be considered to be 
adequate for certain purposes, but that it is 'uninformative', i. e. that 
any statements can be derived from it. A self-contradictory theory does 
not divide the set of all basic statements into two mutually exclusive 
classes, "those which it contradicts and those with which it is compatible" 
(ib id: 9 2). In other words, under a self-contradictory theory the'world 
can behave in any way it likes, for example, the sun may and may not 
rise in St. Andrews tomorrow, at one and the same time. 
As has been mentioned above, hypothetico-deductivists establish 
a direct and strong link between the testability of a theoretical system 
and its clarity and precision. Theories which are not clearly stated 
and precisely formulated cannot be adequately tested, and they can always 
be reinterpreted to avoid any criticism and falsification. The objective 
of bold and novel theories which are highly falsifiable demands that such 
theories be consistent, precisely formulated and clearly stated. 
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In order to fully satisfy the above requirements of consistency, 
clarity and precision the hypothetico-deductivist should try to cast 
his theory in the form of an axiomatic system. Axiomatics will be 
considered in some detail in chapter V. Suffice it to say here that, 
two main advantages accrue from the use of the axiomatic method in 
the setting up of scientific theories. Firstly, because of the explicit 
and closed nature of an axiomatic system, no new assumptions can be 
smuggled into such a system without being easily spotted or detected. 
Such assumptions will then be seen for what they are: "a modification 
, and therefore a revision of the system" 
(ibid: 71). Secondly, as the 
logical relations between the statements of an axiomatic system can be 
easily, clearly and exhaustively established, the falsification of a theory 
cast in this form may be referred to a particular part of it, thus giving 
the scientist the opportunity to amend his theory without completely 
rejecting it in all its parts. 
However, not just any modification or amendment of a theory is 
permissible In the hypothetico-deductive approach. The hypothetico- 
deductivis't permits only those modifications of a scientific theory which 
make it more falsifiable or testable. . Modifications of a theory which 
make it less falsifiable, or which add no new consequences to it, are 
ad hoc modifications or hypotheses which must "almost always", be avoided 
(Popper 1974: 987). The immediately preceding statement expresses what 
Popper (1959) calls a methodological rule 
(26). 
Such rules are not 
"hard 
and fast' rules, hence the "almost always" qualification in the above rule. 
Popper demands that the hypothetico- deductivist should not pronounce , 
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too severe an edict against ad hoc hypotheses, since such hypotheses 
"may become testable .... as may also happen to a metaphysical 
hypothesis" (1974: 987). 
3.9.5 The Growth Of Scientific Knowledge According To The 
Hypothetico-Deductive Approach 
As has already been mentioned, hypothetico-deductivists do 
not believe that science starts with, or from, pure and unadulterated 
observation. On the contrary, they believe that science starts with 
problems which result from unsuccessful attempts at trying to explain 
, some aspect or aspects of the universe by reference to the background 
knowledge at a given time. In order to explain these problems, the 
scientist proposes falsifiable theories or hypotheses as 'tentative 
solutions'. These self -consistent, precisely formulated and clearly 
stated 'tentative solutions' are subjected to severe testing and criticisms 
in order to falsify them. Those which are falsified are rejected, and 
those which are corroborated are accepted only temporarily and are 
subjected to further testing and criticism. And when theories and 
hypotheses which have hitherto withstood criticism and severe testing 
are eventually falsified, new problems, calling for the 'invention', not 
discovery, of new 'tentative solutions' will arise. Popper explains, 
I 
this evolutionary process of the growth of science with the following 
scheme (1975: 119): 
Pi 
---- _)YT - -- -> 
EE 
... 4 
P2 
TV stands for the initial problem the scientist tries to solve. The 
solution of this problem takes the form of a tentative theory, symbolised 
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by ITT', followed by a process of error elimination 'EE' applied to 
the tentative solution or theory. 'P2' stands for the resulting situation 
and to new problems. 
The hypothetico-deductive approach presents a dynamic picture 
of the growth of science. The growth of science does not follow a 
cyclic pattern. In the above formula, the situation, as well as the 
new problem 'P2', is always different from the old situation and the old 
problem 'Pl'. 
The hypothetico-deductivist view of the growth of science 
emphasises the critical dimension or element in the evolution of science. 
Scientists propose theories and hypotheses which they themselves try 
to criticise, falsify and overthrow and, if successful, try to replace 
them by other 'bold' and 'novel' theories which are subjected to the 
same process of severe criticism and testing. The growth of science 
is, in principle, an open-ended and continuous process. Popper (1959: 
59) neatly expresses this point as follows: "Theories are nets cast to 
catch what we call 'the world':, to rationalise, to explain, and to master 
We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer". 
3.9.6 The Hypothetico-Deductive Approach: Some Critical. Comments 
Popper's hypothetico-deductivist theory is sometimes criticised 
as being, what might be called, an 'elitist' theory of science, that is, 
as being only fully applicable to Such landmarks of science as Einstein's 
'theory of relativity' and Eddington's subsequent confirmation of it in 1919. 
In other words, the view is sometimes expressed that Popper's theory is 
not a theory about, what is generally called, 'normal science, a term 
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coined by Kuhn (1970), but that it is a theory about major theoretical 
I inventions such as Newton's 'theory of gravity"or 'Einstein's 'theory 
of relativity' '. The aim of this criticism is to point out that Popper's 
theory does -not-offer a satisfactory and adequate account of what is 
normally understood by science, or of what is normally included within 
the scope of science. 
It must be admitted that Popper, due to his concentration on, 
and constant reference to, such theoretical landmarks as Einstein's 
theory in the exposition of his ideas, creates the distinct impression 
that his theory happily applies only to such theoretical landmarks as 
those it draws upon for exemplification. But this Is only an impression, 
not a reality. Popper's hypothetico -deductive theory is essentially a 
theory of 'problem solving' and, therefore, it is as much applicable to 
'low-level', so to speak, scientific activity as it is to such outstanding 
scientific achievements as the invention of Einstein's theory. 
One important and recurrent criticism of Popper's hypothetico- 
deductive approach centres on the view, advocated in this approach, that 
the falsification of scientific theories and hypotheses, as opposed to 
their corroboration, is conclusive (Chalmers 1978, Harre' 1978, O'Hear 
1980). This view is thought to be untenable on two grounds. On the 
one hand, it Is based on the assumption that the hypothetico-deductivist 
believes in the existence of a secure empirical base which is theory 
independent. But this lies beyond the limit of what the hypothetico- 
deductivist can legitimately and consistently assume on'the basis of his 
approach. As has been previous ly'pointed out, the hypothetico-deductivist 
strongly believes that observation, 'the activity and what results from it, 
76 
is a 'theory-laden' thing, i. e. that it always presupposes something - 
in the nature of a theory. Since, as the hypothetico-deductivist 
advocates, observation cannot take place in a theoretical vacuum, 
then the idea of a theory- independent empirical base cannot be 
consistently assumed in his approach and, therefore, his view that 
falsification is conclusive is, in principle, not tenable. Moreover, 
since observation, and, therefore, the empirical base, always 
presupposes something in the nature of a theory, and since theories 
themselves are, according to the hypothetico-deductivist, fallible, and 
permanently so, then, it follows that the idea of a secure, reliable and 
safe empirical base, which is a necessary condition for the view that 
falsification is conclusive, cannot be, logically speaking, entertained 
in the present approach. 
What may be at fault in a given test situation is not the theory 
itself, but the 'evidence' with which we seek to falsify the theory; this 
is especially so because of the complexity of realistic test situations. 
As Chalmers (1978: 61) states, a "theory cannot be conclusively 
falsified because the possibility that some part of the complex test 
situation other than the theory under test is responsible for an erroneous 
prediction cannot be ruled out". 
On the other hand, the view that theories can be conclusively 
falsified, and if falsified, be rejected, is not, from a historical point of 
view, entirely adequate. Chalmers (ibid. ) gives examples of theories 
and scientific laws, which, in the light of evidence at some stage of 
their discussion, might have been regarded as conclusively falsified, 
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but which, in the light of further evidence were found to be corroborated. 
He writes (ibid: 61): 
"An embarrassing historical fact for falsificationists 
is that if their methodology had been strictly adhered to 
by scientists then those theories generally regarded as 
being pmong the best examples of scientific theories 
would have been rejected in their infancý". 
Despite this criticism, and others that we have not dealt with 
here for lack of space (see Harre' 1978, Lakatos 1979, O'Hear 1980), the 
hypothetico-deductive approach offers Itself as a superior alternative to 
inductivism, in all its versions. The hypothetico-deductivist view of 
the growth of science as a constant process of evolution is both intuitively 
appealing and, more importantly, historically sound. The emphasis on 
bold and novel theories frees the scientist from the inductively oriented 
sh&ckles of cataloguing and mere taxonomic classification. The demand 
to subject theories to severe and continuous testing emphasises the 
critical aspect of science and the permanently tentative nature of 
scientific knowledge. 
3.10 Conventionalism 
The chief figure of the conventionalist approach is the nineteenth 
century scientist and philosopher, of science, Poincare. Duhem is 
regarded 
ýy 
some philosophers, for example Popper. (1959: 78 fn. ), as 
one of the chief proponents of the conventionalist school of thought, but 
there is no conclusive evidence for this classification in Duhem's main 
work on philosophy of science: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory 
(1954). Some aspects of Duhem's work are conventionalist in nature, 
but the bulk of it is not. 
78 
The main work on conventionalism that I know of is Poincare's 
book Science and Hypothesi *(1952). In this book, Poincare sets out 
the main tenets of his conventionalist philosophy of science by 
considering, mainly, Euclidean geometry. He believes that theoretical 
systems and scientific laws'are not inherent in nature, but that they are 
our "own creations; our Inventions; our arbitrary decisions and 
conventions" (Pop-per'1959: 79). In other words, theories and scientific 
laws cannot; according to- the conveniiona list, be regarded as accurate, 
let alone true, accounts of the inherent nature of objects in the universe 
of phenomena, but they are considered as constructs created by the 
scientist to 'define' the structure and properties of such objects. Such 
constructs are not, however, entirely free creations; they must be 
appropriate. Poincare expresses this point by saying that the "framework 
into which we wish to make everything fit is one of our own construction; 
but we did not construct it at random; we constructed it by measurement 
so to speak; and that is why we can fit the facts into it without altering 
their essential qualities" (1952: XXV). 
Clearly, the central idea in conventionalism is that theories and 
laws are arbitrary but appropriateconven'tions. P6incare beautifully* 
explains this point ýy saying that scientific laws and theories are like 
the laws of "an absolute monarch, who is wise and consults his council 
of state" (ibid: xxiii). Scientific laws and theories are also said to be 
"definitions in disguise" (ibfd: 50) and, therefore, they cannot be said 
to be falsifiable. 
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3.10.1 Conventionalism: A Critical Appraisal 
- 
Popper believes that conventionalism is a logically defensible 
approach, and that it deserves credit on two grounds. Firstly, 
conventionalism presents a sound explanation of the relation between 
theory, on the one hand, and experiment and observation on the other, 
by duly recognising the important role played by "our actions and 
operations, planned id accordance with -conventions and deductive 
reasoning, in conducting and interpreting of scientific experiments" 
(Popper 1959: 80). Secondly, conventionalism stresses the importance 
of consistency as a crucial requirement of theoretical systems., 
Conventionalism is a self-contained approach which cannot be faulted 
on logical grounds. 
Popper, however, rejects Poincare's conventionalism because it 
(27) 
clashes with his approach on two different, but related, issues 0 
On the one hand, unlike the hypothetico-deductive approach, 
conventionalism views theories as empirically uhfalsifiable systems 
that cannot be assessed by directly confronting them with the univbrse 
of phenomena they aim to 'account for'. This feature of conventionalism 
follows from their view of theories and scientific laws as "definitions in 
disguise" (Poincare 1952: 50), i. e. as mere 'conventions' whose purpose 
is to enable the scientist to deal with the universe of phenomena. 
According to conventionalism,, theories cannot be directly harmed by ihe 
Irealities' of the empirical world: "Whatever 
I is I found not to conform 
to a law would simply not come uncler this law; and whatever [is 
I not 
in accordance with a definition would not be what the definition defineO 
(E. Harris 1970: 53). The fact that conventionalist based theories are 
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required to be appropriate does not alter the fact that they are not 
empirically falsifiable. A theory, particularly a 'factual', one, which 
is not falsifiable cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as a scientific 
theory according to Popper's hypothetico-deductive philosophy of science. 
On the other hand, by insisting that theories are devoid of any 
empirical content, conventionalism allies itself with instrumentalism, 
so much so that, for some philosophers of -science, conventionalism and 
instrumentalism are almost synonymous 
(28) 
The instrumentalistic 
nature of conventionalism is the second reason behind Popper's rejection 
of conventionalism. Instrumentalism, and Popper's objections to it, 
will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
11 Operationalism 
The author of 'operational analysis' is universally acknowledged 
to be the scientist-philosopher P. W. Bridgman, though Bridgman himself 
claims that operational analysis is not a new theory either of the nature 
of scientific knowledge or of scientific method. He points out that 
some of the main features of his approach are found in Galileo's work on, 
and discussion of, physical theory. In more recent times, the idea of 
operational analysis is said to have been employed by Einstein in his 
"treatment of the concepts of time and space in the relativity of inertial 
systems" (Lindsay 1956: 38). Bridgman views his contribution to have 
been, mainly, to analyse and systematically describe those methods and 
procedures which have been successfully applied and practised in physics, 
and not "to set up a philosophical system and a theory of the properties 
that any method must have if it hopes to-be'successful" (Bridgman 1938: 
115). 
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Bridgman also points out that operational analysis does not, 
and is not intended to, constitute a fully-fledged theory of scientific 
method. This point is emphasised by Hempel in an excellent article 
on the logical status of Bridgman's operational analysis. , Hempel 
(1956: 54) points out that the "central ideas, of operational analysis .... 
are so vague that they constitute not a theory concerning the nature of 
scientific concepts but rather a program for the development of such a 
theory". In other words, the central ideas of operational analysis, as 
these ideas are put forward by Bridgman, constitute nothing morethan a 
prolegomenon to a. theory of operational analysis. This, by no means, 
is a criticism of Bridgman's approach; it is only a factor that must be 
borne in mind in evaluating this approach. 
'Operational analysis'- is better known in the literature by the 
terms 'operationalism, used as 'the heading for this section, and 
loperationism'. Bridgman rejects such "grandiloquent" terms as labels 
for his approach, because "they imply something more philosophic and 
esoteric" than he actually proposes (1938: 114). He expresses his 
strong disapproval of those terms in another, more recent article (1956: 
74-75): "1 abhor the word operationism or operationalism which seems 
to imply a dogma, or at least a thesis of some kind. The thing I have 
(29)' 
envisaged is too simple to be dignified by so pretentious a name" 
However, the term 'operationalism' has gained currency over 'operational 
analysis' as a label for Bridgman's approach; I, therefore, will use it 
whenever convenient in the rest of this discussion, 
As has been mentioned above, pperationalism was initially 
developed for theories of physics, but it was later extended to apply to 
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such disciplines as psychology, economics and law. The main 
principle of operationalism is that the 'meaning' of a scientific concept, 
such as 'length', for example, is inherently statable in terms of the 
operation, or operations, which specify them. In other words, an 
operational definition of a tem is "conceived as a rule to the effect 
that the term is to apply to a. particular case if the performance of 
specified operations in that case yields a certain characteristic result" 
(Hempel 1956: 52). 
Bridgman establishes different kinds of operations in terms of 
which the meanings of scientific concepts can be specified. These 
operations fall into two major categories: 
(a) physical or instrumental operations, such as those that can be 
performed in the laboratory; operations of this kind are extensively 
used in physical science and other branches of natural science; and 
(b) pa per-and -pencil operations, verbal and mental operations. 
Operations of this kind are used in mathematics and logic, the 
natural sciences, law, economics and other branches of social 
science. Such operations cannot always be sharply distinguished 
from each other, and they must ultimately reduce, or be potentially 
reducible, to operations of the first kind. Hempel (1956) groups 
all these operations together under the title of symbolic o'perations.. 
The operationalist view that the meaning of a scientific concept 
is operational is neatly expressed by Bridgman (1938: 117) as follows: 
"What a man means by a term is to be found by observing what he does 
with it, not by what he says about it". According to Bridgman, the 
definition of a scientific term operationally constitutes a necessary 
condition for specifying its meaning; that is, 
I 
unless one knows the 
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operations that are applicable to a scientific concept, one cannot 
claim to know what the meaning of the concept concerned is. 
Bridgman stipulates that all symbolic operations be ultimately 
reducible to simple instrumental operations, i. e. instrumental operations 
which cannot be defined In terms of more basic operations. In addition 
to this, he demands that all operations, whether instrumental or symbolic, 
"be unambiguously and straightforwardly performed" (ibid: 124). 
However, he admits that, from a logical standpoint, no operation can 
be said to be completely safe or perfectly secure, no matter how much 
faith we have in it from a practical or observational point of view 
(30) 
* 
Bridgman expresses this point about the tentative nature of operational 
definition by saying that "one can never be sure that at sometime in the 
future he will not think of something which had not previously o6curred 
to him which will make operations unsatisfactory in which no flaw is at 
present suspected" 
(31) 
o (ibld: 125). 
In order to avoid ambiguity in defining scientific concepts, each 
concept must be unequivocally specified by reference to a single unique 
operation. This means that, every scientific concept must be uniquely 
defined in terms of a distinct operation, and that, even when two or more 
operations, for example the 'optical' and 'tactual' ways of measuring 
length, are found to yield the same experimental. or factual result, 
operationalists insist that, from a logical point of view, two or more 
scientific concepts are involved, and that these concepts must be kept 
terminologically separate from each other. This amounts to saying that 
if the means, i. e. the operations, are different, then, from a logical 
point of view, the ends, i. e. the scientific concepts to be specified by 
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them, must be distinct from each other. There is also a practical 
consideration involved in advocatin4*this view: "The equivalence of 
two operations is established by experiment, and we must always 
adopt the attitude that the results of such an experimental proof may 
be subject to revision when the range or accuracy of our experience is 
incfeased" (Bridgman 1938: -122). 
The operationalist view that scientific terms should have 
specifiable operational definitions which are intersubjectively testable 
ensures that hypotheses formulated in terms of them can be objectively 
tested. Concepts which are not operationally specifiable are said to 
be 'meaningless, in a narrow and technical sense of the term, and-, 
therefore, must be excluded from the field of science. Hypotheses 
w hich employ such concepts cannot be objectively and precisely tested 
and, therefore, cannot be said to be scientific. 
3.11.1 Operationalism: A Critical Appraisal 
As has been mentioned in the preceding section, any appraisal 
of operational analysis must take into account one important factor, 
namely the fact that this approach is not intended as a fully-fledged 
theory of the nature of scientific knowledge and method. 
Some philosophers of science, for example, Lindsay (1956), 
dispute the "absolute legitimacy" of the operationalist requirement that 
all scientific concepts must be capable of being instrumentally interpreted 
and validated. Lindsay argues that this requirement proves to be 
inappropriate when considered in terms of what actually takes place in 
physics, for example. He points out that some important physical 
concepts do not appear to be susceptible to operational definition 
(321 
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By implication, this means that the operationalist belief that 
operational definitions are a necessary condition for objectivity in 
science is rather exaggerated. 
Hempel (1956) argues that one of the serious shortcomings of' 
operationalism is its lack of any criteria for assessing what makes 
operations 'good' for the purposes they are put. ' He believes that-the 
success of a given operation -in achieving an intended result cannot 
serve as a satisfactory explanation of this 'point. He points out that 
the history of science abounds with examples of operations which had 
been considered, albeit implicitly, to be 'good' for achieving some 
intended result(s) in a given discipline at some stage of its development, 
but which had subsequently turned out not to be 'good' for achieving the 
same result. 
Finally, operationalism may be criticised for its failure "to 
impart meaning to substantial concepts, that is concepts related to 
entities that are regarded as carriers of operationally determinable 
qualities" (Margenau 1956: 39). Marge'nau (ibid. ) points out that', 
though it is possible to operationally define the 'charge', 'mass' and 
'spin' of an electron, for example, it is hardly possible to do the same 
for the electron itself. 
4. Topics in EpistemoLlo22Z 
(33) 
: The 'Cognitive' Status Of Scientific 
Theories 
The 'cognitive, status of universal statements and scientific 
theories, that is, the relationship between them and the 'real world' or 
$universe of phenomena',, is an important issue in the philosophy of 
86 
science (Chalmers 1978, Duhem 1954, Harre' 1978, Harris 1970, 
Magee 1979, Morgenbesser 1969, Nagel 1974, O'Hear 1980, Popper 
1959,1969,1975 and Sheffler 1974). The variety of trends established 
by scientists and philosophers of science in the "long and'inconclusive" 
(Nagel 1974: 117) discussion on the subject of the cognitive status of 
theories falls into two major categories: 'realism' and 'instrumentalism'. 
The main difference between these two major categories is that, 
whereas, according to the former, universal statements and scientific 
theories are said to have 'empirical content' and, therefore, to invite 
judgement on grounds of 'factual truth' or 'falsity', they are, according 
to the latter, devoid of any 'empirical content' and, therefore, do not 
invite assessment on grounds of 'factual truth' or 'falsity'. In other 
words, whereas theories of the former type are said to have an existence 
postulate', theories of the latter type are regarded as pure instruments 
whose purpose is to enable the scientist to account for the universe of 
phenomena. 
The aim of this section is to discuss, very briefly, the main 
approaches within 'realism' and 'instrumentalism'. I shall concentrate 
on the salient features of each approach, ignoring those points which 
seem to be only relevant in the application of these approaches to 
particular disciplines. 
4.1 Realism 
4.1.1 Phenomenalism 
Phenomenalism, called 'complete phenomenalism' by Harre' (1978:. 68), 
is one of the oldest views of the cognitive status of scientific theories. 
6 
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The main principle and assumptions of this approach are summarised in 
th6 following three points: 
(1) the aim of science is to provide theories which function as 
descriptions of directly observable phenomena as "only propositions 
about observed phenomena can be dignified by the status of knowledge" 
(ib id: 6 8); 
(2) scientific theories can achieve their aim of describing directly 
observable phenomena by restricting themselves to the "identification, 
classification and codification" of phenomena (ibid: 96); and 
(3) the truth of scientific theories can be established beyond all 
reasonable doubt; by confining themselves to directly observable 
phenomena in the fashion indicated in (2) above, scientists 'achieve 
certainty, and so gain permanent knowledge' (ibid: 68). 
Phenomenalism will be dealt with in more detail in section 4.1.3 
below. Suffice it to say here that, by restricting the scope of science 
to directly observable phenomena only, phenomenalism leads to the 
impoverishment of science as a method for explaining the universe of 
phenomena, with all its hidden forces or elements, so to speak. 
Moreover, phenomenalism requires the elimination from science of all 
sdientific concepts which do not apply to "entities within the range of 
our clearly observable terms" (Sheffler 1974: 159). In other words, it 
results in the eradication of much of what is characteristically scientific 
about science's 
4.1.2 Essentialism 
(34) 
The term 'essentialism' is employed by Popper (1969: 103) to 
refer to a special brand of realism which advocates the following 
principles: 
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(1) the aim of the scientist is to provide a true theory or description 
of the world whose function is to give an explanation of the 
observable facts and the relations between them; 
(2) a theory achieves its aim of providing an ultimate explanation of 
the observable facts by describing their 'essences' or 'essential 
features', - i. e. 'the realities -that lie behind the 'appearances' 
(ibid: 104) - hence the term 'essentialism' as a label for this approach. 
(3) the truth of scientific theories can be conclusively established 
beyond all doubt. 
4.1.3 Phenomenalism And Essentialism: A Critical Appraisal 
Phenomenalism and essentialism' share the view, not adhered to 
by Popperian realism which will be discussed later, that theories offer 
ultimate descriptions or explanations of the universe of phenomena, i-*e. 
that they are "neither in need nor susceptible of further' explanation" 
(Popper 1969: 104), and that their truth can be conclusively established 
beyond all reasonable doubt. They differ from each other, however, in 
that whereas in phenomenalism only immediately observable phenomena 
are thought to constitute the 'true and real' subject-matter of science, 
in essentialism it is only the 'essential features' of phenomena, i. e. 
"the, realities which lie behind the appearances" (ibid. ) that are- regarded 
as the only legitimate and significant subject-matter for science. They 
also differ from each other in that whereas. phenomenalism considers the 
function of scientific theories to be of a descriptive nature, essentialism 
considers it to be of an explanatory one; this difference will not, however, 
be discussed here. 
The phenomenalist and essentialist view that the truth of 
scientific theories can, in principle'. be conclusively established is, 
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logically and historically, untenable. As has been mentioned'in the 
discussion of Popper's hypothetico -deductive approach, no theory, 
from a logical point of view, can be established as finally and 
conclusively true. The fact that all swans which have been observed 
up till now are white does not, from a logical point of view, establish, 
the universal statement 'All swans are white' as being true, let alone 
conclusively true, for the next swan that may be observed might turn 
out to be not white, but black or any other colour. Similarly, the history 
of science provides us with many examples which support the view that 
theories cannot be regarded as being conclusively true. The fate of 
Newtonian mechanics is just one such significant example; for though 
this theory was generally considered to be firmly established as a true 
theory, it eventually 
-turned 
out to be false. The fact that a given theory 
has withstood all severe tests to refute it up to a given time t does not 
logically justify the conclusion that such a theory is conclusively true. 
The jump from the ostensible success of a theory to its truth is a big 
one, which can neither logically nor historically be supported. 
Scientific theories are not fixed, unalterable. bodies of truth, 
engraved on unperishable tablets of stone, and handed down to us 
complete ly. inta ct, without any modifications or revisions, by previous 
generations of conforming scientists. If that was the case, i. e. if 
scientists were to act as mere 'keepers' of scientific theories, then we 
would not be able to account for the growth of science in a 'rational' or 
'meaningful' manner. What the phenomenalists and essentialists appear 
to do when they claim that scientific theories can be conclusively 
established is to confuse the, so to speak,. 'constancy' of the universe 
90 
of phenomena which scientific theories aim to explain, a 'constancy' 
that is not affected by any change of theory, with the 'truth' claims of 
the theories in question. ` This confusion may lead to some embarrassing 
conclusions for the phenomenalists and essentialists, in, for example, 
the field'of astronomy; for, as Chalmers (1978: 114) points out', "no-one 
wishes to claim . .. -. that the earth was once stationary at. the centre of 
the'universe and then began to orbit the sun round about the time of - 
Copernicus". 
The phenomenalist and essentialist doctrine that the truth of 
scientific theories can be conclusively established seriously undermines 
the importance of the critical attitude as a crucial factor in the evolution 
of science. This may be explained by saying that once the truth of a 
given theory is thought to have been conclusively established, the role 
of the scientist is then. regarded as nothing more than the mere application 
of the theory concerned for, apparently, accumulating more and more 
certainties of the. -type offered by the theory. Under the above 
phenomenalist and essentialist view, the critical attitude in science, 
which is the main propelling force behind its progress.., gradually, but 
assuredly, gives way to a dogmatic and conformist attitude, thus resulting 
in the stultification and stagnation of science as an ever evolving 
enterprise. 
But even if, for argument's sake, we ignore the above objections 
and accept the phenomenalist and essentialist view that the truth of 
scientific theories can be conclusively established, - there still remains 
one important problem in connection with these two approaches. It is 
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the problem of 'bridging the gap', as it were, between the theory, on 
the one hand, and., on the other hand, the universe of phenomena which 
a theory purports to account for, i. e. of demonstrating the truth of the 
theory. This problem may be formulated as follows: 'How does one 
really know that one has actually captured the truth when one thinks he 
has? ' And, 'How does one demonstrate to an independent observer, 
independently of the theory he seeks to establish as being conclusively 
true, that the theory in question is actually conclusively true? ' The 
failure of the phenomenalists and the esseptialists to address themselves 
to this point throws more doubt on their above-mentioned view. 
4.1.4 Popperian Realism 
Popper rejects the phenomenalist and essentialist doctrine that 
the truth of scientific theories can be conclusively established beyond 
all reasonable doubt, and that science aims at ultimate explanation. 
But he upholds the chief realist doctrine that the ultimate aim of the 
scientist is to find a "true theory or description of the world", though 
such theories have the status of genuine conjectures. 
As genuine conjectures, theories are highly informative guesses 
(35) 
about the universe of phenomena which, though they cannot be established 
as being conclusively true, can be subjected to severe and ruthless tests 
to try to refute them. As far as the universe of phenomena is concerned, 
the Popperian view is that it encompasses both the world of appearances, 
and the world of realities which lies behind those appearances as "equally 
real aspects or layers of the real world" (ibid: 103). Popper explains 
this point by giving an example. He says that it is as "mistaken to say 
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that my piano, as I know it, is real, while its alleged molecule. s and 
atoms are mere logical constructions, .... as it is mistaken to say that . 
atomic theory shows that the piano of everyday world is an appearance 
only" (ibid. ). By not restricting the concept of reality either to the 
world of appearances, or to ihe world of essences which lie behind'them, 
Popperian realism transcends both phenomenalism and essentialism as a 
realist theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Popper accepts the traditional view of 'truth' and 'reality' according 
to which "a state of affairs is E said to be'] real" if, and only if, the 
statement describing it "corresponds to the facts" (1969: 116). But 
this'view of correspondence to the facts is a rather naive one, considering 
the complexity of realistic test situations. Moreover, since this view 
of reality appears to be based on the assumption that there exists a 
'hard core' of facts in the universe of phenomena, i. e. that there are 
theory independent facts, this view cannot be said to be compatible with 
the other hypothetico-deductivist view according to which observations, 
and, therefore, the facts they 'report', are theory-de pendent. 
Popper's view that if a theory is falsified, then the existence of 
some reality with which it clashes is established and the theory in 
question is taken to "contradict some real state of affairs described by 
its true negation" (ibid. ) is neither satisfactory nor entirely clear. It 
is not satisfactory because the falsification of a theory tells us nothing 
more than that the universe of phenomena is not what the theory claims it 
to be; and it is vague, because Popper does not tell us what is exactly 
meant by the "true negation" of a theory; nor does he give us any 
examples, whether real or hypothetical, to illustrate this point. 
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The main problem which faces the researcher in dealing with 
Popperian realism is that whereas, on the one hand, Popper emphasises 
that theories are merely conjectures, on the other hand, he appears to 
be sometimes rather keen to espouse a stronger version of realism. 
One is left with the tantalising feeling that Popper has not conclusively 
unequivocally resolved his position on the cognitive status of scientific 
theories. 
4.2 Instrumentalism 
As has been previously mentioned, instrumentalism decrees that 
scientific theories are devoid of any empirical content and that, therefore., 
they do not allow any evaluation on grounds of empirical truth or falsity. 
Scientific theories, according to instrumentalism, are "leading 
principles" or Pinference tickets" in accordance with which (factual) 
statements about the universe of phenomena may be formulated, and not 
systems of premisses from which such statements can be inferred or 
drawn (see Nagel 1974). In other words instrumentalism regards 
scientific theories as guiding principles or computation rules in accordance 
with which the scientist deals with the universe of phenomena. A 
scientific theory, according to instrumentalism, is not a projected Map 
of the universe of phenomena but a "set of principles of mapping" (ibid: 139). 
There are two types of instrumentalism in the literature; fictionalism and, 
what I have called, for lack of a better term, sceptical instrumentalism. 
I shall deal with these two types in the following two sections. 
4.2.1 Fictionalism 
Fictionalism views scientific theories as fictions "which read like 
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factual accounts, and ostensibly work according to the logic of 
I 
description and reference, but I which actually I are works of the 
imagination and nothing else" (Harre 1978: 80). Harre" considers the 
relationship between scientific theories adhering to this epistemological 
view-and the real world to be roughly comparable to the relationship 
between novels and 'real life'. It is in terms of this rough comparison 
that he tries to explain some of the salient features of fictionalism. 
He points out that, in some general and intuitive sense, novels 
are works of the imagination. Nonetheless, events narrated by novels 
often seem to be similar to events in real life, and characters portrayed 
by them often seem to have some strong resemblance to characters in 
real life. Put differently, episodes and plots narrated by novels, and 
characters portrayed by them, often appear to have the hring of truth" 
(ib id: 8 1). However, episodes and plots narrated by novels differ from 
actual events in real life in that, despite their plausibility, they are, 
strictly speaking, fictional. A similar situation holds for the relationship 
between the characters portrayed by novels and people in real life. The 
former, despite their, sometimes, strong resemblance to people in real 
.0 life, are, strictly speaking, fictional. As Harre points out, "their 
names and-addresses do not refer to real people and addresses". (ibid. ). 
A similar situation holds for the relationship between scientific 
theories and the real world in fictionalism. According to fictionalism, 
the entities and relations postulated by a theory are pure fictions. As 
Harre (ibid. ) points out "the entities themselves have no more reality 
than the characters of fiction, and the terms which are used to describe, 
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and particularly to refer to them, are like the names and addresses of 
characters in novels" (ibid. ). 
Fictionalists believe that in the same manner in which one 
cannot infer the truth of the premisses of an argument from the evident 
truth of the conclusion validly derived from it, one cannot, from'a 
logical point of view, assert the truth of a theory from the truth of the 
statements constructed in accordance with it. In other words, the 
fallacy of asserting the antecedent applies as much to arguments as it 
does to scientific theories according to fictionalism. - This fallacy 
decrees that, since It is possible to derive factually true statements 
from demonstrably false premisses, it is, logically speaking, false to 
argue from the truth of a conclusion to the truth of the premisses from 
which it is derived. In the following deductively valid argument, 'the 
factual truth of the conclusion cannot be transmitted to the premisses, 
because the premisses concerned are demonstrably empirically false: 
Premisses: All transformationalists are Americans 
All Americans are linguist 
Conclusion: -All transformationalists are linguists 
The premisses of the above deductive inference may, ' for argument's -sake, 
be construed as a theory whose aim is to explain the fact that 'all 
transformationalists are linguists' and not, say, butchers. This argument* 
is a good argument because it leads to a true conclusion about the real 
world, though its two premisses are demonstrably false. 
By analogy, true statements about the real world can, logically 
speaking, be constructed in accordance with a false theory. The force 
of this argument in fictionalism is that scientific theories cannot be 
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evaluated on grounds of emprical 'truth' or 'falsity',, but only on grounds 
of whether or not they achieve the results they aim to achieve, Le. on 
grounds of their efficiency, as instruments whose aim is to deal with 
the universe of phenomena. To this, considerations of consistency, 
simplicity, economy and beauty may be added. 
According to Harre, fictionalism tends to be adopted in times 
of crisis in the history of science. Such times are characterised by 
the existence of a large number of competing theories in a given discipline, 
where there is a lack of a generally accepted procedure for'resolving the 
issue between them with respect to their information contents. At -such 
periods in the history of science, "ideal theoretical knowledge 
becomes the best set of fictions, and these are understood as being the 
neatest, the shortest, and the most elegant" *(ibid. ), assuming that 
consistency is satisfied by each one of them. Harre' exemplifies this 
situation by the controversy in the recent history of fundamental physics 
as to whether the "basic constituents of matter are particle-like or 
wave-like" (ibid: 82). When attempts to resolve the issue between 
these two competing views proved unsuccessful, a fictionalist view of 
the nature of the "basic constituents of matter", called 'complementarity" 
was adopted. Harre explains this principle and its fictionalist nature 
in this manner: "electrons which in some circumstances appeared 
particulate, could be differentiated when in sufficient number in a beam. 
Light, which since the eighteenth century had been generally agreed to 
be a wave motion, had for certain purposes to be supposed particulate. 
The wave picture and the particle picture were then supposed to be 
complementary, and each fictional" (ibid. ). 
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A similar situation obtained in linguistics in the mid-thirties 
in connection with the phoneme concept. Some linguists, notably 
Bloomfield, and the phonetician D. Jones, regarded the phoneme as a 
physical entity j, while others, notably Sapir, regarded it as a 
psychological unit. The difference between the followers of these 
two schools regarding the nature of the phoneme could not be resolved 
in favour of either one of them due to the lack of any well -established 
methodology, or set of criteria, for evaluating the competing claims 
advanced by these two rival groups. Each view of the nature of the 
reality of the phoneme was thought to have its own shortcomings and 
limitations, and, therefore, a choice between them proved to be well- 
nigh impossible. 
But neither could a rapprochement between these two competing 
views be successfully. effected. The differences between them were 
thought to be too great and fundamental to allow any meaningful 
rapprochement to take place. In short, the difference between the 
physicalist view of the phoneme and the mentalist one proved to be 
irresoluble. We may, albeit very loosely, talk about a time of crisis 
in the history of linguistics. 
To overcome this situation, Twaddell (1966) proposed to define 
the phoneme as an "abstractional fiction" (p. 67), pointing out that such 
a definition would have two advantages: (1) "we could use the phoneme 
as a terminological convenience just as well as at present"; (2) "we 
should not have to use as legal currency in our study the promissory notes 
of the laboratory, which are liable to a heavy discount". He (ibid. ) 
further adds: 
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"Then, if the next decades should bring a. satisfactory . 
physical definition of the phoneme from the laboratory, we 
could discard the abstractional and substitute the physical 
definition, without disturbing the products of earlier 
linguistic study. If advances in psychological method, 
at present unimaginable, should justify the use of 
psychological units in linguistic study, we could 
substitute a pýychological definition without the necessity 
of reappraising all preceding phonological research". 
Fictionalism will be dealt with further in section 4.2.3. Suff ice 
it to say here that, TwaddelPs treatment of the situation concerning the 
phoneme concept in the mid-thirties presents a. good example of the 
fictionalist approach at work, though there are elements of this treatment 
which may justify regarding it as an example of the following type of 
instrumentalism. 
4.2.2 Sceptical Instrumentalism 
The main difference between sceptical instrumentalists and 
fictionalists is that the former do not go as far as declaring that all 
scientific theories and the entities they contain are fictional, and , 
permanently so; for, they do not rule out the possibility that a theory, 
or a theoretical entity,, which is said to be devoid. of any empirical 
content at a given time t may turn out to be emprically realist. This, 
however, does not alter the fact that sceptical instrumentalists consider 
it to be pointless to* inquire whether a theory is true or not, or whether or 
not a theoretical entity is real: "We can no more settle the question as 
to the existence of things, qualities and processes referred to by, a theory , 
than we can settle the question of its truth. To settle the truth of 
[a theory] we have to know whether the things it refers to'exist, because 
only if they do can they be studied to see if they have the qualities, 
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natures'and behaviour the [theory] alleges theydo" (Haire' 1978: 87). 
Sceptical instrumentalists do not, however, concern themselves with 
whether such things as 'atoms', for example, exist or not. I They believe 
that science can achieve its goals without necessarily concentrating on 
such issues 
(36) 
0 
Since theories cannot, according to sceptical instrumentalists, 
be evaluated on grounds of truth or falsity; the only grounds for 
evaluating them are (1) whether or not they fulfil their purpose of 
providing a basis for the construction of statements which are required 
to be factually correct, and (2) considerations of consistency, simplicity, 
economy and elegance or beauty. A theory selected over its rival on 
these grounds "might by chance be true, but it equally well might not" 
(ibid. ). 
4.2.3 j Fictionalism and Sceptical Instrumentalism: A Critical Appraisal 
Fictionalism and sceptical instrumentalism are logically defensible 
approaches, i. e. they cannot be faulted on grounds of some logical 
defects in their construction. Thus, any appraisal ýof these two. approaches 
must rest on some non-logical grounds, such as considerations pertaining 
to what one regards as the nature and aim of science and scientific 
theories. It must, however, be admitted that such a process of 
evaluation and appraisal Inevitably involves a 'personal' element, for 
the nature and aim of science are not universally agreed upon by 
researchers working in the field of philosophy of science. 
Instrumentalism, whether of the fictionalist or of the sceptical 
instrumentalist type, is 'obscurantist' in nature. Because' scientific 
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theories are, under the instrumentalist view, mere instruments or 
tools that cannot be directly harmed by the empirical world, anything 
which looks like a refutation of a theory, can always be construed as 
nothing more than a delimitation of its scope of applicability as a tool, 
in terms of which the universe of phenomena can be dealt with. The 
force of this argument is that instrumentalism is prone to lead to 
complacency and, effectively, to the immunisation of scientific theories. 
If, in dealing with the universe of phenomena in terms of a given 
instrumentalist theory, certain aspects of this universe are found not to 
be readily amenable for treatment under the theory concerned, then those 
aspects are said to fall outside the scope of the theory in its capacity. 
as a tool. The fictionalist scientist would be under no obligation to 
discard his theory in favour of a different theory with a wider scope of 
applicability. But even if he did discard his theory in favour of a 
different one, this would not constitute a 'refutation' of the original 
theory. The original theory can still stand as an efficient instrument 
which is able to achieve the objectives it was originally designed for. 
As has been pointed out above, there is, logically speaking, nothing 
wrong with this view. What I consider tol be wrong with it is that it 
appears to encourage complacency in science by dampening or stifling 
the critical attitude in the evaluation of scientific theories. 
Moreover, the fact that the history of science abounds with 
examples of scientific theories that were refuted by direct confrontation 
with empirical phenomena, proves to be an embarrassing point for the 
instrumentalist; for, it shows that scientific theories, contrary to what 
the instrumentalist claims, can have an empirical content and, therefore, 
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can be evaluated on grounds of empirical 'truth' or 'falsity'. 
Instrumentalism, if it is to be taken seriously, should be able'to 
explain away this well-attested situation in the history of science. 
It is,, however, doubtful that instrumentalists can come up with a 
plausible explanation of this situation on the basis of the doctrines of 
their approach. 
Equally embarrassing-, particularly for fictionalist instrumentalists, 
are discoveries which demonstrate the existence of their instrumentalist 
entities, and that show that the newly discovered objects have exactly 
those qualities and features which are predicated of the theoretical terms 
which, now, can be said to label them. An example of this kind is the 
discovery of the molecular structure of benzene, which Chalmers - 
(1978: 117) explains as follows: 
"The idea that the molecular structure of some compound, 
benzene for instance, should consist of closed rings of 
atoms was first proposed by Kekule. Kekule himself had' 
a somewhat instrumentalist attitude towards his theory and 
regarded his ring structures as useful theoretical fictions. 
On this view it must be regarded as a remarkable 
coincidence that these theoretical fictions can nowadays 
be seen almost 'directly' through electron microscopes. 
The above example shows that theories which are said to be 
instrumentalist and, therefore, devoid of any empirical content, can, . 
in principle, be shown to be 'factually true', albeit only provisionally. 
This directly flies in the face of fictionalism, and, to a lesser extent, 
sceptical instrumentalism. 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The previous discussion of realism and'instrumentalism shows 
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that neither of these two views of the epistemological nature of -, 
scientific theories is completely without difficulty. While realism 
finds it difficult to explain the fact that apparently incompatible realist 
theories are sometimes used to deal with one and the same universe of 
phenomena, instrumentalism finds no difficulty in accommodating this 
situation. This follows from the fact that, in instrumentalism, theories 
are simply treated as useful tools or instruments, created by the 
scientist to guide his scientific investigations and to relate certain 
areas of experience which, without the theory, may not be related to 
ea ch other. Furthermore, while realism faces the difficulty of providing 
an acceptable method for translating theoretical terms, regardless of 
their degree of abstraction, into observational ones 
(37) 
, instrumentalism 
is not subject to this problem. This follows from the fact that an 
instrumentalist theory does not contain an 'existence postulate'. 
In contradistinction, instrumentalism is subject to some problems 
which realism does not face. One such problem is the fact that 
instrumentalism is compelled to deny the reality of such things as atoms, 
molocules, etc. which are almost universally regarded as empirically 
real entities on the basis of experimental investigations. The attempt 
of sceptical ins trument4 lists to hold to their epistemological doctrine,. 
while still acknowledging that what their theories state may turn out to 
be true, amounts to an attempt to dilute instrumentalism to enable it to 
deal with the above problem. Moreover, unlike realism, instrumentation 
leads to a utility-orientated account of progress in science. In other 
words, if theories cannot be said to have any factual content, then 
progress in science must be explained in terms of usefulness or utility. 
103 
However, usefulness is, at least in part, a historically add culturally 
bound concept, and therefore, it cannot serve as an acceptable basis 
in terms of which progress in science can be adequately dealt with. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
Feigl (1965: 472) points out that all these disciplines are "about 
science,, but that they are 'about' it in different ways". He (ibid. ) 
. 
explains the nature of these disciplines in this way: "The history 
of science traces the development of scientific problems, ideas 
and solutions, preferably within the entire socio-cultural context. 
The psychology of scientific discovery tries to account for the 
creative, -problem solving activities of the scientist in terms of the 
requisite mental processes. The sociologist of science tries to 
account for the development and reception of scientific theories 
and points of view. *Investigations of styles and fashions in 
scientific theorising, reflecting the 'zeigeist' of a given period 
of cultural, social, economic or political conditions clearly belong 
in this area of the sociology of knowledge". 
(2) For another excellent discussion of this point the reader. may consult 
FeigI (1965: 470-476). See also Harre" (1978). 
(3) The following treatment of inductivism is intended as a general 
background for the discussion of all inductivist approaches in the 
literature, including item and arrangement and tagmemics which are 
not dealt with in this thesis due to the lack of space. A previous 
version of this thesis included three more chapters on item and 
arrangement, item and process and Martinet's orthodox functionalism. 
(4) Singular statements may be defined, following Chalmers (1978: 2-3), 
as statements which "refer to a particular occurrence or state of 
affairs at a particular place at a particular time". 
(5) Following Chalmers (ibid: 3) universal statements may be defined as 
statements which "refer to all events of a particular kind at all 
places at all times". Popper (1959: 27) uses the terms singular 
statements and universal statements in more or less the same senses. 
(6) It may be noted here that philosophers and historians of science are 
not generally agreed on the importance of Bacon's contribution to 
philosophy of science or to science itself. Losee (1972: 6) points* 
out that "Francis Bacon is a controversial figure in the history of 
science". He explains this point by saying that for philosophers 
and scientists of his days Bacon was "the prophet" and "champion" 
of the "new inductive -experimental method" (ibid. ). For some 
modern philosophers of science "Bacon's role in science was 
analogous to the military role of the lame Greek poet Tyrtaeus. 
Tyrtaeus could not fight, but his war songs brought inspiration to 
those who could" (ibid. ). A similar attitude is expressed by 
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Harre" (1978: 38): "... . the inductive method is sometimes, with 
little justice, called the Baconian method. The chief exponents 
of the inductive method have been William of Ockham, John 
Herrschel and John Stuart Mill". 
(7) This requirement by Bacon is expressed by Losee as follows 
(1972: 62): "Bacon insisted that the first requirement of 
scientific method is that the natural philosopher should purge 
himself of prejudices and predispositions in order to become a 
child before nature ". 
(8) Errol Harris (1970: 21) sums up Bacon's contribution to the 
inductivist approach in this manner: "Francis Bacon was 
responsible for the idea that the first task of the scientist is to 
seek the facts in direct observation free from preconception and 
prejudice, to describe and classify these directly observed facts, 
and to propound hypotheses cautiously only after a prodigous 
number of such facts have been accurately recorded and correlated". 
(9) The attractions of naive inductivism are neatly expressed by Harre" 
(1978: 4) who, nevertheless, considers this approach to be "a very 
seductive theory of science"; he writes (ibid. ): "anduction] 
seems to be a hard-headed, straightforward, and empirically based 
view. Scientists are seen as steadily piling up facts, generalising 
them into laws, and piling up more facts, step by step in the 
laboratory. If you can infer the laws from the accumulated facts, 
you can deduce the facts again from the laws, and the content of 
the laws is nothing but the facts". 
(10) This point will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
Popper (1959: 27) says: "Now it is far from obvious, from a 
logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal 
statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any 
conclusion drawn this way may always turn out to be false: no 
matter how many instances of white swan we may have observed, 
this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white". 
(12) A, perhaps, more interesting example is Chalmers' elaboration of 
. 
Russell's story c; f the 'inductivist turkey' (Russell 1974). Chalmers' 
(1978: 13) elaboration of this story runs as follow. 5: "This turkey 
found that, on his first morning at the turkey farm, he was fed at 
9 a. m. However, being a good inductivist, he did not jump to 
conclusions. He waited until he had collected a large number of 
observations of the fact that he was fed at 9 a. m. , and he made 
these observations under a wide variety of circumstances, on' 
Wednesdays and Thursdays, on warm days and cold days, on 
rainy days and dry days. Each day he added another observation 
statement to his list. Finally his inductivist conscience was 
satisfied and he carried out an inductivist inference to conclude, 
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'I am always fed at 9 a. m. ' Alas, this conclusion was shown 
to be false in no uncertain manner when, on Christmas Eve, 
instead of being fed, he had his throat cut. An inductive 
inference with true premisses has led to a false conclusion". 
(13) Feigl (1965: 487) says ". ... Hume made'it clear that we cannot 
Justify the acceptance Of inductive validation by reference to 
the previous successes of these procedures. Only on pain of 
vicious circularity, or of an impossible and equally 'vicious' 
infinite regress, could this be done". 
(14) Popper (1969: 44) says that the "kind of repetition envisaged by 
Hume can never be perfect: the cases he has in mind cannot be 
cases of perfect sameness; they can only be cases of similarity. 
Thus they are repetitions only from a certain point of view. (What 
has the effect upon me as a repetition may not have this effect on 
a spider)". 
In connection with this justification Magee (1979: 21) says: "That 
the whole of scienceof all things, should rest on foundations 
whose validity it is impossible to demonstrate has been found 
uniquely embarrassing. It has turned many empirical philosophers 
into sceptics, or irrationalists, or mystics. ' Some it has led to 
religion". A similar view is expressed by Feigl (1965: 487): ' 
, "Hume's own sceptical solution simply rests its case by reference 
to the psychological regularities according to which beliefs and 
expectations are formed. This reduces inductive inferences to 
o ... 'animal faith', and does not provide a rational justification 
of any sort. The psychological account itself depends on inductive 
generalisations concerning the formation of expectations". 
(16) One such example is that of "the man'who dedicated his life to 
natural science, wrote everything he could observe, and 
bequeathed his private collection to the Royal Society to be used 
as inductive evidence" (1969: 46). Another example is this one: 
I tried to bring home the same point [about the logical 
priority of theory over observation3 to a group of physics students 
in Vienna by beginning a lecture with the instruction: - 'Take pencil 
and paper; carefully observe and write down what you have 
observed'. ' They asked, of course, what I wanted them to observe. 
Clearly the instruction 'Observe. ' is absurd". (ibid. ). 
(17) Hanson (1975* 19) adds that one other "influence on observations 
rests in the language or notation used to express what we know, 
and without which there would be little we could recognise as 
knowledge". This is a very interesting point, but a discussion 
of it here would take us very much outside the scope of this the. sis. 
(18) The term 'antedates' here means something like 'is logically prior to'. 
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(19) The name of this type of Justification of induction is a mere 
label, and the reader should not read too much in the term 
' pragmatic'. 
(20) Ignoratio elencht by redefinition means "any instance of ignoratio 
elenchi in which (i) the same sentence expresses both the 
proposition which ought to be'proved and the proposition which 
is confused with it, and where (ii) in the latter employment of 
the sentence one or more of its parts are used in a sense which 
is different from their ordinary sense or senses" (Edwards 1974: 30). 
(21) Popper (1974: 1031) rejects the naive view that there is such a 
thing as 'the scientific method' for generating new laws and 
theories. He explains this point as follows: "the idea that 
great scientists are master practitioners of a special method. 7 a 
special way which, if followed faithfully, must lead to success, 
that is, to a discovery, seems to me to be mistaken. It is 
refuted by the fact that some great scientists ( .... ) made only 
one great discovery, and though they continued in a life devoted 
to science, and did not stop producing work of considerable merit, 
they did not repeat their one outstandingly brilliant performance. 
The phenomenon is not rare, and this shows that great success 
was not explicable by their mastery of a method (whether or not 
its rules are consciously understood or followed unconsciously). 
This, however, is not to deny that all or most successful scientific 
activities have something in common: a flair for the important 
(and soluble) problem, the imagination which produces not one but 
many competing hypotheses and, above all, that critical attitude 
which, alone, might helpfully be described as a 'method': the 
method of severely criticising one's own ideas". 
(22) Popper supports this view by quoting Einstein as saying that: 
"'There is no logical path leading to (the laws of science]. They 
can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an 
intellectual love .... of the objects of experience" (1959: 3ý). 
(23) Magee (1979: 31) sums up Popper's view on this point in the 
following three points: "First, how I arrived at the theory has 
no bearing on its scientific or logical status. Second, the 
observations and experiments in question, far from giving rise 
to the theory' are partially derived from it, and are designed to 
test it. Thýd, at no point does induction come into'the matter". 
(24) In connection with this point, Popper (1959: 41) points out that 
the argument from the truth of observati. on statements to the falsity 
of universal ones is "the only strictly deductive kind of inference 
that proceeds, as it were, in the 'inductive direction'; that is 
from singular to universal statements". 
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(25) Popper does not demand that every single statement, in a theory 
'Imust in fact have been tested" before the theory is accepted, 
as long as every such statement is capable of being tested. 
See The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959: 47-48) for. a full 
discussion of this point. 
(26) Methodological rules are rules of method and not rules of pure 
logic. They are regarded as conventions, established and 
accepted by a community of scientists who share, more or less, 
the 'same' objectives. Popper (1959: 53-54) gives the 
following two rules as examples of methodological rules: 
W The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who 
decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any 
further tests, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, 
retires from the game. 
(ii) Once a hypothesis has, been proposed and tested, and has 
proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good 
reasone, 
(27) Popper, however, is careful to point out that the clash between 
his theory and conventionalism cannot be "settled merely by a 
detached theoretical discussi-on" (1959: 81). 
(28) For this reason 'conventionalism' might have been dealt with in 
the section on epistemology. However, the reason behind dealing 
with it here is based on the fact that it follows on from the 
hypothetico-deductivist approach quite neatly. 
(29) Bridgman (1938: 130) says "it appears that we are not dealing with 
anything new or definite enough to be dignified by being called 
any kind of an 'ism' 
(30) Concerning this point Bridgman (1938: 121) writes: "We ultimately 
have to assume from sheer weariness, if nothing else, that it is 
not necessary to carry out our specifications beyond a certain 
degree of refinement; the place we draw the line is .... dictated 
by experience". 
(31) Bridgman (1938: 119) says "operations are not ultimately sharp or 
irreducible any more than any other sort of creatur6. We always 
run into a haze eventually, and all our concepts are describable 
in spiralling approximation". 
(32) Lindsay (1956: 12) exemplifies this by "Planck's quantum of 
action"; constructs of this kind have "no direct connection with 
experience but[their unifying influence on large domains of 
physical phenomena 
)as 
been considered ample justification for 
their postulation". In my view, this criticism is only valid if 
we approach operationalism from an instrumentalist point of vien. 
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le (33) Harre (1978: 5) characterises epistemology as "the theory of 
knowledge"; he further adds: "In epistemological investigations 
we reflect on the standards to which genuine knowledge should 
conform, we try to characterise the kind of knowledge which a 
given method of study might yield about a certain sort of 
subject-matter, and how far that kind of knowledge conforms to 
what are taken to be standards of genuine or true knowledge". 
(34) Essentialism is alternatively known as 'naive realism'. See 
Popper (1969). 
(35) Popper (1969: 26) quotes the following lines from the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Xenophanes to represent his position concerning the 
conjectural nature of human knowledge: 
The Gods did not reveal, from the beginning, 
All things to us, but in the course of time, 
Through seeking we may learn, and know things better. 
But as for certain truth, no man has known it, 
Nor will he know it: neither of the Gods, 
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak. 
And even if by chance he were to utter 
The final truth, he would himself not know it; 
For all is but a woven web of guesses. 
(36) Twaddell (1966) seems to hold such a view; he, therefore, may 
be regarded as a sceptical instrumentalist, too. In other words, 
it appears that Twaddell does not commit himself entirely to 
either branch of instrumentalism. 
(37) The reader may refer to Mannoia (1980: pp. 66-67) for. a discussion 
of this point. 
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i 
MORPHOLOGY IN STRATIFICATIONAL GRAMMAR 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to deal with morphology in 
stratificational grammar, by concentrating on the different versions of 
this approach that have been proposed over the past two decades. 
As used in this thesis, the term 1stratificational grammar' refers to the 
linguistic theory originally proposed mainly by Lamb (1964,1966, 
1972(a) ), and later adopted by, mainly, a number of American linguists 
who, in their turn, contributed considerably towards its exposition and 
development. Among these linguists, the name of David Lockwood 
comes to the fore, as he has written the most detailed and accessible 
introduction to stratification grammar. 
This generally accepted delimitation of stratificational grammar 
excludes the work of two linguists whos e name s are sometimes linked 
with this approach; they are Gleason, Jr. and Reich. As far as the 
former linguist Is concerned, Lockwood (1972(a): 284) points out that he 
"arrived at stratificational ideas about linguistic structure independently 
of Lamb", and that he and Lamb "later began to influence each other's 
thinking and came to some basic agreements with regard to terminology". 
Gleason's main stratificationalist ideas can be found in one of his early 
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articles on the subject, namely "The Organisation of Language: A 
Stratificational View", published in the same volume of Monograph 
Series on Language and Linguistics (1964) in which Lamb's early 
. important article 
"On Alternation, Transformation, Realisation and 
Stratification", appeared. It would be interesting to compare the ideas 
of these two linguists on the nature and internal organisation of 
stratificational grammar at such an early stage to establish the extent' 
of agreement or/and difference between them; but such a task falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. However, suffice to say here that the 
views of these two linguists on the nature and organisation of a 
stratificational grammar are sufficiently different from each other to 
warrant the exclusion of Gleason's work from mainstream stratificationalism 
To this we may add the fact that Gleason has published very little on 
stratificational grammar, and that though he declares in one of his major 
works that his own "preference and conviction run to stratificational 
grammar" (1965: 243), he completely fails to apply this theory in the 
work concerned. 
Reich's views on the nature and organisation of a- stratificational 
grammar are vastly and fundamentally different from those of Lamb's and 
(2) 
his followers, and also from Gleason's This seems to spring from 
the fact that Reich's main interest in the phenomenon that is human 
language has, at least in its early stages, centred on the task of 
developing a framework "which could allow him to relate linguistic 
structure to the psychologists' view of language behaviour , 
(3) (Lockwood 
1972 (a): 289). Due to this, "Reich feels that the term 'relational 
network theory"is more appropriate to his ideas than 'stratifkcationall " 
(ibid. ). 
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There are two practical difficulties which face the outside 
researcher in stratificational grammar. The first one arises from the 
fact that there is a relatively small number of detailed studies of the 
different aspects of this theory. Consequently, the outside researcher 
sometimes finds himself groping in the dark in his attempts to understand 
and evaluate this approach. This point should be borne in mind in the 
evaluation of the present study of morphology in stratificational grammar. 
The second difficulty arises from the variation in terminology in 
the different works on stratificational grammar by the stratificationalists 
themselves. Lockwood (1972(a): 286) expresses this point as follows: 
"linguists attempting to find out about stratificational theory by reading 
the existing literature have sometimes been discouraged by the lack of 
correspondence in terminology and concepts among the various works". 
He (ibid. ) further adds that "even the works of Lamb show a considerable 
variability over the past decade. 
show still further variation" 
(4) 
0 
The works of other stratificationalists 
This feature of stratificational grammar 
has the adverse effect of making the task of dealing with, and evaluating, 
stratificational grammar much harder than it would otherwise have been. 
2. Stratificational Grammar And Other Schools of Linguistics 
In his review of Lamb's book Outline of Stratificational Grammar 
(1966), henceforth Outline, Hockett (1968) draws a comparison between 
stratificational grammar and transformational generative grammar in 
terms of their "stance" from the work of preceding generations of 
linguists. He (ibid: 145-46) writes: 
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"There is a sharp difference in flavour between the 
work of the stratif icationa lists and that of the 
transformationalists. The latter tend to adopt what 
has been called the 'eclipsing stance': none of the 
labours of earlier generations of linguists (at least 
from Grimm to Bloomfield inclusive) really accomplished 
anything; everything worthwhile starts with Chomsky. 
Lamb, on the other hand, finds much positive spirit in 
the work of almost every predecessor or contemporary 
- even Chomsky - and tries hard to provide a niche in 
his system for every genuinely useful notion of whatever 
origin". 
Though the above quotation does not, in my view, describe the 
situation in transformational grammar entirely accurately, it does so in 
stratificational grammar. Stratif icationa lists readily acknowledge their 
indebtedness to the work of other linguists, whether these linguists are 
their predecessors or contemporaries. Evidence of this may be found in 
Lamb's publications (e. g. 1966,1972(a) ) and, especially, in Lockwood's 
book Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics (1972(a) In this book, 
Lockwood devotes a whole chapter (pp. 250-270) to dealing with the 
It connections" between stratificational grammar and other views of 
language, specifying the areas in which stratificational grammar has been 
influenced by these views. According to him, the two main influences on 
stratificational grammar are Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics, and glossematics. It is not. my intention here to deal with 
the oft-made stratificationalist claim that glossematics is one of the 
"forerunners" of stratificational grammar# 
(5) 
as this will take us outside 
the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say here that the present writer 
has found very little evidence to support this claim in the works on 
stratificational grammar he has consulted. 
(6) 
The situation is different with respect to the influence of 
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Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics on stratificational 
grammar. This influence is historically traceable, and as it is dealt 
with in some detail by Lockwood (1972(a) ) there is no need to deal with 
it in its entirety here. There is, however, one aspect of this influence 
or connection which is worth concentrating on due to its relevance to 
the treatment of morphology in stratificational grammar that will follow 
later in this chapter. This is the fact that stratificational grammar Is 
rooted in the debate concerning the nature of the relationship between 
the morpheme and the phoneme in Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics. 
(7) 
Because of this, the major points of this debate will be 
dealt with in the following section. 
3. From The Morpheme To the Phoneme: 
3.1. The Bloomfieldian View 
(8) 
Bloomfield distinguishes two main types of unit of linguistic 
signalling: lexical and grammatical. Within the latter category 
Bloomfield deals with four different types of grammatical information: 
order, selection, modulation and phonetic modification; and within the 
former category he establishes a division between the lexically meaningless 
unit of the phoneme, on the one hand, and the lexically meaningful units 
of the morpheme, word, clause and sentence, on the other. The 
relationship between the lexically meaningful units of grammar is one of 
compositionality. This Is generally taken to mean that a word may consist 
of one or more morphemes, a phrase of one or more words, and so on up 
to the sentence level, though sentences contain intonation features in 
addition to their normal clause bases. What is of relevance here is not 
the nature of the distinction between the grammatical and lexical features 
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but the relationship between the minimal lexically meaningful unit, 
i. e. the morpheme, and the minimal lexically meaningless unit, i. e. 
the phoneme. 
Two views of Bloomfield's will be considered in dealing with 
the debate concerning the relationship between the morpheme and the 
phoneme. According to the first view, the morpheme is said to be 
directly composed of a string. of one or more phonemes. This view may 
be exemplified by the morpheme book which may be said to consist of the 
string of phonemes /b/, /u/ and /k/ in that order or arrangement. This 
view of the nature of the relationship between the morpheme' and the 
phoneme is not only contradictory - for, how could a linguistic object 
which, by definition, is said to consist of both form and meaning be 
directly wholly analysed into a string of one or more purely formal entities? 
- but is also unsuitable as a basis for a stratified view of human language, 
due to the fact that it leads to the treatment of the transition from phoneme 
to sentence as, simply, a matter of hierarchical ascendence on a, 
continuous and uninterrupted scale of linguistic units. In other words, 
this view of the nature of the relationship between the morpheme and the 
phoneme challenges the validity of the distinction 'meaningful versus 
meaningless' which holds between the morpheme and the phoneme and, 
therefore, seriously weakens the ability of this distinction to serve as 
a basis for a properly minimally stratified view of human language., In 
view of this, the stratificationalists are justified to a large extent in 
their claim that Bloomfield adopts a-mono-stratal view of human, natural 
language. 
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According to the second view of the relationship between the 
morpheme and the phoneme, the morpheme is not directly composed of 
phonemes, but is considered as a class or group ofalternants each 
one of which is said to consist wholly of a string of one or more 
phonemes. This view may be illustrated by the endings [- iz 1, E-Z I 
and [-s ] in the plural nouns -glasses pens and 
books which are treated 
as alternants of the plural morpheme in English, and which are said to 
consist of a string of one or more phonemes. It may also be exemplified 
by the treatment of 
Enaj fI and E najv I in, for example, The knife is 
blunt and The knives are blunt as alternants of the morpheme 'knife'. 
By definition, each one of these alternants may be exhaustively accounted 
for by specifying the set of phonemes which constitute it and their 
arrangement relative to each other wherever appropriate. It is clear 
that, in terms of this view, Bloomfield regards the relationship between 
the morpheme and the phoneme as neither direct, nor compositional, but 
as a complex relationship involving intervening alternants which, 
analogously with the first view, are said to consist of strings of one or 
more phonemes. 
In addition to being incompatible with zero-alternants which 
Bloomfield permits in his approach, the view that alternants are composed 
of phonemes harbours the inconsistency of treating as alternants of 
morphemes, which are units with both form and meaning, entities that, 
by definition, have form only. Looked at from a different angle, we 
may say that by virtue of the fact that the morpheme is a class or group 
of alternants, and by virtue of the fact that alternants consist of 
phonemes, it readily follows that the morpheme must be composed of 
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phonemes, a conclusion which is inconsistent with the view of the 
morpheme as a meaning-bearing unit. - This contradiction weakens the 
ability of the second view of the nature of the ýrelationship between the 
morpheme and the phoneme to serve as a basis for a validly minimally 
stratified view of human, natural language - 
The logical consequences of simultaneously adhering to the 
two views that (a) the morpheme entirely consists of phonemes, and 
(b) the morpheme is a class of phonemically different alternants are 
neatly established by Hockett (1961). Hockett (ibid: pp. 29-30) does 
this by constructing the following Slantilogism" "a triad of assertions 
any two of which imply the negation of the third": 
(1) Knife and_knive- (in knives (pl. ) ) are the same morpheme. 
(2) Knife and knive- are phonemically different. 
(3) A morpheme is composed of phonemes. 
He (ibid: 30) explains the logical contradictions contained in this 
antilogism and,. therefore, in the Bloomfieldian position concerning the 
relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme as follows: "If we 
(1) posit the first and third assertion as premisses, the conclusion is 
that knife and knive- are phonemically identical. If we (11) posit the 
second and the third as premisses, the conclusion is that knife and 
knive- are not morphemically the same. If we wish (111) to posit the 
first and second as our premisses, then we are forced to conclude that a 
morpheme is not composed of phonemes". 
The contradictory and problematic nature of Bloomfield's view of 
the relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme and, therefore, 
between grammar and phonology, was recognised by the neo-Bloomfieldlans, 
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particularly Harris (1942) and Hockett (1947), and by some of their 
contemporaries, particularly Swaddesh and Voegelin (1939). Their 
attempts to explain the nature of this relationship took two different 
directions. The first and older approach, proposed by Swaddesh and 
Voegelin, posits a complex and indirect route-between these two types 
of unit, which involves intervening morphophonemes. The second 
approach agrees with the former with respect to the view that the 
relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme is a complex, 
indirect one, but It differs from it in positing the morph as an intermediate 
entity between the two units we are concerned with here. I shall deal 
with these two approaches in some detail in the following two sections. 
3.2. Morpheme, 
_Morp ophoneme 
And Phoneme 
As has been mentioned towards the end of the preceding section, 
the first fully-fledged attempt during the neo-Bloomfieldian era at 
utilizing the morphophoneme method in relating the morpheme to the 
phoneme was first put forward by Swaddesh and Vogelin in their article 
"A Problem in Phonological Alternation" (1939). In this article, the 
authors propose the setting up of what might be called, for the lack of a 
better term, a pseudo-phonemic intermediate level between the 
morphemic and phonemic levels of language. The entities of this 
intermediate level are phoneme-size components of morphemes, called 
the morphophonemes. To relate the morphophonemes to the phonemes 
in the language, Swaddesh and Voegelin propose the employment of a 
special type of rule, called the "mechanical rule". Mechanical rules 
are better known in the literature as " morpho phonemic rules" (Lounsbury 
1966). The function of these rules is to specify the signalling of 
morphophonemes by phonemes. 
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To, explain how this model works, i. e. the manner in which it 
proposes to relate morphemes to phonemes, let us consider the following 
set of examples: fife, Live, knife. and_knive- (in knives (pl. ) ). Under 
this approach, the procedure of relating the morphemes fife, hive and 
knife to the phonemes in the language consists of the following two steps: 
(1) the-specification of the morphophonemic composition of each one 
of Ithese morphemes - 
thus MP/ f +-. a +j+f/, MP/ h+a+J, + v/, 
and MP/n +a +j + F/, -(9) and (2) the specification of the signalling 
by phonemes of each one of the morphophonemes in the above 
morphophonemic representations. This task is carried out by means of 
morphophonemic rules which 'convert', morphophonemes into phonemes. 
The morphophonemic rules in a linguistic description of English will, 
therefore, specify that every morphophoneme in the above morphophonemic 
representation, except for /F/, is signalled by one and the same phoneme 
in all relevant contexts in the language. The morphophoneme IFI in 
MP /najF/ is signalled either by the phoneme /V/ in the environment of 
the morphemes plural and third person singularand by the phoneme /f/ 
in all other contexts. This procedure may be schematically represented 
as follows: 
Morphemes: 11 fe3 ýhive3 
composed of composed of 
Morphophonemic 
I 
+a +j +f/ A +a + J'+ v/ Representation: 
signalled by i s na eI 
IIII IIwI 
Phonemic 
Representation: 
/f/ /a / /J / /f/ Al /a//J/ /v/ 
I knife3' 
composed of 
/Ti''+ aIi+ F/ 
IIII 
ignalled by IIIA 
n/ /a//J//f/ /v/ 
Fig. (1) 
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The above view of the nature of the relationship between the 
morpheme and the phoneme is incompatible with the Bloomfieldian 
concept of the morpheme as a meaningful unit. This follows from the 
fact that morphophonemes, which are said to make up morphemes, are 
meaningless entities. 
It is, however, not this contradiction which led many neo- 
Bloomfieldians to show very little enthusiasm for this view of dealing 
with'the relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme, but the 
fact that this approach was thought to result in the setting up of 
. linguistic units, i. e. the morphophonemes, and the application of 
linguistic techniques, i. e. morphophonemic rules, which were regarded 
as 'fictitious' elements lacking in linguistic reality. This attitude 
towards the morphophoneme is expressed by Lounsbury (1966: 381) 
according to whom this unit Is a "fictitious construct once removed from 
reality". similarly, morphophonemic rules are from the synchronic 
point of view thought to be no more than fictitious devices that lack in 
empirical content. 
In addition to clashing with the more or less phenomenalist view 
of linguistic structure advocated by the vast majority of the neo-Bloomfieldians, 
the notion of morphophonemic rule was considered to be inappropriate in 
the statically-oriented field of synchronic linguistics. Generally 
speaking, the neo-Bloomfieldians preferred a static mode of description 
in the field of synchronic linguistics to a dynamic-process one, due to 
the "moving part" or "historical analogy" implicit in the latter (Hockett 
1954: 211). Lounsbury (1966: 379) expresses this attitude by his 
reference. to the morphophoneme method as the "method of internal 
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reconstruction", and by devoting an entire section in his article "The 
Method of Descriptive Morphology" (ibid. ) for dealing with the nature 
of the "relation of morphophonemic forms to historical forms" in the 
morphophoneme approach. This similarity between the process of 
setting up morphophonemic forms in synchronic linguistics and the 
process of historical reconstruction in phonology or phonemics is 
explicitly stated by the proponents of the morphophoneme approach for 
relating morphemes to phonemes; Swaddesh and Voegelin (1939: 2) write: 
"The most efficient formulation of the synchronic facts 
is ordinarily not the same as a reconstruction of the actual 
historical developments, but the process of constructing 
morphophonemic formulae has some resemblance to that of 
historico-phonological recognition". 
3.3 Morpheme, Morph And Phoneme 
The first fully-fledged statement of the-morph approach for 
relating morphemes to phonemes in language is put forward by Harris 
in his article "Morpheme Alternants in Linguistic Analysis" published in 
1942. According to this approach, the relationship between the 
morpheme and the phoneme is a complex and indirect one. The morpheme, 
which is the minimal grammatical unit, is considered as a class of one 
or more alternants. Alternants, except for zero alternants, are viewed 
as strings of one or more phonemes. And the alternants of a morpheme 
must satisfy the following three conditions: 
(a) they must have the same meaning; 
(b) they must be mutually exclusive with respect to their environments 
or contexts of occurrence; and 
(c) their total distribution or environments must not be greater than the 
distribution or environment of one single alternant of another morpheme. 
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Harris' view of the 'morph' method differs from the second 
Bloomfieldian view for relating morphemes to phonemes, in which the 
'alternant' concept is employed, in three major respects. Firstly, 
whereas Bloomfield's alternants seem to be on the same level of 
abstraction as the morphemes of which they are members, Harris' 
alternants are at a lower level of abstraction than the morphemes to 
which they belong. Secondly, whereas Bloomfield appears to apply 
the alternant concept only when dealing with variable morphemes, i. e. 
with morphemes that are said to have two or more alternants, Harris 
applies the notion alternant to all morphemes, regardless of whether 
they have one or more exponents. Thirdly, unlike Harris, Bloomfield 
does not concentrate on the crucial issue of providing criteria for 
classifying alternants as members of the same morpheme. 
Harris' view of the nature of the morpheme and of the relationship 
between this unit and the phoneme was the subject of much discussion 
and debate during the neo-Bloomfieldian era. One of the main participants 
I 
in this debate was Hockett who, in his article "Problems of Morphemic 
Analysis" (1947), proposed two revisions in this approach. The first 
revision is a terminological one. It involves the replacement of the term 
'morpheme alternant', employed by Harris, by the term 'morph' by analogy 
with the term 'phone' in phonology; it also involves the employment of 
the term 'allomorph', by analogy with the term 'allophone' in phonology, 
to designate the morph of a morpheme having as members two or more 
morphs. The second revision advocated by Hockett proposes the 
substitution of the "class-member relation" between the morpheme and 
its alternants or morphs by a relation of 'representation. In accordance 
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with this revision, the morpheme can no longer be regarded as a class 
9 
or group of alternants, but as an abstract indivisible unit which is 
represented by a set of one or more morphs. The following quotation 
from Hockett's classic article "Two Models of Grammatical Description" 
(1954: 215) expresses these two revisions: 
"A morpheme may appear in more than one phonemic 
shape. A single shape of a morpheme is a MORPH; the 
various morphs which are the shapes or REPRESENTATIONS 
of one and the same morpheme are its ALLOMORPHS". 
The motivation behind the first revision pertains to considerations 
of terminological neatness which, in this context, is part and parcel of 
the desire to explicate the parallelism between grammar and phonology 
in neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. 
The second revision is intended to obviate some of the 
difficulties associated with the notion 'class' in Harris' characterisation 
of the morpheme. Whereas it is from the set-theoretical viewpoint 
sufficient only to list the members of a class to describe that class 
exhaustively, this is not the case with the morpheme as a class of 
morpheme alternants or morphs, since for the purposes of an exhaustive 
description of the morpheme in terms of its alternants, the describer 
must not only specify the entire set of alternants which are circumscribed 
under this morpheme, but must also provide their contexts of occurrence. 
This boils down to saying that the view of the morpheme as a class of 
morphs does not provide an adequate basis for an exhaustive description 
of morphemes in human languages. 
The second revision also overcomes some of the logical 
difficulties connected with the recognition of such phenomena as empty 
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and portmanteau morphs in neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. Lamb 
(1966: 33) expresses these difficulties as follows: 
"To take account of empty realisation with the 
morpheme as a class would mean recognising entities 
which are members of non-existent classes; no 
version of set theory accommodates such a notion.... 
The same is true of portmanteau, since it would involve 
an entity being a member simultaneously of two classes, 
but only when they are concatenated. This is not the 
same as the relationship of membership in two or more 
separate classes". 
To illustrate how the morph method for relating morphemes to 
phonemes works, let us consider the examples fife, hive, knife and 
knive- (in knives (pl. ) ) which have been dealt with in the treatment 
of the morphophoneme method above. Under the morph approach, the 
procedure for relating the set of morphemes fife, hive and knife in the 
above examples, to the phonemes in the language consists of the 
following two steps: 
(1) the specification of the set of morphs which represent each one of 
these morphemes, together with their contexts of occurrence. In terms 
of this step, we may say that the morphemes 
tfife] 
and 
jhive3 
are 
represented in all their contexts of occurrence by the morphs /faif/ and 
/liajv/ respectively; and that the morpheme 
jknifej is represented by' 
the allomorph /naJv/ in the context of the plural morpheme and by the 
allomorph /najf/ in all other contexts; and 
(2) the specification of the phonemic composition of each'one of the 
morphs involved - thus /f -+ a+i+ f/, A+a+i+ v/, /n + a'+ + v/ 
and /n+a+j +f/. 
This procedure may be schematically represented as follows: 
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Morphemes: ffife3 
I 
represented by 
Morphs: /N j f/ 
I 
. .... posed of 
Phonemic 
Compos ition: /f+a+j+f/ 
f hive3 
... 
I 
ýknife 
I 
represented by represe nted-by 
/liaiv/ I 
AajNi/ /haj f/ 
composed of 
led 
of comp 
I 
con, v,,.,;, 
A+ a+j +v/ /n+a+j+v/ /n +a +j +f/ 
Fig. (2) 
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The almost universal preference of the morph method over the 
morphophoneme one in the neo-Bloomfieldian era is based on the 
assumption that morphs, unlike morphophonemes, ate structurally 
significant units which occur in spoken utterances. - In other words, 
the morph method was regarded as superior to the morphophoneme method 
because it was thought to deal with the "segmentation of actual utterances 
rather than with constructs once removed from reality" (Lounsbury 1966: 
381). This preference is also related to the fact that the morph method, 
by virtue of being a static approach, was thought to be more appropriate 
than the dynamic morphophoneme method for dealing with synchronic 
phenomena. 
3.4 The Two Approaches Compare 
The two preceding approaches rest on the fundamental assumption 
that the relationship between morphemes and phonemes - and, therefore, 
between morphemics and phonemics - is "compound not simple" 
(Hockett 1961). The morphophoneme and morph are regarded as stepping 
stones between the morpheme and phoneme in the morphophoneme and 
morph approach, respectively. According to the former approach, 
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morphophonemes are treated as phoneme-size entities of which 
morphemes are composed, and they are said to be signalled by phonemes 
on the level of phonemics. According to the latter approach, morphs 
are generally regarded as morpheme-size entities by which morphemes 
are represented, and they are said to consist of phonemes. 
Morphophonemes and morphs, in their respective approaches, are said 
to belong to an intermediate level between morphemics and phonemics, 
which inter-level is generally designated by the term 'morpho phone mi cs'. 
The difference between these two approaches may be schematically 
represented by the following diagram: 
Morpheme 
I 
'R' 
I 
Morph- 
Icl Morphophoneme 
I 
ISO 
Oct Phoneme 
Fig. (3) 
These two approaches also differ from each other in that whereas 
the 'R' relation in the morph approach is a static relation, the 'S' relation 
in the morphophoneme method is a dynamic one. The 'S' relation is, 
however, amenable to a static interpretation. This can be achieved by 
viewing this relation as a relation of representation, thus replacing the 
mechanical or morphophonemic rules proposed by Swaddesh and Voegelin 
(1939) by statements of representation of the type employed in the morph 
ap proa ch. As a matter of fact, such a static re-interpretation of the 
morphophoneme approach is adopted by Hockett in his article "Linguistic 
Elements and Their Relations"(1961), to be dealt with in the next section, 
and also by the stratificationalists. The precise manner in which the 
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stratificationalists incorporate the morphophoneme in their theoretical 
framework will become clear later'In this chapter. 
3.5 Hockett: "Linquistic Elements and Their Relations" 
S. 1A Prelude 
As has been indicated in section (2) above, stratificational 
grammar is, deeply rooted in Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics. In dealing with the nature of this relationship, Lockwood 
(1972(a): 251) singles out Hockett's influence on the development of 
stratificational grammar for a special mention: "Of the neo-Bloomfieldian 
ideas which have entered into stratificational thinking, perhaps the 
greatest number are to be found in the work of Charles Hockett". The 
importance of Hockett from the stratif icationa list point of view is that 
he "went further than any of the other prominent neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguists to dispel the essentially monostratal view held'by Bloomfield 
himself", and, more significantly, that he "maintained an explicitly 
stratified view of language, albeit only with two strata" (Lockwood 
ib id: 25 2). Hockett's paper "Linguistic Elements and Their Relations" 
I 
is generally thought to embody his most fully-fledged 'stratificationalist' 
views on the nature of natural language. 
However, Hockett disputes on historical grounds the correctness 
of the stratif icationa lists' claim that their theory, albeit only in part, 
is rooted in his ideas. In a footnote in his review of Lamb's Outline 
(1966), Hockett (1968: fn (3), p. 146) states that "Lamb's stratificational 
thinking began before the appearance of Emy paper "Linguistic Elements 
and Their Relations" quite independently of my own, although his 
earliest publications on the theory are later". ' Moreover, in this review, 
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Hockett's explicitly rejects the idea, or principle, of stratification 
completely, including the realisation of this principle in his above- 
mentioned article and in Lamb's stratificational grammar; he (ibid: 153) 
writes: 
"The scientist's basic right is the right to be wrong. 
Negative results are valuable. Lamb has made a worthy 
and honourable contribution to our understanding of our 
language, by exploring, in direct detail, a certain notion 
of language design (Le. stratificationalism), and by 
showing - even thouýý he himself does not see it yet - 
that the notion is unfruitful. I am thankful to him for 
this, especially since I don't think I would have had the 
patience to follow out the implications of my own 
primitive stratificationalist views of 1961 to the point 
of exposing the underlying fallacy". 
Despite Hockett's rejection of the 'principle of stratification 
and all its extant realisations, and regardless of whether or not Lamb 
was actually influenced by Hockett's stratificationalist ideas in 
developing his theory in its early stages, it is worth investigating 
these ideas, in order to establish the degree of resemblance between 
them and the very early versions or models of stratificational grammar. 
3.5.2 Hockett's I Stratificattona list' Views 
Hockett (1961) puts forward what he calls the "duality hypothesis" 
concerning the structure of human language. This hypothesis is said to be 
constituted by two interrelated propositions (ibid: 45): 
(a) "it is not possible to say that morphemes are composed of phonemes"; 
and 
"at least two strata of linguistic patterning, grammatical and 
phonological, must be recognised". 
Hockett (ibid. ) points out that this hypothesis is an empirical 
hypothesis in the sense that it "cannot be proved nor disproved by 
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deductive gymnastics, but only by empirical study of the way that 
languages function in human affairs". In justifying this hypothesis, 
Hockett. (ibid: 48) points out that "since there are always vastly more 
morphemes in any language than there are ultimate phonological elements, 
a language has duality of patterning and would retain that duality even 
if all morphophonemic irregularities were to disappear". 
Within each stratum, there is a hierarchy of elements of 
different size-levels. Except for the highest level elements which 
cannot be said to be components in anything else, and the lowest level 
ones which cannot be said to be composed of anything else, all other 
elements on each stratum may be said to consist of elements of the level 
next below, and/or to be components of elements on the level immediately 
above .U 
1) On the grammatical stratum words, for example, may be said 
to consist of morphemes and/or to be components or constituents In 
phrases. In a similar manner, phonemes in phonology may be said to 
consist of phonological components, I. e. distinctive features, and/or 
to be components in syllables which are the elements on the next higher 
level. The tactics of each stratum is specified in terms of the 
composition relations which hold between the different types of elements 
on each stratum. This composition relation is a simple not a compound one. 
According to Hockett, the relation between the grammatical and 
phonological stratum is neither entirely a relation of 'representation, 
followed by a relation of 'composition', as is advocated by the proponents 
of the morph approach, nor entirely a relation of 'composition' followed by 
a relation of 'representation', as is the case in the morphophoneme method 
in its static interpretation, but a 'programming into' relation, symbolized 
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as IPI, which may be resolved in either of the above two fashions, or 
by employing these two methods conjointly in the following manner: 
Morpheme 
Oct Morphophoneme Morph 
I 
'RI 
Phoneme 
Fig. (4) 
The choice of method for resolving the 'programming into' 
relation in a given language is governed by considerations of simplicity 
and neatness of description. Of two or more competing methods for 
decomposing the 'programming Into' relation in a language, that one which 
leads to the setting up of the simplest description is selected. Different 
methods for decomposing the 'programming into' relation may, therefore, 
be employed in dealing with different languages; and such differences 
of method in description are thought to reflect 'real' structural differences 
between languages. Hockett (1961: 35) expresses this point in the 
following manner: 
"If one language (or one part of a language) seems 
more easily handled with one decomposition of the 
relation P, and another language (or part of a language) 
is more easily handled with a different decomposition, 
then these are differences between the languages (or 
parts of languages)". 
There isin Hockett's viewla fundamental difference in the status 
of morphemes and phonemes, on the one hand, and morphs and 
morphophonemes, on the other. Wbereas the former are regarded as 
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real linguistic units that are structurally significant, the latter are 
considered as "intervening variables" or as "ARTIFACTS OF ANALYSIS or 
CONVENIENCES FOR DESCRIPTION" (ibid: 42). The purpose of morphs 
and morphophonemes is not to account for any inherent properties of 
language, but to enable the describer to relate the grammatical stratum 
to the phonological one by setting up cross-stratal connections in a 
neat and economical fashion. In contradistinction, morphemes and 
phonemes play a crucial role in the statement of stratal tactics. The 
reality of morphemes and phonemes is based on the fact that they are 
considered to be tactically relevant, whereas the fictionality of morphs 
and morphophonemes is based on the fact that they are considered to be 
onlv realisationally significant. 
This combination of realism and fictionalism in dealing with 
natural language results in a simple, but fundamental, contradiction. 
For if morphemes are real, structurally significant entities, how could 
they be said either to consist of morphophonemes, or*to be represented 
by morphs which, i. e. morphophonemes and morphs, are purely f ictionalist 
constructs? In other words, how could either the components of something 
which is structurally real, or the manifestations of that thing, be said to 
be mere fictions? To eliminate this contradiction one would have to 
regard everything about language either as fictional, or as real, but not 
as both. As shall be seen later in this chapter, the stratificationalists 
favour the latter solution, at least in principle. 
Similarly, if the 'programming into' relation is a fictionalist 
notion, how could differences in the manner in which this relation is 
resolved in different languages be said to reflect structural differences 
between those languages? 
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Moreover, Hockett's views concerning the structure of language 
reveal more or less the same contradiction as that exhibited by 
Bloomfield's view that morphemes consist of phonemes. According to 
Hockett morphemes may be meaningful, but meaningfulness is not a 
criterion of morpheme identity. Whereas, in terms of this view, it is 
not contradictory to say that morphemes which are meaningless either 
consist of morphophonemes, -or are represented by morphs - due to the 
fact that entities of this type are of a purely formal nature - it is 
contradictory to say that meaningful morphemes in a language consist 
of morphophonemes. Similarly, whereas it is not contradictory in terms 
of this view of the morpheme to say that words, which by definition are 
meaningful entities, consist of combinations of meaningful morphemes, 
It is contradictory to say either that words consist of combinations of 
meaningful and meaningless morphemes, or that they consist of 
meaningless morphemes only. In my opinion, these contradictions 
challenge the validity of the claim that Hockett presents a fully-fledged 
stratificationalist view of the nature of human language. 
4. MorphologY In Stratificational Grammar 
Generally speaking, it is possible to identify three different 
phases in the development of stratificational grammar: the pre-Outline 
phase, the Outline phase and the post-Outline phase. The first phase 
encompasses three different models of this theory, spanning the period 
from 1957 to 1965. It is, especially, in the early models of this phase 
that stratificational grammar most clearly reveals its neo-Bloomfieldian 
origins. The second phase is constituted by the Outline model; this 
model is presented in Outline of Stratificational Grammar (1966) which 
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is the most comprehensive single work on stratificational grammar by 
Lamb to date. The third phase is constituted by the model worked out 
by Lamb and his collaborators in the early seventies. This model is 
presented by Lamb in an important article entitled "The Crooked Path 
of Progress in Cognitive Linguistics" (1972), and more extensively by 
Lockwood in his book Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics (1972(a) ). 
In the following few sections I shall deal with the development 
of morphology in stratificational grammar by concentrating on the different 
models of this theory in the above-mentioned phases. Due to what 
might be called, for the lack of a better term, the 'organic unity' of 
the stratal systems in stratificational grammar, the following discussion 
will inevitably involve a great deal of reference to other stratal systems, 
particularly the adjacent phonemic and lexemic stratal systems. 
4.1 The Pre-Outline Phase 
4.1.1 The First Model 
The first public presentation of Lamb's ideas on the nature and 
organisation of human language came in a paper he delivered to the 
Linguistics group at Berkley in 1957, and in his doctorate dissertation 
submitted at- Berkley in the same year (Lamb 1972(a) ). In dealing with 
Monachi, an American Indian language of California, Lamb came to the 
conclusion that there was another level, a level of alternation, between 
the morphemic and phonemic levels of neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. 
Lamb points out that this intermediate level involves two types of 
alternation: a higher level alternation between morpheme-size units 
with morphologically conditioned distribution, and a lower level 
alternation between phoneme-size units with phonologically conditioned 
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distribution. Lamb adopts the neo-Bloomfieldian term ' morpho phonemics' 
to designate this intermediate level of human language. This 
intermediate level is said to be as structurally or linguistically real 
as the other two levels of human language. As a result of this, the 
morphemes in this early Lambian model, called morphemes (2), are said 
to be at a structurally higher level of abstraction than the neo-Bloomfieldian 
p 
morphemes. Lambian morphemes are realised by morpheme-size units, 
called morphemes (1), which roughly correspond to the neo-Bloomfieldian 
morphs. Morphemes (1) are said to consist of morýhophonemes which, 
in turn, are said to be realised by phonemes. Phonemes are said to 
consist of phonemic components. This three-tier system of language 
design may be schematically represented as follows (the symbols R' 
and 'C' in this diagram stand for the relation "is realised by" and "is 
composed of" respectively): 
Morpreme (2) 
Morphyhoneme < C, Morpheme (1) 
'R' 
Phonemic ICI-Phoneme 
Component 
F ig. (5) 
Except for the fact that morphophonemics is established as a 
structurally fully-fledged level of human language, Lamb's view of 
language-design at this stage in the development of stratificational 
grammar is essentially neo-Bloomfieldian in character. Lamb rejects 
the Bloomfieldian view according to which morphemes are composed of 
phonemes, replacing it by the neo-Bloomfieldian view that the relationship 
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between morphemes and phonemes', and, therefore, between morphemics 
and phonemics, is a compound and not a simple one. The manner in 
which this relationship is decomposed by Lamb resembles to a great 
extent the manner In which it is decomposed by Hockett in fig. (4) above. 
Lamb also agrees with the neo-Bloomfieldians with respect to the view 
of the inappropria'cy of process-type models for the purposes of 
synchronic description. The preference for a static mode of description 
over a dynamic one, in the realm of synchronic linguistics, is one of 
the most abiding neo-Bloomf ieldian -features of 
stratificational grammar. ý 
]Furthermore, Lamb's distinction between a higher level alternation and a 
lower level one in morphophonemics is somewhat based on the well-known 
neo-Bloomfieldian distinction between morphological and phonological 
conditioning. The lack of interest In semantics, and the treatment of 
the whole of grammar in one component as it were, i. e. without dividing 
it into morphology and syntax, further reveal the neo-Bloomfieldian nature 
of Lamb's early model. 
The similarity between Lamb's early model'and neo-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics is also manifested by the contradiction it exhibits w-ith respect 
to the nature of the relationship between the morpheme and, the phoneme. 
Since, it seems, Lamb does not regard meaningfulness as a criterion of 
morpheme identity, though morphemes may be meaningful, Lamb's early 
model exhibits the same range of contradictions as those exhibited by 
Hockett's (1961) model, which contradictions are dealt with in the last 
paragraph of section 3.5.2. 
4.1.2 The Second Model 
The second model of stratificational grammar had its first public 
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presentation in a paper which Lamb read to the Linguistic Society , 
towards the end of 1961 (see Lamb 1972(a): 18). In this paper Lamb 
suggests the replacement of the term 'level', which he employs In the 
first model to refer to an organisationally distinct portion of human 
language, by the term 'stratum'; here, the term 'stratum' is used to 
refer to a "realisationally defined level" of human language (ibid. ). 
Lamb also suggests in this paper the replacement of his earlier three- 
level model by a four-stratum one (see fig. 6 below). 
This paper was soon followed in 1962 by an informally published 
Outline of Stratificational Grammar. However, the most important work 
in this period is Lamb's paper "On Alternation, Classification, 
Transformation and Stratification" published in 1964. In this paper 
Lamb argues that the relationship between the different levels of 
structure generally recognised by linguists cannot be properly accounted 
for either in terms of alternation (Bloomfield), or classification (Harris), 
or even by means of the powerful device of transformation which Chomsky 
advocates. He further argues that the only appropriate and 'legitimate' 
method for relating the different levels of language to each other is that 
of realisation. This relation consists of a small set of elementary 
relationships, namely diversification, neutralisation, zero -rea I isation, 
empty realisation, composite realisation, portmanteau realisation and 
anataxis. These different types of elementary realisation relationships, 
re-christened as interstratal discrepancies in later models, will be dealt 
with later in this chapter. 
Research in this period also revealed that each stratum of 
language has its own tactics or syntax which deals with the constructional 
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aspect of that stratum. However, the nature of the interlock between 
the tactical portion of a stratum and its realisational portion was left 
unresolved. The four strata of human language recognised by this 
model are, from top to bottom, the sememic stratum, the lexemic 
stratum, the morphemic stratum and the phonemic stratum. This model, 
including the different types of linguistic unit which appear on each 
stratum, may be schematically represented as follows (adapted from 
Lamb 1972(a): 20): 
(Sememics) 
(Lexemics) 
(Morphemics) 
(Phonemics) Phonon 
Phonetic Component 
Fig. (6) 
The phonons, morphons, lexons and semons are regarded as the 
minimal units of the phonemic, morphemic, lexemic and sememic strata 
respectively. The -emes on each stratum are said to consist of -ons 
on that stratum; alternatively, we may say that the -ons of each stratum 
combine with each other to form the -emes of that stratum. The tactics 
of each stratum operate on the -emes of that stratum to define the set of 
well-formed -emic constructions on that stratum. Each stratum is 
related to the adjacent stratum or strata via the realisation relationship. 
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It is clear from figure (6) above that the morphemic stratum in 
this model is roughly on the same level of abstraction as the . 
morphophonemic level of the previous model respectively. As there is 
virtually no discussion of the morphemic stratum in this model in the 
literature I have consulted, I shall refrain from dealing with it any 
further here. 
4.1.3 The Third Model 
Further research on the organisation of language from the 
stratificationallst point of view concentrated on the nature of the inter- 
connections between the different types of elementary realisation 
relationships whose function is to account for inter-stratal discrepancies. 
This research revealed that the relationships concerned are "systematically 
ordered with respect to one another, so that a 'full-stratum' of difference, 
say from lexons to morphons, consists of several steps rather than just 
one big one with all the realisational relationships in a single bundle" 
(Lamb 1972(a): 21). It also resulted in the setting up and employment of 
the now familiar graphic notation of stratificational grammar. This 
graphic notation appears to have led to another development in 
stratificational grammar, namely the treatment of language not as a 
system of units and relationships but as a system of relationships only. 
According to this view of the nature of human language, such things as 
morphons, morphemes, lexons, etc. are not units or objects in the 
conventional sense of the term, but are mere positions in the network of 
linguistic relationships. The third model may be schematically 
represented as follows (Lamb 1972(a): 22). 
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Basic Sememe- Semotactics 
(c) 
I (b) 
Semon Sememe 
Lexotactics 
sic Lexeme 
I 
(b) 
Lexon -Lexeme 
Basic Morpheme Morphotactics 
I 
(b) 
orp on Morpheme 
(a) 
Basic Phoneme 
Phonotactics 
(c) 
(b) 
Phonon__ -Phoneme 
a: anataxis, zero realisation, empty realisation 
b: diversification, neutralisation, portmanteau realisation, zero 
realisation 
c: composite realisation 
Fig. (7) 
(12) 
This model presents a more complex or elaborate picture of the 
organisation of human language than the previous one. For example, 
whereas there is one intermediate 'level' between, say, the lexons and 
the morphons in the -second model, there are two intermediate levels 
between them in the model presently under consideration, namely the 
basic morpheme and the morpheme. This difference stems from the fact 
that the new model recognises two alternation patterns in each stratal 
system: 
(13) 
a higher 'alternation pattern, involving anata xis, zero 
realisation and empty realisation, and a lower 'alternation pattern' 
involving divdrsification, neutralisation, portmanteau realisation, zero 
realisation and composite realisation. The division of the alternation 
patterns into 'higher' and 'lower' is carried out by reference'to the tactics 
of a stratal system. 
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A distinction is also made in the new model between a stratal 
system and a linguistic stratum. This distinction may be exemplified 
by reference to morphemics. The morphemic stratal system of the 
morphemic component of language consists of the basic morphemes, the 
morphemes and the morphons, the realisational interconnections between 
them, and the morphotactics. The morphemic stratum, which is only a 
sub-part of the morphemic stratal system, consists of the morphemes, 
their constituent morphons and the realisational relationship of 
composition between them. 
The tactics of the morphemic stratal system operates on the basic 
morphemes to specify the set of well-formed morphemic constructions in 
the language. Since the basic morphemes of this model are at a higher 
level of abstraction than the morphemes of the preceding level, it 
follows that the tactics of the former model operate on a higher level of 
abstraction than the tactics of the latter one. 
Roughly speaking, the basic morpheme, morpheme and morphon 
of the present model correspond to the morpheme, morphemic sign and 
morphon of the Outline model, respectively. This model will be 
extensively dealt with in the next section. 
4.2 The'Outline Phase 
Lamb's book Outline of Stratificational Grammar (1966) presents 
the only model of this phase. Despite its brevity, .. 
the afore-mentioned 
book constitutes the most fully-fledged statement of the stratificationalist 
approach by Lamb. However, Lamb does not offer any detailed 
explanation or presentation of evidence in support of the view of human 
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language proposed in this model. As a result of this, the non- 
stratificationalist often finds himself groping in the dark in his attempts 
to understand the rationale behind some of the points put forward by 
Lamb In this model, and. the precise nature of some of the important 
features in it. This point should be borne in mind in the process of 
evaluating the following discussion. 
4.2.1 The Notation System And The Basic Types Of Node 
Stratificationalists propose three different methods for presenting 
linguistic structure. The first method is the well-known method of a 
technical language, i. e. the employment of a quasi-natural language 
in a rigorous and precise manner. The second method is that of quasi- 
algebraic formulae which are accompanied by explicitly stated 
interpretative conventions. The third method involves the employment 
of a special graphic notation system which consists of various types of 
nodes inter-connected by lines. This notation system is one of the 
most striking features of stratificational grammar, at least at a 
superficial level. 
From a logical point of view, the above methods are equivalent 
ways for expressing linguistic structure. From a practical point of view, 
however, the first two methods are superior to the last one in dealing 
with large portions of linguistic structure. In dealing with small portions 
of linguistic structure, the third method is superior to the other two 
methods. The superiority of this method is also based on the fact that 
(a) it accords with the stratificationalist tenet that language is a system 
of relationships, (b) it gives a visually direct expression of linguistic 
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structures and (c) it serves as the basis for the simplicity measure in 
stratificational grammar. This principle constitutes the main criterion 
for choosing between competing solutions formulated in accordance with 
stratificational grammar. 
(14) 
It has been mentioned above that linguistic graphs consist of 
various types of nodes which are interconnected by lines. The. Outline 
model contains eight basic types of node which are specified by means 
of three "fundamental dichotomies": (i) and: or (ii) upward: downward 
and (iii) ordered: unordered. The following is a list of these nodes with 
their schematic representation: 
(1) Unordered Downward And 
(2) Unordered Downward Or 
(3) Unordered Upward And 
(4) Unordered Upward Or 
(5) Ordered Downward And 
(6) Ordered Downward Or 
(7) Ordered Upward And 
(8) Ordered Upward Or 
Unordered 
Downward And Or And Or 
admp 
bcef nAo qr 
Upward 
u 
y. 
Ix 
Ordered 
(15) 
F ig. 
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It is very difficult to give one general statement to express 
the functions of the land' and 'or' nodes in stratificational grammar, 
due to the fact these nodes assume different interpretations according 
to, particularly, whether they are 'downward' or 'upward'. For instance, 
whereas the 'downward unordered or' node expresses the relationship of 
- diversification, the 'upward unordered or' node expresses the relationship 
of neutralisation. The functions expressed by the different types of 
nodes given above, except for the 'upward unordered or' which is not 
used in stratificational grammar, will be explained later in this chapter. 
'Ordering' with respect to an land' node is a matter of temporal 
ordering or sequential arrangement, while it is a matter of priority of 
choices with respect to an 'or' node. 'Unordering' with respect to an 
land' node expresses simultaneity of occurrence; and with respect to 
an #or' node it expresses the lack of priority among the different choices 
circumscribed under the node concerned. 
It is clear from the afore-mentioned explanation of the 'ordering' 
and 'unordering' relations, that these relations have fundamentally 
different interpretations on the basis of whether they are in construction 
with an 'and' or an 'or' node. Whereas ordering versus unordering with 
respect to an 'and' node express the presence as opposed to the absence 
of temporal priority or sequential arrangement between elements, they 
express the presence as opposed to the absence of priority of choice(s) 
between elements with respect to an 'or' node. And since 'temporal 
priority' is an entirely different concept from 'priority of choice', it 
follows that the lordered: unordered' dichotomy with respect to 'and' nodes 
is fundamentally different from that with respect to 'or' nodes. This 
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implies that instead of one 'ordered' versus 'unordered' dichotomy in 
stratificational grammar, there are two dichotomies: one relevant to 
'and' nodes and the other to 'or' nodes. This in turn implies that the 
two 'ordered: unordered' dichotomies are dependant on the 'and: or' 
dichotomy, a situation which is incompatible with the stratificationalist 
claim that the dichotomies are logically independent of each other. 
The relations 'upward' and 'downward' mean 'towards meaning' 
and 'towards expression' respectively. Lamb (1966: 9) points out that 
this interpretation of these two relations is "in keeping with the 
diagramming conventions according to which meaning is at the 'top' and 
speech at the 'bottom' of linguistic structure". 
The 'upward: downward' dichotomy differs from the other types of 
dichotomy in being asymmetrical in nature. This means that while it is 
true that if (a) is in an. 'and' or an 'or' relation to (b), then (b) is in the 
same relation to it, and while it is true that if (a) is in an 'ordered' or 
'unordered' relation to (b), then (b) is in the same relation to it, it Is 
not true that if (a) is in an 'upward' or a 'downward' relation to (b), then 
(b) is in the same relation to it. The difference between the 'upward: 
downward' dichotomy and the other types of dichotomy may be correlated 
with the fact that whereas the lupward: downward' dichotomy holds 
vertically in graphic notation, the other dichotomies hold on a horizontal 
plane. 
4.2.2 Basic Types Of Nodes And Their Functions 
(1) Downward And Nodes 
'Downward and' nodes express the relation of composition, i. e. the 
relation of a 'constitute to its constituents. If the constituents of a 
145 
constitute occur simultaneously, then the 'downward and' node is of 
the unordered variety. This situation may be exemplified by the 
bhoneme /p/ in English which is an unordered combination of the 
constituent phonons /labial/, /unvoiced/ and /occlusive/. * 
PN /labial/ PN /unvoiced/ PN /Occlus ive/ 
F ig. (9) 
If the components of a combination or construction follow each 
other in a sequential fashion, then the combination in question is said 
to be 'ordered' and, therefore, is represented by means of a 'downward 
ordered and' node. This situation may be exemplified by the morpheme 
/big/ which is an ordered combination of the morphons /1: )/, /1/ and /g/: 
MN /b/ MN /i/ MN /g/ 
Fig. (10) 
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'Downward and' nodes occur both in the realisational, portion 
of the language and in the tactics. 
(16) 
The function of the 'downward 
and' nodes in the realisational portion of the language is to express the 
compositionality of the -emes of each stratum in terms of the -ons of 
that stratum. The two previous examples illustrate this function. In 
the tactics, the function of the -'downward and' node 
is to express the 
compositionality of -emic constructions in each stratal system; this 
function may be exemplified by the morphemic construction 'unlawfully': 
un law ful . ly 
Fig. (11) 
Hockett (1961) recognises these two types of tactical and 
realisational relation, but he regards the former only as having a genuine 
structural significance. Stratificationalists treat these two types of 
relation as linguistic relations proper, and they keep them apart by 
virtue of their function in different parts of a stratal system. 
(2) Downward Or Nodes 
'Downward unordered or' expresses two functions: the relation , 
of free-variation in the realisational portion of the language, 
(17) 
and the 
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relation of class membership in the tactics. Unlike the 'downward 
A 
unordered or', the 'downward ordered or' does not appear in the tactics. 
Its function in the realisational portion of the language is (a) to express 
context-sensitivity in thp alternation pattern, where the conditioning 
eniAronment is provided by the tactic pattern of the stratal system, 
and (b) to express portmanteau realisation in the sign pattern. 
Examples of the functions expressed by these two types of node will be 
given later in this chapter (fig. 16). 
One of the terms of a 'downward or' node may be a zero. This 
indicates a 'zero realisation' in the case of a 'downward ordered or' and 
loptionalityl in the tactics of a stratal system in the case of a 'downward 
unordered or'. 
Upward And Nodes 
The 'upward and" no&s occur only in the realisational portion 
I oflanguage. 
The 'upward unordered and' is used to represent the -emes 
on each stratum. Each one of these -emes has a connection upwards to 
the next higher stratum, a connection downwards, via the -emic signs, 
to the next lower stratum and a connection to the tactics. The line 
moving upwards to the next higher stratum from such a node may pass 
freely without being interrupted by intervening nodes - this expresses a 
case of simple realisation; or it may be interrupted by, mainly, 
'downward ordered ors' - this expresses a case of alternate realisation. 
The 'upward unordered or' also expresses cases of portmanteau 
realisation, particularly in the sememic stratal system where it is 
normally- not possible to establish the order of the higher elements 
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partaking in such a realisation. The situation may be exemplified by 
the portmanteau realisation of the sememes /sheep/ and /male/ in the 
semon /ram/ : 
/sheep/ /male/ 
Fig. (12) 
The 'upward ordered and' node is used to express portmanteau 
realisation in cases where it is possible to establish the sequential 
arrangement, elsewhere in the language, of the units taking part in such 
a reallsation. The classic example of this type of portmanteau 
realisation is that of the morphemes /zZ/ 'to' and /Ie/ 'the' in the 
phoneme /o/ in French; the ordering, of these two morphemes may be 
established by reference to the construction a* le 'to the'. The 
following diagram (Lamb 1966: 14) represents this portmanteau realisation: 
-9 -e 
Fig. (13) 
- /ram/ 
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(4) Upward Unordered Or 
This node expresses cases of neutralisation and empty 
realisation in the alternation and knot patterns of a stratal system. 
It also expresses 'multiple function' in both the tactics and the sign 
patterns of a stratal system. Figure (15) below provides an Illustration 
of the application of this node in the morphemic sign pattern. In the 
following diagram (Fig. 14), the 'upward unordered or' expresses the 
multiple lexotactic function of the lexemic constructions 'the boy', 
'the men', 'the girl' and 'the woman' as subjects and objects of the 
verbs 'kills'. 'kisses'S 'killed' and 'kissed': 
Fig. (14) 
the boy man girl woman kill kiss -es -ed 
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4.2.3 The Patterns 
The preceding types of basic or elementary relationships "occur 
in a small number of recurrent types of PATTERNS" (Lamb 1966: 12). 
These patterns are: (1) the sign pattern, (2) the tactic pattern, 
(3) the alternation pattern and (4) the knot pattern. In the following 
sections I shall deal with these different types of pattern in the Outline 
model, exemplifying them from the morphemic stratal system. 
(1) The Sign Pattern 
A sign pattern has a series of 'upward unordered ors' at its 
bottom and a series of 'downward ands' at its top; these represent the 
l-ons' and '-emic' signs of a stratal system, respectively. The 
1upward unordered ors' of a sign pattern express the multiple functions 
of '. emic siýnsl. Some of the lines emanating from the 'upward 
unordered ors' may pass through without any intervening 'and' nodes; 
such lines represent simple '-emic signs'. 
The 'downward and' nodes at the top of a sign pattern may be 
-either Ordered or unordered. 'Ordered and' nodes, which occur mainly 
in the morphemic and lexemic sign patterns, represent the fact that the 
-emic signs in these two stratal systems constitute ordered combinations. 
'Unordered and' nodes occur mainly in'the phonemic sign pattern; this 
represents the fact that the 'ons' of the phonemic stratal system occur 
simultaneously in phonemic signs. 
Portmanteau realisation is accounted for above the 'downward and' 
nodes of a sign pattern. . The reason for treating this type of'inter-stratal 
discrepancy below, rather than above, the tactics will be explained 
later in this chapter. The following diagram represents a portion of the 
morphemic sign pattern of English (Lamb 1966: 13): 
151 
MS/-d/ . -fl/ 
According to Lamb (1972(a) ), each one of the 'and' nodes at 
the top of a sign pattern, with its connecting lines, represents a sign 
in the traditional Saussurean interpretation of this term. He (ibid: 63) 
states that the "lower lines I ofand nodes 'I in a given sign pattern I lead 
to the SIGNIFIANTS of Saussure, while the upper lines lead to the 
SIGNIFIE". * As shall be shown below, this claim by Lamb is without 
any foundations. 
To begin with, stratificational -emic signs are considered as 
purely relational in nature, while signs of the Saussurean type are 
linguistic units, in some general interpretation of this term. Moreover, 
since phonem , ic signs and many morphemic signs in say, English, are 
purely formal in nature, it follows that these signs cannot be properly 
characterised, at their relevant level, as having both signifiants and 
siqntfie%. Similarly, since sememic signs are purely semantic or semological 
In nature, it follows that these signs cannot be directly and consistently 
char'acterised as having both signifiantS and signift"'. In other words, e 
AIIII /e/ MN 
Fig. (15) 
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the treatment of certain -emic signs in stratificational grammar as 
signs in the Saussureart sense of the term is tantamount to establishing 
as signs 'objects' which do not satisfy the definition of the notion sign 
in Saussure. In addition to this, since the lower and upper lines of. all 
nodes in the realisational portion of the language lead to the signifiants 
and signifie of Saussure, it follows, under Lamb's view, that all such 
nodes may be regarded as signs in the Saussurean sense of this term. 
But this leads to the inconsistent conclusion of treating the phonons 
and phonemes, which are purely formal in nature, and the semons and 
sememes, which are purely semological in nature, as signs in the 
Saussurean sense. 
(2) The Tactic Pattern 
The function of the tactic pattern of a stratal system is to 
define* the well formed combinations of -emes in that system, called 
constructions, regardless of whether or not these constructions are 
attested in actual texts. 
As far as its internal organisation is concerned, the tactic 
pattern of a stratal system normally consists of a large number of 
'downward ands' which represent the well-formed constructions of the 
system concerned. A tactic pattern also has upward and downward 
'unordered ors'. 'Upward unordered ors' express the multiple tactic 
functions of the units they represent; 'downward unordered ors' specify 
classes of 'units' for specific tactic functions. 
Another defining feature of a tactic pattern is the zero element 
placed on Its top. This signifies the fact that there is no direct 
connection between the tactics of a stratal system and the tactics of 
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the systems immediately above and below, and that the connection 
between a given tactic pattern and other tactic patterns goes via the 
other patterns which constitute the realisational portion of the language. 
(3) The Alternation pattern 
(20) 
Roughly speaking, the function of the alternation pattern is to 
connect the '-ons' of a stratal system to the '-emes' of the system next 
below. An alternation pattern is dominated by 'downward ors' at its 
top expressing situations of diversification and zero-realisation; and 
it has 'upward unordered ors' at its bottom to express cases of 
neutralisation and empty realisation. It is also characterised by the 
fact that it has many, lines going through from one stratal system to 
another without any intervening nodes; this situation holds for cases of 
simple realisation wherein the '-ons' of a stratal system are said to be 
realised by single '-emes' on the next lower stratum. 
I 
(4) The Knot Pattern ' 
The function of the knot pattern is mainly to tie the other three 
patterns together, hence the label 'knot pattern'. This pattern consists 
of a series of upward ands which represent the -emes of the system 
concerned. Each such node has a connection upwards via the alternation 
pattern to the next higher stratum, a connection downward via the sign 
pattern to the next lower stratum and a connection to the tactics. The 
tactics of a stratal system operates on the -emes of that system to 
generate the well-formed constructions of that system. 
A knot pattern may have a small number of lines which connect 
to the tactics without the intervention of any 'upward ands'. This 
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situation expresses the non-distinctiveness of 'units' whose 
occurrence is implied by the tactics. By virtue of the fact that such 
'units' do not connect to any 'upward unordered and' nodes in the knot 
pattern, they have'no connection to the next higher stratal system. 
A knot pattern may also occasionally have 'upward unordered ors' to 
express some cases of neutralisation. The following diagram, adapted 
from Lamb (1966: 17), illustrates this pattern, together with the preceding 
two'patterns: 
LN/goc 
Alternation 
Pattern 
tic 
tern 
t 
ern 
M/beT/ M/gud/ M/r/ M/st/ 
Fig. (16) 
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This diagram presents a limited fragment of English morphology, 
involving the lexonic alternation pattern and the morphemic tactic and 
knot patterns. The lexonic alternation pattern constitutes the uppermost 
portion of the morphemic stratal system. This, however, calls for some 
clarification. While the lexons are the basic 'units' of the lexemic 
stratal system, their realisation in terms of morphemes belongs to the 
morphemic stratal system. Similarly, J, while the morphons are the 
basic 
'units' of the morphemic stratal system, their realisation in terms of 
phonemes belongs to the phonemic stratal system; this, of course, 
means that the morphonic alternation pattern is the uppermost pattern of 
the phonemic stratal system. 
The above diagram accounts for English morphemic tactic 
constructions consisting of an adjective followed by either the comparative 
or the superlative suffix. The morphon /T/ in the morpheme /beT/ is a 
special type of morphon: it is realised by the phoneme /t/ In the context 
of the comparative suffix and by 'zero' in the context of the superlative 
suffix. The 'downward or' in the lexonic alternation pattern leads from 
the lexon /good/ to the morphemes /beT/ and /gud/ in the morphemic 
knot pattern. Though the morphotactics can, in principle, generate both 
morpbemic constructions better and -gooder, 
only the former is allowed due 
to the ordering of choices in the 'downward or', i. e. due to the fact that 
morpheme /beT/ takes priority over morpheme /gud/ when there is an 
impulse from morpheme /r/. Similarly, though the morphotactics can, 
In principl , generate both morphemic constructions best and qoodst, 
only the former is allowed due to the priority expressed by the 'downward 
ordered or' in the lexonic alternation pattern, i. e. due to the fact that 
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morpheme /1: )eT/ takes priority over morpheme /gud/ when there is an 
impulse from morpheme /st/. In the absence of lexons /-er/ and 
lexon /-st/, lexon /good/ is realised by morpheme /gud/, "since the 
impulse from lexon /good/ to morpheme AeT/ cannot get past the 
upward ANDEof morpheme /beT/ I unless the other line leading Into it 
also has a downward impulse" (Lamb 1966: 18). 
Morpheme /gud/ is regarded as an adjective; this is expressed 
by its membership in the class of adjectives represented by the downward 
unordered or in the tactic pattern. The 'upward unordered or' in the 
tactics expresses the multiple functions of the morpheme /gud/ in 
morphemic constructions. .1 
The preceding diagram also shows a case of neutralisation; 
this neutralisation is symbolised by 'N' and is represented by an 'upward 
unordered or' leading to two 'upward ands' in the knot pattern. The two 
lexons taking part in this neutralisation are the lexon /-er 1/ of the 
comparative and lexon /-er 2 
/of the agentive, e. g. swimmer, writer, 
driver, etc. 
4.2.4 Inter-Stratal Discrepancies 
The alternation pattern, the knot pattern and the sign pattern 
together constitute the realisational portion of a stratal system. The 
tactical or constructional portion of a stratal system is constituted by 
- its tactic pattern. The term inter-stratal discrepancies designates the 
different types of non-simple relationships in the realisational portion of 
the language, 
The relationships between 'entities' on adja'cent strata are called 
'realisations'. Lockwood (1972(a): 27) specifies this relationship as 
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follows: "An entity of a lower stratum is said to realise a corresponding 
entity of a higher stratum, and to be Its realtsation. The entity of the 
higher stratum which it realises is called the realisate". Obviously, 
the term realisation Is used in two different senses: first, to designate 
the relationship between 'entities' on adjacent strata; and, second, to 
refer to the 'entity' which is said to realise one or more realisates on 
the next stratum below. Any ambiguity In the meaning of this term can 
I 
be easily resolved by the context. 
The most basic type of realisation in stratificational grammar is 
simple realt sation 
(21) 
which holds between 'entities' "over a full-stratum 
of differences (from -eme to eme or from -on to -on)" (ibid. ). In this 
type of realisation, a realisate is always realised by one and the same 
realisation on the stratum next below. An example of this type of 
realisation is the realisation of the lexeme /boy/ by the morpheme /boy/ 
in English. 
Stratificationalists recognise seven different types of inter- 
stratal discrepancies: diversification, neutralisation, composite 
realisation, portmanteau realisation, zero -real isa tion, empty realisation 
and anataxis. In what follows, I shall explain and exemplify these 
different types of inter-stratal discrepancy, mainly as they have been 
presented by Lockwood (1972(a) ). 
Diversification 
Diversification occurs when a unit of a given stratum is realised 
by two or more units on the stratum next below. There are two types of 
diversification in stratificational grammar: conditioned diversification 
/ 
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and unconditioned diversification. In morphology, conditioned 
diversification may be exemplified by the realisation of the lexon 
/plural/ in English by, for instance, the morphon /-Z/ as in boys and 
cats or the morphon /n/, as in oxen. The morphon /-Z/ is, in turn, 
realised either by the phoneme IsI, as in cats, or the phoneme /z/, as 
in dogs. Clearly, conditioned diversification pertains to cases of 
context-sensitivity. 
In contradistinction, unconditioned diversification is said to 
refer to cases of free variation. An example of unconditioned 
diversification in morphology is the realisation of the lexon /past 
participle/ in English either by the morphon /D/ or the morphon A/ in 
showed : shown. The morphon /D/ is realised on the next stratum below 
either by the phoneme /d/, as in playe , or the phoneme 
A/ as in spelt 
this realisation constitutes a case of conditioned diversification. 
The following diagrams provide a graphic representation of these 
two types of diversification. Conditioned diversification is represented 
by an 'ordered downward or', whereas unconditioned diversification is 
represented by an 'unordered downward or': 
LN/Plural/ 
MN -' /n/ , LVA. L'A/-z/ MN ý /D/ /n' 
Fig. (17) 
LN/past participle/ 
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Neutrallsation 
Neutralisation is the opposite of diversification. In 
neutralisation two or more distinct upper stratum units are realised by 
one and the same lower stratum element. This type of inter-stratal 
discrepancy may be exemplified by the morphon /D/ which is said to 
realise either the lexon /past tense/ or /past participle/. Neutralisation 
is represented by an 'upward unordered or', with the realisates at the top 
and the realisation at the bottom. The following diagram presents a 
graphic representation of the above example: 
LN /past tense/ 
LN /past participle/ 
/Ij/ 
Composite Realisation 
Fig. (18) 
Composite realisation takes place when a single element on a 
given stratum is realised by a combination of two or more elements on 
the adjacent stratum below. Composite realisation falls into two 
categories: ordered and unordered. Ordered composite realisation 
occurs when the constituents of a combination follow each other in a 
linear or sequential fashion, e. g. the morphons /f/, /i/, s /in the 
lexon /fish/, - this type of realisation is represented by a 'downward 
ordered and'. Unordered composite realisation occurs when the constitutents 
of a combination occur simultaneously, e. g. the phonons /nasal/ and 
/apical/ in the phoneme /n/ in English; this type of realisation is 
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represented by a 'downward unordered and'. The above two examples 
may be represented as follows: 
p /n/ 
MN ivIIN/i/ IVIIII/sv/ PN /apical/ "'/nasal/ 
Fig.. (19) 
Howdver, contrary to what the stratificationalists say, composite 
realisation does not only hold between 'entities' on adjacent strata, but 
it also holds within individual strata between -emic signs and -ons. 
This of course means that -emic signs may be constructions, but they 
are different from tactic -constructions in that whereas the latter result 
from productive principles of patterning, -emic signs do not. In other 
words, whereas tactic constructions constitute, in principle, an infinite 
set of elements that result from a fully productive set of principles of 
Patterning, -emic sign constructions constitute a closed set of elements 
(22) 
that are, perhaps, only analytically significant. 
(4) Portmanteau Realisation 
(23) 
Portmanteau realisation is, the opposite of composite realisation. 
According to Lockwood (1972(a): 28), portmanteau reallsation "occurs 
when a combination of upper-stratum units is realised by a single unit on 
the lower stratum. " He also points out that portmanteau realisation is 
not a frequent phenomenon in languages. An example of this type of 
realisation has been given in section 4.2.2 above. 
LN /f Ish/ 
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The above explanation of portmanteau realisation is, however, 
not entirely accurate, since it is only by implication that this type of 
realisation can be said to hold between a combination of upper stratum 
units and a single unit on the lower stratum. This follows from the 
fact that (a) portmanteau realisation occurs in the sign pattern below 
the knot pattern, and (b) it is to some extent controlled by the tactics. 
Zero Realtsation 
Zero realisation occurs when an element of an upper-stratum 
is realised by "nothing" on the stratum next below. This situation, 
which is represented by a 'downward or' in the alternation pattern, may 
be exemplified by the reallsation of the lexon /plural/ in English by 'zero' 
in the context of the noun sheep in, for instance, "The sheep are grazing". 
The stratificationalist explanation of the notion 'zero realisation' 
is nonsensical, for if an upper stratum unit is realised by "nothing" on 
the stratum next below, then it follows that that unit cannot, logically 
speaking, be said to be realised. This of course means that, under this 
explanation of zero realisation, zero realisation in stratificational grammar 
cannot be regarded as realisation Proper. 
(24) 
(6) Em]Rty Realisation 
(25) 
Empty realisation 
(26) 
is the opposite of zero realisation. According 
to Lockwood (1972(a): 28) empty realisation holds in situations wherein 
"no element occurs on the upper stratum, but one occurs on the lower 
stratum, determined by the pattern of elements which occur as a result of 
the realisation of upper stratum elements. " The realisation, i. e. the 
'entity' on the lower stratum, in this type of realisation is called the 
determined element. Empty realisation, which is represented by 
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$upward unordered or' in the alternation and knot patterns, may be 
exemplified by the determined occurrence of the morpheme /do/ in 
certain types of question and negative construction in English, for 
instance 'Do you speak English? ' and 'I do not know'. 
The stratificationalist notion of empty realisation harbours a 
similar type of inconsistency as that harboured by zero realisation. 
This inconsistency springs from the fact that if no entity exists on an 
upper stratum as a realisate of a realisation on the next stratum below, 
then it follows that the realisation cannot, logically speaking, be said 
to be a realisation of anything on the next higher stratum. By implication, 
this means that empty realisation cannot be regarded as realisation proper. 
Anataxis 
(27) 
or Anatact'ic Realisation 
Anatactic realisation 
(28) 
applies to situations in which two 
elements of an upper stratum are realised in reverse order on the next 
stratum below. Lockwood (1972(a): 28) exemplifies this type of 
realisation from Korean wherein the morphonic elements /h/ and Al in 
the morphonic sequence /alhko/ are realised in reversed order in the 
phonemic stratal system /alkho/ - "ailing". 
(29) 
Clearly, anatactic realisation differs from the first four types 
of inter-stratal discrepancy, as well as from simple realisation, in that 
whereas the latter types of realisation hold between elements on adjacent 
strata, without any regard to their ordering in the realisation relationship, 
anatactic realisation is exclusively concerned with the reversibility in 
the order of the realisation of upper stratum elements by lower stratum ones. 
In connection with this, it may be pointed out that anatactic realisation 
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cannot be regarded as realisation proper, due to the fact that It is not 
covered by the definition of realisation mentioned at the beginning of 
this section. 
4.2.5 Realisational Analyst : General Remarks 
The folIowing diagram, taken from Fischer-j9frgensen (1975: 305), 
gives a direct visual representation of the preceding types of realisation 
in stratificational grammar: 
higher stratum 
41 
11 
lower stratum 
-\ 
/--- Iv 
6. 
V4 
Fig. (2 0) 
1. simple realisation 
2. diversification 
3. neutralisation 
4. composite realisation 
portmanteau realisation 
6. zero realisation 
7. empty realisation 
B. anatactic realisation 
The above types of realisation, except for neutralisation and 
anatactic realisation, are all recognised by Hockett (1947,1954,1958, 
1961). This provides further evidence for the influence of Hockett on 
strattficational grammar. However, whereas in Hockett's grammatical 
system these realisation relationships hold only between morphemics and 
phonemics, the only two levels recognised in this system, in 
stratificational grammar they hold between every pair of adjacent strata, 
from the hypophonemic to the hypersememic. 
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Anatactic realisation is no more than a static interpretation of 
the dynamic relation commonly known as metathesis. This relation is 
recognised by the neo-Bloomfieldians. 
The different types of realisation relationships in stratificational 
ýrammar may be classified into three groups: 
(1) those that involve 'entities' on both the adjacent stratattaking part 
in a realisation relationship; this includes simple realisation, 
diversification, neutralisation, composite realisation and portmanteau 
realisation; 
(2) those that involve one 'entity' only, either on the higher or the lower 
stratum taking part in a realisation relationship; this includes zero 
realisation and empty realisation, respectively; and 
(3) anatactic realisation which concerns the order in which higher 
stratum 'elements' are realised on the adjacent stratum below. 
As has been mentioned previously, the latter two types of 
realisation relationships cannot be regarded as realisation relationships 
proper, due to the fact that these relationships do not satisfy the 
stratificationalist specification of realisation mentioned at the beginning 
of the preceding section. 
Inter-stratal discrepancies in stratificational grammar, together 
with simple realisation, inter-lock with each other to form a complex 
web of relationships. This may be illustrated by Fig. (21). The 
diagram expresses: 
(i) an unconditioned diversification between (a) the lexon /past participle/ 
and its alternate realisations 
MN /D/ and 
MN /n/, as in showed and 
shown respectively; and (b) the lexon /plural/ and its alternate 
realisations morphon /n/ and morphon AA as in oxen and cats or dog 
respectively; and 
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(ii) neutralisation of the lexons /past participle/ and /plural/ in the 
morpheme 
MN /n/. 
LN /past participle/ 
LN /plural/ 
MN WLi', I /n/ 
Fig. (21) 
IVI 1N /2 / 
Realisational analysis, as opposed to tactical analysis, 
(30) 
involves four basic types of operation: 
(1) horizontal grouping: this type of analysis involves the recognition 
of instances of composite realisation, whether ordered or not, and is 
graphically represented by 'downward and' nodes. 
(2) horizontal 
-splitting: 
this involves instances of portmanteau 
realisation, and is graphically represented by 'upward and' nodes; 
(3) vertical grouping: this operation is concerned with instances of 
diversification and zero realisation; and 
(4) vertical splitting: this operation is concerned with instances of 
neutralisation and empty realisation. 
(31) 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the realisation relationship 
in stratificational grammar is of a completely static nature. The 
transition from one stratum to another in this theory does not involve any 
transformation or mutation, and no priority is given to the realisate over 
its realisation, or vice versa. This point will be dealt with in some 
detail later in this thesis. 
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4.2.6 The Outline Model: An Outline 
The Outline model consists of six strata; they are from lowest 
to highest: the hypophonernic, the phonemic, the morphernic, the 
lexemic, the sememic and the hypersememic. This, however, does 
not mean that all natural human languages must have, or exhibit, these 
six strata. Stratificationalists adopt the position that the question as 
to how many strata a given language possesses can be properly resolved 
only by empirical investigation, i. e. by the application of the 
stratificationalist theory to the language concerned. But, as Lamb 
(1966: 1) states, "evidence available so far suggests that all natural 
languages have at least four 
[strata] 
, and that at least some languages, 
Including English, have six strata". 
Each stratum has a stratal system associated with it. A stratal 
system consists of a knot pattern, with an alternation and tactic pattern 
above it, and a sign pattern below it. However, In terms of this definition 
of stratal system, the stratal system associated with the hypophonemic 
stratum cannot be considered as a stratal system proper, since this system 
lacks a sign pattern. Moreover, the above characterisation of Istratal 
system' in stratificational grammar is not entirely accurate due to the fact 
that alternations pertaining to portmanteau realisation are dealt with 
below the knot pattern. In other words, the Outline model recognises 
not one, but two alternation patterns: one below and one above 6e knot 
pattern. 
The stratal systems associated with the afore-mentioned strata are 
grouped into three separate components: phonology, grammar ar 
IA 
semology. 
(32) 
The phonological component consists of the hypophonernic and phonemic 
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stratal systems, the grammatical component of the morphemic and 
lexemic stratal systems and the semological component of the sememic 
and hyper-semic stratal systems. It must be pointed out, however, that 
this organisation of linguistic strata and stratal systems lacks empirical 
, content or 
linguistic reality, i. e. it is entirely a matter of organisational 
or administrative convenience. 
Hyper-Sememic 
Sememic 
Hyper-sememe 
; emon 
Lexemic 
Morphemic 
Phonemic 
Hypo-phonemic 
Fig. (22) 
--J{-, r---. --. 
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The above diagram, taken from Lamb (1966: 20), gives a schematic 
representation of the Outline model with its six strata. The vertical 
lines represent the alternation pattern, whereas the'slant lines represent 
the knot and sign patterns; the tactic pattern operates horizontally, as 
it were, at the level of the -emes of each stratal system. 
4.2.7 The Organ isation Cf The Morphemic Stratal System 
The organisation of the morphemic stratal system in the Outline 
model may be represented by the following diagram taken from Lockwood 
(1972(a): 114): 
Lexons 
I Lexonic Morphotactics 
Alternation Morphemic 
Pattern 
II 
Tactic Pattern 
Morphemes I MORPHEMIC KNOT PATTERN 
Morphemic 
Signs 
MORRHEMIC SIGN PATTERN 
Morphons 
Fig. (23) 
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The lexonic alternation pattern is the uppermost portion of the 
morphemic stratal system. It accounts for the realisation relationship 
between the lexons,, which are the basic units of the lexemic stratum and 
the morphemes of the morphemic stratum. This involves simple 
realisation as well as other types of inter-stratal discrepancy, except 
for portmanteau realisation which is dealt with below the knot pattern. 
The morphemic tactic pattern specifies the well-formed combinations 
or constructions of morphemes, including both inflectional and derivational 
(33) 
morphemes. The "grammatical word" is said to constitute the basic 
domain of this portion of the morphemic stratal system. 
(34) 
The, morphemic knot pattern consists of a series of upward ands, 
with occasional neutralisation and empty realisation, below them. It 
allows the lexemic stratal system to control the operation of the 
morphotactics; this ensures that the output of the morphemic tactics is 
well-formed in accordance with the specifications of the lexemic stratal 
systems. The morphemic knot pattern also allows the morphotactics to 
control the realisation of the lexons by providing the conditioning 
environments for them. 
(35) 
The morphemic si2n pattern specifies the composition of morphemic 
signs in terms of morphons which are the basic units of the morphemic 
stratal systems. Morphons are related to phonemes in the same manner 
in which lexons are related to morphemes. However, the task of 
accounting for the realisation of morphons in terms of phonemes belongs 
to phonology. This, of course, means that the morphonic alternation 
pattern is the uppermost portion of the phonemic stratal system. 
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Despite its brevity, the above explanation of the organisation of 
the morphemic stratal system and of the function of the different patterns 
within this system provides as complete a picture of this system as is 
possible to establish on the basis of Lamb's presentation of his model in 
the Outline. In other words, Lamb's discussion of the morphemic stratal 
system in the Outline is too short and general to enable the outside 
researcher, i. e. the non-stratif icationalist, to arrive at a precise and 
exhaustive picture of the nature of this system. This situation also holds 
for the other stratal systems recognised in the Outline model. As a result 
CI of this programmatic character of Lamb's presentation of his model the 
outside researcher often finds himself compelled to refer to his knowledge 
of the discipline of linguistics, and to his experience with linguistic 
phenomena, in his attempts to arrive at a somewhat full understanding of 
this model. But such a procedure cannot be relied upon to any 
satisfactory degree due to the fact that it leads to the replacement of 
explicitness and precision, which linguists strive for, by guess-work and 
intuition. 
4.2.8 The Third Pre-Outline Model And The Outline Model Compared 
The Outline model differs from its predecessors In two major respects. 
On the one hand, it recognises a larger number of strata than the one it 
replaces; this is achieved by adding two new strata: the hypophonemic 
and the hypersememic at the bottom and the top of the four strata recognised 
in the pre-Outline model. This implies that in those languages which 
exhibit six strata under the Outline model, for example English, the 
morphemic stratal system is at a higher level of abstraction than its 
counterpart in the pre-Outline model. On the other hand, whereas the 
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pre-Outline model places alternation phenomena above and below the 
knot pattern, the Outline model proposes to deal with alternation 
phenomena above the knot pattern. The only exception to this is 
portmanteau realisation which is dealt with below the knot pattern in the 
sign pattern. 
The reason behind the proposal to treat portmanteau realisation 
below the tactics in the outline model springs from the fact that the nature 
of the conditioning environment for this type of realisation relationship is 
different from that of other types of alternation phenomena dealt with in 
the alternation pattern of a stratal system. Whereas in the case of 
alternation phenomena dealt with above the knot pattern the conditioning 
environment is provided by the tactics of a stratal system, part of the 
conditioning environment for portmanteau realisation is the -emes themselves 
that take part in this realisation. This of course means that in the latter 
case the realisation relationship concerned cannot but be dealt with below 
the knot pattern which represents the -emes of a stratal system. In the 
following portmanteau realisation, the morpheme /two/ is said to condition 
and to be condittoned by the morpheme /-th/, and that these two morphemes 
together result in the morphemic sign /second/. 
(36) 
See Fig. (24). 
It is, however, worth pointing out that by incorporating some 
alternation phenomena below the knot pattern in the Outline model, Lamb, 
albeit implicitly, recognises the 'existence' of some sort of alternation 
pattern below this pattern. In other words, by incorporating alternation 
phenomena in the sign pattern in this model, this pattern cannot be 
completely regarded as a sign pattern proper, but as two disparate patterns 
in one. By implication, this means that as far as the organisation of a 
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stratal. system is concerned the Outline model is not, despite disclaimers 
to the contraryý intrinsically different from its predecessor. 
/two/ /-th/ 
MS/two/ ms /second/ ms /th/ 
Fig. (24) 
(37) 
4.3 The Post-Outline Phase 
The post-Outline phase in stratificational grammar contains, to 
the best of my knowledge, one model only. This model was developed by 
Lamb and his collaborators, mainly Lockwood, towards the beginning of 
the seventies. According to Lamb (1972(a): 30) this model has "resulted 
from breaking out of some previous conceptions of the organisation of the 
overall [linguistic I network considered as a series of stratal systems. 
In terms of the number of stratal systems it proposes, and in terms of the 
organisation of each stratal system, this model is closer to the third 
model in the pre-Outline era than it is to its successor, i. e. the Outline 
model itself. 
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The aim of this section is two-fold: first, to explain briefly 
the major revisions incorporated in the new model in comparison with 
its predecessor; and, secondly, to give a general characterisation of 
the organisation of the morphemic stratal system in this new model. 
4.3.1 The Post-Outline Model 
One of the most striking features of the post-Outline model is 
the employment of diamond shaped nodes to replace the 'upward ands' 
of the knot pattern in the Outline model. This revision in the graphic 
notation of stratificational grammar is made to accord with the new 
conception of the tactic pattern as occupying a horizontal plane in the 
representation of linguistic networks, rather than as being oriented in a 
vertical fashion as has been the case in the Outline model. On the 
basis of this, the connection of the -emes of each stratal system to the 
tactics cf that system is now sideways rather than upwards. 
There are four types of diamond node in the post-Outline model, 
and each diamond node is said to represent an inter-section between the 
vertically arranged patterns of the realisational portion of the language 
and the horizontally arranged tactics. The following diagram 
(38) 
gives 
a schematic representation of the four types of diamond nodes in this model. 
(See Fig. 25). 
The third diamond node in Fig. (25) expresses another revision in 
the post-Outline model: this is the possibility of a line from an upper 
stratal system going directly into the middle of the tactics of the adjacent 
system below. This revision replaces the previous conception of the 
organisation of human language according to which all upper realisational 
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connections to the tactics of an adjacent lower stratal system are at 
the bottom of the tactics via the 'upward ands' of the knot pattern. 
to upper ta ctics stratum tactics 
to lower 
stratum 
Fig. (25) 
(39) 
higher 
to upper tactic 
stratum level 
lower 
tactic 
level 
lower 
ta ctic 
level 
higher 
tactic 
level 
to lower 
stratum 
The introduction of the diamond shaped nodes, coupled with the 
view that the tactic pattern occupies a horizontal plane intersecting the 
vertical flow of the realisational portion of a stratal system, led Lamb 
and his collaborators to abolish the knot pattern of the Outline model and 
to assign part of its function to the diamond nodes. 
The post-Outline model also differs from its predecessor in that it 
incorporates a sub-tactic alternation pattern in each stratal system it 
recognises. - In this respect, this model is closer to the third model in 
the pre-Outline era than it is to the Outline model which immediately 
precedes it. 
This revision is based on, considerations of economy and 
appropriateness in description with respect to the phenomenon of free 
to lower 
stratum 
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variation. The treatment of the phenomenon of free variation above the 
tactics and the knot pattern in the Outline model requires all the lines 
leading down from a 'downward unordered or' to 'terminate' in the same 
I 
tactic location in a stratal system. But since the distributional difference 
between the various alternants in a free variation relation is of no tactic 
relevance, the outline method for dealing with free variation is, by virtue 
of the fact that it results in setting up analyses which must refer to the 
tactics, neither economical nor entirely appropriate. To rectify this 
defect in the Outline model, Lamb proposes the establishment of a 
sub-tactic alternation pattern in each stratal system in the post-Outline 
model, in which system the phenomena of free variation are dealt with; 
this eliminates the redundant reference to the tactics which characterises 
the Outline method and,. therefore, renders the post-Outltne model more 
economical than its predecessor. 
The incorporation of an additional sub-tactic 
(4 0) 
alternation pattern 
in each stratal system ofthe post-Outline model results in the setting up 
of a new concept of environmental conditioning in stratificational grammar. 
This concept is based on the employment of conditioning lines, normally 
originating in the tactic pattern of a stratal system, and enablers to 
condition the occurrence of the alternants in the alternation pattern of the 
system concerned. Thus, for example, in the morphemic stratal system, 
conditioning lines from the morphotactics lead to enablers in both the 
lexonic alternation pattern and the morphemic alternation pattern to specify 
the environmental conditions for the occurrence of the alternants in each 
alternation pattern. Since the tactic pattern in this example is below the 
lexonic alternation pattern and above the morphemic alternation pattern, it 
may be said that the lexonic alternation pattern is output-conditioned 
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whereas the morphemic alternation pattern is input-conditioned. 
(41) 
The post-Outline model also differs from Its predecessor by 
allowing a multi-level representation or analysis of phenomena in the 
sign pattern instead of the, single level one allowed by the Outline model. 
The reason behind this revision in the post-Outline model is one of 
simplicity and economy. The following two diagrams deal with the same 
portion of data. But if we compare the diagram in Fig. (26: a), which is 
constructed on the basis of the Outline view of the sign pattern, -with the 
diagram in Figure (26: b), which is constructed in accordance with the 
post-Outline view of the nature of the same pattern, we shall come to 
the conclusion that, in terms of the simplicity criterion advocated by the 
stratificationalists, the latter diagram and, therefore, the analysis it 
expresses, is simpler than the former diagram and the analysis put forward 
in it. Moreover, insofar as the second diagram expresses the 
'general isation' that 'sapsucker' and 'woodpecker' are constituents of the 
lexemes 'yellow-bellied sapsucker' and 'red-headed wood-pecker,, which 
the first diagram and analysis fail to express, the second diagram is to be 
regarded as superior to the first one. 
The post-Outline model differs from its predecessor in the number 
of stratal systems it recognises and, consequently, in the manner in which 
these stratal systems are grouped into components. Whereas the Outline 
model recognises a maximum of six stratal systems which it groups, for 
administrative purposes, into three components - phonology, grammar and 
semology - the post-Outline model recognises four stratal systems only 
which it groups into two components. 
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lexe me s 
Lexons 
Lexemes 
Lexons 
C, 
Yellow-bellied Red-headed 
Fig. (26(a) ) 
Yellow-bellied Red-headed 
Fig. (26(b) ) 
Sap Wood Suck peck , -er 
Yellow red belly head 
, -ed 
Sap Wood Suck peck -er Yellow red belly head -ed 
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The four stratal systems recognised in the post-Outline model 
are the phonemic, morphemic, lexemic and sememic stratal systems. 
And the, components into which these systems'are grouped are phonology 
and grammar., 
(42) 
Phonology incorporates the phonemic stratal system, 
and grammar incorporates the remaining three stratal systems. 
The reduction of the number of stratal systems from six to four 
in the post-Outline model is achieved by, first, coalescing the 
hypophonemic and phonemic stratal systems in the Outline model into a 
single stratal system and, secondly, by removing the hypersememic 
stratal system in the Outline model outside language proper and calling 
it the conceptual or gnostemic system. The first revision seems to be 
based on the recognition that the hypophonemic stratal system does not 
constitute a stratal system proper because it lacks a sign pattern. Lamb 
(1972(a): 31) expresses the rationale behind the second revision as follows: 
"When we explore Ethe hypersememic stratum I we find 
that this stratum has to contain all of the individual's 
knowledge of his culture, his personal history, his physical 
environment, in short everything he knows, save the language 
itself, which is already represented in the lower strata. In 
other words, one is dealing with a system of far greater 
complexity than any of the lower stratal systems - indeed 
probably more complex than all of them put together. 
Therefore it seems appropriate to give a special status to 
this highest level - to consider it as outside the language 
proper (which does not mean for a moment that the linguist 
is prohibited from its premisses) and to give it a more fitting 
name than the awkward term hypersememic. Accordingly I 
now call it the conceptual system, or for those who would 
like another Greek term, the gnostemic system; its basic 
units are the 2nosteme and gnoston It 
The groupment of the morphemic, lexemic and sememic stratal 
systems into one component, i. e. grammar, is linked with the observation 
that there are direct connections between each one of these stratal, systems 
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and the gnostemic system. Lamb (ibid: 32Y points out that, for 
example, "morphotactic classes which are needed to specify the 
occurrence of morphemes in derivational constructions are often 
semantically defined", To account for cases of this type Lamb employs 
(43) 
a special device, called the 'representative'. The 'representative' 
appears to be something like a dummy symbol whose function is to 
represent, hence the term 'representative', a lower stratum unit, or group 
of units, 'in a higher stratal system, 
(44) 
thus enabling them to be directly 
linked to the gnostemic system. 
4.3.2 Morphology In The Post-Outline Model 
The following diagram,, taken from Lockwood (1972(a): 122), gives 
a schematic representation of the morphemic stratal system in the post- 
Outline model: 
Lexons 
Morphons 
Fig. (27) 
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The function of each one of the above patterns, except for the 
morphemic alternation'pattern, is more or less the same as in the Outline 
model. As has been previously said, the function of the morphemic 
alternation pattern is to deal with phenomena of free variation. 
To illustrate some of the above-mentioned revisions that are 
incorporated in the post-Outline model, particularly the use of diamonds, 
enablers and conditioning lines, and to explain the difference between 
this model and its predecessor in dealing with the phenomena of 
morphological alternation, I shall consider Lockwood's treatment of the 
following set of data (1972(a): 82-86): 
LN /Comparative/ LN /Superlative/ 
LN /good/ gud beT r beT st 
LN /bad/ b2z d war s war st 
LN Ysoft/ S: )ft s, 3ft r s*ft st 
This table contains a set of five lexons arranged in rows and 
columns, with the adjectives arranged in the rows and the comparative 
and superlative suffixes in the last two columns. The first column gives 
the morphonic- representation of the adjectival lexons when they are not 
in construction either with the comparative or superlative lexon. The 
intersection of each adjectival lexon with the comparative and superlative 
lexons is filled by a morphemic combination, stated in morphonic 
transcription, for the relevant lexons. The morphon 
MN /T/ in the 
morpheme /beT/ has the alternate realisations 
P /t/ and 0 as, for 
example, in latter and last respectively. The vowels preceding. L and st 
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in the ultimate phonological forms of better, softer and softest are 
provided by the phonology. 
The following observations concerning the realisation of the 
I 
lexons in the above table may be formulated: (1) the lexon 
LN /good/ 
has the alternate morphemic realisations 
MN /gud/ and 
MN /beT/, - 
(45) 
(2) the lexon 
LN /bad/has the alternate realisation 
MN /baed/ and 
MN /war/, - (3) the lexon /soft/ has the single morphemic realisation 
MN Is z ft/, * (4) the lexon /comparative/ has the alternate morphemic 
realisations 
MN /r/ and 
MN lsl, - and (5) the lexon 
LN /superlative/ has 
MN 
the single morphemic realisation /St/. 
In terms of the Outline model, the alternants of the above lexons 
are dealt with above the tactics and the knot pattern in the lexonic 
alternation pattern. The following diagram (Lockwood 1972(a): 83) shows 
the treatment of the above phenomena in'accordance with this model - the 
diamonds replace the 'upward ands' of the knot pattern in this model 
(Fig. 2 8). 
The 'downward ordered ors' in this diagram represent cases of 
conditioned diversification or alternation. This situation holds for the 
lexons LN /comparative/, LN /bad/ and 
LN /good/only, since a situation 
of simple realisation holds for the lexons 
LN /superlative/ and 
LN /soft/. 
The diamond shaped nodes represent the set of morphemes which constitute 
the realisations of the lexons listed below. The alternations are placed 
above the tactics and the diamond shaped nodes, and the conditioning 
environments for the alternants or realisations are provided by the tactics. 
To explain how the alternations represented by the 'downward ordered ors' 
in the lexonic alternation pattern are dealt with in the diagram below the 
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following statements will be given: 
lexon /com : the morphotactics allows the occurrence of the suffix 
MN Isl only when preceded by the morpheme 
MN /wa r/, and the suffix 
MN Irl elsewhere; 
(it) lexon /good/: the morphotactics allows the occurrence of the 
morpheme 
MN /beT/before the suffix 
MN /r/ and 
MN /st/, and the morpheme 
MN /gud/ elsewhere; and 
(iii) lexon /badZ : the morphotactics allows the occurrence ofIthe morpheme 
MN /war/ only when followed by either the suffix 
MN Isl or the s uff ix 
MN Istl, and the morpheme 
MN /b2e d/ elsewhere. 
LN /bad/ 
LN /Comp/ 
LN /sup/ 
MN /wa r/ 
MN /beT/ 
MN /gud/ 
MN /batd/-*" 
MN A Oft/ 
MN /r/ 4, 
MN /St/ 
LN /good/ 
MN 
LN /soft/ 
Fig., (28) 
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T NT T T,, T T ? %T 
MN AeT/ 
q 
/sup/ 
The solution presented in the above diagram differs from the 
previous one in that it treats the afore-mentioned phenomena of alternation 
above, not below, the tactics and knot pattern. This is reflected in the 
fact that the 'downward unordered ors' are placed below the diamond 
shaped nodes and the tactics. As a result of this method for treating 
phenomena of alternation in the morphemic stratal system, the tactic 
pattern of this system in the post-Outline model is at a higher level of 
abstraction than its counter-part in the Outline model. 
Furthermore, the above Post-Outline solution differs from its 
predecessor in the manner in which it deals with the phenomenon of 
/gua//war//baecV /soit/ Al /r/ /St/ 
Fig. (29) 
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environmental conditioning. As is clear from the above diagram, 
environmental conditioning is dealt with by means of enablers and 
conditioning lines. Conditioning lines, which are represented by dotted 
lines, originate either in the tactics or in the realisational portion of a 
stratal system. The former situation may be exemplified by the 
conditioning lines providing for the occurrence of the morphemes 
MN 
/beT/ 
and 
MN /wa r/, and the latter situation by the conditioning line providing 
for the occurrence of the suffix 
MN Islas a realisation of the lexon 
LN /comparative/. This disparity In the origins of the conditioning lines 
MN 
is based on the fact that the suffix Isl occurs only after the morpheme 
lw, a r/ in the language under consideration here. 
The treatment of the alternants of the le . xons 
LN /good/, LN /bad/ 
and 
LN /comparative/ sub-tactically, and the employment of enablers and 
conditioning lines to state the conditioning environments for these 
alternants results in a simplification of the morphotactics in the new model 
and, therefore, in a simpler over-all description in comparison with the 
Outline model. 
Stratificational Grammar : General Remarks 
S. 1 The Relational Nature 01 Stratificational Grammar 
(46) 
It is possible to recognise three stages in the development of 
the stratificational view of the nature of human, natural language. In 
the first stage stratificational grammar, following Bloomfieldian and neo- 
Bloomfieldian linguistics, considered language as a system of elements, 
i. e. linguistic objects in the traditional sense of this term, and their 
relations. Like Bloomfield and the neo-Bloomfieldians, stratificationalists 
gave priority to the elements over the relations which hold between them. 
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In practical, descriptive terms this meant that the task of the linguist 
was, ' first, the identification of the elements which make up the linguistic 
system and, then, the statement of the relations which hold between 
these elements. It is patently clear that this ordering of descriptive 
procedure is intended to reflect the logical priority of elements over 
relations. This priority is also reflected in the almost total pre-occupation 
of the groups of linguists mentioned above with the task of trying to set 
up procedures and criteria for the isolation or identification 6f linguistic 
units, for example, the morpheme and phoneme. 
In the second stage, stratificationalists, while still holding to 
the view that human language consists of elements and their relations, 
give more priority to the relations over the elements. According to 
Lockwood (1972(a): 5), this shift of emphasis from elements to relations 
in characterising human language occurred as a result of the realisation, 
that "no adequate theory could be based on elements alone". This 
realisation, and the concomitant shift of emphasis from elements to 
relations, led to the 'distinction' between stratal system and stratum in 
stratificational grammar, and to the view that the relationally orientated 
1stratal system' is logically prior to the unit centred 'stratum'. 
In the third stage elements or units completely disappear from the 
stratificationa lists' characterisation of the nature of human language. 
In the Outline Lamb advocates the view that language does not consist'of 
elements'and relationships, but of relationships alone. According to 
Lockwood (ibid: 5), this view has resulted from the observation that the 
"various kinds of elements within language are defined and distinguished 
wholly on the basis of their relattonýhips to other elements". On the 
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basis of this, Lamb started to "conceive of linguistic structure as 
consisting of relationships to relationships, intricately interweaving 
to form what could be called alinguistic network" (ibid. ), with elements 
occurring only at the peripheries of such a network, i. e. at those points 
where the linguistic network connects with the worlds of conceptual 
correlations and phonic correlations. Lamb (1972(b): 69) expresses 
this view as follows: 
"*.. the entire linguistic system consists just of 
relationships - not symbols (i. e. elements) and 
relationships, which may be diagrammed in a network 
of lines and nodes. Symbols are needed only at the 
end points of a diagram of a linguistic structure (. . . ), - 
symbols would be needed only for phonetic features at 
the bottom, and concepts at the top. On the other hand, 
diagrams are in general much easier to read if we sprinkle 
labels around liberally. " 
It is clear from the above quotation that labels in graphic 
diagrams do not stand'for elements in linguistic networks, but are merely 
mnemonicdevices whose value lies in their utility in reading or 
interpreting such diagrams. Each label in a graphic diagram designates 
a position in the linguistic network of relationships, and each position 
is defined in terms of its connection to other positions both inter-stratally 
and Antra-stratally, in the network. For example, a morpheme in a given 
morphemic stratal system is no more than a position in that system, to be 
defined in terms of its connection upwards to the lexemic stratal system, 
in terms of its connection downwards to the phonemic stratal system and 
intrastratally in terms of its connection to the morphotactics. The term 
morpheme is no more than a generallsing label for a class of positions 
defined in the manner given above. 
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In addition to its relational character, language, according to 
the stratificationalists, is a code for communication, i. e. "a code for 
relating conceptual correlations to phonic correlations" (Lockwood 
1972(a): 3). On the basis of these two views, we may characterise 
human language as a system of relationships whose purpose Is to relate 
the world of meanings to the world of sounds. 
In its capacity of being an integral part of the information or 
knowledge 'stored in the brains of the native speakers of a speech 
community, this relational communicative code is said by the 
stratificationalists to be of a cognitive or neurophysiological nature. 
And, insofar as the networks of neural connections which are closely 
connected with the storage of information, including the linguistic code 
in the brain, are said to consist purely of relationships, and insofar as 
the stratif icationa lists insist. that it is the linguistic code which 
constitutes the proper object for study under their theory, it follows that, 
from the stratificationalist point of view, language can be characterised 
as a system of relationships only. It, therefore, seems that the 
stratificationalist view that language is a system of relationships is, ' if 
not cognitively based, at least cognitively motivated. 
On the basis of what has been said above, we may characterise 
the goal of stratificational grammar as the explanation of the phenomenon 
of natural language as a cognitively significant relational code for 
communication. However, stratif icationa lists admit that they have not, 
as yet, succeeded in characterising language in its capacity as a 
cognitively significant phenomenon. Lockwood (1972(a): 6), expresses 
this view as follows: 
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"While it is one of the aims of stratificational theory 
to characterise language as it is represented in the brain, 
the theory is not yet in a position to claim to have 
attained this goal. But in view of its functional 
orientation, which insists that language consists of 
relationships, stratificational theory can claim to be 
closer to such a goal than any theory which does not 
make this assumption. How close it is with regard 
to particular details, however, remains a very much 
unanswered, and at present perhaps unanswerable, 
question. 
Lamb's insistence that language consists entirely of relationships 
seems to be no more than a reaction against the almost phenomenalist 
Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian view of linguistic units and elements 
as object or thing which exist as delineable and identifiable segments 
of spoken utterances. According to this view,, such things ýas phonemes 
and morphemes constitute portions of the utterances spoken by members 
of a speech community. Consequently, relations between linguistic 
units are temporally significant. Arrangement between linguistic units 
is a matter of being 'followed', or 'preceded by' in a temporally real 
sense. It is not my intention here to give a critical assessment of this 
view of the nature of linguistic units and their relations, for this would 
take us outside the immediate aim of this chapter. Suffice it to say 
here that, however, Bloomfield and his followers did not consistently 
follow this view, but insofar as they follow It in their approach Lamb is 
right in rejecting it. 
But the above view of the nature of linguistic units is not the 
only view available in the literature. In glossematics and other 
Saussurean-oriented approaches, for example axiomatic functionalism, 
linguistic units are abstract objects in the sense that they are models 
which can be mapped onto portions of texts or speech-phenomena. 
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Furthermore, linguistic units in these approaches are relationally 
defined. Witness, for example, Hjelmslev's view of the linguistic 
sign as a 'function' and Mulder's similar view of the nature of the 
'signum' to be dealt with later in this thesis. It, therefore, seems that 
what Lamb calls positions in linguistic networks correspond to linguistic 
units thus defined, i. e. linguistic units as abstract relationally defined 
constructs. 
On the basis of this, it may be said that the stratif icationa list 
view that language consists entirely of relationships reduces to a 
terminological issue, with everything hinging on whether or not it is 
philosophically admissable to call abstract, relationally defined 
constructs linguistic units. Now, as there is no reason why constructs 
of this type, which Lamb refers to as positions, cannot be called 
linguistic units, it follows that Lamb's view that language consists 
entirely of relationships is neither novel nor radical. 
Finally, it Is ironical that stratif I cationa lists, who strongly 
oppose any attempt to refer to 'units' or 'elements' in characterising the 
phenomenon of human language, continuously employ these and similar 
terms in explaining notions in their approach. Witness, for example, 
Lockwood's characterisation of the notion realisation, mentioned earlier 
in this chapter and his explanation of the different types of realisation 
relationships (section 4.2.4). 
5.2 Stratification And Its Rationale 
Stratification in the field of linguistics is mainly associated with 
Lamb's theory of human language. The aim of this section is to examine 
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briefly the rationale for positing stratification as a defining property 
of human language in this theory. 
(47) 
Two arguments are offered for positing stratification as a 
property of the organisation of human language. The first argument is 
linked to the stratificationalist view of human language as a 
communicational code relating the world of conceptual correlations to 
the'world of phonic correlations. It is held that in view of the fact that 
the world of conceptual correlations is "multi-dimensional" and "non-linear" 
in nature, and that the world of phonic correlations is "essentially linear" 
in nature.. in a temporally significant sense, it islreasonable'to assume 
that stratification "provides gradual stages" for bridging the vast gap 
between these two worlds. In other words, in view of the "structural 
diversity" of the two worlds between which language mediates, "it seems 
reasonable", according to Lockwood (1972(a): 6), "to hypothesise that 
within language there exist several layers of structuring", with one being 
adapted to the multi-dimensional nature of conceptual correlations, and 
another to the "essentially linear" nature of the phonic correlations and 
with one or more layers of structuring intervening between them. Ea ch 
one of these layers of structuring is called a 'stratum', and a 1stratal - 
system' is said to be associated with each one of these strata. ,- 
The second argument for positing stratification as a property of 
the organisation of human language centres around what Lockwood (ibid. ) 
calls "systematic nonsense". This may be explained as the ability of a 
stratificationally orgýinised theory to provide the basis for defining well- 
formedness in language at different levels or layers of structuration. 
For example, the phonotactics of English pronounces the unattested form 
191 
dran as a well-formed phonological construction, but rules out dlan 
as being phonotactically ill-formed or deviant on grounds of the 
inadmissability of dl as a cluster initially in the form of words. 
(48) 
From the point of view of lexOtactics, 'John will go yesterday' and 
'John went yesterday' are both well-formed in English. However, only 
the latter construction can be said to be well-formed from the viewpoint 
of English semotactics; the -former Is regarded as ill-formed because it 
"violates a restriction which may 
[be] informallyEcharacterised I as 
a limitation on the tense of the verb in the presence of certain temporal 
elements" (ibid. ). The latter two examples clearly show how a 
stratificationally organised theory can serve as the basis for a fine 
scale of well-formedness or 'grammaticality' in linguistic description. 
The above arguments do not. constitute compelling reasons for 
positing stratification as a fundamental property of human language. 
This claim is supported by the fact that other extant theories of human 
language, for example axiomatic functionalism and transformational 
generative grammar, can perform the tasks indicated by the above two 
arguments without adhering, or having to adhere, to the stratif ica tiona list 
view of the stratificational nature of the organisation of human language. 
If it were the case that the stratif icationa list could demonstrate that 
only a Lambian stratificationa list view of the organisation of human 
language can lead to an adequate explanation of this phenomenon, in 
some generally acdepted sense of the term 'adequate, then that would be 
an unequivocal demonstration of the necessity of adopting stratification 
as a criterion of human language. In the absence of such a demonstration, 
the above arguments are no more than rationalisations for the desirability 
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of adopting a stratified view of the organisation of human language. 
In dealing with the merits of stratificational grammar in comparison 
with Chomsky's transformational grammar, Lockwood (1972(a) ) admits 
this point; he (ibid: 266) states: "Chomsky cannot really prove the 
need for transformation, nor can Lamb prove the need for strata. They 
can only show that their respective theories can handle various 
phenomena and must leave them to be judged on various grounds". 
5.3 The Morphemic Versus Lexemic Stratal Division 
All stratificationalist models to date, except for the first 
pre-Outline model, distinguish between a morphemic and a lexemic 
stratum. However, whether all natural languages exhibit this distinction 
or not is an empirical matter to be decided on the basis of the outcome 
of the application of the stratificationalist theory to human languages. 
Lockwood (1972(c): 205) expresses this point as follows: "Whether it is 
necessary to postulate the two grammatical strata for every language 
remains to be seen. It seems altogether conceivable that the ... 
morphemic stratum may' not be necessary in languages which show no 
inflection". An example of a language which is said to exhibit this 
distinction is English. The aim of this section is to examine the basis 
of the distinction between morphemics and lexemics in this language. 
There is very little discussion of this distinction in Lamb's work'. , 
It appears, however, from statements found in the Outline that Lamb bases 
this distinction on the following considerations: (a) the fact that the 
morphemic and lexemic strata "have quite different tactic patterns" 
(1966: 29), and (b) the fact that the lexotactics of the lexemic stratum of 
English contains the co-ordination element, graphically represented by 
half-circle, which is absent from lower strata. 
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But these two features cannot be said to constitute a valid 
basis for the distinction between the morphemic and lexeMic strata. 
The reason for this is very simple. Rather than providing the 
for the distinction concerned, these two features result, or emerge, from 
the distinction itself. Thus, by regarding as the basis for the distinction 
morphemic versus lexemic stratum a set of features which emerge from 
the distinction itself, Lamb commits the logical fallacy of pLtitto 
principii, i. e. begging the question. In other words, by establishing 
the result, or part of the result, of a state of affairs as the ralson d'etre 
of that state of affairs Lamb commits the same logical fallacy as that 
committed by the man who asserts that. the reason why it, is raining is 
that he has his umbrella up. f 
In addition to this, the second feature given by Lamb does not 
constitute even a sufficient condition for distinguishing between morphemics 
and lexemics. This follows from the fact that this feature applies as 
much, say, to the distinction between the lexemic and phonemic stratum 
as it does to the distinction between the former stratum and the morphemic 
stratum. 
Other stratificationalists, namely Lockwood (1972(a), * (c)') and 
V. Makkai (1972) discuss the distinction between the morphemic and 
lexemic strata in terms of the requirement to provide an adequate solution 
for dealing with "sets of forms which exhibit some sort of formal 
patterning but which, synchronically at least, bear very little if any 
semantic relationship to one another" (V. 'Makkai, 1972: 180). Examples 
of such forms in English are: understand: understood; withs ta nd: with stood; 
undercio : underwent; withdraw : withdrew; undertake : undertook; and 
withhold : withheld. Stratificationalists give the following observations 
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concerning these data: 
(i) each item is formally divisible into two elements; this formal 
divisibility may be represented by the following two diagrams: 
stand / stood stand / stood 
under go / went and with draw / drew 
take /took hold /held 
Tig. (30) 
(ii) none of these formally divisible forms can be said to be semantically 
compositional from the synchronic point of view. 
According to such stratificationalists as Lockwood and V. Makkai 
the afore-mentioned observations have, albeit implicitly, the status of 
linguistically significant genera I isations. By implication, this means 
that a linguistic theory, such as stratificational grammar, must be able 
to account for the formal analysability as well as the semantic, non- 
compositionality of the above items. The ability of a linguistic theory 
to capture these empirically significant generalisations is, therefore, a 
test of its descriptive adequacy. 
On the basis of what has been said in the preceding paragraph, 
it may be pointed out that if the above items are considered as morphemes, 
and if the morpheme is treated as the minimal, i. e. unanalysable, 
meaningful unit in grammar, then it follows that the first of the afore- 
mentioned linguistically -significant generalisations cannot be captured 
or accounted for. This, by implication, means that a linguistic theory 
which adopts the afore-mentioned interpretation of the morpheme cannot 
be said to be empirically adequate. Stratificational grammar cannot, 
therefore, adhere to this view of thetmorpheme. 
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To provide the basis for capturing the above significant 
generalisations, particularly the first one, stratif icationa lists propose 
the establishment of two layers of structuration in grammar: the lexemic 
and the morphemic strata. The -emes of the former stratum are regarded 
as the minimal meaningful units of grammar, while the -emes of Ahe 
latter one are said to be the minimal formally definable units of the 
grammatical portion of language. In addition to their semantic 
indivisibility, lexemes have the property of being formally divisible into 
morphemes. 
Now, by treating the items in 11g. (30) above as lexemes 
stratificationalists claim that they can, at one and the same time, account 
for the semantic indivisibility of these items as well as for their formal 
analysability into, ultimately, morphemes. In other words, by adopting 
the above framework stratificationalists believe that they can explain the 
fact that the items listed above are "unitary with respect to their - 
connections in the direction of conceptual correlations, as well as with 
respect to their syntactic behaviour, but at the same time compound". with 
respect to their connections in the direction of the phonic, correlations via 
the morphemes (Lockwood 1972(a): 22). 
The preceding discussion points to the following conclusion: the 
digtinction between the morphemic and lexemic strata in grammar is based 
on, or, to say the least, motivated by, the requirement to provide a 
theoretical framework that can deal adequately with certain classes of 
phenomena which, though semantically indivisible from the synchronic, 
point of view, can be formally analy'sed into definable and recurrent 
grammatical units. It is also clear from the preceding discussion that 
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the lexeme is the comer stone of any relevant solution based on this 
theoretical framework. The lexeme, which is the nearest stratificationalist 
unit to the Saussurean and Hjelmslevean (simple) sign, may be aptly 
characterised as a Janus-like construct, with one unitary and indivisible 
side pointing in the direction of the world of conceptual correlations and 
with the other divisible side pointing in the direction of, ultimately, the 
world of phonic correlations. 
The above argument from the field of descriptive adequacy for 
establishing a division between morphemics and lexemics in grammar 
suffers from the logical fallacy of petitt principit. Rather than it being 
the case that it Is the requirement of providing an appropriate framework 
for adequately dealing with the afore-mentioned so-called linguistically 
significant generalisations which leads to the distinction morphemics 
versus lexemics in grammar, it is this distinction itself which gives rise 
to these significant generalisations and, consequently, to the requirement 
to account for them in an adequate manner. In other words, by giving 
as an argument for establishing a distinction something which emerges 
from that distinction itself, stratif icationa lists are guilty of circularity 
and begging the question. 
In the light of what has been said. above, it may be concluded 
that stratificationalists fall to offer a valid explanation of the basis of 
the morphemics versus lexemics distinction in their approach. In view 
of this, it Is worth pointing out that stratificationalist sometimes appeal, 
to what might be called, for the lack of a better term, the 'general practice' 
of linguists in establishing this distinction. This tendency may be 
exemplified by the following quotation from Lamb (1972(a): 30-31): 
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"One might be tempted to suppose that the morphemic 
and lexemic strata might be ... coalesced, but this 
possibility does not work out. The essential property 
of a stratum is its distirictive pattern. Now linguists 
have long recognised the obvious fact that languages 
have syllable structure. That is the essence of 
phonotactics. And if there is anything that is 
inescapable abotit linguistic structure it is that there 
are such things as prefixes, stems and suffixes which 
combine in characteristic ways to form words. That 
is the escence of morphotactics ... And if there is . 
anything even more readily recognised by linguists of 
varying persuasions it is that clauses come in subjects 
and predicates, that subjects are, or contain, noun 
phrases, and predicates are, or contain, verb phrases. 
But such an approach cannot be seriously contemplated as a, valid 
procedure for performing the task of laying down the foundations of the 
morphemics versus lexemics distinction in stratificational grammar. 
This springs from the fact that this approach dispenses with scientific 
methodology, and replaces it, by tradition and 'general practice' as 
criteria of 'rationality. ' 
S. 4 Stratificational Grammar And Scientific Methodolog 
5.4.1 Lamb 
Like the majority of modern linguistic approaches, stratificational 
grammar lacks any in-depth explanation of its methodological foundations 
and epistemological principles. In this respect stratificational grammar 
is most un-Hjelmslevean in character. Whereas Hjelmslev's work 
displays a great deal of interest in the methodological and epistemological 
nature of linguistic theory and linguistic description, their internal 
organisation and their relationship to each other, Lamb's work reveals, the 
opposite tendency. This observation concerning Lamb's work is to a 
great extent applicable to the work of the other stratificationalists. This 
is one of the reasons why the stratificationalist claim that glossematics 
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is one of the major predecessors of stratificational'grammar must be 
regarded as being, to a large extent, baseless. 
A major difficulty in trying to establish the general methodological 
character of stratificational grammar on the basis of the relevant remarks 
one finds scattered in Lamb's work is that Lamb does not distinguish 
sharply between the theory in stratificational grammar, on the one hand, 
and the linguistic descriptions which result from its application to 
linguistic texts, on the other. However, insofar as it is possible to 
apply this distinction to stratificational grammar, the following remarks 
concerning the methodological and epistemological character of the 
stratificationalist theory, as opposed to the descriptions wh i ch a re 
dependent on it, may be made: 
(i) the theory contains many logically untraceable elements. In setting 
up his theory the linguist may have recourse to his intuitions, hunches, 
his experience with natural languages, his knowledge of other linguistic 
approaches and relevant disciplines, etc. What really matters in the 
evaluation of a'linguistic theory is not the way it is arrived at, 
(49) 
but 
the fact that it achieves its purpose of serving as a basis for constructing 
linguistic descriptions which satisfy the criterion of simplicity; 
(ii) the theory is not a rigid system. It may be modified In the light of 
advances in the field of scientific-theory construction in general and ' 
linguistic theory in particular, and/or as a result of theoretical insights 
into the nature of human language. It may also be modified on the basis 
of insights derived from the linguistic descriptions which are based upon it; 
(iii) the latter source of modifying the theory appears to be inductively 
orientated, in the sense that generalisations derived from linguistic 
descriptions may be incorporated in the theory as theoretical statements; 
(iv) certain features of the theory, for instance the fact that ordering with 
respect to an 'and' node is a matter of temporal priority, have an empirical 
content. Others, for example the notions of pre-emptive morphon and 
representative, are purely instrumentalist notions whose sole purpose and 
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Justification is to enable the linguist to deal with linguistic data in a 
theoretically predetermined and consistent manner. These features of 
the theory in stratificational grammar have implications for the 
descriptions which are dependent on it; and 
(v) from the point of view of linguistic description, the theory 
constitutes a methodological framework for describing language; but it 
is not, nor does it imply, either a discovery, or a decision, procedure. 
As far as the linguistic description is concerned, the following 
remarks may be made: 
(1) the description is dependent on the data it purports to describe; it 
is also dependent on the theory in the sense that it is formulated in terms 
of, or by reference to, it; 
(2) in constructing the description, the linguist "may ... use his tuition, 
hunches and trial-and-error techniques" (Lamb 1966: 7); but when he 
arrives at the description, he must subject it to the test of simplicity, 
which is the only evaluation criterion advocated by the stratificationalists; 
(3) simplicity is a matter of expressing genera I isations. Of two 
competing descriptions carried out and formulated in terms of the theory, 
the one which expresses more genera I isat ions, i. e. results in a greater 
degree of systematisation of data, is said to be simpler; and 
(4) as far as epistemology is concerned, statements in the description 
fall into two major categories: (a) those which have an empirical content 
and, therefore, are proper hypotheses, e. g. the statement that the 
phoneme 
P /p/ in English is a simultaneous bundle of the phonemic 
components 
PN /labial/, PN /o cclu s ive/ and 
PN /voiceless/, - and (b) 
those which lack any empirical content, i. e. those which are of an 
instrumentalist nature, e. g'. the statement that the morphonic 
composition of the morpheme bet in better is /beT/, or the statement 
that the final morphon in /beT/ has the alternate realisation 
P /t/ and /j6 
Statements of the latter type establish constructs which are mere 
descriptive conveniences in Hockett's (1961) sense of the term; the 
purpose of these constructs appears to be nothing more than the easing 
of the transition from one layer of assumed structure to another. 
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From what has been said above it is clear that Lamb does not 
follow any coherent philosophy of science, either in the methodological 
or the epistemological field. With respect to scientific methodology, 
Lamb's theory is neither deductive, nor fully inductive; it is also not 
operational in character. And with respect to epistemology, it combines 
empirical hypotheses with statements of an instrumentalist type. This 
boils down to saying that in both scientific methodology and epistemology, 
Lamb's theory is of an eclectic nature. As Hockett (1968: 146) points out, 
"Lamb finds much positive spirit in the work of almost every predecessor 
- even Chomsky - and tries hard to provide a niche in his system for 
every genuinely useful notion of whatever origin. " It is this eclecticism 
which accounts for the fact that Lamb's theory seems to be no more than 
a collection of loosely connected statements. 
Eclecticism leads not to inconsistency, but to a-consistency. ' 
The trouble with a-consistency is that it leads to immunisation from 
criticism. One cannot criticise stratificational grammar for being 
instrumentalist, for it is not fully so. Nor can one criticise this theory 
for being inductivist, for it is not fully so. Moreover, eclecticism 
deprives the scientist of the most important test in his logical armoury 
of evaluation, namely the criterion of consistency. This follows from 
the fact that, from the logical viewpoint, the opposite of consistency is 
not a-consistency, but inconsistency. Whereas an inconsistent approach 
can, logically speaking, be categorically rejected, an a-consistent one 
cannot. However, insofar as a-consistency leads to immunisation from 
criticism and to the elimination of an important test in evaluating theories, 
and by virtue of the fact that stratificational grammar is an eclectic and, 
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by material Implication, a-consistent theory, we may conclude that 
stratificational grammar does not, strictly speaking, merit the status 
of scientific theory. 
5.4.2 Lockwood 
According to Lockwood (197 2 (a) ), stratif icational grammar adopts 
the method of modelling in setting up linguistic descriptions. This method 
is said to accord with the cognitive goal of this theory. In terms of this 
goal, human language is, as has been mentioned previously, viewed as 
a communicational code whose seat is in the brain. As such, language 
cannot be directly observed due to the lack of suitable techniques, e. g. 
"powerful-but harmless micro-X-ray" (ibid: 5), which can be used to 
observe the functioning of the brain in the process of 'speech' production 
and perception, without either seriously damaging, or completely 
destroying, it. As a result of this limitation on the methodology of 
linguistic theory, Lockwood argues that the most fruitful method for 
studying human language as a cognitive phenomenon is that of modelling, 
which involves the indirect observation of this phenomenon via its 
manifestations in utterances. He (ibid: 4) explains this method as follows: 
"This Emethod :] is implemented by constructing 
hypothetical systems known as models. In constructing 
these models, we try to make their behaviour parallel 
the observable behaviour of the un-observable system as 
closely as possible. Underlying this method of 
investigation is the a'ssumption that the more closely the 
behaviour of a model approximates that of the unobservable 
system of investigation, the closer the internal workings of 
the model can be expected to correspond to the-internal 
structure of the actual system. 
However, Lockwood does not rule out the possibility of "equally 
workable alternate models" for one and the same system. In such 
instances the simpler model is preferred. 
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To sum up, the main elements in this method of linguistic 
description may be stated as follows: 
(a) human language existsas a system in the brain; 
(b) in describing this system the linguist sets up a model on the basis 
of the observable behaviour of the system; 
(c) the descriptive model is of a hypothetical nature; 
W the closer the behaviour of the model - in predicting texts of the 
language of which it purports to be a model - is to the behaviour of the 
linguistic system it presupposes "the closer the internal workings of the 
model can be expected to correspond to the internal structure of the 
actual system" (ibid. ); and 
(e) of two "equally workable alternate models" (ibid. ) of the same 
system, which are constructed in accordance with the same theory, the 
simpler model is to be preferred. 
The assumption that human language exists as a syste in the 
brains of the native speakers is unwarranted. 1 
This is based on the fact 
that since language, in the pre-descriptive sense, is not accessible for 
direct observation, it follows that we can neither assert nor deny that 
language is, or may exist as, a well-defined system in the brain. The 
claim that human language is a system Is a claim which concerns language 
in the, post-, and not the pre- descriptive sense. In other words the 
claim that human language is a system is only a posterior , and not 
a priori, valid. In the light of this, it may be pointed out that the 
assumption under consideration here has built into it a claim about human 
language which, strictly speaking, is not a property of language itself, 
but of the model set up for it. By doing this, Lockwood argues not from 
the premisses to the conclusion, but from the conclusion to the premisses. 
Equally unwarranted is the assumption that "the more closely the 
behaviour of the model approximates that of the unobservable system under 
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investigation, the closer the internal workings of the model can be 
expected to correspond to the internal structure of the actual system" 
(emphasis ours). Lockwood does not indicate whether the 'expectation' 
he has in mind is psychological or logical in nature. If it is of the 
former type, then it Is not relevant from the point of view of philosophy 
of science, since it falls within the scope of the different, though related, 
discipline of psychology of science (see Chapter I, section 2). If this 
expectation is of a logical nature, then it is a matter of probability. 
Now, since both the model and the unobservable system are structurally 
finite, and since their behaviour - characterised in terms of the texts 
they can generate - is, so to speak, Infinite, it follows that the 
probability of the internal workings of the model corresponding to the 
internal structure of the "actual system", on the basis of any observed 
correspondence between the texts generated by these two objects, must, 
under any standard theory of probability, be zero. Furthermore, if we 
consider the internal workings of the model and the internal structure 
of the "actual system" as antecedents, and the texts they generate as 
their respective consequences, then we may conclude that, by trying to 
establish correspondence between the model and the system on the basis 
of observed correspondence between the texts they generate, the above 
assumption put forward by Lockwood suffers from the logical fallacy of 
asserting the antecedent (see Chapter I, section 4.2.1). 
The view that of two competing models, the simpler one is to be 
preferred seems to rest on the implicit assumption that the simpler a model 
is, the higher it. S probability of corresponding to the "actual system". 
However, this assumption, like the previous two, is unwarranted. This 
204 
judgement is based on the fact that there is no valid method for testing 
the empirical correctness of this claim. In view of this, there is no 
reason, logically speaking, why a less simple model of a set of two 
competing models should not be closer to the "actual system" than its 
more simple rival. 
Furthermore, since the goal of the simplicity criterion is to 
discriminate between cognitively significant models, it may be said 
that this criterion has a cognitive base, i. e. it is cognitively significant, 
too. In other words, the stratificationalist simplicity criterion may be 
taken to express a feature of the neurolinguistic mechanism of the brain. 
By virtue of the fact that this, albeit Implicit, view cannot be empirically 
tested, we may conclude that it is of a metaphysical nature, in the 
Popperian sense of the term. 
Finally, Lockwood's view that the model set up by the linguist 
is hypothetical in nature is not entirely accurate. As has been indijcated 
in the previous section, the theory in stratificational grammar contains 
instrumentalist notions, such as the morphon, the pre-emptive morphon 
and the representative. Now, by virtue of the fact that a linguistic model 
is dependent on the theory, it follows that such a model will, to a certain 
degree, contain instrumentalist constructs. Such constructs may not 
reasonably be expected or said to have cognitive analogues. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
Lockwood (1972(a):. 289) summarises the main differences between 
Gleason and Lamb as follows: " [Gleason: ] has not employed the 
graphic notation as thoroughly as Lamb ... and has much greater 
use of less completely formalised descriptive statements, particularly 
for interstratal relationships. Gleason has generally recognised 
fewer stratal systems than Lamb, never recognising as many as six. 
His most significant work within the theory has been in the area of 
semological structure, particularly the structure of texts". 
(2) Lockwood (1972(a): 289) explains the difference between Reich's 
approach and that of Lamb as follows: " [ReichIsJ version of the 
theory has come to differ from that of Lamb in a number of ways. 
Unlike Gleason, he makes a thorough use of the graphic notation 
system. He has departed from Lamb's use of this system, however, 
in a number of ways. He also differs from Lamb in the way he 
defines the working of the nodes in a model of performances. He 
interprets each node as a kind of process system known as a finite 
state machine ... Reich also differs from both Lamb and Gleason on 
the nature of the strata in that he does not posit a separate tactic 
pattern for each one. Rather, he has an initial tactic pattern and, 
attempts to account for additional variation entirely in the realisational 
portion" 
(3) For the basic features of this model the reader may refer to Reich's 
article "Competence, Performance, and Relational Networks" in 
A. Makkai and D. Lockwood (1972). 
(4) According to Lockwood (1972(a): 286) the reason behind this is the 
fact that "stratificational theory, considering all its practitioners, 
came about as the result of a convergence in the thought of its 
principal founders, Sydney Lamb and H. A. Gleason, Jr. This 
convergence has at no point been complete. As a result, 
stratificational grammar never went through a period in which it was 
homogeneous and monolithic. It has exhibited diversity throughout 
the period during which it has been known to the linguistic community". 
(5) For this point the reader may refer to Lockwood (1972(a): 257-259) 
and Sampson (1980). 
(6) See Section (5.4.1). 
(7) For the relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme the 
reader may refer to Hockett (1947,1954,1961 and 1968). 
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(8) It is not my intention here to give an extensive or exhaustive 
examination of Bloomfield's view on morphology, including the 
relationship between the morpheme and the phoneme. I shall 
only deal with those features of Bloomfieldian morphology which 
are relevant for the discussion of morphology in stratificational 
grammar. 
(9) The symbol "MP" stands for morphophoneme. 
(10) The symbols V, 'C' and IS' stand for the relationships 'is represented 
by', 'is composed of' and 'is signa: lled by, respectively. 
(11) For the type of elements which appear in each stratum the reader may 
refer to Hockett (1961) section (7). 
(12) These different types of realisation relationships will be dealt with 
later in this chapter. 
(13) This view of the organisation of human language resembles that 
adopted in the post-Outline model (see sections 4.3 - 4.3. '2 and 
figure 27), whereas the one presented in the second pre-Outline 
model resembles that adopted in the Outline model (see sections 4.2.3 
- 4.2.4 ' section 4.2.6 and figure 23). The reason for not giving 
extensive treatment and illustration of the exact nature of the second 
and third pre-Outline models (at the relevant points in the discussion) 
is to avoid repetition, since the post-Outline and the Outline models 
will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
(14) Stratificationalists distinguish between surface information and 
effective information with respect to graphic diagrams. Lockwood 
(1972(a): 58) explains these two types of information as follows: 
"Surface information has to do with the number and complexity of the 
relationships expressed within a diagram. Two diagrams connecting 
identical lines at identical nodes are identical in surface information, 
regardless of the actual placement of the nodes and the length of lines. 
The set of possible outputs accounted for by such a pair of diagrams 
will necessarily be the same ... . But two diagrams may provide an 
account of the same set of actual outputs and yet differ in surface 
information. In such a case, the diagrams are said to have the same 
effective information". 
The simplicity measure in stratificational grammar concerns surface 
information. Lockwood (ibid: pp. 58-59) gives this measure, 
developed by Reich, as follows: 
"Step 1. Count the number of nodes in a diagram (N), disregarding 
diamonds with only two connections. 
'Step 2. Count the number of connections above three at any node 
("extra lines"Y W. 
Step 3. Add N and L for the preliminary measure of surface' 
information. 
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Step 4. Among diagrams with identical effective information, 
that which receives the lowest numb ' or 
by Step 3 is 
judged to be simpler and therefore preferable. If this 
step does not provide a decision, also consider the 
figure N. The graph with the smaller number of nodes 
will be considered simpler. 
Example If two alternative diagrams have 5 nodes and 3 extra lines 
in one case, and 4 nodes and 4 extra lines in the other, 
N+L=8 in both cases, but the second diagram is judged 
to be simpler by virtue of having fewer nodes". 
(15) This node is not used in stratificational grammar. 
(16) The 'realisational portion' of the language and the 'tactics' will be 
dealt with later in this chapter. 
(17) This is incompatible with the stratificationalist view that the 
'or node' is an 'exclusive or'. 
MS MS (18) The capital letters /t/ and INI initially in /Ed/ and /Ned/ 
signify the fact that these entities represent names. 
(19) See figure (16) for an illustration of this pattern. 
(20) For an illustration of this pattern'see figure (16). 
(21) Lockwood (1972(a): 27) points out that this type of realisation 
"seldom occurs in languages". 
(22) By 'analytically significant' I mean that their complexity cannot be 
readily dealt with in terms of maximally general principles of 
patterning. 
(23) Hockett (1947) is, to the best of my knowledge, the first linguist to 
apply the term 'portmanteau morph' in the field of morphological theory. 
A portmanteau morph according to Hockett is a morph which 
simultaneously belongs to two or more morphemes, and has the 
meanings of both of them. It is not my intention here to deal with 
the theoretical consistency of this notion within Hockett's grammatical 
framework. Suffice it to say that the stratificationalist notion of 
'portmanteau realisation' finds its root in this notion. However, the 
former notion differs from the latter one in terms of its scope; this 
follows from the fact that stratificational grammar recognises more 
strata than the levels recognised by Hockett. 
(24) The stratificationalist notion 'zero realisation' finds its roots in the 
well-known neo-Bloomfieldian notion of 'zero morph'. It differs from 
it however in that it is not restricted to the field of morphology, but 
it applies across any two strata in the linguistic network of relationships. 
Zero realisation is represented by a 'downward or' which leads down to 
a zero symbol. 
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(25) The notion 'empty realisation' in stratificational grammar originates 
from Hockett's (1947) notion 'empty morphl. However, due to the 
fact that stratificationalists recognise more strata than the number 
of levels recognised by Hockett, this notion has a wider scope of 
application in the former theory. 
(26) Empty realisation is represented by an 'upward unordered or' which 
leads down to a zero symbol. This type of realisation is insilfficiently 
discussed in the literature on stratificational grammar that I have 
consulted. 
(27) The term anataxis, rou 
, 
ghly meaning "difference of ordering", is 
-borrowed 
from Greek. 
(28) Lamb (1960 recognises two types of anatactic realisation: 
interstratal and intrastratal. For a very brief discussion of these 
two types of anataxis the reader may refer to Lamb's Outline 
(pp. 22-24). 
(29) Anatactic realisation is essentiaily a static interpretation of the 
more well-known diachronic (dynamic) notion 'metathesis'. The 
term 'metathesis' designates anataxis between the ordering of the 
morphons and that of the phonemes in stratificational grammar. 
(30) According to Lamb (1966: 5) the basis of tactic analysis is the 
isolation of "recurrent partial similarities"; he (ibid: 5) points out 
that "If the traditional equipment of tactic analysis is reduced to 
its essentials, it turns out to involve little more than applying a 
simple factoring operation like that performed by the ninth-grade 
algebra student. This process leads the analyst to distribution 
classes , 
and constructions which describe arrangements in the 
simplest possible terms". 
(31) Simple realisation and anataxis do not come under any one of these 
operations. 
(32) Lamb (1966: 1) says: "such a three way division into major 
components is perhaps appropriate for all natural languages, but 
until further research is done, it remains an open question whether 
each of the three major components in every language comprises 
exactly two stratal systems". 
(33) The well-known distinction between inflection and derivation will 
be dealt with in Chapter IV. 
(34) The notion grammatical word is, to the best of my knowledge, no 
where defined in stratificational grammar. 
(35) See figure (16) and the discussion relevant to it for these two points. 
(36) The notion of conditioning will be dealt with further in the next 
section. 
209 
(37) See Lamb (1972(a): 25) for this point. 
(38) Lamb (1972(b): 78) points out that the first type of diamond is the 
most usual type in linguistic networks. The second type of diamond 
is said to provide for "determined elements, i. e. elements whose 
presence is determined by the tactics and which therefore have no 
connection to the higher stratum". In other words, the second type 
of diamond represents an empty realisation in the tactic pattern. 
However, Lamb points out that this type of diamond is "not really a 
node at all, since it has only two connecting lines" but that "it is 
a convenient notational convention which makes possible a clear 
boundary between the tactic pattern and the realisational ones". 
The third type of diamond is used for higher stratum elements which 
are realised by features of arrangement". There is, to the best of, 
my knowledge, no explanation of the function of the fourth type of 
diamond in the stratificationalist literature. 
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(39) The following type of diamond is used to represent zero realisation: 
For the different types of diamond employed in stratificational grammar 
the reader may consult Lockwood (1972(a): 55-58). 
(40) The new sub-tactic alternation patterns are named after their 
realisates in each stratal system; thus, for example, the lexemic 
and morphemic alternation patterns in the lexemic and morphemic 
stratal systems respectively. 
(41) This point is expressed by Lockwood (1972(a): 121) as follows: 
11 &*. alternations assigned to the -onic alternation pattern Care3 
conditioned in terms of the outputs, while those assigned to the 
-emic alternation pattern Carej conditioned in terms of their inputs. 
A lexonic alternation pattern, for example, will occur when a lexon is 
realised by alternate morphemes, with a conditioning environment 
stated in terms of morphemes. A morphemic alternation, on the other 
hand, will occur when a morpheme is realised by alternate morphemic 
signs, with its conditioning environment likewise stated in terms of 
morphemes. We may thus speak of -onic alternations as output 
conditioned and of -emic alternations as input conditioned. The most 
essential determining factor in assigning an alternation pattern to one 
or the other of these alternation patterns within a stratal system will 
be whether its treatment can be fitted in most simply and efficiently 
as an output conditioned and therefore -onic alternation, or as an 
input conditioned and therefore -emic one". 
(42) Each one of these partially independent grammatical stratal systems 
has its own tactics. The tactic patterns of these stratal systems, 
i. e. the morphemic, lexemic and sememic systems are said to deal 
with "morphology, surface syntax, and deep-syntax, "' respectively 
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(Lamb 1972(a): 32). But no definition of these terms, particularly 
'deep syntax' is given. It, however, seems that deep syntax covers 
both semantics and, what the transformationalists call deep or 
underlying structure. 
(43) Lamb (1972(a): 32) calls this device the "representative" because 
"it functions like a representative In a legislature, who acts for the 
people he represents, at least in theory, so that their interests are 
served without their having to be present in the legislature". I have 
no ,t come across any 
(clear) examples of it in the stratificationalist 
literature. 
(44) A representative is more or less like a place holder for a group of 
lower stratum elements on a higher stratum to enable those elements 
to be connected to the conceptual system. 
(45) Morphemes and suffixes in this set of data are stated in terms of 
their morphonic representation. 
(46) These stages should not be confused with the three stages in the 
development of the stratificationalist view of the organisation of human 
language dealt with previously. 
(47) As has been mentioned in Section 4.3.2 the term stratum was employed 
for the first time in the third pre-Outline model. Prior to that, Lamb 
employed the term'level. 
(48) See Lockwood (1972(a) ) for these examples. - 
(49) In this respect Lamb seems to echo Chomsky's position (1957,1965). 
CHAPTER THREE 
MORPHOLOGY IN 
TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 
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CHAPTER THREE 
w MORPHOLOGY IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to give a critical survey of 'morphology' 
in transformational generative grammar between 1957-1976, the years 
which mark the publication of Chomsky's Syntactic Structures and 
Aronoff's Word Formation in Generative Grammar 
(1) 
respectively. 
(2) 
Generally speaking, the term 'morphology' in this context refers to either 
derivational morphology or compounding, or both. It is generally tacitly 
agreed in transformational generative grammar that what is traditionally 
referred to as 'inflectional morphology' is a syntactic matter and, therefore, 
falls outside the scope of 'morphology' proper in this approach; the only 
exception to this I know of is Halle's (1973) suggestion of treating 
inflectional processes in an exactly parallel manner to derivational ones. 
Roughly speaking, it is possible to recognise three periods 
(3) 
in the 
development of 'morphology' in transformational grammar centred around 
the following works by Chomsky: 
1. Syntaetic Structures (1957) 
2. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) 
3. "Remarks on Nominalisation" (1970) 
Transformational grammar is generally regarded as a type of 'item 
and process' grammar. For example, Botha (1968: 85), following Lamb 
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(1964) refers to transformational generative grammar as "mutation 
grammar" because "of an essential feature of a certain type of rule it 
contains. Transformational rules ... can be considered as typical 
examples of rules possessing this 'characteristic. They are formulated 
namely in terms of processes and state that the symbols occurring to the 
left of the arrow must be transformed or changed into those to the right 
of the arrow". In considering the label 'item and process' in relation to 
generative grammars, i. e. grammars which are formulated in terms of 
re-write rules in the widest sense of the term, Matthews (1974: 227) says: 
11 o*. the term IIPI has been used, in several slightly different ways. For 
some writers, it simply refers to any kind of "process" formulation. If 
a rule has an input and an output (e. g. input bake, output baked then 
already it presents a process picture of language. Since most generative 
rules are precisely so interpreted, IP is -sometimes identified with a 
generative description, as such. " f And since transformational grammar is , 
the paradigm example of a linguistic theory which utilises rules of this 
type, we may say that transformational generative grammar, and, therefore, 
transformational generative morphology is well and truly of the 'item and 
processl, type. 
2. The Neglect Of Morphology In Early- Transformational Grammar 
The neglect of 'morphology' in early transformational grammar, 
(4) 
in the sense of a lack of a separate and distinct morphological component 
in the first two models of this approach, has long been observed by Dik 
(1967), Botha (1968), Kiefer (1970), Schane (1973) and Aronoff (1976). 
This feature of early transformational grammar may be seen as an outcome 
of a shift of interest from morphology to syntax as the focal point in 
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grammatical studies, initiated by the new approach as a reaction 
against the predominance of morphological studies in grammar in pre- 
Syntactic Structures linguistics in America. Early transformational 
grammar sought to challenge neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, in which 
morphology was the focal point of grammatical studies, and which was 
then thought to have received its ultimate statement in Harris' book 
Methods in Structural Linguistics, (1951), by dealing with an area of 
linguistic structure, syntax, which had been barely studied in the older 
approach of neo-Bloomf ieldian linguistics. One result of this was that 
questions pertaining to the internal structure of words in terms of 
morphemes, and to the manifestation of morphemes in terms of phonological 
features, which constitute the domain of morphology in its traditional 
sense, were now dealt with In syntax and phonology ('morphophonemics, 
in Syntactic Structures) respectively. This factor, Which I shall call the 
historical factor, is referred to as the "practical reason" by Dik (1967: 355) 
and as the "ideological reason" by Aronoff (1976: 4). The latter linguist 
explains this factor as follows:. 
"Within the generative framework, morphology was 
for a long time successfully ignored. There was a good 
ideological reason for this: in its zeal, post ayntacti 
Structures linguistics saw phonology and syntax 
everywhere with the result that morphology was lost 
somewhere in between. Phonology, at last freed from 
its phonemic blinkers, encompassed all of morphophonemics 
and phonemics in a grand system of ordered rules. Syntax 
took care of everything else: "all the grammatical sequences 
of a language" (Chomsky 1957: 32). Within such a framework 
morphology is not a separate study. In fact, though some 
of the earliest studies in transformational. syntax were 
specifically restricted to'the domain of the word (e. g. Lees 
1961) this domain was not considered to differ in any real 
way from that of the sentence". 
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As a corollary to this, the neglect ofmorphology in 
transformational grammar may be also related to the emphasis on rules 
in formulating grammars in this approach. This attitude may be 
exemplified by Chomsky's remarks concerning the treatment of inflectional 
and derivational formations in. Aspects of the-Theory of Syntax. According 
to Chomsky (1965: 173) "morphemic" or "modern descriptive analysis", 
i. e. 'item and arrangement', - treatment of inflectional processes proves 
to be "clumsy for a grammar based onrewriting rules or transformations". 
He points out that due to the fact that many inflectional morphemes are 
not phonetically realised and, therefore, must be regarded as zero elements, 
the grammar, under this transformationalist view, must contain a large 
number of context -s ens itive rules which specify that the morphemes in 
question are "phonetically null". He (ibid. ) also mentions that "the 
often suppletive character of inflectional systems, as well as the fact 
that ... the effect of the inflectional categories may be partially or even 
totally internal, causes cumbersome and inelegant formulations of rules". 
On the basis of these factors, Chomsky (ibid: 171) declares that "modern 
descriptive analysis of traditional paradigmatic formulations in terms of 
morpheme sequences" is an "ill-advised theoretical innovation" (ibid:, 174),, 
and he rejects it in favour of treating inflectional categories 
transfdrmationally, i. e. "in terms of rules that alter and expand the matrix 
of features constituting a lexical item" (ibido)o 
(5) 
As far as the majority 
of derivational processes are concerned, Chomsky points out that they 
raise serious difficulties for any generative or transformational grammar, 
because of their "typically sporadic and quasi-productive nature" 
(ibid: 184). Derivational formations are said to resist "systematic and 
revealing grammatical description" (p. 192), i. e. "significant 
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systematisation" in terms of overly general or productive rules, and, 
therefore, are assigned to the lexicon which represents "the full set of 
irregularities of the language" (ibid: 142). The treatment of inflectional 
formations transformationally iri the syntactic component of a Chomskyan 
grammar, and the relegation of derivational formations to the lexicon, 
which was barely studied in pre-"Remarks on Nominalisation" 
transformational grammar, resulted, in my opinion, in the neglect of 
morphology in the early stages of this approach. 
Dik (1967) sees a direct link between thd neglect of derivational 
morphology in transformational grammar and the "mentalistic nature" of 
this theory. He, (ibid: 361) points out that the "difficulty experienced 
by transformational generative grammar in accounting for derivational 
formations and similar phenomena is not due to any limitation of generative 
rules as such but to the further and quite independent requirement which 
is put on these rules, viz. that they reflect in some way a psychological 
reality. " What Dik is driving at is that a generative treatment of the 
"sporadic and quasi-productive" derivational formations results in setting 
up grammars containing a large number of idiosyncratic rules for which no 
"psychological reality" can be plausibly and, perhaps, validly claimed. 
It has also been suggested (Kiefer 1970) that the neglect of 
morphology in transformational grammar may, at least in part, be related 
to the "poor morphology" of English, the language most studied in 
transformational grammar, and, for that matter, other modern linguistic 
theories. In other words, insofar as transformational grammar, at least 
tn tts early stages, has been developed and tested tn relatton to the 
English language, and insofar as English is assumed to have a relatively 
216 
simple morphology in comparison with other languages, say, Latin or 
Arabic, - transformational grammar., in its early stages, has failed to 
accord morphology a proper and autonomous place in its view of the 
over-all design of human language. Kiefer's (1970) study'of Swedish 
morphology is intended to demonstrate the need for a special morphological 
component in the over-all scheme of transformational generative grammar. 
3. The Emergence Of Morphology In Transformational Grammar: 
According to Aronoff, the emergence of morphology as a separate 
component in transformational grammar owes a great deal to progress made 
in the field of generative phonology. In Sound Patternsof En2lish, Chomsky 
and Halle dispute, and, finally, reject, the assumption that surface 
structures generated by the syntactic component of an Aspects type 
grammar are actually the input to the phonological component of such a 
grammar. Instead, they express the view that surface structures must 
be modified In some specific fashion, by a special set of rules, before 
they are converted into phoneme sequences by the phonological component 
of the grammar. These rules, which are called re-adjustment rules, fall 
into two main categories according to the operations they perform on 
surface structures: 
1) rules which generally eliminate structure; these are of two types: 
a) rulps whicý divide surface structures into phonological phrases, and 
b) rules which convert sequences of grammatical formatives into 
phonological matrices, e. g. 
[sing + past] into /Szej /; 
2) rules which specify the formal make up of particular morphemes in 
specific morphological environments. 
Aronoff (1976: 5) points out that re-adjustment rules 
(6) 
of types 
(lb) and (2) are not, strictly speaking, phonological rules, but rules of 
217 
'inflectional morphology' and 'allomorphy', respectively. The 
recognition of a set of rules in Sound Patterns of English which are 
neither phonological nor syntactic, and which, to a great extent, 
correspond to what is traditonally circumscribed under morphology, is 
a strong factor behind the emergence of morphology as a separate branch 
of linguistic theory in more recent models of transformational grammar. 
(7) 
In addition to this, Sound Patterns of English left in its wake a 
great deal of interest in attempts at constraining phonological theory. 
(8) 
Early transformational phonology considered all so-called, morphophonemic 
alternations to lie within the scope of phonological theory. To handle 
these alternations, Chomsky and Halle proposed extremely abstract 
phonological systems and rules which were later'thought'to be far "too 
abstract and to abuse the classificatory function of phonetic features" 
(Aronoff 1976: 5) in terms of which these systems and rules are to be 
formulated. Attempts at constraining the power of phonological rules, 
and, therefore, the phonological component as envisaged by Chomsky and 
Halle, led to the narrowing of the scope of phonology, thus leaving certain 
so-called morphophonemic alternations to be accounted for by what has 
come to be known as 'morphological theory' in transformational grammar. 
(9) 
In a similar fashion, the emergence of morphology as a separate 
component in transformational grammar owes a great deal to advances made 
in the field of 'syntactic theory' in this approach. The main work in this 
"(10) respect is Chomsky's article "Remarks on Nominalisation which 
proposes a new model 6f transformational grammar to replace the model 
presented in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. One of the main features 
of the new model, in comparison with the older one it aims to replace, is 
the establishment of a more powerful lexicon to handle all derivational 
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processes, regardless of their degree of productivity, and the setting 
up of a greatly constrained syntactic component from which all productive 
derivational processes are removed. While this, in itself, does not 
establish morphology as a separate branch of transformational grammar, 
it does, nevertheless, pave the way for'doing so in later publications by 
transformationa lists (Halle 1973,, Jackendoff 1975, Aronoff 1976). 
Aronoff (ibid: 5) expresses this factor in the following manner: 
"This paper (i. e. "Remarks on Nominalisation") 
presents a new theory of syntax in which all derivational 
morphology is isolated and removed from the syntax; it 
is instead dealt with within an expanded lexicon, by a 
separate compartment of the grammar. This legitimises 
the field of morphology as an independent entity. " 
To sum up, the publication of Sound Patterns of English (1968) 
and "Remarks on Nominalisation" (1970) created a great deal of interest 
in, especially, the phenomena of derivational morphologyl and the, manner 
in which these phenomena interact with other types of phenomena in 
grammar. In recent years, some linguists have gone so far as to claim 
that any "significant progress in the study of semantics and phonology 
-and probably also syntax - cannot be made without concomitant study 
of derivational morphology" (Lightner 1975: 617). It is also interesting 
to point out here how the widening of the scope of 'phonology' and 
$syntax' in early transformational grammar, which had led to the demise 
of morphology in that period, gave way in later models to the opposite 
trend of constraining these two compartments, which, ironically, paved 
the way for the re-birth, or resurrection, of morphology as a separate 
branch of this approach. 
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4. The Syntactic Structures Period: (1957-1965 
4.1 Syntactic Structures:, 
The model of grammar, in the wide sense of the term, proposed 
by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures contains three components: the 
phrase structure component, the transformational component and the 
morphophonemic component. The first two components are said to 
generate "all the grammatical sequences of morphemes of a language" 
(1957: 32). In other words, the phrase structure and transformational - 
components encompass the areas of syntax and morphology (in its 
structural sense). The rules of the morphophonemic component convert 
the morpheme sequences generated by the above two components into 
"grammatical phoneme sequences" (ibid. ). 
Clearly, morphology is not established as a separate component 
of the Syntactic Structures model. Issues pertaining to the internal 
structure of 'words' in terms of morphemes, and the manifestation of 
morphemes in terms of phonemes, which traditionally constitute the domain 
of morphology, are dealt with in the syntactic and morphophonemic parts 
of the model, respectively. No distinction seems to be established 
between inflectional and derivational morphology, or between either of 
these two types of morphology and compounding, In the Syntactic Structures 
model. 
Chomsky rejects the 'item and arrangement' approach, which was 
predominant during the neo-Bloomfieldian era, in favour of an 'item and 
process' picture of human language, as has been indicated at the outset 
of this chapter. This shift of perspective results in a shift of emphasis from 
units to rules in the new theory. Chomsky also rejects the neo-Bloomfieldian 
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view of the morpheme as a "class of sequences of phonemes, i. e. as 
having phonemic 'content' in an almost literal sense" (ibid: 58). In an 
obvious reference to Hockett's (1954) well-known treatment of the 
morphophonemic 'shape' of the 'past tense' morpheme in took, Chomsky 
points out how the neo-Bloomfieldian concept of the morpheme "leads to 
trouble in such well-known cases as English "took" /tuk/, where it is 
difficult to associate any part of the word with the past tense morpheme 
which appears as /t/ in "walked" /wD kt/, as /d/ in "framed" /freymd/, 
etc. " (ibid. ). 
However, Chomsky does not offer an alternative, explicit 
definition of the notion morpheme, despite the fact that he makes use of 
this notion in his theory. 
(11) 
Witness, for example, the view that the 
syntactic part of a transformational grammar is said to generate "all the 
grammatical sequences of morphemes of a language" (p. 32) mentioned 
above. This feature of the Syntactic Structures model is a manifestation 
of the emphasis placed on rules, rather than units, in transformational 
grammar. This latter feature is thought to enable transformational grammar 
to deal with the morphophonemic exponence of morphemes in a fairly easy 
and straight -forward manner. However, this task is not always 'legally' , 
as it were, carried out in Syntactic Structures. For instance, Chomsky 
(fn. 8: 58-59) proposes the following rule to express the morphophonemic 
exponent of the 'past tense' morpheme in 'took' - /tuk/. * 
/ey/-------: ý/u/ in the context /t .... k/ +past , 
This rule gives the "past tense" morpheme, whose morphophonemic 
exponent it aims to specify, as part of the context for the rule itself. 
In other words, this rule specifies the morphophonemic exponent of the 
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morpheme 'past' partly in terms of the morpheme itself. - This mode of 
specifying a feature of X in terms of X itself smacks of cirularity. 
4.2 Lees' Theory Of English Nominal Compounds 
Lees' theory of Ehglish nominal compounds, presented in his 
book The Grammar of English Nominalisations (1966), is one of the most 
(12) 
important works in the Syntactic Structures period for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is one of the first attempts at applying the model proposed by 
Chomsky in SyntacticStructures in constructing an extended grammar of 
a portion of a natural language. 
(13) 
Secondly, and more importantly 
from the point of view of the present work, it is the first attempt within 
transformational grammar at dealing with an area of linguistic structure, 
i. e. compounding, which is generally thought to be part of the domain of 
morphology. It is this aspect of Lees' work that will mainly concern 
us here. 
4.2.1 The Grammar Of English Nominalisations 
Lees' theory of English nominal compounds, and, by implication, 
other languages, is based on three main assumptions: 
a) the set of nominal compounds in English is said to be an infinite set; 
this, implies that any corpus of English nominal compounds can be always 
enlarged or extended by adding to it, or by creating, more compounds 
"each characteristically 
[composed I 
of two members, themselves already 
bona fide words or compounds" (Lees 1970(b): 174); 
b) since the set of nominal compounds is an infinite set "one must 
suppose that a speaker's knowledge of WHICH composite nouns count as 
well-formed expressions of his language must be formulable only in terms, 
t(14) 
(ibid); and of some grammatical RULES 
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c) the set of English nominal compounds incorporate the "grammatical 
forms of many different sentence types, and of many different internal 
grammatical relationships within sentences, such as subject-predicate, 
subject-verb, verb-object, etc. " (Lees 1966: 119). 
On the basis of this, Lees points out that the set of nominal 
compounds in English can be generated, i. e. specified or defined, by 
applying an ordered set of grammatical transformations to underlying 
expressions exhibiting the syntactic relations which these compounds 
mirror in their (surface) structures. For example, the compound 
drawbridg is said to reflect the syntactic relation verb/direct object 
contained in the sentence (Lees 1966: 175): 
someone draws the bridge 
from which the compound concerned is said to be trans format iona lly 
derived via, firstly 
bridge which is for someone to draw 
and secondly, 
bridge for someone to draw 
In a similar manner, the compounds girlfriend, redskin and blackboard 
are said to reflect the syntactic relation subject/predicate in the 
underlying sentences: 
the girl is a friend 
the skin is red 
the board is black 
from which they are transformationally derived, respectively. 
Lees gives a number of arguments in support of his theory. The 
theory is said to generate an infinite number of nominal compounds, 
US) 
thus accounting for the 'fact' that the set of nominal compounds in English 
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is an infinite one. Not all of the compounds generated by the grammar, 
however, occur in "any extant corpus of English" (ibid: 121). For 
instance, in addition to the 'attested' or 'occurring' compounds 
nigh -crawler and book-lover, the grammar also generates the 'non- 
occurring' or 'unattested' compounds day-crawler and book-liker. Lees 
likens compounds of this type to "phonemically permitted nonsense words" 
(ibid. ). He also points out. that the 'non-occurring' compounds are not 
"excluded by the grammatical rules of English, but rather because of 
conventions of usage and historical vicissitudes" (ibid. ). 
Lees also claims that his theory explains how nominal compounds 
are 'understood' by native speakers. According to him, nominal 
compounds are "understood on the bas is of certain fixed syntactic 
relations (subject, object, etc. ) which are specifiable in terms of the 
relations among the constituents of underlying sentences" (1966: XKXIX). 
This includes an explanation of how native speakers understand "multiply 
ambiguous" compounds which can be 'interpreted' or 'understood' in more 
than one way, and compounds which, though superficially similar, are 
actually different at a deeper level. The first phenomenon of "multiple 
ambiguity" is exemplified by the compound snake poison which is 
trans format iona Ily derived from three different sources to account for its 
multiple ambiguity, and to explain how it is understood by native speakers 
(ibid: 122-23): 
1) poison from a snake 
perhaps ultimately from 
the snake gives the poison 
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2) poison of a snake 
perhaps ultimately from 
the snake has the poison 
3) poison for snakes 
perhaps ultimately from 
the poison is for snakes 
The second phenomenon is exemplified by the compounds windmill and 
flour mill which, on the surface, concatenate a noun + noun. These 
compounds, however, are said to be 'understood' or 'interpreted' in 
different ways by native speakers. The theory is said to account for 
this 'fact' by deriving them from the source sentences: 
4) the wind powers the mill 
5) the mill grinds the flour 
which exhibit the syntactic relations subject/object and object/subject, 
respectively. According to Lees, explanations of the above-cited type 
are considered essential if the linguist wants to avoid alluding to the 
"speaker's and hearer's common knowledge of material culture" in 
accounting for the way compounds are understood (ibid: 117). 
4.2.2 The Ad Hocness Of The Underlying Structures Of Compounds: 
Botha (1968: 119) characterises an ad hoc element in the underlying 
structure of a given nominal compound - whether it be a "grammatical 
relation, grammatical category, a lexical category or syntactic feature" - 
as an element which is "set up solely to make possible the derivation, 
trans formationa Ily, of compounds as surface structures from deep structures". 
An ad hoc element in the'underlying structure of a given nominal compound 
is established as such because it is not "used for the generation of non- 
compounds too" (ibid. ). An element of this type is said to lack 
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of systematic import". Botha (ibid: 120) further adds that"since such an 
element does not also occur in statements expressing generalisations 
about non-compounds, the systematic gain in introducing it is small". 
It may be also added that since elements of this type must not'be allowed 
to appear in surface structures generated by a grammar, it follows that 
the grammar must incorporate some procedure by means of which this task can 
be achieved, and, this, consequently, leads to a complication in the 
grammar concerned, which grammar is to be ultimately assessed by 
reference to a simplicity criterion. Clearly, considerations relevant to 
the task of evaluating grammars seem to militate against the employment 
of ad hoc elements in a description of a given language, or portion of a 
language. 
Ad hocness characterises some of the analyses proposed by Lees 
in his grammar. This phenomenon in the underlying structures, or source 
sentences, of nominal compounds in The Grammar Of English Nominalisations 
may be illustrated by the treatment which Lees suggests for the compound 
car thief, which is said to exhibit the syntactic relation object/subject 
between its constituent parts. 
source sentence 
Lees derives this compound from the 
the thief steals the car 
in which the constituents the thief and the car are 'subject' and 'object', 
respectively. In terms of Botha's specification of an ad hoc element, 
the entity 'steals' in the above source sentence may be regarded as an 
ad hoc element due to the fact that it is not, or cannot be, used in the 
derivation of non-compounds in English, i. e. it lacks "systematic import". 
According to Botha (ibid. ), the ad hocness characteristic of the 
source sentence of the compound car thief in Lees' grammar does not have 
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an absolute. value in the transformationalist framework pre. -supposed 
by this grammar, in the sense that this ad hocness is a feature only of 
the solution proposed by Lees, and not of the theoretical framework upon 
- which this solution is based. From this it follows that Lees' grammar can 
be rendered non-ad hoc simply by proposing a different, theoretically 
consistent, solution which meets the requirement of systematic import. 
In other words, the transformational ist theory does not need to be modified, 
or revised to permit the setting up of a non-ad hoc solution for the compound 
concerned, but that only Lees' solution stands in need of modification or 
revision in a way which satisfies the condition of systematic import. 
To satisfy the afore-mentioned condition, Botha proposes to derive 
the compound car thief from the source sentence 
someone thieves the car 
The main ingredient in this solution is the removal of the verb steals 
from Lees' source sentence and its replacement by the "hypothetical" 
verb or abstract item "thieves' in the new source sentence given by Botha. 
That this lexical item satisfies the condition of systematic import is clear 
from the fact that this verb will be used in the generation of the non-compounds 
thief and theft in a comprehensive grammar of the English language. 
Zimmer (1975) criticises Botha's proposal precisely because it 
fails to achieve its objective if it is applied in the setting up of a 
comprehensive grammar of compounds in English. To illustrate this 
point, Zimmer (ibid. ) applies Botha's solution of employing "hypothetical" 
items to the compound hone bee, which he derives from the source sentence 
something bees the honey 
In this source sentence the hypothetical verb 'bees' is an ad hoc element 
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precisely in the sense of ad hocness specified by Botha. Zimmer 
(ibid: 171) concludes 
"In fact if EBotha's] suggestion [for treating 
compounds of the car thief typej is extended to a 
representative number of compounds Ein English] it 
is not clear that any great reduction in ad hocness 
will take place, since in most cases no more would 
be done than to posit abstract verbs to account for 
particular surface compounds, which would often 
provide the only evidence for the assumed abstract 
-'-, verbs". 
It is clear from what has been said above that Botha's revision 
of Lees' solution fails to satisfy the condition of systematic import set 
by Botha himself, i. e, it fails to eliminate the ad hocness from1ees, 
type analyses which it is designed to eliminate. However, even if it 
was the case that Botha's solution succeeded in achieving its aim, this 
solution would be still open to criticism on two grounds The first one 
concerns the fact that'abstract items, whether they satisfy the condition 
of systematic import or not, are merely 'descriptive conveniences' whose 
sole purpose is to enable the linguist to deal with what might be called, 
for the lack of a better term, 'recalcitrant data' In a theoretically 
pre-determined fashion. - In other words, abstract items in a transformational 
generative grammar, which purports to be realist in character, appear to be 
no more than a saving device, a deus ex machina whose intervention is 
designed to 'fit' the data into a pre-determined mould. In phonology, for 
example, abstract items are said to "abuse the classificatory function of 
phonetic features" (Aronoff 1976: 5). 
The second one concerns the fact that since abstract items must 
be deleted at some stage in the derivation in a grammar, to prevent them 
from appearing in surface structures generated by such a grammar, it 
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follows that such a grammar must incorporate additional rules or 
rule-features to perform this task. However, the incorporation of such 
rules or rule features in a grammar obviously has an adverse effect on 
simplicity, which is the criterion in terms of which such a grammar is 
ultimately judged. 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may be pointed out 
that Lees' solution for the compound car thief, which is subject to the 
second criticism given above, is perhaps less ad hoc - in my 
interpretation of this notion given above - than Botha's solution. This. 
follows from the fact that Lees does not employ abstract items, but 
attested ones. 
4.2.3 The Problem Of "Indeterminacy" Or "Non-Uniqueness" Of 
.. Underlying Structures: 
The problem of 'indeterminacy' or 'non-uniqueness' of underlying 
structures of compounds in Lees' grammar may be examplified by the 
non-ambiguous compound school grammar which is said to be derived 
from either of the following two distinct sources: 
either: The grammar is for Na (nominal constituent) 
or: The grammar is taught in school 
The problem facing this solution is that it contradicts one of the main 
assumptions of transformational grammar, namely that only ambiguous 
surface structure elements can be derived from distinct underlying 
structures, in order to account for their ambiguity. Unambiguous surface 
structure elements, such as the compound school grammar, must be 
. derived from one source only, i. e. they must have 'unique' underlying 
structures. Clearly, the problem of 'indeterminacy' or 'non-uniqueness' 
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arises when, for a given non-ambiguous nominal, compound, two, equally 
valid sources or underlying structures may be posited in a grammar. . 
To explain how this problem arises in Lees' grammar of English 
nominal compounds, let us consider the method that the author of this 
grammar seems to adopt in positing underlying structures for compounds 
of this type, excluding lexicalised compounds which shall be dealt with 
later in this chapter. 
Generally speaking, underlying structures, or source sentences, 
of nominal compounds in Lees' grammar appear to be no more than paraphrases 
of the compounds concerned. The procedure, albeit an implicit one, which 
Lees appears to employ in setting up underlying structures for compounds 
may be characterised as follows: take a compound, consider its set of 
competing paraphrases, and then select the paraphrase which demonstrably 
leads to the construction of the simplest solution for the compound 
concerned, and, by implication, for the grammar as a whole. 
The last-component of this procedure requires some elaboration. 
Since each compound may, in principle, have more than one possible 
paraphrase and, therefore, more than one potential underlying structure, 
the theory must be able to provide a basis for selecting the most appropriate 
underlying structure for each compound, from the set of competing 
structures. The deciding factor in such a selection is normally the 
criterion of simplicity, assuming that all other relevant factors are equally 
balanced. According to this criterion, only that underlying structure, 
from the set of competing underlying structures, which leads to the 
simplest solution, ý and, therefore, the simplest grammar, is selected. 
The problem of 'indeterminacy' arises only in those cases, e. g. school 
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grammar, where such a selection is not open to the linguist, due to 
the fact that the competing solutions can be shown to be equally simple. 
Thus*, the describer finds himself on the horns of a dilemma: if he 
selects one underlying structure and ignores all the other equally valid 
ones, his grammar will be open to the charge of arbitrariness, but if he 
he gives the two underlying structures'as equally valid sources for 
deriving a given compound, then his grammar, and the theory it 
presupposes, will be open to the charge of 'non-uniqueness'. Every 
such case of non-uniqueness in a grammar represents a clash between 
the grammar concerned and the theory it presupposes, due to the fact that 
the theory stipulates that only ambiguous turface structure elements can 
have two or more underlying structures. By opting for the latter solution 
for school qrammar, Leest grammar is open to the charge of non-uniqueness, 
and its above-mentioned logical consequence. 
4.2.4 The Problem Of Unattested Compound 
Lees (1966: 121) states that it is possible to construct, in terms 
of the rules of his grammar, "an indefinitely large number of compounds 
which do not occur in any extant corpus of English". For example, in 
addition to the attested compounds night-crawler and book-lover the 
grammar is said to generate the unattested compounds day-crawler and 
book-liker; unattested compounds are said to be analogous to "phonemically 
permitted nonsense words" (ibid. ). 
According to Lees, the non-occurrence of unattested compounds, 
generated by the grammar, in any extant corpus of English., is not "excluded 
by the grammatical rules of English, but rather because of various 
conventions of usage and historical vicissitudes" (ibid. ); he further adds 
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that such compounds are grammatical but "for some accident of 
cultural history, they happen not to have come into use" (ibid. ). 
, 
In his review of Lees' grammar, Schachter (1962) sees a direct 
link between the generation of unattested compounds by this grammar, 
and the notion of 'grammaticality 
(16) 
in the theory of transformational 
grammar, as this theory is put forward in Syntactic Structures. It is 
because of this connection that Schachter regards the generation of 
non-occurring compounds as the "central problem" facing Lees' grammar. 
According to Chomsky (1957: 13), a grammar may be viewed as 
"a device that generates all of the grammatical sequences of a language 
and none of the ungrammatical ones. The term 'grammatical' is used in 
two different senses, albeit implicitly, in Syntactic Structures: a 
pre-descriptive sense and a post -descriptive one. A given sequence 
of elements, or features, in a language X is said to be grammatical in 
the pre-descriptive sense if it is acceptable to native speake. ýs of language 
X; if it is unacceptable to them, it is said to be ungrammatical. A given 
sequence of elements, or features in a language X is said to be grammatical 
in the post-descriptive sense if it is generated by a grammar of that 
language, provided that this grammar is constructed on the basis of 
sequences that are said to be grammatical in the preceding sense. 
Sequences that are said to be grammatical in the post-descripttve sense 
may not be part of any extant corpus of language X. Acceptability to 
native speakers is an important condition that grammatical sequences in 
the post -descriptive sense should try to satisfy. In intermediate or 
dubious cases, however, "the grammar itself [will] decide" (ibid. ). 
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In constructing his grammar, Lees follows the same procedure. 
He isolates a set of nominal compounds that are said to be grammatical 
in the pre-descriptive sense, and on, the basis of that set he constructs 
a grammar to account for the set of nominal compounds in the English 
language. The compounds generated by the grammar are said to be 
grammatical in the post-descriptive. sense, regardless of whether or not 
they are attested in any extant corpus of English. Acceptability to native 
speakers is a consideration in assessing the grammaticality of compounds 
generated by the grammar. However, in intermediate, or dubious, cases 
the grammar itself will decide; this means that those compounds which 
are not wholly acceptable to native speakers will be, regarded as 
grammatical, by virtue of the fact that they are generated by the grammar 
itself. 
Botha (1968) criticises the above view of grammaticality on grounds 
that transformationalists have failed to provide an acceptable and valid , 
methodology for eliciting native speakers' intuitions about their language. 
Botha (ibid: 78) expresses this view as follows: "Because of the failure 
to construct an acceptable way to elicit native linguistic intuitions'. the 
expression 'the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker' often refers in 
fact to the linguistic intuitions that the linguist has as a native speaker". 
Schachter (1962) raises more or less the same point in his discussion of ' 
the grammaticality of intermediate cases in a transformational grammar. 
He (ibid: 137) states that the "grammar's decision [as to the grammatical 
status of "intermediate" cases] must still reflect the GRAMMARIAN'S 
decision as to which are the[definitely grammatical] cases" in the 
pre-descriptive sense. The force of this argument, as far as Lees' grammar 
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is concerned, is that many of the unattested compounds generated by 
his grammar, which apparently fall in the category of intermediate cases, 
may not be acceptable to native speakers of English, other than Lees' 
himself. 
The full significance of this point may become apparent if one 
compares the acceptability of unattested utterances generated by a 
transformational grammar of English with the acceptability of unattested 
nominal compounds generated by Lees' grammar. While the former tend 
to be, generally speaking, immediately acceptable to, or intelligible by, 
native speakers, the latter do not readily exhibit this property. This 
discrepancy between the 'acceptability' or 'intelligibility' of unattested 
utterances on the one hand, and the acceptability of unattested compounds 
on the other, must be regarded as an important factor in assessing Lees' 
grammar, dueto the fact that both sets of entities, under Syntactic 
Structures transformational grammar, are generated by 'productive' rules, 
and, therefore, must have the same status in terms of acceptability. 
Zimmer (1964) deals with this point in his treatment of the concept of 
productivity in transformational grammar; he (ibid: 18) points out that in 
many cases "the application of apparently productive rules leads to the 
generation of compounds or derivatives that are, for some reason or , 
another, felt to be unacceptable, or at least very odd., by native speakers". 
The difference in the degree of acceptability or intelligibility of 
unattested utterances, on the one hand, and unattested compounds, on 
the other, is obscured by the fact that utterances and compounds are, under 
transformational grammar, dealt with syntactically by means of productive 
grammatical rules. In other words, this difference is obscured by the 
fact that transformational grammar fails to recognise two different areas 
234 
of grammatical structure, to be dealt with by different types of , 
grammatical rule, -one pertaining to syntactic, constructions -proper, and 
the other pertaining to compounds and, perhaps, other types of grammatical 
structure. These two areas are generally referred to by the terms syntax 
and morphology respectively, in the literature. The difference between 
these two areas of grammar, with regard to productivity, is vividly 
expressed by Bolinger (1968: 67) as-follows: 11... the essence of syntax 
is -freedom. It is the airiest stratum of language, where elements unite 
and separate in the white heat of communication ... The connectedness 
within [morphology] is. established once and repeated. The connectedness 
within syntax is ad-libbed". 
4.2.5 The Problem Of 'Lexicalised' Compounds: 
In dealing with the entities redskin and bulldog, Lees derives them 
from the underlying sentences 
the skin is red (P. 12 6) 
dog which Is like a bull (P. 118) 
respectively. This treatment is based on the assumption that each one 
of the above entities consists of two words: redskin = red + skin, and 
bulldo =bull+ dog. Looked at from the Saussurean point of view, the 
above treatment of redskin and. bulldog is based on the assumption that 
each one of these two entities is a complex sign, whose constituents are 
also fully-fledged signs from the synchronic point of view. The above 
treatment is also based on the assumption that the analysis it presents 
accounts for the intuitions native speakers of English have about their 
language. 
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The main difficulty for any discussion of the validity of the 
first assumption is that the notion 'word', in'terms of which the notion 
compound is defined in Lees' grammar, is not defined either in this work, 
or anywhere else in the theoretical framework it presupposes. If, 
however, we take the term 'word' to refer to a meaningful grammatical 
entity, as is the general practice in the literature, then it is, patently 
obvious that the first assumption, i. e. that each one of the nominal 
compounds mentioned above consists of two words, is a false one, since 
neither of these compounds can be -said to be semantically -compositional. 
In other words, since the semantic import of neither of the above so-called 
compounds can be fully recovered from the assumed semantic import of 
the constituents of each one of these compounds, it readily follows that 
the assumption presently under consideration is a false or invalid one. 
Consequently, the derivation of redskin and bulldo trans formationally, 
from the source sentences mentioned above, is not a valid one. 
This criticism is levelled against Lees' grammar by Schachter (1962), 
Householder (1962) and Dik (1967). Schachter expresses the view that 
such items as redskin and bulldog are not synchronically analysable 
because they result from a single choice on the order of soldier or dog. 
Householder (ibid: 343-44) reiterates more or less the same view when he 
points out that "the vast majority of all the compounds discussed by Lees 
are in fact lexemes or idioms, i. e. items learned as wholes by the native 
speaker and never consciously analysed". Dik (ibid: 378) rejects many 
of the derivations proposed by Lees in his grammar for very much the same 
reason: "More often than not the whole derivation is already, initially 
unacceptable in as far as the complex words concerned clearly function 
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as irreducible wholes, the knowledge and interpretation of which does 
not presuppose any connection with similar structures in the same 
language". 
Lees offers no evidence in support of the second assumption on 
which his treatment of redskin and bulldo is based. In addition to the 
fact that transformational grammar fails to offer an acceptable methodology 
for eliciting native speakers' linguistic intuitions, it is highly dubious, 
in the case presently under consideration, that native speakers of English 
may, on investigation, turn 
Lt to have the sort of intuitions implicitly 
ascribed to them by Lees. The similarity between 'red' and 'skin', in 
redskin, and red and skin in red skin, which the native speakers of 
English may 'feel', is only a formal similarity, and not a similarity on 
the level of words, i. e. the level of 'signs' proper. In the. same manner, 
any similarity between 'bull', in bulldo , and bull, in the bull in the field, 
is a formal similarity only. By treating redskin and bulldo as compounds 
proper, and by, implicitly, identifying 'red', 'skin' and 'bull' with the 
words red, skin and bull respectively, Lees appears to ascribe to his, 
native speakers certain intuitions about their language that are not 
'validly' established. Moreover, even if it was the case that the 
intuitions which Lees ascribes to his native speakers with respect to the 
items 'red, 'skin' and 'bull' can be validly established, Lees' position is 
still open'to criticism on the basis of the fact that it results in a clash 
between the two assumptions it presupposes, which assumptions have been 
given at the beginning of this section. 
The problem of lexicalised compounds in Lees' grammar-results 
from a very simple and basic fault, namely the neglect of the well-known 
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and established distinction of synchrony versus diachrony and its 
descriptive implications in linguistics. As a result of this fault, Lees 
establishes formal-semantic identity between entities which are only 
formally identical. He also ascribes to native speakers intuitions about 
their language without providing us with a methodology for testing the 
$empirical truth' of the claim that''native speakers of English 'have' the 
intuitions that Lees ascribes-to them. This. has some implications for 
the mentalistic nature of Lees' grammar,. as shall be explained in the next 
section. 
4.2.6 The Mentalistic Nature Of Lees' Grammar 
(17) 
In discussing the epistemological nature of his grammar, Lees 
(1966: XXXI) writes: 
Be 0** it is incorrect to view the rules of grammar as a 
d ire ct , description of a speaker's gross'linguistic 
behaviour. Rather, they comprise a specification of 
a certain kind of linguistic knowledge which he has. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that these rules bear only 
an extremely abstract relation to the observed physical 
data or to a speaker's actions. Part of an explanation 
of what an automobile does consists of an abstract 
chemical theory of combustion, and the relation between 
them is remote but definite; part of an explanation of 
what a speaker does consists of an abstract linguistic 
theory of well-formedness, and the relation between 
them is remote but definite. " 
He further (ibid: XXXII) adds: . 
" Rhe Grammar of English Nominal isationsý] is'intended 
to be a description of the principle in. accordance with 
which I in fact construct real, well-formed sentences 
of my dialect of English. " 
The above remarks clearly indicate that Lees' grammatical 
description of English nominalisations is of a mentalistic nature. The 
relation between this grammar, or, rather, the 'linguistic knowledge' it 
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specifies, and the actual linguistic knowledge possessed by a native 
speaker of English, is said to be a remote, but definite one. However, 
it seems that the native speaker which Lees has in mind is none other 
than Lees himself. This means that Lees' grammar of English 
nominalisations is a specification of the linguistic knowledge he has 
about this particular portion of his own English dialect. 
The above restriction of scope of Lees' grammar makes it very 
difficult, from the practical point of view, to test the empirical truth of 
the descriptive claims it puts forward, since such a test would require 
the presence of Lees, the native speaker, as a subject himself. But even 
if Lees' presence for the purposes of conducting such a test could be 
secured, two more obstacles would need to be overcome before this test 
could be meaningfully undertaken. On the one hand, the investigator 
must make sure that it is the linguistic knowledge of Lees the native 
speaker, -and not Lees the linguist and author of The Grammar of Englis 
Nominalisations, that he is eliciting for the sake ofVerifying'the empirical 
truth of the claim that the grammar correctly accounts for the linguistic 
knowledge Lees has. Adherence to such a precaution is more difficult 
than it appears to be. Intuitions are of a notoriously fickle nature, and 
they tend to get modified and, perhaps, 'distorted' during, and as a result 
of, the construction of a grammar. On the other hand, the investigation 
must provide an acceptable methodology, which takes account of the 
above difficulty, for eliciting a native speaker's linguistic knowledge about 
his language as a whole, or any portion of it. The lack of such a 
methodology in the transformationa list approach, or in the linguistic 
literature in general, makes it very difficult to carry out the above test, 
even if the grammar were to be considered as a description of the 
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linguistic knowledge of a native speaker, or speakers, other than Lees 
himself. The possibility of such a methodology being devised in the 
future cannot, in principle, be ruled out. But this possibility appears 
to be rather remote at the present time, - due to the absence of any 
technique for either directly or indirectly observing the workings of the 
human brain, and investigating the nature of the human mind. In the 
absence of such a methodology, it may be concluded, not without 
justification, that Lees'claim that his grammar amounts to a specification 
of his actual linguistic knowledge borders on the metaphysical, in the 
Popperian sense of this term. 
I 
Moreover, by setting as his goal the construction of a grammar 
whose aim is to specify the linguistic knowledge he actually has, Lees 
opens the door for introspection. Witness, for example, his treatment of 
lexicalised compounds as compounds proper, which seems to be based on 
the rather naive view that certain formal components of such so-called 
compounds are words proper. 
Finally, by treating his grammar as a description of his own 
linguistic knowledge, as a native speaker of English, and by apparently 
not committing himself firmly to a position in terms of which the scope of 
this grammar can be extended beyond Lees the native speaker, to other 
native speakers, of the same dialect, Lees appears to modify not 6nly 
the goal of linguistics, but also the aim of science in general. ýA 
physiologist is not typically interested in securing knowledge concerning 
the structure, and other features, of the heart of a particular animal, but. 
in the wider implications any such knowledge may have for the species as 
a whole. Similarly, a linguist is not typically interested in'the 
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specification of the linguistic knowledge or structure pertaining to a 
given individual only, but in the specification of such knowledge or 
structure insofar as it is pertinent to as pee ch- community as a whole. 
The above-mentioned limitation of the scope of Lees' grammar appears, 
thus, to be incompatible with this generally, if not universally, accepted 
view of the aim of scientific inquiry. 
4.3 Zimmer: Affixal Negation 
Zimmer's monograph, Affixal Negatio (1964), is an investigation 
(18) 
into "restricted" productivity in the field of grammatical theory. It 
is specifically concerned with the implications of treating the word- 
(19) 
formation process of 'affixal negation' in English, and other languages, 
and, to a certain extent, other processes of word-formation, by means of 
generative, productive, i. e. 'maximally general', rules under 
transformational grammar. By word-formation Zimmer means 'derivational 
processes' and "compounding". There are two aspects to Zimmer's 
treatment of the concept of productivity in grammatical theory. On the 
one hand, Zimmer expresses the view that the employment of productive 
generative rules to account for all word-formation processes in a language, 
say, English, regardless of the degree of productivity of these processes, 
leads to the setting up of a grammar which is "unrealistically simple" 
(ibid: 86), and which generates derivatives and compounds, for example 
unbad and puppycat, respectively, that "for one reason or another E are] 
felt to be unacceptable or at least very odd by native speakers" (p. 18). 
(20) 
This method for dealing with"word -formation processes boils down 
to treating these processes as syntactic ones. But, Zimmer argues, 
syntactic processes differ from word-formation processes in that whereas 
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the former are generally thought to occupy a central place in the grammar 
of a language, the latter occupy an "intermediary area between the 
grammar and týe lexicon" (ibid. ). Syntactic processes, he points out, 
are fully- productive and, therefore, can be dealt with by productive, 
i. e. "maximally general", rules. In contradistinction, word-formation 
processes are, generally speaking, restricted, or semi-productive., and, 
therefore, cannot be appropriately dealt with by means of fully-productive 
rules. 
This difference between syntactic and word-formation processes 
is manifested in the degree of acceptability exhibited by native speakers 
of unattested forms which belong to either of these two different types of 
process. Zimmer points out that while native speakers of English are, 
on the whole, more certain of the sentence - status of the unatllested 
syntactic sequence Colourless green ideas sleep furiously, they are less 
(21 
so of the word status of the unattested squences unbad and pUppycat. 
Another difference between word- formation and syntax is that 
whereas the phenomenon of "lexical clash" or "blocking" may take place 
in the former, it does not occur in the latter. Zimmer explains this 
phenomenon by noting that native speakers of English, on the whole, 
consider unactive as odd, because it clashes lexically with inactive 
(22) 
which is an established lexical item of English, and which, presumably, 
occupies the 'potential' place of the former entity in their lexicon. 
(23) 
This difference between word-formation and syntax in language may be 
summed up by the following quotation from Zimmer (ibid: 80) 
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"The fact that a given set of circumstances has 
been referred to, say, by a sentence of type SI 
constitutes no obstacle to its being referred to by 
means of other sentences of different types S2, S31 
etc. , on the other hand, the fact that a given designatum 
is referred to by a particular lexical item may well 
constitute a serious obstacle to the formation of another 
lexical item". 
On the other hand, the treatment of all word-formation processes 
in a language, regardless of their degree of productivity, by listing and 
classifying them on the basis of "syntactic function and internal structure 
of attested forms" (ibid. ), though, in a sense, is "safer" than the former 
method, is said to be an unacceptable procedure. Not only does such a 
method amount to the rejection of the notion of grammatical rule, and its 
descriptive utility, in transformational, grammar, and, for that matter, any 
generative grammar, but it also fails to raise any interesting problems 
concerning the structure of human language, or to lead to any insights 
into its nature. 
It is clear from the above discussion that neither of the previous 
two proposals for dealing with word-formation processes - i. e. the method 
of productive generative rules and that of listing and classifying compounds 
on the basis of syntactic function and internal structure - is wholly 
adequate for the entire field. Each one of these proposals suffers from 
lover-generalisation'. Obviously, some new solution is required to deal 
with such processes. Zimmer attempts to provide such a solution. 
Zimmer distinguishes two types of acceptability in the domain of 
word-formation, which he exemplifies by reference to the process of 
affixal negation in English: acceptability in terms of a "particular form" , 
e. g. unkin , and acceptability in terms of a particular pattern, e. g* 
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Un-X-able. Of these two types, of acceptability 
(24) 
in the field of 
word-formation only the latter implies full-productivity. On the basis 
of this distinction, Zimmer establishes two different types of morphology: 
an "analytic" or "recognition" morphology, 
(25) 
which deals with 
word-formation processes characterised in terms of the former type of 
acceptability., by employing the second method mentioned above, and a 
"generative" morphology, which deals With word-formation processes 
characterised in terms of the latter type of acceptabilityby employing 
the first method mentioned above. Zimmer (ibid: 85) explains the basic 
nature of this solution as follows: "It seems reasonable to assume that 
we should not try to account for all ... morphological complex forms in 
terms of the generative combination of smaller elements. It might be 
advisable rather to list some of them as lexical items on par with 
morphophonemic rules. " 
The significance of Zimmer's monograph in the early history of 
transformational grammar is that it reveals the inappropriate consequences 
of the over zealous attempt to deal with the phenomenon of word-formation 
entirely in syntax, by means of productive, or maximally general, rules. 
Zimmer's distinction between a generative morphology and an analytic, 
or recognition, one constitutes a departure from the theoretical framework 
of transformational grammar, proposed by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures. 
It also constitutes a prelude to the model suggested by Chomsky in 
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). In this model, as shall be seen 
later in this chapter, Chomsky proposes to treat all regular or productive 
grammatical processes and formations in the syntactic component, 
assigning all irregular or semi-productive phenomena to the lexicon. In 
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terms of this model,, ' Zimmer's generative morphology would be treated 
as a syntactic matter, whereas his analytic morphology would be 
regarded as a lexical one. 
However, Zimmer fails to follow up the full implications of his 
proposal, by applying the distinction he establishes between the two 
types of morphology mentioned aýbove to the field of inflectional 
formations, especially as this field is traditionally regarded as an 
integral part of the over-all domain of morphology in language. In 
other words, one of the defects of Zimmer's monograph is its failure to 
integrate inflectional morphology with word-formation, by applying to the 
former the framework suggested for the latter, especially as inflectional 
formations normally admit of the same treatment and analysis suggested 
for word-formation phenomena. It may, however, be the caýe that there 
are other, more important, considerations for dealing with inflectional 
formations and word-formation differently. in grammar, but in the absence 
of any discussion of such considerations in Zimmer's monograph, it is 
justifiable to assume that the difference in the treatment of these two 
types of phenomena is, perhaps, an ad hoc one. 
It Is, however, possible that the above difference is implicitly 
based on the well-known distinction between inflectional and derivational 
formations (Nida 1949). But, as shall be seen later in Chapter IV, this 
distinction harbours many contradictions and inadequacies. 
In addition to this, Zimmer fails to offer a uniform and precise 
explanation of the concept 'productivity' in his monograph. The term 
'productivity' is employed in this monograph in two senses: a 
pre-descriptive sense and a post-descriptive one. In its pre-descriptive 
sense, the term productivity refers to certain features of word-formation 
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process; whereas in its post-descriptive sense it refers to a feature of 
a grammatical rule or a set of such, rules. But at no point in his 
monograph does Zimmer explicitly distinguish between these two different 
interpretations of this vital term. Nor does he explicitly delineate such 
terms as 's emi- productive', 'immensely productive' and 'more productive 
than' which he employs in discussing 'restrictedly productive' rules as 
opposed to 'fully productive' ones. 
S. Asp&cts Of The Theory Of Syntax Period: (1965-1970) 
In the next few sections I shall deal with the following works in 
transformational grammar: 
1 Chomsky : Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) 
2. Botha : The Function of the Lexicon in Transformational Generative 
Grammar (1968) 
Chomskv: Aspects Of The Theory Of Syntax 
In dealing with derivational processes, Chomsky (1965: 184) 
expresses the view that these processes "create much more of a problem 
for any sort of generative - that is, explicit - grammar than do inflectional 
systems". Inflectional processes, regardless of their degree of 
productivity or regularity, are dealt with transformationally in the syntactic 
component of the Aspects model. In contradistinction, derivational 
processes are divided into two classes: productive derivational processes 
and semi-productive ones. The first type of derivational processes is 
dealt with transformationally in the syntactic component of the Aspects 
model. An example of a productive derivational process in English is the 
process of Inominalisation' which occurs in the nominals destruction and 
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refusal. Chomsky proposes to deal with these nominals by deriving 
them from deep structures containing the underlying elements destro 
and refuse, by applying a nominalisation transformation which operates 
on phrase markers containing these elements. 
Semi-productive derivational processes are thought to raise 
serious problems for transformational grammar because "there are no 
rules of any generality" that can account for them (ibid: 186). Chomsky 
(ibid. ) exemplifies the defective nature of semi- productive'derivational 
processes by the following paradigms: 
horror terror candor 
horrid terrid* candid 
horrif y terrify candify* 
Chomsky points out that if the above paradigms are dealt with 
transformationally, then the elements marked by an asterisk would have 
to be regarded as 'accidental gaps' in English, He rejects this mode of 
dealing with semi-productive derivational processes because of its ad hoc 
nature, and because it leads to obscuring the real difference betweeý 
semi-productive processes and productive derivational processes. 
Chomsky's solution to the problem of semi-productive processes 
involves the establishment of a lexicon as a special compartment of the 
syntactic component. The lexicon is said to consist of "an unordered 
set of lexical entries and certain redundancy rules" (ibid: 142). The set 
of lexical entries "constitute the full set of irregularities of [a ] language" 
(ibid. ). The set of complex lexical items of a language involving 
semi-productive derivational processes are entered in the lexicon as 
fully-specified lexical entries. But even this solution is not without its 
247 
disadvantages, as Chomsky (ibid: 186) points out in relation to the, 
complex words in the above paradigms: 
" This ... is a very unfortunate 
[solution ], s ince 
it is clear from the point of view of both the semantic 
and phonological interpretation it is important to have 
internal structure represented in [the above] words. 
Their meaning is to some extent predictable - or at 
least limited - by the inherent semantic properties of 
the morphemes they contain, and it is easy to show 
that internal structure must be assigned to these items 
if the phonological rules are to apply properly in forming 
their phonetic representations. " 
So, the main disadvantage of the above-mentioned solution is 
that it may lead to obscuring some of the semantic and, phonological 
regularities present in certain classes of lexical items listed in the 
lexicon. According to Chomsky (ibid: 187) this "dilemma is typical of 
a wide class of examples with varying degrees of productivity, and it is 
not at all clear how it is to be resolved, or, in fact, whether there is a 
non-ad hoc solution that can be achieved". In concluding his discussion 
of semi-productive derivational processes, Chomsky (ibid: 192) alludes to 
the tentative nature of the solution he suggests for dealing with them: 
I 
- "It is possible that we are approaching here the 
fringe of marginal cases to be expected in a system 
as complex as natural language, where significant 
systematisation is just not possible. Still, it is 
much too early to draw this conclusion with any 
confidence and, even if it is eventually justified, 
we still must face the problem of extracting whatever 
sub-regularities exist in this domain. In any event, 
the questions we have touched on here have not yet 
been illuminated in any serious way by approaching 
them within the framework of any explicit grammatical 
theory. For the present, one can barely go beyond 
mere taxonomic arrangement of data. Whether these 
limitations are intrinsic, or whether a deeper 
grammatical analysis can succeed in unravelling some 
of these difficulties, remains an open question". 
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Chomsky's proposal for dealing with derivational processes in 
the Aspects model is very reminiscent of Zimmer's proposal for dealing 
with word-formation processes, including, of course, derivational 
processes, in his monograph Affixal Negation. Like Zimmer, Chomsky 
proposes to deal with inflectional processes, whether or not they are fully 
productive, by transformational means. But, as with Zimmer, Chomsky 
offers no explanation for this discrepancy in dealing with inflectional 
processes vis-a-vis derivational ones, especially as the former admit of 
the same classification with regard to the notion of 'productivity'. 
Moreover, it has been noted by some linguists, e. g. Dik (1967), that 
Chomsky's view that the Aspects model can deal with inflectionaL 
processes transformationally, without any difficulty, is based on the 
success of this model in dealing with the "poor" morphology of English, 
the language most studied by the transformationa lists. Like Zimmer, 
Chomsky offers no discussion of the basis of the distinction between 
inflectional formations and derivational ones. 
The similarity with Zimmer's approach extends even further. Like 
Zimmer, Chomsky does not give any explicit definition of the notion 
$morpheme', though he makes extensive use of this notion in discussing 
(26) the nature of his proposal for dealing with derivational processes. 
Nor does he offer a uniform and precise explanation of the notion productivity 
in his treatment of derivational processes. These defects of Chomsky's 
solution, particularly the last one, cast serious doubt on the 'validity' of 
the claim that transformational grammar is an explic theory of human 
language. 
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S. 2- Botha: The Function Of The Lexicon In Transformational Generative 
Grammar 
5.2.1 Botha's Critique Of The Concept Of The Lexicon In As pe cts -0 
The Theory Of Syntax: 
It has been mentioned in the previous section that Chomsky 
(1965: 142) regards the lexicon as the repository of the "full set of the 
irregularities of the language". Botha's book The Function of the Lexicon 
in Transformational Generative Grammar has two main objectives: first, 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of this concept of the lexicon in the 
Aspects model, and, secondly, to outline a revised version of this model, 
whose purpose is to overcome the sort of difficulties revealed in Botha's 
discussion of the first point. 
To carry out the first task, Botha considers the manner in which 
an Aspects-type lexicon may deal with Afrikaans nominal compounds, in 
respect of the following features: 
1. the so-called connecting or link phonemes; 
irregular stress patterns; 
3. metaphorical semantic features; and 
idiomatic semantic features. 
To illustrate Botha's main thesis, I shall only deal with his treatment of 
Afrikaans nominal compounds in terms of the first feature. i. e. the 
so-called connecting or link phonemes. 
The term 'link phoneme' refers to one or more phonemes which may 
be present in the phonological form of a formative, or group of formatives, 
when that formative functions as the initial immediate constituent, i. ee 
specificans, of an Afrikaans nominal compounds (N 1+N2), but which is 
absent from the phonological form of the formative, or group of formatives, 
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concerned when it occurs in isolation, i. e. when it does not function 
as the specificans of a compound. This phenomenon may be exemplified 
by the formative dier (animal) in Afrikaans which has the phonological 
form /di: r /when it occurs in isolation, and which has the phonological 
r 
form /di: r-a/ when it functions as the specif icans of the nominal compound 
diertuin (animal garden, zoo). The phoneme /a/ in the phonological 
form of the specificans of the above nominal compound is called a link 
phoneme; another link phoneme in Afrikaans nominal compounds is IsI. 
Generally speaking, Botha establishes two classes within the 
category of Afrikaans nominal compounds. The first class includes 
co-ordinative (e. g. digter-komponts- : poet composer , multiplicative 
(e. g. voet-pond-sekondi: foot-pound-second and appositional compounds 
(Lan-nen : John nose, John with the (prominent) nose) which -contain no 
link phonemes. The second class consists of attributive compounds 
(e. g. hondetand : dog's tooth) which may contain link phonemes. 
Concerning the latter category of compounds, Botha (1968: 183) points 
out that it is "impossible to predict, in terms of general rules, the 
circumstances under which the phonological form of the specificans of 
an attributive Afrikaans nominal compound will be characterised by the 
presence of link phonemes /a/ and Isl". Because of the irregularity 
or unpredictability of the occurrence of link phonemes in the phonological 
forms of the specificantia of attributive nominal compounds in Afrikaans, 
such compounds must be entered in the lexicon as single lexical entries 
according to the Aspects concept of the lexicon. 
But by entering attributive nominal compounds as lexical entries 
in the lexicon, the grammar blocks the possibility of accounting for some 
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of the regular syntactic, semantic and phonological features of such 
compounds by means of general rules. . For instance, by entering 
attributive nominal compounds as lexical entries in the lexicon, the 
grammar fails to account, by means of a general rule, for the regular fore 
stress-pattern, symbolised by e. g. At Lamlily ý ýk 
characteristic of attributive nominal compounds in Afrikaans. This also 
means that the Aspects lexicon cannot be consistently said to constitute 
"the full set of the irregularities" of the language. 
In his review of Botha's book, Chapin (1972: 302) stresses the 
importance of seeing Botha's argument for 'what it is' in the context of 
transformational generative grammar: 
"Although they have rarely been distinguished in 
the literature ..., there are three different forms that 
the concept of the lexicon as the repository of linguistic 
irregularity can take. The strongest form is that the 
lexicon contains all and only the irregularities of the 
language, no regularities are represented inside the 
lexicon, and no irregularities outside of it. This is 
the concept which Botha's argument militates against. 
Two alternative hypotheses are available: that the 
lexicon contains only irregularities, no regularities but 
irregularities are represented outside of the lexicon; 
or that the lexicon contains all of the irregularities and 
some regularities as well". 
Botha's proposal for revising the Aspects concept of the lexicon adopts 
the first of the two alternatives pointed out by Chapin in the above quotation. 
This proposal will be dealt with in the next section. 
S. 2.2 Botha's Solution To The Problem Of The Lexicon In Transformational 
Grammar: 
Botha's proposal for modifying the structure of the Aspects model 
to enable it to deal with the generally unpredictable presence of link 
phonemes in Afrikaans attributive compounds, while still accounting for 
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their regular syntactic, semantic and stress-pattern features by means 
of general rules, is briefly explained towards the end of The Function 
of the Lexicon. Botha distinguishes two different types of instances in 
which link phonemes occur. Firstly, the occurrence of link phonemes in 
the phonological forms of a small number of attributive nominal compounds 
can be predicted in terms of 'minors rules; 
(27) 
these rules can be 
formulated in terms of the syntactic, semantic, lexical and phonological 
features of the compounds concerned. Secondly, in a large number of 
cases, the occurrence of link phonemes cannot be predicted by any type 
of rule, whether general or minor. To account for the precise phonological 
forms of compounds of the latter type, Botha proposes to modify the 
structure of the Aspects model by incorporating in it a phonological 
dictionary and a phonological matching rule, and by establishing an 
autonomous readjustment component. 
The phonological matching rule is essentially a readjustment rule 
which operates on an "explicitly defined subset of the surface structures 
that constitute the output of the transformational component, before these 
structures enter the phonological component. In accordance with the 
information represented in the phonological dictionary, it readjusts the 
classificatory phonological matrices which are associated with the ... 
surface structures" (Botha 1968: -236). The phonological dictionary is 
said to be "an unordered set of entries specifying certain idiosyncratic 
properties of the phonological form of complex syntactic units" (ibid. ). 
I 
The diagram on the following page schematises these revisions or 
modif ications. 
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It has been mentioned at the end of the preceding section that 
Botha adopts a view of transformational grammar according to which the 
lexicon "contains only irregularities, no regularities but some 
irregularities are represented outside of the lexicon", (Chapin 1972: 302). 
Botha replaces the Aspects view'of the lexicon as "the full set of the 
irregularities of the language" with the concept of the lexicon as "the 
full set of the irregularities of the syntactically simple units of a language" 
. 
(1968: 296), thus restricting the power of the lexicon in relation to other 
parts of the grammar. Part of the function of the lexicon in the Aspects 
model is now handled by another dictionary-like device, the phonological 
dictionary, which specifies idiosyncratic features of the phonological 
forms of syntactically complex units. 
Botha's discussion of this revised model is too brief to enable 
us to pass any Informed judgement on it. However, the employment of 
abstract underlying elements to derive nominal compounds trans formationa Ily 
from underlying deep structures, provided that such elements are not 
lacking in 'systematic import, is a contentious feature of Botha's proposal. 
The use of 'abstract features' in the above fashion, is rejected by 
Chomsky (1970), jackendoff (1975) and Aronoff (1976) because of their 
ad hoc nature. The nature of this criticism and other objections to the 
employMent of 'abstract featuresI, have been dealt with previously in 
section 4.2.2. 
6. "Remarks On Nominal Isation" Period: 1970-1976 
6.1 Chomsky "Remarks On Nominaltsation" (1970): 
Chomsky's main concern in this article is the task of developing 
a model which can account for derived nominals in the simplest and most 
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11 natural" manner. Chomsky recognises two types of nominal: 
'derived nominals'. e. g. John's criticism of the book and Tohnls refusal 
of the offer, and gerundive nominals, e. g. John' s -criti cis 
ing the book 
and Tohn's refusing of the offer. In terms of syntactic behaviour, 
gerundive nominalisation is said to. be significantly more productive-and 
regular than derived nominalisation. This is manifested by the fact 
that whereas all sentences have corresponding gerundive nominals, many 
sentences have no corresponding derived nominals, e. g. 
1. it is easy to please John. 
2. its being easy to please John 
3. *the easiness to please John 
It is also manifested by the fact that gerundive nominals, by comparison 
with derived ones, are semantically productive. jackendoff (1977: 9) 
expresses this point as follows: "Derived nominals typically have 
meanings rather idiosyncratically related to parallel verbs,, whereas 
gerundive nominals have absolutely predictable semantic relationship 
with the verb". 
(28) 
Consequently, Chomsky concludes that derived nominals, unlike 
gerundive nominals, cannot be derived by transformational rules of any 
significant generality. A transformational treatment of derived nominals 
is said to have two major drawbacks. First, due to the idiosyncratic 
and semi-productive properties of, derived nominals, a, transformational 
treatment of such nominals entails an "incredible proliferation of 
idiosyncratic transformations, " (jackendoff 1977: 10), which will be 
"rather difficult to state and order" (ibid: 9). Secondly, the use of 
hypothetical verbs in generating derived nominals transformationally, as 
0 
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is required in certain instances, points to the unnaturalness or ad hocness 
of such an approach. 
Chomsky points out that the method of generating derived 
nominals trans formationally from underlying deep structures was the only 
method available in pre-Aspects of the Theory of Syntax transformational 
grammar. Though the Aspects model incorporates a lexicon as a device 
for dealing with all the idiosyncratic or irregular features of a language, 
Chomsky proposes to deal with all nominals trans format iona lly, deriving 
them from underlying structures by means of a nominalisation transformation. 
This method for dealing with nominals reflects the attitude in 
transformational grammar that nominalisation is a productive and regular 
grammatical phenomenon in English. However, the recognition of two 
categories of nominalsl i. e. derived and gerundive, and the concomitant 
observation that derived nominals are not as regular and productive as 
gerundive ones, led Chomsky to revise his. Aspects treatment of the 
former category and the model upon which this treatment is based. This 
revision is one of the main components of his article "Remarks on 
Nominalisation". 
According to the new solution, Chomsky extends the power of the 
base to contain an enriched lexicon, while limiting the power of the 
transformational section of the syntactic component. In this model, 
which is referred to as the Ilexicalist' hypothesis in transformational 
grammar, the lexicon no longer represents "all the irregularities of the 
language", and only those - the Aspects view - but it also incorporates 
some regularities as well. Instead of dealing with derived nominals 
transformationally, as is suggested in the. Aspects model, Chomsky now 
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proposes to deal with them in the lexicon, thus incorporating some 
regularities in this part of the grammar. Gerundive nominals are dealt 
with trans formationa lly. 
This method of dealing with derived nominals is designed to 
meet the two objections against the older method for dealing with this 
category of grammatical forms mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
Chomsky, however, does not clearly indicate how derived nominals will 
be dealt with lexically in the new model. Some of the attempts for 
spelling out the structure of such a lexicon will be dealt with in the next 
few sections. 
6.2 Halle: "Prolegomena To A Theory Of Word -Formation": (1973) 
6.2.1 The Theory 
Halle's article "Prolegomena to a Theory of Word -Formation" 
(1973) contains the first attempt I know of at constructing alairly 
detailed theory of morphology in post7Asj2ects transformational generative 
grammar. Halle (ibid: 3) views a grammar as a. "formal representation of 
what a speaker must know about his language". Part of this knowledge 
concerns words. According to Halle, a native speaker is said to know 
which items are words in his language, and which items are not. For 
instance, a native speaker of English knows that the item dog is a word 
in his language, but, say, that 'kalb' is not. A native speaker is also 
said to possess knowledge about the "composition and structure" of the 
words in his language. To exemplify this point, Halle says that a native 
speaker of English 'knows' that the adjective transformational is composed 
of the morphemes trans -form-at-ion-al. In order to account for the 
knowledge a native speaker has about the words in his language, Halle 
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proposes a theory of word-formation with three "distinct components": 
a "list of morphemes", "rules of word . -formation" and a "filter". 'He 
(ibid: 8) schematises this theory as follows: 
(29) 
------------------------------------- 
List of Rules of Fi 
Eter 
Dictionai 
Morpheme]s--p Word-Formation of Words 
% 
(30) 
output ! 'E Phonology Syntax 
The "list of morphemes component" is I an un&dered set, of all 
and only the morphemes of a language. Each morpheme is represented 
by a "sequence ofEphonetic] segments", together with all the 
grammatical information which is necessary for the proper functioning of 
word-formation rules. This may be exemplifiedby the entry for the 
English morpheme write which, Halle (ibid: 4) points out "must contain 
the information that it is a verbal r9ot, that it is a member of the 
"non-latinate" portion of the list (it is by virtue of this fact that it is 
allowed bythe rules of word-formation to combine with certain affixes 
and not with others), that it is among the small class of verb stems that 
undergo the so-called "strong" conjugation, etc. ". In ad, dition to verbal, 
nominal and adjectival roots, the list of morphemes Include affixes of 
various kinds. 
As its name indicates, the "word -formation rules" component 
contains the set of word-formation rules of a language, whose function is 
f- 
to specify the set of words in that language. Halle recognises, albeit 
I 
implicitly, two types of word-formation rules depending on the type of 
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entities they operate on. Thefirst type derives words by concatenating 
morphemes with each other. , He exemplifies this type by the following 
labelled bracketting rules (ibid: 10): 
va cant 
[STEM + ant] A (djective) 
total ESTEM + al IA (dJective) 
brother [STEM + ther] N (oun) 
which express the fact that the words vacant, total and brother are linear 
sequences of the morphemes vac + ant, tot + al and bro + ther, respectively. 
The second type of word-formation rules derives words from words. 
Halle (ibid. ) exemplifies this type by the labelled bracketting rule: 
[VERB 
+ al 
IN 
which specifies that, for example, the nominals refusal and arrival are 
derived from the verbs refuse and arrive by the addition of the morpheme -al. 
Halle (ibid. ) points out that rules of this type have access to the 
dictionary of words because "it is only there that such crucial information 
as that arrive is a verb of English will be found". It is, however, not 
clear why such information cannot be recovered or derived from the list 
of morphemes, where such information is also said to be present. 
A word-formation rule provides the relevant semantic and 
syntactic information which is general to the set of words it generates, 
including the lexical category specification of these wordso' In addition 
to this, word-formation rules must be able to specify the regular or 
idiosyncratic semantic and syntactic features of derived words. The 
latter point may be illustrated by the English suffix -hood which is 
attached to nouns designating "human beings" to derive abstract nouns, 
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e. g. Man : manhood, priest : priesthood. The appropriate word-formation 
rule in English must supply this information by, perhaps, assigning to 
words derived by it the feature 
E+ Abstract 
It has been mentioned above that word-formation rules may, for 
their proper functioning, refer to the information contained in the 
"dictionary of words". Similarly, word-formation rules may, for their 
proper functioning, refer to the output of the phonological component of 
the grammar. 
(31) 
Halle (ibid: 13) illustrates this point by considering 
the class of inchoative verbs in English. - He points out that verbs of 
this kind are "subje6t to the phonetic condition that their base must be 
monosyllabic and end with an obstruent, which optionally may be preceded 
by a sonorant". According to Halle, this explains why English has: 
blacken, whiten, toughen, damýen, harden 
but not 
b. *dimmen "*lLý. enen, *laxen 
which are phonetically well-formed, as can be shown by the existence of 
the following words in English 
c. lion, women, keenan, flaxen 
Halle (ibid. ) points out that this condition "appears to be a condition not 
on the string formed by the word-formation 
[rule] which deals with it , 
but on the string after the phonological rules have applied to it". To 
demonstrate this point, Halle considers the following verbs 
d. soften, fasten, moisten 
which have -the underlying representations 
e. szkoft + n, fast'+ n, mDyst +n 
The strings in (e) violate the condition that an obstruent sequence cannot 
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appear before the inchoative suffix -en. However, the phonologioal 
rule which deletes [t] in the environment - 
[13 
applies to the n 
underlying representations of the strings in [d] , ensuring that they 
appear with a single obstruent, and, therefore, meet the condition cited 
above. Halle (ibid: 14) sums up this point concerning the interaction 
between word-formation rules and the rules of the phonological component 
as follows: "a word formation rule will produce acceptable words if the 
mords formed by this rule have been acted upon by the rules of the , 
phonological components". 
Word-formation rules are fundamentally different from phonological 
rules. In phonology. ' whether a given rule applies to a certain string or 
not entirely depends on whether or not the string in question meets the 
conditions under which the rule concerned is said to apply, i. e. whether 
or not it has the appropriate "structural description" at the point in the I. 
derivation where the phonological rule concerned is said to apply. This 
means that whether a given phonological rule applies or not does not 
depend on the shape of the string it operates on at an earlier or later 
stage in the derivation. Word-formation rules operate on a different 
basis. In addition to the information contained in the strings to which 
they apply, word-formation rules have access to the information contained 
in the "dictionary of words" component, and to the output of the rules of 
the phonological component. Word formation rules are, therefore, 
extremely powerful devices which, Halle points out, must be heavily 
constrained to ensure that, the grammar generates the right output, i. e. 
the set of all and only the grammatical words of the language. According 
to Halle, the ability of word-formation rules to refer to different stages 
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in a derivation is their chief characteristic feature which sets them 
apart from the rules of the phonology. Halle (ibid: 15-16) writes: 
"I should like to propose ... that the word-formation 
component differs from the phonology by having completely 
different principles of interaction among rules. Whereas 
in the phonology this interaction is captured by means of 
the convention of linear order of rule application, the 
interaction among word-formation constraints may require 
a different principle altogether, e. g. simultaneous 
application". 
The third component of Halle's theory of word-formation is the 
"f ilter" . The filter is the repository of the idiosyncratic features or 
properties of words of a language. Halle recognises three different 
types of idiosyncratic features of words: 
a) semantic idiosyncratic features; 
b) phonological idiosyncratic features; and 
c) restrictions on productivity of word-formation processes, or "accidental 
gapsel, 
From the semantic point of view, a set of words derived by the 
same word-formation rule must exhibit a common core of meaning. 
However, some of the words derived by a word-formation rule may have 
individual additional meanings which are not shared by other words 
generated by the same word-formation rule. For example, the words 
approval, recital, proposal, transmittal and reversal, which are derived bY 
the word-formation rule [VERB + agN, exhibit a common core of me 
. 
aning 
stated by Halle as "the act of V-ing". Of the words in this set recital 
and transmittal have additional meanings which are not predictable by the 
word-formation rule cited above. The word recital refers to a 'solo concert' 
and the word transmittal refers to the 'transfer of official documents or 
information". Such idiosyncratic semantic information is entered in the 
fUter. 
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Halle' exemplifies phonologically idiosyncratic features by 
considering the words serenity and nicety He mentions that these words 
are derived from the underlying adjective serene and nice by a rule which 
adds the suffix -jtZ to them. ý From the point of view of phonology, 
however, the word, serenity is subject to the "Trisyllabic Shortening Rule", 
whereas nicety is not, This idiosyncratic feature of serenity is entered 
in the f ilter. 
The third type of idiosyncracy is exemplified by two kinds of 
English deverbal nominals: those formed with -al, and those formed with 
at-ion or -ion. While in some instances the addition of any of the above 
suffixes to underlying forms produces words which are acceptable to native 
speakers, e. g.: 
propose proposal 
re cite recital 
proposition 
recitation 
in other instances this is not so, as the items in the last columns of 
the following two sets of examples show: 
and 
2) arrive arriva I *arrivation 
refuse refusal *refusation 
3) derive derivation *derival 
describe description *describal 
The information that the items marked with an asterisk are not actual words 
of English is entered in the filter. Such items are regarded as "accidental 
gaps" in the grammar. 
Halle recognises two types of words: actual words, e. g. 
propos . ition and proposal, and non-occurring words, e. g. *arrivation and 
*describal. The set of potential words of a language is specified by the 
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application of the set of word-formation rules to, the morphemes in the 
list of morphemes. The set of actual words results from the application 
of the information contained in the filter to the set of items generated by 
applying the first two components. The remaining set of potential words 
generated by these two components ýconstitute the set of non-occurring 
words. Words of this type are marked by the feature [-Lexical Insertion] 
in the dictionary of words to prevent them from being inserted by the 
lexical insertion rule in pre-terminal strings before these strings are 
operated on by transformational rules. In other words, the feature 
[-Lexical Insertion] is used to prevent items marked by it from, ultimately, 
appearing in the sentences generated by the grammar. 
Halle suggests the treatment of inflectional formations in a 
"completely parallel" fashion to derivational formations. Under this view 
of morphology, the "list of morphemes" component will include, in 
addition to the derivational morphemes of a language, all inflectional 
morphemes on which the rules of a modified "rules of word -formation" 
component would operate to generate all the inflected forms of a language. 
Accordingly, the "filter" will be extended to include all idiosyncratic 
features of inflected words, and the "dictionary of words" all of the 
inflected words of a language. 
Halle points out that if the suggestion to treat inflectional 
formations in a "completely parallel" fashion to derivational formations 
is incorporated in the theory, then, due to the fact that the form a given 
inflected word takes is normally determined by surface structure factors, 
namely its position in a paradigm, then the above concept of the theory 
of-word-formation must be modified (a) to allow the 'dictionary of words' 
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to list inflected words in a language in "paradigm form", (b) to allow 
lexical insertion rules to insert whole or partial paradigms, instead of 
single lexical entries and (c) to enable the grammar to include some 
mechanism or device to select the appropriate word form from a given 
paradigm of inflected words to insert in surface structures. 
6.2.2 Halle's Theory Of Word-Formation: General Remarks 
The major significance of Halle's theory of word-formation is that 
it represents the first attempt, within transformational generative grammar, 
at constructing an autonomous and distinct component, in this theory, 
for dealing with a portion of linguistic data that are generally circumscribed 
under the term 'morphology'. This theory is also significant because it is 
the first proposal, within transformational grammar, which puts forward a 
framework envisaging the integration of inflectional and derivation 
phenomena within one and the same mould. However, Halle's theory of 
word-formation is not a fully-fledged theory of this area of linguistic 
structure, i. e. word-formation, but the prolegomena to such a theory. 
Still, it represents a very bold attempt at dealing with a linguistic problem 
only slightly and half-heartedly focussed upon by other transfo'rmationalists, 
including Chomsky. Halle's explanation of the basis of the distinction 
between the word-formation rules and the rules of the phonological component 
establishes the demarcation line between these two areas of linguistic 
structure, and the components within the theory that are designed to account 
for them. 
Halle also deals with the difference between word-formation rules, 
on the one hand, and the rules of syntax and phonology, on the other. 
He (Ibid: 16) explains this difference as follows: 
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ý"There is a fundamental difference between the 
use of words, and the use of sentences. In general, 
one uses familiar words, words one has heard and used 
before, and does not expect to use or encounter new 
words, whereas one rarely uses sentences that one 
has encountered before. From the point of view of 
performance one might say that the role played by the, 
rules of syntax and phonology differs fundamentally 
from that played by the rules of word-formation. The 
knowledge represented by the latter might be said to 
be more passive than that represented by the former". 
While Halle's remark concerning the difference between the use of words 
and the use of sentences seems to be observationally adequate, the 
validity of his conclusion that the "knowledge represented by the rules 
I of word-formation] might be said to be more passive than that - -, 
represented by 
Ethe 
rules of syntax and phonology] "is questionable 
within the overall context of transformational generative grammar. One 
of the fundamental features of this approach is the crucial distinction it 
establishes between 'competence' and 'performance'. The relationship 
between these two aspects of linguistic 'behaviour' is a unilateral one, 
with performance dependent on competence, and not vice versa. Insofar 
as Halle's above-mentioned conclusion concerning the difference between 
syntax and word-formation appears to be based on factors pertaining to 
differences in performance between them (c. f. above quotation),, it may be 
said that Halle does not strictly adhere to the trans formationalist view of 
the relationship between 'competence' and 'performance', as this view is 
expounded by Chomsky in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. 
Halle's theory, which is referred to as the 'Morpheme Based' theory 
by Aronoff (1976), is built on the assumption that the "list of morphemes 
together with the rules of word-formation define the set of potent words 
of the language" (ibid: 6). While it is true that morphemes are always 
involved in the derivation of words, according to Halle's theory, it is 
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not true, in terms of that theory, that the set of potential words of the 
language is specified entirely by the "list of morphemes together with 
the rules of word -formation". Halle recognises two types of word- 
formation rules: rules that concatenate morphemes to 'derive words, and 
rules that derive words by adding morphemes to existing words. Strictly 
speaking, the recognition of the latter type of word-formation rule renders 
the label 'Morpheme Based' theory inappropriate as a designation for 
Halle's word-formation theory. However, in view of the fact that this 
label is normally used by some transformationalists, e. g. Aronoff (1976), 
to refer to Halle's theory, I shall employ this label in the rest of this thesis. 
Like Chomsky, and other transformationa. lists, Halle pays very 
little, or no attention, to the question of defining the linguistic units in 
terms of which his theory is formulated'. For example, no definitions of 
the notions 'morpheme'. and 'word' are given by Halle, though these notions 
play an essential and crucial role in his theory; this is also true of the 
notion, 'root' and 'stem' which Halle employs in his theory. This feature 
of Halle's approach may be associated with the general tendency in 
transformational grammar of giving more priority to rules over units in 
linguistic description. It is, however, incompatible with the emphasis on 
explicitness as a goal of linguistic theory. 
This feature 'of Halle's approach may be also related to the 
operationally-oriented nature of the transformationalist theory. According 
to operationalism (see Chapter I), the'meaning of a scientific term may be 
established by reference to the operations employed in specifying it. It 
is also the view in this approach that "what a man means by a term is to 
be found by observing what he does. with it, not by what he says about it" 
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(Bridgman 1938: 117). It appears to be the, case in'tra. ns format iona I 
grammar that the 'meanings' of such terms as 'word' and 'morpheme' are 
to be established in terms of their'function in the description and by 
reference to the rules, i. e. operations, which constitute this description. 
This a- ttitude is reflected, on the descriptive level, in Halle's statement 
that the words výcarit, total and brother have the morphemes vac + ant, 
tot + al and bro + ther "by virtue'of the existence of word-formation rules 
that express this fact" (1973: 10). In addition to the objections I have 
raised against operationalism previously in this thesis, which are generally 
relevant here, the above argument by Halle appears to have a circular 
flavour; -for it may be said that the word-formation rules concerned owe 
their existence to the fact that the above words are thought to have the 
morpheme structure they are said to have. 
From the point'Of view of epistemology, Halle's theory seems to 
adhere to an essenhally naive realist conception of the nature of the 
word-formation portion of the language. Halle claims that native speakers 
know which items are words in their language, and which items are notý 
He also claims that native speakers possess knowledge concerning the 
It composition and structure" of words in their language. While these two 
assumptions do not make Halle's theory naive realist, the view that a 
grammar of word-formation is a "formal representation" of such knowledge, 
advocated by Halle, does. On the basis of this,, we may conclude that, 
according to Halle, his theory of word-formation provides the conceptual 
framework in terms of which a grammar of the above type may be constructed. 
Halle's view of the epistemological basis of his theory is 
essentially the same as that advocated by Lees in his treatment of English 
nominal compounds. The main trouble with this view is that it borders 
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on the metaphysical, in the Popperian sense of this term. The 
demonstration of this point is so simple that it seems almost trivial: 
it is that transformational grammar lacks any "acceptable" methodology 
for eliciting native speakers' intuitions about their language. This 
implies that there is no independent and reliable method for testing the 
claims made by the grammar in any precise and scientifically meaningful 
mýanner. The claim that the grammar puts forward a formal representation 
'sof the linguistic knowledge of the native speaker" does not mean that 
the grammar can be 'precisely' and 'rigorously' tested for the purpose of 
establishing the empirical truth or falsity of this claim. 
However, the naive realist orientation of Halle's theory cannot 
be reconciled with the 
E-lexical Insertion I feature employed by this 
theory to mark the set of entries representing non-occurring words in the 
language. As has been indicated previously, the primary function of 
this feature is, essentially, to prevent all items marked by it in a grammar 
from appearing in sentences generated by this grammar. But, as jackendoff 
(1975: 664) points out, it is "rather suspicious to have Eitems I which have 
all the properties of words except that of being words", i. e. of being 
capable of appearing in sentences. 
The E-Lexical Insertion I feature appears to be no more than a, 
blocking device. It is, however, a vital feature of Halle's theory, for, 
without it, the grammar will generate sentences some of whose components 
might not be accepted by native speakers as well-formed words of their 
language, though, from a strictly grammatical point of view, these 
constituents have all the hall-marks of words. It, therefore, appears 
that, from a strictly linguistic, i. e. competence point of view, the 
[ 
-Lexical Insertion] feature is no more than a descriptive convenience 
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which lacks empirical content, unless one is willing to regard knowledge 
about performance factors as part of the linguistic knowledge which ý 
constitutes competence. Such a procedure would, however, lead to 
the relaxation of the basis of the competence versus performance 
dichotomy in transformational grammar, and, therefore, must be rejected. 
6.3 Tackendoff: The 'Lexicalist' Or 'Full-Entry' Theory_(1975 : 
6.3.1 Preliminaries 
jackendoff's "full-entry" theory of word-formation is presented 
in his article "Morphological and Semantic Regularities in the Lexicon" 
(1975). '-This theory presupposes Chomsky's view of the lexicon in his 
paper "Remarks on Nominalisation" dealt with above; but it departs from 
this view in some important respects, as shall be seen later in this section. 
Though jackendoff uses the term Ilexicalist' to refer to his 
full-entry theory of the lexicon, I shall reserve this term to refer to 
Chomsky's view of the lexicon in "Remarks", and to all models of word- 
formation cast within this framework; in addition to jackendoff's 
full-entry theory, this framework encompasses Halle's morpheme-based 
theory and Aronoff's word-based theory of word-formation, which will be . 
dealt with later in this chapter. The application of the term 'lexicalist' 
in the above fashion will allow us to contrast the models designated by it, 
as a whole, with the I trans format ionalis t' approach, in the narrow sense 
of this term, for dealing with word-formation phenomena. 
According to jackendoff, the main task of a theory of the lexicon, 
in the 'lexicalist' framework, is the development of a "notion of lexical ' 
redundancy rules which permit an adequate description of the partial 
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relations and idiosyncracy characteristic of the lexicon" (ibid: 639). 
He also points out that a theory of the lexicon must meet three conditions 
of adequacy, parallel to those given by Chomsky in Aspects of the Theory 
of-Syntax, i. e. observational adequacy, descriptive adequacy and 
explanatory adequacy. According to the first condition or criterion, a 
theory of the lexicorf must provide each lexical item entered in the 
lexicon with " suff icient 'information to des cribe its behaviour in the 
language" (ibid: 639). In accordance with the second criterion, a theory 
of the lexicon must state all the relevant "relationships, sub-regularities 
and generalisations among lexical items of a language" (ibid. ). An- 
explanatorily adequate theory of the lexicon explains "how the particular 
relationships and sub-regularities in the lexicon are chosen - why the 
observed relationships, and not other imaginable ones, form part of the 
description of the lexicon, in question" (ibid: 640). It must also explain 
why a particular lexical item of a set of two or more related lexical items 
is regarded, for the purposes of lexical redundancy rules, as more 'basic' 
than the other, or others, in the grammar. A theory of the lexicon must 
explain why, for example, the first, rather than the second, member of each 
one of the following pairs of lexical items decide : decision and refuse 
refusal is taken, for the sake of lexical redundancy rules, as more basic 
than its partner in the grammar. ' An explanatorily adequate theory of the 
lexicon must be able to provide an "evaluation measure" for choosing 
between competing analyses and grammars constructed in accordance with it. 
6.3.2 The 'Transformationalist' Versus The 'Lexicalist' Approach To 
The Lexicon: 
(32) 
As has been indicated above, there are, within transformational 
grammar, two competing frameworks for dealing with the problem of 
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accounting for the native speaker's intuitions concerning lexical 
relatedness between lexical items in the lexicon: the 'transformationalist' 
and the 'lexicalist' approaches. 
The first, and older approach, deals with the phenomenon of 
lexical relatedness by positing a transformational relation between 
lexically related entities, in terms of which one entity is said to be 
derived from another more basic one, 
(33) 
e. g. decision from decide. 
(34) 
One of the main features of this approach is that it sanctions the use of 
underlying hypothetical entities in deriving lexical items, for example the 
hypothetical entity *Rgress to derive the lexical item agression The 
evaluation measure in this approach is the traditional one of simplicity, 
stated in terms of the number of symbols the grammar contains. According 
to this evaluation measure, of two or more competing grammars, the one 
which contains the smallest number of symbols is more highly valued and, 
therefore, is said to be explanatorily adequate. 
Jackendoff rejects this approach on grounds of its un-naturalness 
artificiality or ad hocness. He demonstrates this by considerin g the 
employment of hypothetical lexical items under this approach, and by the 
treatment this approach gives to the phenomenon of compounding. 
According to jackendoff, the employment of the 'hypothetical 
lexical item' device in a grammar results in the establishment of entities 
which have the status of "positive absolute exceptions to various 
word-formation transformations" (ibid: 466), to prevent them from being 
inserted in base structure trees and, ultimately, from appearing in the 
sentences generated by the grammar concerned. Moreover, such items 
must be marked obligatorily to undergo certain transformations in the 
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grammar. For example, the hypothetical lexical items *agress, 
*retribute and *fiss, from which the nominals agressio , retribution and 
fission are said to be derived, under the 'transformationa list' approach, 
must be marked obligatorily to undergo the nominalisation transformation- 
in the grammar. 
The afore-mentioned consequences which follow from the decision 
to allow the employment of hypothetical lexical items in the grammar are 
said to render the transformationalist approach "unnatural" or "artificial". 
A 'tran'sformationalist' grammar employing such hypothetical lexical items 
must be unusually heavily constrained to ensure that it generates 
grammatical sequences that meet the condition of being acceptable to 
native speakers. The 'unnaturalness' or 'artificiality' of such a grammar 
is also reflected in the inevitable conclusion that hypothetical lexical 
items have all the properties of lexical items except that of being lexical , 
items proper (c. f. section 6.2.2). jackendoff also points out that the 
use of hypothetical lexical items in a grammar implies that the language 
of which the grammar is a description would be simpler if such items were 
actual words in the language concerned; this follows from the fact that 
all the exception features associated with such items would be removed 
from the grammar to accord with this state of affairs. But, jackendoff 
(ibid. ) claims, this implication renders the transformational ist approach 
"counter intuitive" and, therefore, "incorrect at the level of explanatory 
adequacy". A language, as a self-contained system, cannot. be said to 
be any more simple, at any given synchronic state, than it already is. 
(35) 
The treatment of English nominal compounds under this approach 
leads to similar consequences and, therefore, it draws similar objections. 
Any such treatment of compounds in English would require the imposition 
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of unusually heavy constraints on the relevant transformational rules 
to ensure that the grammar generates all of the set of compounds 
acceptable to native speakers, and none of the unacceptable ones, e. g. 
(36) 
*ant man and *tissue man. , Now, due to the restricted productivity 
of the vast majority of compounding processes in English, the task of 
stating all the exception features essential for the constraining of the 
transformations dealing with such compounds, would amount to a 
cross-listing of every noun with every other noun in the language. Rule 
features' or 'derivational constraints' would be also required for stating 
the idiosyncratic information relevant for dealing with the set of 
lexicalised compounds, for example redhead or whitecap. This may be 
illustrated by considering the former lexicalised compound. In dealing 
with this lexicalised compound, the transformational ist approach would 
posit an underlying structure containing the idiosyncratic information that, 
for example, a "redhead is -a person not a pimple" (ibid: 657). 
Though it is, theoretically speaking, possible to state all the 
exception or rule features relevant to a treatment of compounds in English, 
I 
the abundance of such features in a grammar, which would give rise to 
highly restricted and idiosyncratic transformations in the 'trans formational ist' 
approach, is said by jackendoff to render grammars based on this approach 
Ifunnatural" or "artificial"s 
(37) 
In his lexicalist treatment of word-formation processes Chomsky 
(1970) expresses the view that lexically related entities, for example 
decide : decision and refuse : refusal, are entered in the lexicon as a 
single lexical entry, syntactically urunarked for those features which ., 
distinguish 'verbs' from 'nouns. The first member will be inserted in 
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base trees under the V node, and the second one under the N node. 
jackendoff does not adhere to this Chomskyan view of the 
organisation of the lexicon. Instead, he proposes the alternative view 
that related lexical items have "distinct but related lexical entries" 
(ibid: 641), and he states as the aim of a theory of the lexicon the 
development of a method for expressing "the relations between lexical 
entries in accord with a native speaker's intuition" (ibid. ). Two items 
a and b in a language are said to be lexically related if knowing the one 
makes it easier to learn the other, 
(38) 
and lexically related items in a 
language are said to contain less independent information than lexically 
unrelated ones. 
To illustrate this view of lexical relatedness, let us consider the 
pairs of lexical items decide : decision and book : Jam. By virtue of the 
fact that knowing the lexical item decide makes it easier to learn the 
lexical item decision, it follows that these two items are lexically related 
to each other. In contradistinction, by virtue of the fact that knowing the 
lexical item book does not make it easier to learn the lexical item jam, it 
follows that these two items are not lexically related to each other. And 
since part of the lexical information relevant to the lexical item decision 
is already inherent or present in the lexical specification of the basic item 
decide a situation which does not hold for the lexical itemjýjm in relation 
to the item book, it may be concluded that the lexically related items 
decide and decision contain less independent, i. e. non-redundant, 
information than the lexically unrelated items book and jam. 
As has been mentioned above, the task of a theory of the lexicon 
is to develop a notion of "lexical redundancy rule" whose purpose is to 
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enable the linguist to capture the redundancy and idiosyncracy 
characteristic of the lexicon. Such a theory must also provide a 
well-defined "information measure" whose purpose is to enable the 
linguist to compute the "information content" of competing grammars or 
grammatical analyses; this information will serve as a basis for the 
"evaluation measure" of the theory. 
6.3.3 The Impoverished -Entry Theory 
One of the solutions jackendoff considers for dealing with lexical 
redundancy, by assigning distinct but related lexical entries to lexically 
related items, is called the impoverished -entry theory. This theory 
assigns a "fully-specified entry" to the simple item of a set of lexically 
related items, consisting of features of the type cited in (1) below, 
(39) 
entry number 
/phonological representation/ 
syntactic features 
SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION 
and an impoverished -entry - hence the name I impoverished -entry' theory - 
to all items derived from it in the set in question. This mode of listing 
lexical items in the lexicon preserves the condition set by jackendoff 
that lexically related items be assigned distinct lexical entries. The 
relatedness of such lexical entries is expressed by redundancy rules; 
this also preserves the condition that lexically related items be assigned 
related lexical eiitries. 
The function of a lexical redundancy rule is to provide the entry 
of the derived lexical item, i. e. the impoverished -entry, with all the 
redundant information retrievable from the fully-specified entry of the 
277 
basic lexical item, at the appropriate stage in the derivation of a 
sentence containing the derived lexical item concerned. The following 
entries and lexical redundancy rule for the set of lexically related items 
decide and decision illustrate some of the points explained above: 
(2) The entry for decide: 
(40) 
784 
/d e c7d/ 
+V 
+ 
[NP 
1 on NP 2] 
NP 1 DECIDE ON NP 2 
(3) Lexical redundancy rule. * 
(41) 
xw 
/Y + ion / Y- 
+N+V 
+ [NP, 's -(P) NP2j + 
[NP, 
ABSTRACT RESULT OF ACT (NP 1z 
of NP I 
's Z-ING NP 2 
(4) The entry 
. 
for de cis ion 
(42) 
375 
derived from 784 
by rule 3 
NP 2) 
(P) NP 2 
The 'information measure' of the impoverished -entry theory will not 
be dealt with here due to the fact that Jackendoff's rejection of this theory 
is not based on the nature of this measure. Jackendoff rejects the*- 
impoverished-entry theory on two grounds. On the one hand, by virtue of 
the fact that the impoverished -entry theory requires the postulation of 
hypothefical lexicaf items under certain circumstances, this theory is said 
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to be "unnatural" "artificial" or ad hoc (see section 6.3.2). For 
example, the impoverished -entry theory deals with the lexical items 
retribution and fission by relating them to the hypothetical items 
*retribute and *fiss which it marks by the rule feature -Lexical Insertion]. 
. jý .E hypothetical items cannot be regarded as fully-fledged words, precisely 
because they do not partake in the property of occurring in sentences 
that is characteristic of words. The postulation of hypothetical lexical 
items is sometimes required by virtue of the existence of lexical 
redundancy rules that imply them. 
On the other hand, in dealing with pairs or triplets of lexically 
related items which lack lexical roots, for instance aviation : aviator and 
agression : agress , the impoverished -entry theory normally regards the 
first member of such pairs or triplets as the basic or simple item, to be 
assigned a fully-specified lexical entry. But, jackendoff argues, the 
priority assigned to these items is a completely Rd hoc and vacuous one 
since it reflects no empirical reality on the mentalistic level. 
(43) 
This 
implies that the impoverished -theory leads to descriptive consequences 
that are felt to be counter intuitive. On the basis of this, the impoverished 
entry theory may be said to be incorrect at the level of explanatory 
adequacy discussed above. 
6.3.4 The Full-Entry Theory 
According to the full-entry theory the lexicon contains a list of 
fully-specified lexical entries which comprise the set of words in the 
language. For example, the lexical items decide and decision are entered 
in the lexicon as fully-specified lexical entries in the manner given in (1) 
above, except for, %, -. he "entry number" which is now abolished due to the 
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different role played by lexical redundancy rules in the new theory. 
The entry for the lexical Item decision may now be given as follows: 
(5) The entry for decision: 
/dec-ld + ion/ 
+N 
+ (NPI Is on NP 21 
ABSTRACT RESULT OF ACT 
OF NP 1 's DECIDING NP 2 
Lexical redundancy rules in the full entry theory "play a role in 
the information measure for the lexicon. E They] designate as redundant 
that taformation in lexical [entries] which is predictable by the existence 
of related lexical [items] " (jackendoff (1975: 643). It is clear 
from this that the role played by lexical redundancy rules in th 
-e 
full-entry 
theory Is fundamentally different from the role played by their counterparts 
in the "impoverished -theory". According to jackendoff, this concept of 
lexical redundancy rule in the full-entry theory is one of the most 
important innovations of this theory. The information measure of the 
full-entry theory will be dealt with later in this section. 
Lexical redundancy rules of the type employed in the impoverished- 
entry theory, for example (3) above, have the property of expressing the 
relationship between lexically related entries on both the morphological 
and semantic levels simultaneously. By virtue of this property or feature 
such rules posit a unique morphological-semantic relationship between 
lexically related entries. But, jackendoff argues, this is not borne out 
by actual linguistic data. He (ibid: 650) points out that, for example, 
the lexical redundancy rule (3) above "claims that there is a particular 
meaning ABSTRACT RESULT OF ACT of V-ING, associated with the 
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ending -: ton. However several different semantic relations obtain 
between -ion nominals and their related verbs, and several nominalising 
endings can express the same range of meanings". 
To avoid this difficulty in the full-entry theory jackendoff 
proposes to split lexical redundancy rules into two sections: morphological 
redundancy rules and semantic redundancy rules. For example, to account 
for the lexical redundancy present in the following lexical items, which 
are classified in rows according to their shared semantic features or 
properties, and in columns according to their shared morphological 
features or properties: 
Ml 
(6) S1 discussion 
S2 congregation 
S3 copulation 
M2 M3 
argument rebuttal 
government 
establishment refusal 
jackendoff suggests the following morphological (M) and semantic (S) 
redundancy rules: 
(7) Ml /. y + ion /-y 
+N+V 
M2: /Y + ment / /Y- / 
+N+V 
M3 + al :> 
F/ 
Y- 
+N-+V 
(8) Sl +N+v 
+[Dip is (P) NP , NP, (P) NP I 201<--4 +E 2)] ABSTRACT RESULT OF NP 1 ZNP 2 
ACT OF NP 1s Z-ING 
NP2 
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s2+N+V 
+ 
E-(NP2)] +[NP, (P) NP2)] 
GROUP THAT Z-s (NP 2) NP 1Z 
(NP 
2) 
s3 +N +V 
(P) N NP, (P) N " 
E(Npi's P 21) +E P 2)] " (NP 1 's) ý Act 
e of 
NP 1Z NP 2 kpro CSJ 
Z ING NP 2 
According to jackendoff, the existence of a morphological relation 
between lexically related entries is a pre-condition for recognising lexical 
redundancy. In other words, lexical redundancy is ýessentially based 
on the existence of a morphological relation between lexically related entities. 
With respect to whether or not the existence of a semantic relation 
between morphologically related lexical entries is a pre-requisite for the 
recognition of lexical redundancy, jackenýoff considers two different 
views. The first view, called the 2ermissive view, does not require the 
existence of a semantic relation between morphologically related lexical 
entries as a pre-requisite for the recognition of lexical redundancy'. The 
second view, called the restrictive view, adopts the opposite position, 
i. e. it insists on the existence of a semantic relation between 
morphologically related lexical entries as a pre-requisite for recognising 
lexical redundancy. The full-entry theory is based on the permissive 
view of lexical redundancy. The rationale behind this will be dealt with 
later, but suffice it to say here that the above views make different claims 
concerning the nature of the native speaker's knowledge of lexical 
redundancy in his language. 
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jackendoff (1975: 652) gives the following information measure 
to compute the independent information content of the lexicon under the 
permissive version of the full-entry theory: 
(9) "Given a fully-specified lexical entry W to be 
introduced into the lexicon, the Independent 
information it adds to the lexicon is 
a) the information that W exists in the lexicon; 
plus 
b) ... all the information in W which cannot be 
predicted by the existence of an M-rule which 
permits W to be partially described in terms of 
information already in the lexicon, including 
other lexical items and S-rules; plus 
c) the cost of referring to the redundancy rules". 
On the basis of this information measure, jackendoff (ibid: 644) gives the 
following evaluation measure: 
"Of two lexicons describing the same data, that with a 
lower information content is more highly valued". 
6.3.5 Some Applications Of The Full-Entry Theory 
6.3.5.1 Prefix-Stem Verbs 
The term 'prefix-stem' verb refers to a special class of verbs each 
member of which consisting of a prefix followed by a stem, e. g. 
-permi 
and transmit which consist of the prefixes per- and trans-, respectively, 
followed by the item mit. On the level of observational adequacy, 
jackendoff considers two solutions for dealing with this class of verbs. 
The first solution assigns lexical entries for the set of prefixes 
and stems in the language, in addition, of course, to the fully-specified 
lexical entries for all 'Pref ix-stem' verbs. Lexical entries for prefixes 
and stems specify the phonological and syntactic features of such items, 
but they typically lack any semantic features as items of this kind have 
"no (or little) semantic information" (ibid: 654). For example, the 
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following phonological and syntactic information comprises the lexical 
entry for the prefix trans in transmit, transfer, transgress: - 
(10) : Lexical entry for trans 
trans 
pre f ix 
By virtue of the fact that lexical entries for prefixes and stems 
are devoid of semantic specification, the set of lexical redundancy rules 
dealing with prefix-stem verbs will consist of morphological redundancy 
rules only, without corresponding semantic ones. Morphological 
redundancy rules dealing with entries concerning lexical items of this 
kind typically have the following form: 
2E =-y 
+v 
y 
+ Pre f Ix] 
/y/ 
+ stem 
According to the second solution 'prefixes' and 'stems' are not 
entered in the lexicon as lexical entries, but are incorporated in 
morphological redundancy rules which, for the reason given above, lack 
, corresponding semantic redundancy rules. Under this solution 
morphological redundancy rules take the following form: 
(12) trans 
per 
sist 
mit 
jackendoff seems to favour the second solution because, in terms 
of the information measure given above, this solution leads to the 
construction of a grammar whose information content is lower than that 
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of a grammar constructed on the basis of the first solution. However, 
what is significant about these two solutions is that neither of them 
requires the existence of semantic redundancy rules as a pre-requisite 
for morphological, lexical redundancy. The insistence on semantic 
redundancy as a pre-condition for the'recognition of morphological 
redundancy in the lexicon would result in setting up grammars that are 
unable to account for generalisations of a morphological type which are 
deemed to be significant under the transformational generative approach, 
i. e. it would lead to the construction of grammars that are not descriptively 
adequate. This provides a justification for jackendoff's decision to 
adopt the permissive view of lexical redundancy rather than the restrictive 
one, as, under the latter view, the above-mentioned short-coming would 
be unavoidable. 
(44) 
6.3.5.2 Noun Compounds 
The full-entry theory assigns to each actual compound in the 
language a fully-specified lexical entry. The set of potential compounds 
is specified by the set of relevant lexical redundancy rules, both 
morphological and semantic ones. The aim of this section is to explain 
how the full-entry theory deals with 'noun compounds' by considering some 
of the examples discussed by jackendoff. 
In dealing with the following compounds: 
(11)a: garbage man, iceman, milkman, breadbasket, oil drum 
b: snowman, gingerbread man, bread crumb, sand castle 
c: bulldog, kettledrum, sandstone, tissue paper. 
jackendoff gives the following lexical, i. e. morphological and semantic, 
redundancy rules: 
(12) 
+N 
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[NY] / 
ý. -[/X/ 
+N 
/y/ 
+, N 
(13)a: +N+N 
Z THAT CARRIES Wz 
I, 
b: +N 
Z MADE OF W 
-r 
z 
+N 
+N 
X -LIKE AW 
__A 
+N 
z 
N 1w 
] 
H 
These rules imply that the above compounds are analysable into 
morpho-semantic components. 
In computing the information content of the entry for the compound 
noun garbage man, for example, all the information relevant to its 
constituent nouns garbag and man is regarded as redundant, i. e. 
non-inde pendent, due to the fact that these two nouns are already entered 
in the lexicon. The independent information content of the entry for thiS 
noun is said to consist of the "information that such a word exists, plus 
any idiosyncratic fact about I its] meaning (e. g. that 
Ea 
garbage man] 
picks up rather than delivers garbage), plus the cost of r eferring to 
[the 
appropriate lexical redundancy rules (12) and (13a)j " (ibid: 656). 
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- As far as computing the independent information content of the 
lexicon is concerned, the so-called 'berry- compounds' in English are 
not uniformly treated. jackendoff recognises, albeit implicitly, three 
different classes of -. ý= compounds on the basis of the different sets 
of factors involved in computing their independent information content; 
these classes may be exemplified by (a) blueberry, blackberry, 
(b) cranberry, huckleberU and (c) gooseberry, strawberry. 
To account for the lexical redundancy relevant to the noun 
compounds blueberr and blackberry, jackendoff suggests the following 
%S. 
(45) 
morphological and semantic redundancy rule . 
(14), 
+N 
[NY ] 
. /ý -e 
( F/ x /I 
+N 
Z VMICH IS W 
+N 
I 
The independent information content of the lexical entries assigned 
to these nominal compounds in the lexicon is computed in a manner 
analogous to that of garbag man i. e. it consists of the information that 
such worýas exist, plus any idiosyncratic facts about their meanings, plus 
the cost of referring to the above lexical redundancy rules. 
The computation of the information content of the lexical entries 
for the compounds cranberry, and huckleberry is not so straightforward. 
Each one of these compounds is said to be composed of a non-lexical 
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morpheme followed by a lexical one. 
. 
Due to the fact that the noun 
-berry will be entered in the lexicon as a fully specified lexical entry, 
all the information relevant to it will be regarded as redundant in 
calculating the informatign content of the compounds cranberry and 
huckleberry. The "phonological segments / kr*- n/ and / hukI and 
the semantic characteristics distinguishing cranberries and huckleberries 
from other kinds of berries" (ibid: 657), being idiosyncratic features of 
the compounds concerned, are counted as independent, i. e. non-redundant, 
information in the lexicon. 
In calculating the independent information content of these 
compounds, the cost of referring to lexical redundancy rules must also 
be taken into account. This, however, presents a. problem to the 
full-entry theory. Due to the indeterminacy of the lexical categorisation 
and the functional semantic import of, cran- and. huckle, it is not clear 
I which semantic redundancy rules that a grammar contains should apply. 
To solve this problem, jackendoff suggests that the grammar refers to 
those lexical redundancy rules which "cost least"; he (ibid: 657) expresses 
this situation as follows: 
"I see nothing against arbitrarily applying the rules 
which cost least; this convention will minimise the 
information in the lexicon without jeopardising the 
generality of the evaluation procedure". 
The two compounds gooseberry and strawberry fall half-way 
between the above two types of berry compounds in terms of the task of 
accounting for their independent information content. Each one of these 
two compounds is said to consist of two lexical morphemes, and both are 
berries, but "gooseberries have nothing to do with geese and strawberries. 
have nothing to do with straw" (ibid. ). In working out the independent 
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information content of the entries for these compounds jackendoff 
treats them in a manner parallel to that of blueberry and -blackberry, 
but without any reference'to semantic redundancy rules, since the 
elements goose and straw are devoid of any semantic content. This 
provides dnoiher reason for jackendoff's decision to adopt the permissive, 
rather than the restrictive, view of lexical redundancy. 
Excocentric compounds, for example, redhead and whitecap, 
differ from the above endocentric ones in that none of their constituents 
gives any indication about the semantic import of the compound as aýI 
whole. 
(46) 
In dealing with the above excocentric compounds, jackendoff 
applies morphological redundancy rule (14) above, and the following -- 
semantic redundancy rule: 
(16) +NN 
THING WITH AZ Z] 
WHICH*IS w [A 
L- -i W] 
The. independent information content of the entry for redhead, 
for example, is the information that there is a word in the lexicon, plus 
the idiosyncratic information that redhead is a person ("a more 
fully-specified form of THING") and the cost of referring to the relevant 
lexical redundancy rules. 
6.3.6 The Full -Entry Theory And -Creativity 
In-The Lexicon 
Roughly speaking, the concept of 'creativity' in transformational 
grammar is traditionally taken to mean the ability of the native speaker 
to construct and understand an infinite number of sentences in his 
.I language, which ability may be explained in terms of a finite set of rules 
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operating on a finite set of symbols or vocabulary items. This set of 
rules is represented by the phrase structure rules and transformations in 
the syntactic component of the grammar. The lexicon is generally 
regarded as a "repository of learned information" (Jackendoff 1975: 666), 
i. e. as a passive comporient of the grammar. 
It is quite customary for a native speaker to construct, and to 
understand easily and perfectly, new compounds in his language. This 
ability of the native speaker indicates the creative nature of the phenomenon 
of compounding in language. To account for this creativity, or to explain 
it, transformational grammar normally deals with the phenomenon of 
compounding by means of syntactic rules. Clearly, the assumptions upon 
which this method for dealing with compounds is based are different from 
those underlying the method adopted by the full-entry theory for dealing 
with the same class of phenomena. Either the full-entry theory, or the 
traditional transformationalist concept of 'creativity' in language)must be 
rejected or, at least, modified. 
According to jackendoff (1975: 668) the "way out of this dilemma 
must be to follow the empirical evidence, rather than our pre-conceived 
notions of what the grammar should be like. We must accept the 
lexicalist account of compounds, and change our notion of how creativity 
is viewed in the grammar". The "empirical evidence" Jackendoff refers 
to concerns the fact that "creativity" and "memorisation", which are 
traditionally attributed to 'syntax' and the 'lexicon' respectively, actually 
characterise both portions of the language, though the normal mode of 
syntax'is "creative" while the normal mode of'the lexicon is "passive". 
(47) 
This means that, from the empirical point of view, the tra nsformationa list 
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hypothesis according to which creativity is solely assigned to 'syntax', 
and memorisation to the 'lexicon', is untenable; ' and that the full-entry 
theory according to which both the 'syntax' and the 'lexicon' are 
characterised by creativity and memorisation, tho-ugh in different ways, 
or to different degrees, is to be upheld. ý *ý The decision to deal with - 
compounds in the lexicon, in the full-entry theory, reflects the view that 
the normal mode for grammatical rules dealing with compounds is a passive, 
rather than an active, one. 
6.3.7 The Full-Entry Theory: General Remarks 
The full-entry theory proposes three major theoretical modifications, 
or "innovations" - as jackendoff calls them - in the theory of 
transformational generative grammar in general, and theories of the lexicon 
in particular. The fi: rst of these modifications concerns the nature and 
function of lexical redundancy rules. Lexical redundancy rules are 
sub-divided into two categories or types: morphological redundancy rules, 
which must apply in the evaluation of the information content of all lexical 
entries, and semantic redundancy rules that apply only in the evaluation of 
lexical entries assigned to lexical items which are said to have semantic 
import. More important,. however, is the modification concerning the 
function of lexical redundancy rules in the full-entry theory. In this 
theory, lexical redundancy rules are employed as a component in the 
evaluation of the information content of the lexicon, and not -as rules for 
deriving lexical items. 
The second theoretical modification of the full-entry theory concerns 
the nature of the evaluation measure. This measure is formulated in terms 
of the amount of independent information content the lexicon contains, and 
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not, as is the usual practice in transformational grammar, in terms of 
the number of symbols the grammar contains. In other words, this 
modification amounts to a re -interpretation of the concept of simplicity 
in transformational grammar, with the effect that this concept is now 
stated not in terms of symbols, but in terms of independent information. 
This modification or revision is based on the view that a grammar " cannot 
capture the full range of genpralisations in the lexicon" (jackendoff 
1975: 669) if it takes as its goal the task of satisfying the measure of 
simplicity in the normal interpretation of this measure in transformational 
generative grammar. 
The third innovation concerns the concept of creativity. As has 
been mentioned in the previous section, the full-entry theory departs 
from the general trend in transformational grammar by recognising that 
both creativity and memorisation characterise syntax as well as the 
lexicon, though the normal mode of the former tends to be active and that 
of the latter passive. This boils down to saying that, though creativity 
and memorisation characterise syntax and the lexicon, the former, i. e. 
syntax, exhibits a higher degree of creativity than the latter or, 
alternatively, the latter exhibits a higher degree of memorisation than. 
the former. This revision in the application of the concept of creativity 
in transformational grammar accords with the treatment of 'Noun Compounds' 
lexically in the full-entry theory. 
jackendoff's proposal for treating compounds lexically, rather 
than transformationally in the base and transformational compartments 
of the syntactic component of the grammar, is based on the view that the 
lexicon is the most "natural" place for dealing with such phenomena. , 
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However, jackendoff offers no positive proof of, or evidence to support, 
his . view concerning the 'naturalness' of treating compounds lexically. 
Nor does- he offer any explanation of the nature of this concept. The 
'argument' he puts forward to support his view may be described as a 
Inegative' one. It purports to show that the alternative transformationalist 
approach for dealing with compounds, e. g. Lees, results in the setting up 
of grammatical analyses that. are characterised by a great deal of 
, 
ad hocness, 'artificiality' or 'unnaturalness'. Moreover, a grammar of 
compounds under such an approach would be unnecessarily complicated, 
due to the fact that the grammatical rules in such a grammar would have to 
be heavily constrained to ensure that the grammar generates all and only 
the set of grammatical compounds in the language. By implication, the 
merit of a lexicalist treatment of compounds is that it overcomes these 
difficulties. It is this claim, albeit an implicit one, that I shall 
concentrate on in the next few paragraphs. 
By virtue of the fact that no grammatical rules of the type employed 
in a transformalist treatment of compounds are used in the full-entry 
approach for dealing with this portion of language, and by virtue of the 
fact that lexical redundancy rules require none of the constraining which 
must be imposed on grammatical rules in the transformalist approach, due 
to the special nature and function of these rules, it follows that the 
full-entry theory succeeds in avoiding the second Isupposed' short-coming 
of the transformationalist approach to the description of compounds 
mentioned above. 
By contrast, the full-entry theory fails to overcome the first 
objection raised by its author against the rival transformationa list approach 
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for dealing with compounds. To illustrate this point, I shall 
concentrate on Jackendoff's treatment of the independent information 
content of, first, the compounds blackberry and blueberry and, afterwards, 
the compound strawberry. 
In calculating the independent information content of the 
compounds blackberry and blueberry, jackendoff identifies, albeit 
implicitly, their constituent parts black and blue, with the lexical Items 
black and blue as, for example, in blackish and bluish. This means that 
the items black and blue in the above compounds have the same semantic 
information as the items black and blue in blackish and bluish, respectively. 
This semantic information-may be identified as the colour properties 'black' 
and 'blue', for the items black and blue respectively. 
But, at the same time, jackendoff points out that'ihe compounds 
blackberry and blueberry have their own'idiosyncratic semantic features. 
This may be expressed by saying that blackberries are not necessarily 
black and blueberries are not necessarily blue - witness their 'green' 
colour in the early stages of their growth. Such information is treated 
as non-redundant information in calculating the independent information 
content of the lexical entries for the compounds blackberry and blueberry. 
The contradictory nature of the above treatment of the compounds 
blackberry and blueberry is quite clear. On the one hand, the elements 
bla*ck and blue" in these 'compounds are taken to designate the colour 
properties 'black' and 'blue' respectively. This is implicit in the 
decision to identify these elements with black and blue in, say, blackish 
and bluish. But, on the other hand, the elements black and blue in the 
compounds concerned are thought not to designate the colour properties 
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'black' and 'blue' completely. This is implicit in the recognition of the 
fact that the compounds blackberry and blueberry refer to objects which 
are characterised by the colour property 'green'. From this, it is obvious 
that Jackendoff's treatment of the above compounds leads to the 
contradictory conclusion that (a) the element black, refers, at one and the 
same time, to both the colour properties 'black' and 'green', and (b) the 
element blue refers, at one and the same time, to both the colour properties 
'blue' and 'green'. 
The contradictory nature of the above treatment of the compounds 
blackberry and blueberry springs, in my view, from the emphasis on the 
theoretical commitment to reducing the independent information content 
of the lexicon in the full-entry theory. It is this commitment, as has 
been explained in section 6.3.5.2, which leads jackendoff to identify the 
elements black and blue in the above compounds with the fully-fledged 
lexical entries for the items black and blue. By allowing the commitment 
to the reduction of the independent information content of the lexicon to 
over-ride considerations of consistenty in the description, jackendoff's 
'full-entry' theory is rendered arbitrary and ad hoc. 
jackendoff's treatment of the compound strawberry reveals more 
or less the same defect. In calculating the independent information 
content of this compound, jackendoff identifies the constituent straw, 
albeit implicitly, with the lexical item straw which is assigned a 
fully-specified lexical entry. By implication, this means that straw in 
strawberry has the same semantic information as the lexical item straw 
which is entered in the lexicon as a fully-specified lexical entry. But 
this conclusion contradicts Jackendoff's recognition of the fact that the 
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compound strawberry has the idiosyncratic information according'to 
which the element straw has nothing to do semantically with the lexical 
item straw. This contradiction springs from the afore-mentioned clash 
between the theoretical commitment to reducing the independent information 
content of the lexicon and the attempt to provide what might be called, for 
the lack of a better term, a materially adequate solution. jackendoff's 
simultaneous adherence to these two considerations with respect to the 
treatment of the compound strawberry reveals the ad hoc nature of his 
a pproa ch. 
The ad-hocness and artificiality of the full-entry'theory may be 
also illustrated by considering the solution it provides for dealing with 
so-called rootless lexical items, for example, perdition and the set of 
prefix-stem verbs. 
In dealing with the rootless lexical item perdition jackendoff 
observes that the independent information content of this item is 
intuitively felt to be less than that of an "idiosyncratic word", e. g. 
orchestra, but more than that of a word with a lexical root, e. g. damnation : 
damn, where damn is the lexical root or base. jackendoff points out that 
this observation must be accounted for in a grammar of the lexicon, under 
the full-entry theory, without, at any point, compromising the stand of this 
theory on the inadmissability of assigning lexical entries to hypothetical 
items in the lexicon. 
The redundant information in the lexical item perdition is said to 
be located in the ending -_ion which appears in the right-hand side of a 
morphological redundancy rule of the, type given in rule (12) above. The 
non-redundant information content of this item is partly attributed to the 
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non-lexical residual root *. perdite which must appear In the left-hand 
side of the same morphological redundancy rule containing the ending, 
-ion. It is obvious from this that the lexical item perdition is treated 
in the same manner as that proposed for treating what are traditionally 
regarded as prefix-stem verbs. It is also clear from this that the 
non-lexical root *perdite'is not assigned the status of a lexical entry. 
The above solution iý entirely consistent with the general 
condition, in the full-entry theory, according to which-no non-lexical, 
hypothetical root may be given the status of a lexical entry. Due to the 
fact that the information measure of the full-entry theory is worded in 
such a-fashion so that the computation of redundant information does not 
I necessarily depend on the existence of related'lexical entries, but on the 
statement of such information somewhere in the lexicon-including, of 
course, redundancy rules - the full-entry theory can capture the redundant 
information relevant to perdition without having to list the non-lexical 
item *. perdite as a lexical entry. The independent information content of 
perdition is, therefore, "the information that there is a word, plus the 
cost of the root, plus the cost of referring to the [appropriate morphological 
redundancy rule] " (jackendoff 1975: 648). This, jackendoff (ibid. ) points 
out, is less than the independent information content of orchestra and 
more than that of damnation. 
As has been mentioned previously, -jackendoff puts forward two 
proposals for dealing with prefix-stem verbs, e. g. trans-7mit, perý-mtt, etc. 
According to the second of these proposals, prefixes and stems are not 
listed in the lexicon, i. e. assigned separate lexical entries, but are 
incorporated in morphological redundancy rules, with prefixes and stems 
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appearing in the left and right sides of such rules respectively, e. g. 
rule. (12) above. This method for dealing with prefix-stem verbs is 
essentially the same as that employed in dealing with the lexical item 
perdition. The only difference between the two treatments is that whereas 
non-lexical roots have the appearance of being 'words', 'prefixes' and 
'stems', which are considered as non-lexical items under this proposal, 
lack this appearance. 
According to the first proposal for dealing with prefix-stem verbs, 
prefixes and stems, which are regarded as hypothetical items by 
jackendoff, are listed in the lexicon, i. e. assigned separate lexical 
entries. This proposal clearly contradicts the condition, in the full-entry 
theory, according to which no non-lexical hypothetical items are listed 
in the lexicon. 
jackendoff recognises this fact, but he argues that it can be 
tolerated in a grammar of the lexicon, under the full-entry theory, due to 
the difference, from the point of view of the operation of the grammar, 
between the listing of non-lexical roots, e. g. *perdite, on the one hand, 
and the listing of prefixes and stems, on the other. If non-lexical roots 
were to be listed in the lexicon, then, by virtue of the fact that such 
roots have the appearance of words, they must be marked by the rule 
featureE-Lexical Insertion] to prevent the lexical insertion rules from 
applying to them in the operation of the grammar. According to jackendoff, 
this rule feature is merely a descriptive convenience, an ad hoc device 
that lacks empirical content. By contrast, the listing of prefixes and 
stems in the lexicon does not require the employment of the rule feature 
!9 
E-Lexical Insertion3 , due 
. to the fact that the base rules-of the grammar 
298 
do not generate the syntactic categories "prefix" and "stems" and, 
therefore, lexical insertion rules cannot insert items belonging to either 
of these categories in base trees. 
Though jackendoff's treatment of perdition and his former 
proposal for dealing with prefix"stem verbs, preserve the condition of 
the inadmissability of listing non-lexical items in the lexicon, neither 
of these two solutions succeeds in eliminating such items from the grammar 
completely. This conclusion readily follows- from the fact that non-lexical 
items are still employed in the full-entry theory in lexical redundancy rules. 
On the basis of this, it may be concluded that the full-entry theory, 
despite disclaimers to the contrary by its author, is characterised by 
ad hocness and artificiality of, more or less, the 'type' said to hold for 
the trans formationalist position, especially as jackendoff does not offer 
any explanation as to why the incorporation of non-lexical items in lexical 
redundancy rules should not be regarded as an ad hoc and artificial feature - 
in the grammar. 
The latter solution for dealing with prefix-stem verbs, though 
perhaps regarded as less desirable than the former one, illustrates this 
ad hocness even further. Though this solution contradicts the condition, 
in the full-entry theory, that no non-lexical items may be listed in the 
I. exicon, jackendoff does not hesitate to over-rule it, on grounds that 
prefixes and stems do not fall within the scope of the operation of lexical 
redundancy rules. However, by allowing prefixes and stems to be listed 
in the lexicon, though such items are not subject to lexical insertion in 
base trees, the full-entry theory fails to eliminate non-lexical items from 
the lexicon completely. On the basis of this, it may be concluded that 
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the full-entry theory is characterised by a certain degree of ad hocness 
and artificialfty. 
6.4 Aronoff : The Word-Based Theor (1976) 
6.4.1 Preliminaries: 
Aronoff's theory of word-based morphology is presented in his 
book Word Formation in Generative Grammar published in 1976. 
Aronoff's theory derives its name from its main thesis, namely the 
word-ba'sed hypothesis. which Aronoff (ibid: 21) expresses as follows: 
"All regular 
* 
word-formation processes are 
word-based. A new word is formed by applying a 
regular rule to a single already existing word. 
Both the new word and the existing one are members 
of lexical categories". 
Generally speaking, Aronoff restricts the scope of morphology, 
or word -forma tionto what is traditionally called 'derivational morphology' 
In the literature. More specifically, morphology in the word-based 
theory deals with the internal structure of words formed by productive or 
regular processes of word-formation; these are words whose meanings 
can be accounted for regularly, i. e. can be predicted in terms of the 
word-formation rules applicable to them. Words formed by 'sporadic' 
or 'idiosyncratic' rules of word-formation, i. e. complex words whose 
meanings "can never be derived regularly" (p. 21), inflectional processes, 
and incorporation or cliticisation are said to fall outside the scope of 
the word-based theory. 
Aronoff mentions three types of 'idiosyncratic' or 'sporadic' 
word-formation processes: 'blending', lacronymy' and what he calls 
morphemic-words. Blending concerns the forming of new words in a 
language by "merging parts of already existing words into a word which 
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meets the phonotactic restrictions of the language" (ibid. ). Examples 
of words in English formed in this fashion are smo and liger which are 
formed from the pairs of words smoke : fog and lion : tiger, respectively. 
Acronymy involves the process of forming words from the first elements, 
or initials, of a group of words, e. g. the word NATO which is formed from 
the initial elements of the group of words 'North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation'. Aronoff (ibid: 20) points out that words formed according 
to these two 'idiosyncratic' word-formation processes "have no 
recognisable internal structure or constituents. This makes them opaque, 
and hence uncommon". 
The process of forming words from morphemes is also said to be 
uncommon in languages. This process involves the creation of new 
words by concatenating morphemes in a specific order. Aronoff 
exemplifies this process by the word transmote in American English which 
is formed by concatenating the morpheme trans-, as in transfer, and the 
morpheme -mote as in the words promote and demote. Words formed by 
this process differ from words formed by the preceding two processes of 
word-formation in that they reveal a transparent morpheme structure. 
However, the 'Structural' or 'morphological' transparency exhibited by 
words of this type is not matched by any semantic transparency. This 
factor underlies Aronoff's decision to exclude this word-formation process 
from the scope of the word-based theory. 
Aronoff distinguishes two major approaches to word-formation irr 
the lexicalist framework of post "Remarks on Nominal isation" 
transformational grammar : the strong lexicalist hypothesis and the lexicaliýt 
hypothesis. The first approach is represented by Jackendoff's full-entry 
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theory which removes all word-formation phenomena from syntax. 
The second approach is represented by the word-based theory itself; 
this theory excludes all derivational phenomena only, regardless of 
their degree of productivity, from the scope of syntax. It, however, 
only concentrates on productive derivational processes. 
6.4.2 The Notion Morpheme 
Aronoff rejects the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme as the 
minimal, individually meaningful unit in a language, i. e. as the minimal 
linguistic sign in the Saussurean sense of the term. According to this 
Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme, polymorphemic words are, by 
definition, both structurally and semantically compositional. This means 
that, in terms of this view of the morpheme, struictural, i. e. morphological, 
compositionality, cannot exist without a correlative semantic 
compositionality, in complex words. 
Aronoff's rejection of the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme is 
based on grounds of descriptive adequacy. He (1976: 9-10) points out 
that "below the level of the word we encounter morphemes which, while 
they must be assumed to be real linguistic elements, have no meaning 
which can be assigned independently of each of the individual words in 
which they occur". Morphemes of this type, Aronoff argues, occur in 
many words in language, and, therefore, an adequate grammar must be 
(48) 
able to account for their purely structural, non-semantic regularities. 
Since a grammar based on the BloOmfieldian notion of the morpheme cannot 
realise this goal, such a grammar and, by implication, the theory it is 
based on,, -cannot be said to be descriptively adequate. To illustrate this 
point, Aronoff considers two types of English morphological phenomena : 
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(a) berry morphs and (b) prefix-stem (Latinate) verbs. 'Aronoff's 
discussion of these two types of phenomena will be dealt with in the 
following two sections: 
6.4.2.1 Berry Morphs 
Aronoff considers the following examples: 
(1) cranberry boysenberr huckleberry -' 
and he points out that while the element -berry can be isolated and 
established as an independently meaningful and recurrent morpheme, 
under the Bloomfieldian view of this notion, the residual elements: 
(2) cran # : 
#boysen #huckle # 
I 
cannot. As far as these residual elements are concerned, there is no 
non-circular way of assigning independent meanings to them, due to the . 
fact that their semantic import is an intrinsic and non-separable component 
of the semantic import of the words of which they are parts. As a result 
of this, i. e. due to the fact that the residual elements in (2) above 
cannot be assigned independent meanings of their own, the words 
cranberry, 
_boysenberry 
and huckleberry must be considered as simple, 
unanalysable units. 
(49) 
But, Aronoff argues, this solution fails to 
account for the fact that the element -h2rr has the status of a morpherhe y 
in English, i. e. it fails to state a 'linguistically significant generalisation' 
about the morphemic structure of English. This boils down to say1fig that 
the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme leads to setting up linguistic 
descriptions that fail to satisfy the criterion of descriptive adequacy. 
The following -berry words 
(3) strawberry blueberry 
gooseberr blackberry 
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present a similar problem to the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme. 
While the element -, berry in these words can be established as a morpheme 
in its own right, the residual elements 
(4) 4 straw#" -*Iue 7* 
# goose# : hL blackilý 
cannot consistently be assigned the status of morphemes, due to the 
fact that none of them can be assigned any semantic import in its- own 
right. Despite the phonological similarity between the words straw, 
goose, blue and black and the above residual elements, the words in (3) 
above must, under the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme, be regarded 
as simple, un-analysable linguistic units. But, Aronoff argues, this 
solution fails to account for the morpheme status of -ý2Lry. It also 
leads to the treatment of the phonological similarity between the words 
straw, goose, blue, black and the first elements of the words in (3) as 
an accidental property of the English language. This boils down to 
saying that the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme leads to the setting 
up of linguistic descriptions that fail to satisfy the criterion of descriptive 
adequacy. 
One solution for dealing with data of the above type, which aims 
at preserving the notion of the morpheme as a meaningful unit, while still 
allowing the grammar to account for the morphological compositionality of 
complex words, is suggested by Chomsky in his article "Remarks on 
Nominal isation" This solution is based on the employment of the 
"device of under specification and contextual filling" according to which 
morphemes are assigned "under-specified" or "undetermined" meanings 
with "contextually determined allo-meanings" (Aronoff 1976: 11). 
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Aronoff rejects this proposal'. He points out that while it leads 
to satisfactory solutions in certain cases, it fails to do so in'others. 
This failure may be examplified by the treatment provided for the element 
_# black# in blackberry on the basis of this solution. According to 
this 'proposal, this element is assigned an under-specified meaning - 
characterised, perhaps, as a "certain colour quality" - with "contextually 
determined allo-meanings" -. formulated, perhaps, as the "quality of 
being black", and the "quality of being red", since sour blackberries are 
normally red. But, Aronoff (1976: 11) points out that "since something 
cannot be both red and black at the same time, the two allo-meanings of 
4 black# will be contradictory and will share almost no semantic 
feature (colour? )". 
6.4.2.2 Pref ix-Stem (Latinate) Verbs In English 
Pref ix-stem (Latinate) verbs in English may. be exemplified by the 
verbs permi and remit in which -mit is the stem and per and re are the 
prefixes. Verbs in this category have the characteristic feature of being 
always stressed on the stem. Under the Bloomfieldian view of the 
morpheme, verbs in. this category are established as simple words, due to 
the fact that none of them can be shown to be both structurally and 
semantically compositional. 
Verbs in this category also have the characteristic feature of 
exhibiting regular stem alternations before the suffixes +ion and +ive, 
, as the following table shows: 
permit permission permissive 
remit remission remissive 
This alternation is characterised by the following features: (a) it Is 
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systematic and not accidental; (b) it is not phonologically conditioned 
and, therefore, cannot be accounted for in phonology; (c) it is restricted 
only to the latinate portion of the English language; and (d) it must be 
stated in terms of morphemes, and not words, due to the fact that this 
feature characterises morphemes and not whole words. 
But since, under the Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme, verbs 
in the above-mentioned category cannot be assigned any internal 
morphemic structure, it follows that the above alternation cannot be 
accounted for in the grammar in the most "natural" manner Possible, 
(50) 
Consequently, the systematic and regular nature of this alternation would, 
under this view of the morpheme, be treated as an accidental and arbitrary 
feature of the English language. This boils down to saying that the 
Bloomfieldian view of the morpheme leads to the setting up of linguistic 
descriptions that fail to satisfy the criterion of descriptive adequacy. 
6.4.2.3 The Morpheme Re-Considered 
Aronoff's discussion of the class of -Lerry morphs, and his 
discussion of the stem alternations in the class of prefix-stem (Latinate) 
verbs in English, is intended to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
Bloomfieldian characterisation of the morpheme as an independently 
meaningful linguistic unit. 
To rectify this, Aronoff proposes a revision or, as he calls it, 
"adjustment", in this definition of the notion morpheme to enable it to 
refer to, or designate, such meaningless elements as cran- in cranberry 
and the constituents of prefix-stem (Latinate) verbs. The definition of 
the morpheme as a meaningful grammatical entity involves three features: 
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constant form, constant meaning and an arbitrary link between the 
'form and the meaning. '. Aronoff's adjustment of this notion involves, 
what he calls, the "broadening" of the constant meanin aspect to 
include the phonological operation which spells out the form of a 
morpheme. In terms of this 'modification' of the notion morpheme, a 
morpheme may be "meaningful", but "meaningfulness" Is not a factor in 
defining this unit. Aronoff (1976: 15) sums up his position concerning 
the incorporation of a phonological operation in the meaning-bearing 
aspect of the morpheme as follows: 
"That I include a meaning and a phonological 
rule in the same class of entities, and speak of 
mere broadening in doing so, may strike some as 
odd. But I wish to point, perhaps a little dramatically, 
to what is essential about a morpheme: not that it (5 1) 
mean, but rather merely that we be able to recognise i 
Aronoff suggests another 'modification' in the definition of the notion 
morpheme; this modification will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
6.4.3 The Model 
The model of word-formation proposed by Aronoff in his word-based 
theory contains three components: a list of words or a dictionary, a 
word-formation rules component and an adjustment rules component., 
I. shall. deal with each one of these components separately in the following 
sections. 
6.4.3.1 The List of Words Or Dictionary, 
The dictionary component consists of a set of fully-specified 
lexical entries. Each lexical entry is said to represent a word fully- 
specified for its phonological, syntactic and semantic features, including 
all relevant redundant information of these types. The dictionary 
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component in the word-based theory neither lists morphemes, nor 
does it contain an independent set of lexical redundancy rules, either 
in Chomsky's (1965) sense, or injackendoff's (1975) sense. 
Each lexical entry is independent of the information present in 
other lexical entries and in word-formation rules. Aronoff expresses 
this point by saying that each word in the list of words is a "complete 
sign in itself". However, not all words in a language are listed in the 
dictionary. Only words whose meanings are not totally predictable from 
the information already contained in the lexicon are listed, i. e. assigned 
lexical entries. Carrier (1979) calls this property of the dictionary in 
the word-based theory the "Partial Listing Hypothesis". 
6.4.3.2 The Word-Formation Rules Component 
Word formation rules in the word-based theory have two functions: 
a synthetic, and an analytic, one. In their synthetic capacity, they are 
rules for forming new words in the language. As such, they differ from 
$syntactic' and 'phonological' rules by being "once only" rules. 
Aronoff (1976: 22) explains this property of word-formation rules as 
follows: "They are rules for making up new words which may be added to 
the speakers' lexicon. We can think of themas once only rules. - They 
are very different from the rules of syntax and phonology which must apply 
in the derivation of every sentence". In their analytic capacity, word-' 
formation rules are rules for analysing polymorphemic or complex words 
which are listed in the lexicon; in this sense they are said to be lexical 
redundancy rules. 
Word-formation rules are lexical rules and, therefore, they are 
distinct and separate from semantic,. syntactic and phonological rules 
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in the grammar. One difference between word-formation rules, on the 
one hand, and syntactic and phonological rules, on the other, is that 
the former, in their synthetic capacity, are 'once only' rules. 
Word-formation rules also differ from other types of rule in the grammar 
in that they cannot introduce rule -conditioned properties or features. 
Despite these differences, word-formation rules may refer to the 
information contained in the semantic, syntactic and phonological 
components of the grammar, but without referring to the rules themselves 
in these components. Similarly, syntactic and phonological rules do 
not make any reference'to word-formation rules. 
Each word-formation rule operateslon a set of words that it 
specifies. The set as a whole, or any member of such a set, is called 
the base of the word-formation rule. In other words, the base of a 
word-formation rule is a word, or a group of words, which are uniquely 
specified by the rule in question. Word-formation rules, in the word-based 
theory, do not operate on morphemes, regardless of whether or not these 
morphemes are meaningful. 
For each word-formation rule the grammar specifies two things: 
(a) the information to which a word-formation rule has access - this 
includes the syntactic, semantic, morphological and phonological. 
properties of its base; and (b) the operation a word-formation rule performs, 
and the information - syntactic, semantic, morphological and phonological 
- characterising the output of such a rule. 
6.4.3.2.1 Syntactic And *Sema. ntic Conditions On Word -Formation Rules: 
The syntactic and semantic conditions on the base of a 
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word-formation rule, in the word-based theory, include categorial, 
sub-categorial and selectional, features; they also include governed 
entailment and presupposition features. For instance, the base of the 
___L_z_ 
4F -ness suffixation word-formation rule must be characterised by the 
category specification + adjective, e. g. friendly : friendliness. The 
+ee suffixation word-formation rule operates on bases with the 
sub-categorial feature + transitive verb, e. g. emplo : employee. This 
word-formation rule is also sensitive to selectional restriction features 
of the base; it operates on transitive verbs which only take animate, 
or indirect object, e. g. *tearee. 
An example of a word-formation rule which is sensitive to 
semantic features of the base is the re :# attachment word-formation rule. 
This rule attaches the prefix re _# 
"only to verbs whose meanings entail 
a change of state, generally in the object of the verb" (Aronoff 1975: 47)*, 
To illustrate this point, Aronoff (ibid. ) gives the following examples: 
(1) John punched Bill. 
(2). *John repunched Bill. 
(3) John punched the holes in the paper. 
(4) John repunched the holes in the paper. 
He points out that the re 
# attachment word-formation rule does not 
apply in (2) because the base does not satisfy the above condition, i. e. 
of being a verb whose meaning entails a change of state, generally in 
the object of the verb. In contradistinction, this rule applies in (4) due 
to the fact that the base punch satisfies this condition. 
Word-formation rules assign to their output information of the 
same type they are sensitive to in their base. For instance, the #ý 
ness suffixation word-formation rule assigns the feature E+ noun] to its 
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output, e. g. friendliness. The re- -#attachment word-formation 
rule introduces "presupposition" features into its output. It indicates 
that the action referred to by its output has been done at some previous 
time. In the sentence John rewashed the dishes, the derived verb 
rewashed indicates that the action it refers to, i. e. washing, has been 
done at a previous time either by John or somebody else. 
Each word-formation rule, in the word-based theory, has a unique 
syntactico-semantic specification, by which is meant that each rule of 
this type operates on one, and only one, base. The meaning of a derived 
word, i. e. the output of a word-formation rule, is "always'a function of 
the meaning of the base" (ibid: 50). This is also regarded as the meaning 
of the word-formatio .n rule which applies to the base concerned. 
Aronoff accepts the traditional mode of representing the meaning of a 
word-formation rule; he (ibid: 50) writes: "Traditionally, the meaning of 
a WFR is represented by a phrase containing a variable. So, for example, 
the agentive occupational suffix -iýý er can be roughly paraphrased as 
V -/P er N 
'one who VS habitually, professionally' This 
meaning is exemplified in words such as baker, programmer, and diver". 
I 
6.4.3.2.2 Morphology 
Word-formation rules are also sensitive to morphological 
properties of the base. For instance, the +!! y suffixation word-formation 
rule in English operates only on bases characterised by the morphological 
feature latinate, attaching the suffix-: [ttX to them, e. g. lubricit However, 
prior to the application of this word-formation rule, an alternation rule 
dealing with the alternation between / k/ and Isl in Aubrikeit/ : /lubrisity/, 
and a truncation rule deleting the morpheme +ate in the base lubricate, 
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apply in the grammar. These two types of rule will be dealt with later 
in this chapter. 
Another example of a morphological restriction on the base of 
a word-formation rule is the one pertaining to the #hood suffixation 
word-formation rule in English. This rule operates only on 'native' 
words, e. g. brother : brotherhood, mother : motherhood. However, some 
word-formation rules in English, for example, #. ness suff ixation 
word-formation rule, as in kind : kindness, do not discriminate between 
latinate and native bases. It is worth noting here that the features 
E+ latinate] and E+ native I are abstract morphological feature. The 
feature E+ latinate] for example, is not necessarily a feature of 
morphemes which, from a historical or etymological point of view, are 
I 
of Latin origin. 
The above morphological restrictions belong-to the class of 
positive morphological restrictions on the base. Positive morphological 
restrictions specify that a given word-formation rule must operate on the 
members of a given morphological class, and they are correlated with 
lexical productivity. This type of morphological restriction may be 
further exemplified by the restriction on the bases of the 7ýý ment 
suffixation word-formation rule and the negative un#Prefixation 
word-formation rule. The former rule attaches the deverbal nominal 
suff ix # ment "most productively to verbs of the form en +Y and 
. 
ýe +X (e. g. encroachment bewilderment) where Y and X are variable's 
standing for the base". The latter rule takes as base. the class of 
deverbal adjectives, including present and past participles, e. g. 
un lagging, unhurried, and words in deverbable : #able, e. g. unbearable. 
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Morphological restrictions may also be of a negativ type. 
Negative morphological restrictions on word-formation rules indicate that 
a given rule does not apply to bases of a certain morphological class. 
The restriction that the # ness suffixation word-formation rule does 
not operate on adjectives of the form X+ ate, X+ ant, or X -; ent, e. g. 
decent : *decentness, aberrant : aberrantness, profligat : *'profligatness 
illustrates this type of morphological restriction in the word-based theory.. 
6.4.3.2.3 Phonology 
Each word-formation rule specifies a phonological operation which 
it performs on the base it applies to. The phonological operation normally 
results in the addition of some morpheme to the base of a word-formation 
rule; the morpheme added to the base is called an affix. 
A word-formation rule specifies the phonological form of the affix 
it attaches to the base and the position of that affix in relation to the base, 
i. e. whether it is a prefix, infix, or suffix. The specification of the 
phonological form of the affix and its positional sub-type in relation to 
the base is unique to each word-formation rule. For example, the 
word-formation rule which adds the morpheme =# ness to an adjectival 
base specifies that the morpheme concerned always appears in a specific 
phonological form, i. e. /nes'/, and in a specific linear position to the 
base, i. e. as a suffix. Each word-formation rule also specifies an affix 
boundary. 
The employment of archi-forms or abstract segments in the 
phonological forms of affixes is not permitted by the word-based theory. 
Such forms, which are analogous to abstract lexical items in Botha, 'are 
thought to be ad hoc and artificial. Alternations in the realisation of 
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an affix which, Under the abstract segment approach, have been dealt 
I 
with by means of rules operating on such a segment, are, under the 
word-based theory, accounted for by means of allomorphy rules; these 
rules will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
The phenomenon of reduplication or copying provides the 
word-based theory with the empirical motivation for modifying the view 
of the morpheme as a phonological constant, i. e. pbonologically constant 
segment, and of the view of word-formation rules as labelled bracketts 
or frames which Halle (1973) advocates. 
Word-formation rules include rules of reduplication which copy 
one part of the base of a word-formatibn rule and embody it as an affix, 
or part of an affix, in the output of the rule concerned. As has been 
mentioned above, reduplication phenomena provide the basis for modifying 
the traditional view of the morpheme as a phonological constant. To 
I 
illustrate this point, Aronoff (1975: 64) considers the following data from 
Klamath: 
Non-Causative 
pe: wa 'bathes' 
no: ga 'is cooked' 
iýa: s? a 'is sick' 
Causative 
hespe: wa 
hosno: ga 
has A: s ? na 
The three causative prefixes hes, hos, has have fixed consonants h-s, 
and vowels copied from the first vowel of *the base or stem they are 
attached to. In terms of the traditional treatment of this phenomenon in 
transformational grammar, the vowel of the causative is represented by 
an abstract segment, represented by V to which a copying rule applies, 
replacing it by the appropriate vowel of the stem or base in each one of 
the above affixes. But, while this solution appears to preserve the view 
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of the morpheme as a phonological constant, it does so at the expense 
of breaking the prohibition on the employment of abstract segments, which 
the word-based theory adopts. Aronoff argues that, in order to deal with 
reduplication phenomena of the above type, the word-based theory of 
word-formation must either remove the- "prohibition" on the employment of 
abstract segments, or modify the view of the morphemes as a ýphonological 
constant or segment. He (iýid: 65) expresses this dilemma as follows: 
- "It seems to me 
impossible to preserve both 
hypotheses; either we give up the prohibition on 
abstract segments, or we give up the phonological 
constant". 
Aronoff adopts the second suggestion mentioned in the preceding 
quotation. Thus, the morpheme is now conceived of not as a "phonological 
constant", but as theý "product of a unique phonological operation" (ibid. ), 
associated with a particular word-formation rule in the grammar. The 
product of the phonological operation associated with a given word formation 
rule may be manifested as a phonological constant, e. g. -* ness, but 
this mode of manifesting such a product is not a defining property of the 
morpheme. For example, the following word-formation rule, dealing with 
a the Klamath causative prefix, specifies the form of this prefix not as a 
phonological constant, but as an entity the vowel of which copies the 
first vowel of the base it is attached to; in terms of the preceding 
examples this vowel may be either /e: /, /o: / or /a: / : 
Eco v x] 
123)V 
Eh 
2sV 
[l 2 3] 
] 
caus - Ig 
(52) 
Aronoff points out that labelled bracketts or frames are not 
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suited for dealing with reduplication phenomena, and, therefore, he 
proposes to replace them by rewrite-type word-formation rules. Each 
such rule operates on a base, characterised as a class of one or more 
words which alone occur to the left of the arrow. A morpheme is the 
product of the phonological operation associated with a given word-formation 
rule; no morpheme may occur to the left of the arrow of a rewrite 
word-formation rule, i. e. as the input to such a rule. Unlike morphemes, 
words may be listed in the dictionary of a word-based theory grammar. 
It has been pointed out in section 6.4.3.2 that word-formation 
rules may refer to the information contained in the phonological component, 
but not to the phonological rules themselves or to rule feature in such rules. 
Aronoff (ibid: 73) restricts the application of the phonological operations 
defined by word-formation rules to three places in the grammar: 
first, before the phonology, as has always 
been assumed; second before the word-level rules; 
third, after the phonology. Such a restriction on the 
place of these operations allows us to retain-the 
position that WFRs do not interact with phonological 
rules, though they may interact with the phonology". 
6.4.3.3 Adjustment Rules: 
The third component of the word-based theory is the 'adjustment 
rules'. In some instances, the output of word-formation rules requires 
some adjustment to ensure that the phonological rules of the grammar apply 
to it. The set of rules whose function is to carry out this task are called 
adjustment rules. These rules adjust the phonological forms of morphemes 
in the environment of other morphemes or classes of morphemes. Clearly, 
the main difference between adjustment rules and rules of word-formation 
is that whereas the former operate on morphemes, the latter operate on 
words only. 
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Adjustment rules are'placed before the phonology, and they 
are of two types: 
a) truncation rules, 
b) allomorphy rules. 
6.4.3.3.1 Truncation Rules: 
The role of truncation rules, in the word-based theory, is to 
delete the final morpheme of a stem or base in the environment of a 
specific morpheme or class of morphemes. Truncation rules are re-write 
rules which normally have the following form (Axonoff 1976: 88) 
[[root 
+ Aj X 
12 
)1 
JY 
3 
where X and Y are major lexical categories. I 
It has been previously mentioned that the +ee suffixation 
word-formation rule operates on transitive verbs which take an animate 
or indirect object, e. g. employ : employee, 
_nU 
: payee. However, in 
the case of verbs which have the form X+ ate in this category, e. g. 
nominate and evacuate, a truncation rule is applied to delete the 
'morpheme +ate in the environment of the suffix +ee that is attached to the 
base by the above-mentioned word-formation rule. In other words, the 
+ee suffixation word-formation rules applies to the stems nominatel and 
evacuate, adding the morpheme +ee to them. This creates the appropriate 
condition for the truncation rule - which deletes -ate in the context of +ee 
to apply, thus ensuring that the grammar does not generate *nominatee 
and *evacuatee, but nominee and evacuee. 
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Aronoff (ibid. ) points out that truncation rules are required in 
the word-based theory "because without them we often find cases of 
regularly derived words, semantically transparent, formed with affixes 
which we know to be alive and regular in their operation, which on the 
surface do not appear to be derived from words". In other words, the 
employment of truncation rules in the word-based theory is designed to 
enable this theory to account for certain productive word-formation 
processes which, otherwise, 
-would 
be completely left unaccounted for. 
6.4.3.3.2 Allomorphy Rules: 
Allomorphy rules differ from truncation rules not in their formal 
nature, but in their function. Whereas the latter rules delete morphemes 
in the immediate environment of other morphemes, the former adjus the 
shape of morphemes in the immediate environment of other morphemes. 
An example of an allomorphy rule in English is the one which adjusts the 
shape of the morpheme vert, into verz, before the suffix +ion: 
[Esub"- vertJ + ion] Es ub - verz] +ion] 
The final consonant z of -verz is later palatalised by the rules of the 
phonological component. 
The adjustment of the phonological shape of the morpheme -vert 
to -verz is entirely morphological in nature, i. e. It is not dependent on 
the phonological character of this morpheme. To support this claim, 
Aronoff gives the morpheme -sert in (in - sert) which ends in the same 
consonant as -yert but which, unlike -vert, does not have its shape 
adjusted in the vicinity of the morpheme +ion. The above allomorphy 
rule which converts -vert to -verz in the environment of +ion applies to 
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this morpheme only. This feature of allomorphy rules follows from the 
assumption "one affix, one rule" advocated by Aronoff in his word-based 
theory. 
Allomorphy rules differ from phonological rules in that the former 
are "not subject to many of the'naturalness constraints that govern" the 
latter (Aronoff 1976: 112). However, these rules are subject to the 
constraint that they "cannot introduce segments which are not otherwise 
motivated as underlying phonologi6al segments of the language" (ibid: 98). 
6.4.4 The Word-Based Theor :- General Remarks 
(S3) 
One of the main features of the word-based theory, which 
distinguishes it from other morphological theories in the post- "Remarks 
on Nominalisation" transformational generative grammar, is its treatment 
of the word as the central unit of morphological description. Words, 
according to the word-based theory, are not derived by concatenatidg 
morphemes with each other, as Halle's morpheme-based theory proposes, I 
but by the addition of morphemes to words. Words only function as the 
base of word-formation rules, and they alone may be listed in the 
dictionary in the word-based theory. According to the word-based theory, 
the word, and not the morpheme, is treated as the minimal meaningful 
entity. Aronoff (1976: 14) states that the "hypothesis that morphemes 
are the 'minimal meaningful elements of language' cannot be maintained 
even in any of its most contorted variants. In many cases this role of 
minimal sign must be moved one level up, to the level of the word. The 
sign gravitates to the word". 
As has been mentioned in section 6.4.3.1 not all words are listed 
in the dictibnary. This feature of the word-based theory is referred to 
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as - the Partial Listing I-jypothesis'by Carrier (1979). In terms of this 
ri hypothesis, only words that are entered in the dictionary can function 
as the base of word-formation rules. Carrier (ibid. ) criticises this 
feature of the word-based theory on two grounds. First, she points out 
that, contrary to what the word-based theory asserts, unlisted words 
may serve as the base for word formation rules; for example, the 
unlisted word formless serves as the base for the 
#-Ress suffixation 
word-formation rule in the word-based theory. By implication, this 
means that the word-based theory cannot adequately account for the 
semantic import of word-formation rules that operate on bases which are 
not listed in the lexicon (cf. section 6.4.3.2.1). , Secondly, Carrier 
points out that, by adhering to the Partial ýisting Hypothesis, the 
word-based theory cannot adequately account for the phenomenon of 
0 
semantic drift in languages. According to the word-based theory, 
semantic drift occurs as a result of the accumulation of idiosyncratic 
information in the entries of words listed in the dictionary. However, 
because not all words are listed in the dictionary,, in the word-based 
theory, this theory cannot explain how words that are not listed in the 
dictionary acquire idiosyncratic information and, therefore, drift semantically. 
By treating the 'word' as the basic and central unit of morphological 
description, to which word-formation rules apply, the word-based theory 
fails to account for the morphological compositionality, thought by the 
majority of transformationalists to be characteristic of the class of 
prefix-stem verbs in English, e. g. perceiv , conceive, 'pertain, contain, 
permit, transmit, confer, transfer etc. According to transformationa lists, , 
for example Halle (1973) and jackendoff (1975), the morphological 
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compositionality of the words in this class of verbs reflects the 
knowledge the native speakers of English have about words in their 
language. In terms of this generally held view in transformational 
grammar, the word-based theory may be said to lead to the setting up 
of grammatical descriptions that lack descriptive adequacy. 
The treatment of words in the class of prefix-stem verb s as 
simple, unanalysable lexical* items is in keeping with the view, adopted 
by the word-based theory, that words are formed not by concatenating 
morphemes with each other, but by attaching morphemes to words. 
Strictly speaking, this view is only synthetically relevant (c. f. section 
6.4.3.2). From the analytic viewpoint, words in the class of prefix=stem 
verbs may be said to be morphologically complex and, therefore, to be 
analysable into morphemes. In other words, it may be said that, from 
the analytical point of view, the class of prefix-stem verbs in English 
exhibit a certain degree of lexical redundancy, which an adequate theory 
of word-formation must be able to account for. By virtue of the fact that 
the word-based theory treats the word as the basic and central lexical 
unit, and by virtue of the fact that word-formation rules, In both their 
synthetic and analytic capacity, operate on words, and not morphemes, 
the word-based theory cannot account for the lexical redundancy 
characteristic of the class of prefix-stem verbs in English. This seems 
to indicate that a, more adequate treatment of productive word-formation 
processes must distinguish, in terms of the rule-apparatus it provides, 
between the synthetic aspect of word-formation and the analytic one. 
Whereas the former may be dealt with by means of word-formation rules 
I operating on words, the latter may be accounted for by means of 
word-formation rules operating on morphemes. 
0 
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In a typically transformational ist fashion, Aronoff does not 
offer any explicit definition of the main notions and units utilised in 
his theory. He offers very little discussion of the nature of word-formation 
phenomena, and of the basis of the distinction between these phenomena, 
on the one hand, and the phenomena of inflection and compounding, on 
the other. The concept of productivity, which is so crucial for the 
word-based theory, is not discussed at all by Aronoff. The net-result 
of this is that the outsider is left groping in the dark as to the precise 
scope of the word-based theory. 
Aronoff's delimitation of the word as the minimal meaningful 
entity in the language is contradicted by the fact that some words are 
said to be semantically compositional, e. g. driver. This implies that 
such words consist of smaller meaningful grammatical entities and, 
therefore, cannot be consistently said to be minimal meaningful grammatical 
units themselves. Clearly, the word-based theory faces a dilemma with 
respect to the above delimitation of the 'word'. If the word-based theory 
insists on regarding the condition of 'being minimal' as a defining feature 
of the word, then all grammatical units which satisfy this condition, 
including those that are considered as morphemes by Aronoff, e. g. - er 
in driver, must be established as words. If, however, the condition of 
"being minimal" is dropped as a defining feature of the word, then not only 
all meaningful morphemes, but also other types of grammatical units, e. g. 
sentences, may perhaps be established as words. Clearly, the concept 
of 'word' in the word-based theory is a highly problematic one from the 
logical point of view. 
Aronoff's delimitation of the 'morpheme' is of an operationally- 
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orientated nature. '_ The notion morpheme, in the word-based theory, is 
said to refer'to the clas's of 'entities' which I result from the phonological 
i 
operations performed by word-formation rules on the set of bases In the 
language. In other words, the morphemes in a language are those entities 
which only appear on the right-hand side of a word-formation rule in a 
grammar of that language. 
Though the 'word' is said to occupy a central place in the 
word-based theory, the 'morpheme' still plays a very important role in 
the rule-apparatus of this theory. The centrality of the word is part and 
parcel of the central place assigned to word-formation rules in the 
word-based theory. However, the set of truncation and allomorphy rules 
operate on morphemes, and not words. Some truncation rules operate on 
morphemes which do not seem to appear anywhere in the grammar to the 
right of the arrow of word-formation rules, e. g. the truncation rule which 
deletes the morpheme - ate in nominate and evacuate in the environment 
(54) 
of the suffix +ee (c. f. section 6.4.3.3.1). If entities of this type are 
to be . regarded as morphemes, then this amounts to an admission that the 
above-mentioned characterisation of the morpheme is not adequate enough 
for the purposes of the word-based theory. If, however, the above-mentioned 
characterisation of the morpheme is to be kept, then entities of the above 
type cannot, logically speaking, be regarded as morphemes. But, if 
entities of i the above type cannot be properly regarded as morphemes, then 
it follows that no truncation rules can operate on them, and, consequently, 
the word-based theory cannot, as it stands, be said to have an appropriate 
procedure for dealing with the derivation of such words as nominee and 
evacuee. Obviously, the concept of 'morpheme', like the 'word' concept, 
is a highly problematic one in the word-based theory. 
323 
It has been previously mentioned that the function of truncation 
rules is to delete morphemes in the context of other morphemes. These 
rules are of crucial importance for the proper functioning of the word-based 
theory, i. e. for its ability to generate the set of derived words in a 
language. Truncation rules are extremely powerful devices, whose 
incorporation in the word-based theory enables it to deal with any type 
of word-formation phenomena, no matter how recalcitrant those phenomena 
are. Carrier (1979) regards this property of truncation rules as one of 
the negative features of the word-based theory, from the viewpoint of 
empirical refutation. She points out that it is very difficult, if not 
actually impossible, to provide, or imagine, any linguistic evidence 
which can be adduced to challenge the empirical, descriptive value of 
the word-based theory, as a result of the incorporation of truncation 
rules in this theory. This boils down to saying that the employment of 
truncation rules leads to the immunisation of the word-based theory. 
From the cognitive point of view, truncation rules appear to be 
no more than ad hoc, or artificial, grammatical devices whose purposes 
is to enable the word-based theory to deal with word-formation phenomena 
in a theoretically pre-determined manner. Without such rules, the 
application of word-formation rules to certain classes of bases, in the 
word-based theory, would lead to the generation of entities that fail to 
satisfy the conditions of well-formedness and acceptability to native 
speakers, e. g. *nominatee and *evacuatee. 
Ad hocness, or artificiality, also characterises Aronoff's 
treatment of *croach and *wilder, in encroachment and bewilderment 
respectively, as the base for the ment suffixation word-formation rule 
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(cf. f. section 6.4.3.2.2). By virtue of the fact that word-formation 
rules apply only to words, the application of the above rule to the items 
*croach and *wilder implies that these items are words in English. 
However, the assignment of word-status, albeit implicitly, to the items 
*croach and *wilder is not only empirically false, but is also inconsistent 
in terms of the word-based theory itself. From the empirical point of 
view, these items cannot, be said to function as legitimate words in 
English. 
_And 
from the point of view of the word-based theory itself, 
these items do not satisfy one of the conditions this theory imposes on 
words, namely that they be meaningful. On the basis of this, it may be 
concluded that the items *croach and *wilder are no more than abstract, 
lexical elements which cannot qualify for treatment as the base for 
word-formation rules, under the word-based theory. But, If *croach 
and *wilder are not treated as words in English, then the 7+ ment 
suffixation word-formation rule cannot apply to them, thus causing the 
word-based theory to miss the observationally significant generalisation 
that ment, in encroachment and bewilderment, is the same morpheme as 
ment in, say, statement or involvement, ' which is added to the set of 
words state and involve by the above word-formation rule. To account 
for this generalisation, with respect to the words encroachment and 
bewilderment, Aronoff adopts a solution which violates the condition that 
words only can function as the base for word-formation rules. Insofar 
as this solution is not in keeping with a basic principle of the word-based 
theory, it is inconsistent. And insofar as it requires the employment of 
abstract, lexical items it is an 
_ad 
hoc and artificial one. It also 
violates the prohibition on utilising abstract entities in the grammar, 
advocated by Aronoff. 
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6.5 "Remarks On Nominal isation" Period: An Overview 
Chomsky'd article "Remarks on Nominalisation" (1970), which 
proposes a more enriched lexicon than the one suggested in Aspects, has 
- left in its wake a* great deal of interest in morphological phenomena. 
Halle's morpheme-based theory, jackendoff's full-entry theory, and the 
word-based theory of Aronoff represent this resurgence of interest in 
morphology in transformational generative grammar. However, these 
I 
three theories propose radically different views concerning the treatment 
of morphological phenomena in a lexicalist framework of the- type 
suggested by Chomsky in "Remarks" (ibid. ). They also differ from each 
other with regard to their respective scopes. The main differences 
between these three theories may be summed up in the scheme on the 
following page. 
7. Productivity 
A distinction is made in modern linguistics between the concepts 
of 'productivity' and 'creativity' with respect to the grammatical portion 
oflanguage. Lyons (1977: 76) characterises productivity as "the property 
of the language-system which enables native speakers to construct and 
understand an indefinitely large number of utterances, including 
utterances that they have never previously encountered". The novelty of 
such utterances is said to be different from that of utterances that are 
characterised by "originality of style" (ibid: 77). Lyons (ibid. ) reserves 
the term "creativity" to refer to this type of 'originality' or 'novelty'. 
Bauer (1983: 63) characterises creativity as the "native speaker's ability 
to extend the lanýuage, system in a motivated, but unpredictable (non-rule- 
governed) way". Ina similar fashion, Uhlenbeck (n. d. (b): 166) reserves 
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the term creativity in morphology "for those cases in which a speaker 
makes new words on the basis of improductive formations"-, 
(56) 
Formations of this type are not normally extensively dealt with in 
morphological studies, due to the fact that they do not lend themselves 
to treatment in terms of general rules, in a wide sense of the term frule'. 
It is generally recognised that the concept of productivity is 
"indispensable in the study of morphology" (Uhlenbeck n. d. (b): 166). 
Uhlenbeck (ibid. ) further adds that in "all morphological research, 
diachronically or synchronically motivated, it is considered to be of 
prime importance to determine what is productive and what is not". 
Bauer (1983) expresses more or less the same view. He (ibid: 63) points 
out that the "productivity of word-formation 
I. e. derivation and 
compounding 
I can be taken as a fact which any theory of word-formation 
will be called upon to explain". He (ibid. ) supports this claim by the 
fact that the "productivity of word-formation has, over the centuries, 
been a major factor in providing the huge vocabulary of English, and the 
fact that the process of creating new lexemes with new forms has not 
II faded out can be seen by consulting a dictionary of neologisms .00, 
Prior to the introduction of transformational generative grammar on 
the scene of modern linguistics, the concept of productivity received 
very little attention from the dominant neo-Bloomfieldian school of 
linguistics. 
(57) 
The general attitude of the neo-Bloomfieldians towards 
productivity may be illustrated by the view held by Harris. He (1951: 25S) 
points out that the "methods of descriptive linguistics cannot treat of the 
productivity of elements since that is a measure of the difference -between 
one corpus and some future corpus'of the language". This view of 
328 
productivity seems to be based on a strict and corpus -orientated 
Interpretation of the synchrony versus diachrony distinction. This may 
be explained by noting that the strict adherence to the notion of closed 
corpus in'neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics restricts the scope of descriptive 
statements to observed and attested elements only, thus prohibiting any 
generalisations or descriptive statements which project outside the 
scope of the corpus concerned to unattested elements or forms. 
Furthermore, any such projection would be regarded as unwarranted in 
synchronic linguistics, due to the fact that it establishes a relationship 
between the synchronic state. to which the corpus of attested forms belong, 
and a future one in which the potential, but unattested, forms, may be 
manifested. Now, since the relationship between the two corpora 
concerned involves a temporal factor, this relationship - which embodies 
the domain of the notion of productivity - cannot be dealt with in 
synchronic linguistics. 
The advent of transformational generative grammar on the scene,, , 
of linguistic studies in America changed. this situation radically. . 
Transformationalists, e. g. Chomsky (1965). Lees (1966), -, Iialle (1973), 
jackendoff (1975) and Aronoff (1976), went beyond the stage of just merely 
recognising 'productivity' as one of the design features of languages, to 
that of setting up grammars, or frameworks for such grammars, which aim 
to 'explain' this property. The aim of this section is to give a very brief 
discussion of this notion in transformational generative grammar. 
The term productivity is employed in transformational grammar in 
both a pre-theoretical and a post-theoretical sense. In its pre-theoretical 
sense, productivity designates a particular charact6hStic or feature of 
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grammatical processes, whether syntactic or morphological. In its 
post-theoretical sense, this term designates a particular feature of, 
grammatical rules in a transformational grammar, whether these rules 
are syntactic or morphological. The term "particular" in the above two 
explanations reflects the vagueness present in the transformationa list 
position concerning the exact interpretation of productivity. As Botha 
(1968: 128) states, the concept of productivity "lacks both the immediate 
intelligibility of a pre-theoretical notion and the explicit specification of 
meta -theoretical one". 
It is also clear from the transformational ist literature that 
transformational ists operate in terms of "varying degrees of productivity" 
in grammars (Chomsky 1965: 187). However, while Chomsky distinguishes 
between "productive" processes (ibid: 184) and "quasi-" or "marginally 
productive" ones (ibid: 184,187), other trans formational ists , e. g. Zimmer 
(1964) and Lees (1966), operate in terms of a more elaborate scale of 
productivity, 
(58) 
without, however, clearly specifying the content of every 
productivity step on this scale. In other words, while it is the case that 
transformationalists operate in terms of different degrees of 'productivity, 
it is not at all clear what criteria they adopt to isolate the different degrees 
of productivity from each other. Furthermore, it is not clear how these 
different degrees of productivity are to be reflected in the rules of a 
transformational generative grammar, particularly those dealing with 
grammatical processes that are not f ully- productive. 
There is a strong relationship in transformational grammar between 
the concept of productivity (in the post-theoretical sense), on the one 
hand, and, the concepts of 'competence' and 'grammatical ity', on the 'other. 
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This relationship follows from the fact that transformational generative 
grammar has as one of its main aims the construction of grammars that 
I characterise' the native speaker's competence and the generation of all 
and only the set of grammatical sentences in a language. Moreover, 
since performance is the converse of competence, and since acceptability, 
which is relevant to performance only, is the opposite of grammaticality, 
it readily follows that productivity cannot be delimited with reference to 
factors relevant to linguistic performance, nor can it be evaluated in terms 
of acceptability judgements elicited from ordinary non-ideal native 
s pea kers -hearers. 
According to the Aspects model, competence may be chara6terised 
as the ideal speaker-listener's knowledge of his language. More 
'precisely' expressed, competence is the linguistic knowledge of "an 
ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who 
knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically 
irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of 
attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying 
his knowledge of the language in actual performance" (Chomsky 1965: 3). 
As far as grammaticality is concerned, a given entity is said to be 
grammatical if it is generated by a grammar constructed in accordance 
with Chomsky's transformationalist theory. A grammar of this type is 
required to explain the primary data of linguistic utterances which fall 
within its own scope and, also, the ideal native speaker-listener's 
intuitions about his language. 
Notwithstanding the brevity of the above explanations of the 
concepts '6ompetence' and 'grammaticality', we have now reached a stage 
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in our exposition whereby we can examine more closely the nature of 
the relationship between these two concepts and the concept of 
productivity. In view of the fact that these three concepts are intimately- 
linked with each other, it follows that if it can be established that 
transformational generative grammar provides an, empirically acceptable 
specification of the concepts 'competence' and 'grammaticality', then it 
may be justifiably claimed that - despite the fact that the concept 
'productivity' in the meta -theoretical sense is not an intrinsically well- 
defined one - the nature of the relationship between 'productivity" and the 
other two concepts is 'sufficiently' well-defined to allow the tra nsformationa list 
to employ this concept without any excessive loss of precision. If, 
however, the afore-mentioned situation does not obtain for the concepts 
'competence' and 'grammaticality', then it follows that transformational ists 
would not, scientifically speaking, be justified in treating the concept 
$productivity' as a 'sufficiently' well-defined one in their approach. 
That the empirical content of the concept competence is not well- 
defined in transformational grammar will be dealt with, albeit implicitly, 
in the next section. Suffice it to say here that, one of the major 
difficulties in specifying competence precisely is the fact that it is 
predicated of an 'abstract construct' thrice-removed from the world of 
actual speech-events. This 'abstract construct' is the so-called "ideal 
speaker-listener", and 'he' is thrice-removed from 'reality' by virtue, of 
the fact that (a) 'he' is part of a "completely homogeneous speech- 
community"; (b) 'he' knows the language of this speech community 
"perfectly"; and, (c) 'he' is totally unaffected by considerations pertaining 
to linguistic performance. As a native speaker, the "ideal native speaker- 
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listener" is, in the last analysis, a 'myth' created by Chomsky as a 
repository for the "linguistic knowledge" which Chomsky seeks to 
establish as relevant for a given language. And as an 'abstract 
construct', the "ideal native speaker-listener" of a language X is 
essentially what Chomsky would establish as the 'linguistic competence' 
of language X. Put jocularly, the "ideal native speaker-listener" of 
language X in transformational grammar is normally none other than the 
trans format iona list linguist who happens to be dealing with language X 
at a given moment in time. The same also goes for the linguistic 
competence of the "ideal native speaker-listener" of language X; this 
competence is essentially nothing more than the introspectively perceived 
competence of the transformational ist linguist who happens to be dealing 
with language X at a particular moment in time. 
However, recent tra nsformationa list literature, for example Halle 
(1973), jackendoff (1975) and Aronoff (1976), suggests that 
transformationalists appear to have abandoned the notion of the "ideal 
(59) 
speaker-listener" in favour of the, or a, native speaker-hearer or 
native speakers in dealing with a given language. This is obvious from 
the fact that no mention of the "ideal speaker-listener" is given in these 
works and others we have consulted in the course of writing this thesis. 
Clearly, this change in transformational grammar necessitates a change 
in the traditional transformationalist characterisation of the concept 
#competence', particularly in the context of the notion 'native speakers 
mentioned above, 
(60) 
and in the methodology for testing transformat iona list 
grammars. It is the lack of such a methodology in transformational 
generative grammar, whether in the context of the "ideal -speaker-listener" 
or any variation on this notion that has been mentioned above, which 
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underlies our view that this theory does not succeed in its task of 
unfolding the content of the notion competence in an empirically testable 
fashion. 
The same situation holds for the transformational ist concept 
'grammaticality'. To support this situation, we can do nothing better 
than to quote Chomsky himself. In the first chapter of Aspects of the 
Theory of Synta (1965), Chomsky (p. 11) states: 
"The notion $acceptable' is not to be confused 
with 'grammatical'. Acceptability is a concept that 
belongs to the study of performance, whereas 
grammaticalness belongs to the study of competence. 
*00 Like acceptability, grammaticalness is, no doubt, 
a matter of degree ( ... 
), but the scales of 
grammaticalness and acceptability do not co-incide. 
Grammaticalness is only one of the many factors that 
interact to determine acceptability. Correspondingly, 
although one might propose various operational tests 
for acceptability, it is unlikely that a necessary and 
sufficient operational criterion might be invented for the 
much more abstract and far more important notion of 
grammaticalness. The unacceptable grammatical 
sentences often cannot be used, for reasons having to 
do not with grammar, but with memory limitations, 
intonational and stylistic factors, "iconic elements of 
discourse (for example, a tendency to place logical 
subject and object early rather than late; and 
so on" I emphasis ours I- 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may be concluded 
that the concept 'productivity', by virtue of being intimate I y-I inked with 
the concepts 'competence' and 'grammaticality', cannot be said to be 
specified in a fabhion which lends itself to empirically rigorous testing. 
Consequently, whether such entities as 'book-liker' (Lees, 1966), 
'puppy-cat' (Zimmer, 1964), 'ant-man' and 'tissue-man' (jackendoff, ; 975), 
which are unattested elements in English, are grammatical or not, is not 
a matter which can be decided by the application of a -rigorous procedure 
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for empirical testing. However, the possibility of such a procedure 
being developed in the future . cannot, logically speaking, be ruled out. 
8. Morphology In Transformational Generative Grammar: The 
Methodological And Epistemological Foundations 
1 -Introduction 
The aim of the following two sections is to give a brief 
discussion of the two related- issues of the methodological and 
epistemological foundations of Chomskyan transformational theories and 
grammars, and, by implication, transformational generative morphology. 
This is a particularly difficult and tricky task. While it can be 
ascertained with- confidence that transformational generative grammar 
establishes a distinction of some sort between the theory and the grammars 
which result from its application to languages, and while this distinction 
can be said to be a salient feature of this approach, there is, however, 
very little discussion of the methodological foundations of Chomskyan 
transformational theories. And whatever discussion there is, it does not 
go beyond indicating that such theories are 'non-inductivist' (Katz and 
Bever 1977) and 'falsificationist' (Botha 1980). However, such indications 
cannot be reasonably said to offer a fully-fledged and explicit statement 
of the issue under consideration here., 
On the one hand, the claim that Chomskyan linguistics is 
non-inductivist does not necessarily mean that it is deductivist in nature. 
This springs from the fact that- induction and deduction are not, in absolute 
terms, exact opposites. Whereas it is legitimate to oppose an inductively 
based conclusion to a deductively-based one, it is not legitimate to oppose 
an inductive theory to a deductive one, due to the fact that 'induction' in 
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the context of inductivist theories refers to the mode in which the theory 
is arrived at, while deduction in the context of deductive theories refers 
tIo the organisation of such theories as'bodies of theoretical statements. 
On the basis of this, we may say that the claim that transformational 
generative grammar is non-inductivist is no more than an assertion to -the 
effect that this theory lacks any logical source or origin. In other words, 
this claim is no more than a statement of a Hjelmslevean view that 
transformational generative grammar is 'arbitrary' in nature, i. e. a-realistic. 
On the other hand, the claim that Chomskyan transformational 
generative theories are falsificationist in nature is, according to the 
framework given in Chapter I, a claim about the epistemological - 
foundations of such theories, and not their methodological underlying 
principles. In addition to this, the above claim is, as shall be shown 
below, neither entirely historically accurate, nor empirically and logically 
warranted. 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may be said that a 
theory in transformational generative grammar - and I exclude any 
evaluation criteria which may be associated with such a theory here - is 
no more than an assemblage of loosely connected statements which lack 
any logical source or origin. However, whether such statements are 
empirical hypotheses in the real sense of the term is properly decidable 
only by an investigation of the epistemological foundations of 
transformational generative grammar. 
There are three major sources of difficulty when dealing with the 
epistemological foundations of Chomskyan transformational theories and 
the grammars based upon them. First, Chomsky does not hold a constant 
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position concerning the issue under consideration here. While he 
holds an instrumentalist position concerning grammars and the theory 
they presuppose in the early'stages of transformational generative 
grammar, he advocates a realist-mentalist view of the nature of these 
constructs in later stages, particularly since the publication of Aspects of 
the Theory of Syntax (1965). This radical shift in Chomsky's position is 
hardly recognised in the literature. The only notable exception to this is 
Steinberg (1975). 
Second, transformational generative grammar is no longer the 
unified theory it used to be in the late fifties and early sixties. The 
following statements from Katz, Bever and Langendoen (1977: 1), three 
of the major figures in the transformationalist movement, -support this 
conclus ion: 
"In the late 1960s and early 1970s, generative 
grammar changed from a stable subject with a unified 
theory, called the 'standard theory', ..., to a less 
than stable one with a number of different and 
conflicting theories". 
and, 
11 00* almost all generative grammarians view the 
overall condition of their field with some dismay. 
The proliferation of diverse theories, they can agree, 
is not a state of affairs in which the field can take pride". 
The proliferation of theories in the transformationalist movement 
brought with it varying formulations of the epistemological foundations of 
transformational generative grammar. This situation may be illustrated 
from the field of morphology. For example, while Chomsky (1965,1970), 
Halle (1973) and Lees (1966) advocate an essentially realist-mentalist 
interpretation of their theories- and the grammars based upon them, 
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Aronoff (1976) shows some hesitation in committing himself to such an 
interpretation of his word-based theory of word-formation, and, by 
implication, the grammars based on it. 
Third, transformationalist linguists who advocate a mentalist 
interpretation of transformationalist theories and grammars do not always 
present their views on this matter in a fully explicit and precise manner. 
Botha (1968: 110), after a lengthy discussion of the mentalist nature of 
transformational generative grammar, comes to the conclusion that "while 
it is clear that Chomsky takes a realistic view of the cognitive status of 
transformational linguistic theories, it is not equally clear from his views 
.1 
on mentalism to what reality these theories refer". However, the 
clearest, and, perhaps, the strongest, statement of the empirical content 
of the mentalist claims in transformational generative grammar is provided 
by Katz (1964). He (ibid: 133) states: 
"Every aspect of the mentalist theory involves I 
psychological reality. The linguistic description and 
the procedures of sentence production and cognition 
must correspond to independent mechanisms in the 
brain. Componential distinctions between the syntactic, 
phonological and semantic components must rest on 
relevant differences between three neutral sub-mechanisms 
of the mechanism which stores the linguistic descriptions. 
The rules of each component must have their psychological 
reality in the input-output operations of the computing 
machinery of this mechanism. The ordering of rules 
within a component must, contrary to the claims of 
Bloomfield and many others, have its psychological 
reality in those features of the computing machinery which 
group such input-output operation and make the performance 
of operations in one group a pre-condition for those in 
another to be performed". 
8.2 The Instrumentalist Nature Of Early Transformational Generative G-, ammar. - 
As a point of reference, I shall characterise a fully-mentalist 
linguistic theory as a theory which attributes psychological reality to all 
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aspects and constructs which it incorporates. Similarly, a fully- 
mentalist grammar may be characterised as a grammar which attributes 
psychological reality to all constructs and aspects it establishes for 
the language it aims to account for. Considered from this point of 
view, Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957), and the grammars býsed 
on it, cannot be legitimately said to be properly mentalist in character. 
The aim of this section is to expound this point briefly, and to show that 
early transformational generative grammar is essentially instrumentalist 
in nature. 
Chomsky's transformational generative model in Syntactic 
Structures may be legitimately considered as a "device" or a "leading 
principle", in terms of which, but not from which, statements about the 
universe of phenomena which lie within its own scope can be formulated. 
Put differently, Chomsky's Syntactic Structures model may be regarded as 
an instrument for yielding grammars of certain classes of phenomena, but 
it does not - and Chomsky would not disagree with this - describe any' 
psychological reality of the phenomenon that is human language. 
By implication, grammars based on this model cannot be said to 
be mentalist in the sense specified above. This, however, does not 
amount to a denial of the fact that grammars of this type may have 
'psychological significance, but only in the sense that their outputs 
correspon to intuitions of grammaticality or 'sentence-hood' displayed 
by native speakers. In other words, insofar as intuitions of grammaticality 
and other linguistically relevant issues, for example structural ambiguity 
and synonymy, are psychological in nature, and insofar as Syntactic 
Structures-type grammars may provide 'explanations$ or @accounts' 
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which purport to accord with such intuitions, grammars of this type, 
and, by implication, the model upon which they are based, may be said 
to have psychological significance. 
But, as has been implied above, to say that a grammar and the 
theory it is based upon are psychologically significant is fundamentally 
different from saying that these constructs are psychologically real. 
As a matter of fact, the psychological significance of grammars and 
theories in the sense outlined above is, strictly speaking, 
epistemologically trivial, since any grammar and the theoretical model 
it presupposes must be able to achieve this ideal if they are to be 
legitimately regarded as proper constructs of their own type. 
The condition of psychological significance for Syntactic 
Structures-type grammars, and the model they are based upon, is not 
incompatible with a non-realist interpretation of such constructs. Nor 
is such an interpretation inconsistent with a non-realist interpretation of 
falsificationism. This situation may be illustrated by the help of an 
analogy. Consider a pocket calculator as if it were a theory about a 
particular aspect of human mathematical ability or knowledge. The fact 
that the calculator can provide answers of a particular type which are 
required to correspond to the. answers provided by persons utilising their 
"internalised" mathematical ability or knowledge - of which the calculator 
is said to be a theory - may be said to lend justification to the claim that 
the calculator is both psychologically significant and falsificationist. 
It is falsificationist - the legitimacy of this claim will be dealt with later - 
in the sense that the accuracy of its output can be assessed against 
evidence provided on the basis of judgements'by human beings. And it is 
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psychologically significant in the sense that it leads to predictions 
which can be shown to accord with judgements provided by human 
beings utilising their mathematical apparatus or knowledge. However, 
these two related properties cannot serve as a valid basis for the 
conclusion that the calculator, as a theory in the above sense, is 
psychologically real, since it cannot be legitimately argued that the 
calculator, either in terms of. its internal construction, or in terms of its 
mode of operation, reflects the internal structure or inner workings of the 
relevant part of the brain. 
Similarly, the fact that the Syntactic Structures model and the 
grammars it may lead to are said to be psychologically significant and 
falsificationist does not necessarily mean that these constructs are 
psychologically real. Moreover, in the same manner that a calculator 
as a theory has the status of an instrument, early transformational grammar 
and the grammars it may yield are instrumentalist in nature. 
The claim as to the faIsificationist nature of the Syntactic 
Structures model and the grammars based on it requires further elaboration. 
This property appears to clash with the instrumentalist nature of the 
afore-mentioned constructs. But this clash is more apparent than real'. 
Falsifications in the context of the Syntactic Structures model do not 
directly pertain to the content of this model, but to its appropriateness as 
a descriptive instrument. In other words, the content of the Syntactic 
Structures model cannot be directly harmed by empirical data, but its 
I 
appropriateness or applicability can. Similarly, falsifications in the 
context of grammars do not, in any significant sense, apply to the content 
of such grammars, but to the accuracy of their outputs or predications, 
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which is judged in terms of their correspondence to judgements of 
sentence-hood provided by native speakers. 
However, it is highly dubious that the Syntactic Structures model 
and the grammars it yields can be legitimately said to be properly 
falsificationist even under the above interpretation of falsificationism. 
This follows from the fact that transformational generative grammar fails 
to offer any independent procedure for eliciting native speakers intuition 
about 'sentence-hood' in their language in a methodologically reliable 
fashion. 
On the basis of what has been said above it may be concluded 
that early transformational grammar is instrumentalist in nature. The 
claim that it is also falsificationist, under the above interpretation of 
wbat may be called, for the lack of a better term, instrumentalist 
falsificationism, does not seem to be entirely justifiable, due to the 
lack of an independent procedure for obtaining information about native 
speakers intuitions in a reliable fashion. 
8.3ý The Realist Nature Of Transformational Generative Grammar: 
Harris is responsible for the application of transformations in 
linguistics, though he treats them as operations for relating sentence 
forms in linguistic descriptions. Harris does not consider transformations 
as psychologically real operations, but he treats them as mathematical 
formulae whose sole justification derives from their suitability as tools 
in linguistic descriptions. In this sense, Harris' transformations are 
basically of the same epistemological nature as Chomsky's transformations 
in Syntactic Structures. 
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However, the epistemological status of transformations as one 
type of grammatical rule in transformational generative grammar has 
undergone a major transformation around the time of the publication of * 
Aspects of the TheoEy of Syntax (1965). This shift from-an instrumentalist 
interpretation of transformations to a realist one is regarded by Katz and 
Bever (1977) as one of the most important features of what Searle (1974) 
dubbed the " Chomskyan revolution". According to Katz and Bever (ibid: 18) 
"Chomsky's revolution in linguistics consist Es I in developing a rationalist 
and mentalist interpretation of the same formal transformational model that 
Harris developed]". 
_E In the transformationalist movement, 'rationalism' and 'mentalism' 
are normally opposed to 'empiricism' and 'behaviourism, respectively. 
'Rationalism' and 'empiricism' pertain to the theory of knowledge, and the 
difference between them, at least as this difference is often conceived of 
by transformational ists, may be characterised as follows. While 
empiricism asserts that knowledge is acquired by a process of inductive 
generalisation from experiences, rationalism asserts that knowledge 
"comes not from experience but from innate schemata" (ibid: 23). Moreover, 
while_empiricism expresses the view that the only valid'innate mental - 
principle is the principle of inductive generalisation, rationalism holds 
that the "content of our knowledge is fixed as a biological disposition of 
our minds, and that "the function of experience is simply to activate 
this disposition and thereby cause the innate schemata to be realised and 
differentiated" (ibid. ). 
'Behaviourism' and 'mentalism' are opposed to each other in the 
following way. Behaviourism holds that human behaviour, whether 
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linguistic or not, can be accounted for in a mechanical and, perhaps, 
causal manner, without any recourse to such constructs as 'ideas', 
#mental states' and 'thought processes'. Mentalism holds that human 
behaviour can be adequately accounted for only by reference to such 
things as mental states, ideas and thought processes. 
Katz and Bever (ibid: ' 12) states that "Chomskyan transformatfonal 
theory is rationalist because it allows for unobservable grammatical 
properties to be stated as part of the rules of the linguistic theory about 
the speaker's internalised linguistic competence". It is also rationalist 
because it views language, as knowledge, as the "innate schemata" 
which is genetically transmitted, and which is activated by 'experience' 
in the process of acquiring a language. IYansformational theory and the 
grammars based on it are mentalist because they attribute psychological 
reality to the theoretical constructs they incorporate. The relation 
between the constructs in the theory and all its aspects and mental 
reality are, under this view, a remote, but definite one. 
The rationalist-and mentalist features of transformational 
generative grammar are thought to lead to another defining property of 
this approach, namely the property of being falsificationist. The 
implication of this property is that all aspects of a Chomskyan 
transformational theory and grammar are open to empirical refutation by ý 
confronting them with their test implications. The aim of this section is 
to show that the conditions for empirical refutability are not satisfactorily 
met by theories and grammars of the Chomskyan type. 
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For Chomskyan transformational theories and grammars, whether 
morphological or not, to be legitimately falsificationist, it must be the 
case that they are (a) precisely and explicitly defined, and (b) 
methodologically feasible, i. e. they must define states of affairs which 
are accessible to direct or indirect empirical investigation. Vie second 
condition bolls down to saying that Chomskyan transformational theories 
and grammars must specify, or make reference to, independent 
methodological procedures for refuting their test implications by showing 
that the states of affairs they define do not exhibit the properties 
attributed to them. 
The previous discussion of Chomskyan morphological theories 
shows that the first condition is not fully- satisfied. This conclusion 
may be illustrated by the fact that such important notions as 'word', 
'morpheme', 'formative', 'inflection' and 'derivation' are not well-defined 
in this branch of transformational generative grammar, despite the fact 
that many aspects of these theories are formulated in terms of these notions. 
Nor is the second condition mentioned above fully-satisfied. It 
is a commonplace of modern discussions of the epistemological foundations 
of Chomskyan transformational theories and grammars (Botha 1968,1980; 
Dik 1967; Steinberg 1975, Stich 1972) that transformational generative 
grammar fails to specify a methodological procedure to be applied in the 
falsification of their test implications. It is also not obvious how-such 
a procedure can be provided while still keeping the skulls of native 
speakers intact, or their brains undamaged while scanning them with 
powerful and harmful X-ray techniques. It may, however, be suggested 
that a modelling technique, similar to the one adopted by the 
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stratificationalists (Chapter II S. 4. ý) may be employed to carry out the 
above task. But such a technique would be unwarranted, for very much 
the same reasons as those outlined there. 
On the basis of what has been said above, Chomskyan 
transformational theories and grammars cannot be legitimately said to be 
properly falsificationist in character. This, of course, implies that 
such theories and grammars dre, from the Popperian point of view 
(c. f. Chapter I, Section 3.9.4), metaphysical constructs and, therefore, 
cannot be legitimately said to be proper mental ist-realis t theories and 
grammars. 
But, even if, for the sake of the argument, we ignore the above 
demonstration that Chomskyan trans formational theories and grammars are 
not legitimately mental ist-realis t in character, this conclusion may be 
arrived at from a different angle. For a given theory or grammar to be 
fully mentalist, everything in the theory or grammar concerned must refer 
to a psychological reality. This involves the grammatical rules, the 
lexical items, the componential organisation of a grammar, the derivations 
from deep structure to surface structure in the characterisation of 
competence in a grammar, and the output of a grammar. This interpretation 
of mentalism is essentially the same as that advocated by Katz (1964) and 
referred to in section (7.1) above. 
That this characterisation of mentalism is not always adhered to 
in Chomskyan transformational theory is obvious from the employment in 
morphology of such ad hoc notions as 'hypothetical verbs' (c. f. Section 
4.2.2) and the device of 
[. 
-Lexical Insertion] in Halle's morpheme-base 
.d 
theory (c. f. Section 6.2.1). It is also clear from the fact that Chomsky 
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(1965) refrains from assigning a mentalist correlate for competence 
derivations in a grammar. He (ibid: 9) writes: 
" EA generative grammar] attempts to characterise 
in the most neutral possible terms the knowledge of 
the language that provides the basis for actual use of 
language by a speaker-hearer. When we speak of a 
grammar as generating a sentence with a certain 
structural description, we mean simply that the grammar 
assigns this structural description to the sentence. 
When we say that a sentence has a derivation with 
respect to a particular generative grammar, we say 
nothing about how the speaker or hearer might proceed, 
in some practical or efficient way, to construct such a 
derivation. These questions belong to the theory of 
language use - the theory of performance". 
It is obvious from What has been said above that Chomskyan 
transformational theories and grammars are allowed to include non- 
mentalist, instrumentalist notions. The incorporation of such notions 
in constructs which purport to be mentalist in nature shows that such 
constructs, i. e. theories or grammars, cannot be legitimately said to be 
fully mentalist, in the sense outlined above. From the epistemological 
point of view, such constructs are eclectic in nature, i. e. - they are 
neither fully mentalist - assuming, of course, that they can be shown to 
be so - nor fully instrumentalist. It is not my intention here to deal 
with the methodological pitfalls of eclecticism, as this has been dealt 
with in Chapter II Section 5.4.1. 
To sum up, the early instrumentalism of transformational 
generative grammar does not give way to realist mentalism, but to either 
metaphysicalism or eclecticism or both. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
(1) The choice of Aronoff as the cut off point for dealing with morphology 
in transformational grammar is motivated by (a) considerations of 
space and (b) the fact that his book Word-Formation in Generative 
Grammar constitutes the latest most fully-fledged attempt at 
constructing a 'theory' of morphology in transformational generative 
grammar. 
(2) The present work does not cover the 'extended'word and paradigm' 
theory for dealing with inflectional morphology within the framework 
of Chomsky's 'extended standard theory. The reason for this is 
that I became aware of the existence of this very recent theory of 
inflectional morphology in April 1983 - long after the text of this 
thesis had been finished - when my colleague David Roberts drew 
my attention to a paper by Stephen R. Anderson, entitled "Where's 
Morphology? " This paper, to which the reader may. refer for a very 
g6neral introduction to the main tenets of this theory, is published 
in Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. 13,1982, pp. 571-612. 
(3) These periods should not be regarded as air-tight compartments as, 
in some instances, some of the issue prddominant in one period are 
foreshadowed by ideas present in works of a preceding period, e. g. 
the establishment of the lexicon in the Aspects model (1965) which 
is foreshadowed by the recognition of two types of morphology in 
Zimmer (1964). 
(4) The reader may also refer to'Anderson (1982: 571) for a very short 
discussion of this point. 
(5) Dik (1967) points out that Chomsky's belief that transformational 
grammar is able to deal with inflectional phenomena across languages 
is based upon the ability of this grammar to deal with the "poor" 
inflectional system of English. He further adds that to test whether 
or not transformational grammar can deal adequately with inflectional 
phenomena, it must be applied to languages with more intricate 
inflectional, systems than English. 
(6) Aronoff points, out that re-adjustment rules are not precisely defined 
by Chomsky and Halle (196 8). 
(7) For a fuller discussion of this point, see Aronoff (1976: 5). 
(8) See Kiparsky (1973) for a long and extremely informative discussion 
of this point. 
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(9) 
. In connection with this point, Aronoff 
(1976: 6) writes: "because 
of the desire to place restrictions on the power of phonological 
theory, we find that certain phenomena now lie outside the domain 
of the theory. Many of these phenomena can be seen as 
morphological". 
(10) Aronoff (1976: 6) mentions that in "Remarks on Nominal isation" 
Chomsky "did not propose a theory of morphology; he merely 
suggested that there should be one". 
(11) Botha (1968) considers this to be a defect of transformational , 
generative grammar; he (ibid: 80) writes: "The TERMS 'word' and 
$morpheme' appear in various transformationalist writings without 
an explicit meta -theoretical specification of their meaning". 
(12) This is reflected in the number of printings it has received (four. 
printings) and also the large number of reviews, or references to, 
it in the literature, e. g. Schachter (1962), Matthews (1961,1972, 
1974), Householder (1962), Dik (1967), Bolinger (1968), Botha (1968), 
Chomsky (1970), and Zimmer (1975). 
(13) In some respects, for example its mentalist orientation, Lees grammar 
is closer to Lspects-type transformational generative grammar than it 
is to Syntactic Structures. 
(14) The grammatical rules which generate the set of- English nominal 
compounds in Lees' grammar have a dual function: (a) they 
"synthesise" compounds from their parts in underlying expression, 
and (b) they indicate the positions in sentences in which each 
compound may be inserted or used. The sentence within which a 
compound functions as a nominal is called the matrix sentence, and 
the underlying expression from which the compound is derived is 
called the embedded sentence. In placing compounds in matrix 
sentences, transformations observe co-occurrence restrictions 
applicable in each individual case. 
(15) In connection with this point, Dik (1967: 372) writes ".. . the grammar 
will generate just those formations which the analyst has allowed it 
to generate. It does not explain but merely describes his particular 
intuitive notion of what is grammatical and what is not. It does not 
eliminate his intuition by replacing it with non-intuitive facts, but 
merely formalises this intuition in a particular way. If any thing -is 
predicted by such a grammar Cwhich generates book-liker. ] it is not 
that " book-liker " is grammatical in English, but merely that the 
intuition of the analyst says it is". 
(16) It should be borne in mind here that the distinction between 
'grammaticalityl and 'acceptability' was not 'publically' formulated 
and stated by Chomsky. 
(17) See footnote (5). 
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(18) Botha (1968: 138) gives the following list of terms and distinctions 
that are normally employed in the treatment of productivity in 
transformational grammar; "... Chomsky (1965: 187) distinguishes 
between "varying degrees. of productivity" of which he mentions 
only two: "productive" (p. 184) and "quasi-" or "marginally 
productive" (pp. 184,186,187 ... ). Lees 
(1966) distinguishes 
between "fully-productive" (p. 125), "still productive" (p. 129), 
"most productive" (pp. 138,148) and "clearly productive" ... 0 
Similarly Zimmer (1964) differentiates between types, classes or 
morphemes that are "of less questionable productivity" (p. 26), 
"of marginal synchronic productivity" (p. 28), "more productive ... 
than" (p. 32,481, "quite productive" (p. 67), "of some productivity" 
(P. 76), etc. " 
(19) The other languages are: French, German, Russian, Finnish, Yoraba, 
Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese, Thai, Arabic, Hungarian, Ilokano, 
Kahardian, Thai. 
(20) It must be remembered that at this stage in the development or 
evolution of transformational generative grammar, the distinction 
between'acceptabl4 and 'grammatical', which bears on what Zimmer 
says with respect to lunbad' and, particularly, 'puppy-cat', was not 
formally and publically stated. To the best of my knowledge, the 
first formal and public presentation of this distinction came in 
Aspect (1965). 
(21) Zimmer gives no evidence to support this claim. 
(22) Zimmer (1964: 29) mentions one example which does not conform to 
this state of affairs; this is the word immanageable which is not 
blocked despite the existence of unmanageable. This word, i. e. 
immanageable, occurs in the text of a message from President J. F. 
Kennedy to Premier N. Khrushchev quoted in the New York Times of 
October 29,1962 ... "I think that you and I ... were aware that 
developments were approaching a point where events could become 
immanageable". 
(23) Aronoff (1976: 43) refers to this situation by the term blocking, which 
he defines as ". .. the non-occurrence of one form due to the simple 
existence of another". 
(24) In connection with this concept of acceptability Zimmer (1964: fn. 3, 
p. 18) writes: "It should also be kept in mind that in this area we 
must reckon with the possibility that previous acquaintance with a 
given derived or compound item may be a factor in its being considered 
acceptable; there is an important difference between the output of 
at least some word-formation rules and that of purely syntactic ones". 
(25) 'Analytic' or 'recognition' morphology is said to assign an 
"interpretation to new formations that become established" (Zimmer 
1964: 26). 
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(26) Accord ing to D ik (19 6 7: 35 6) "... the units f iguring in a 
generative grammar are regarded as constructs which receive 
their definition from the theoretical framework in which they are 
embedded, and whose relation to the facts of speech is at most 
an indirect one". 
(27) No explicit explanation of the notion 'minor' rule is given by Botha. 
I 
(28) The reader may consult jackendoff (1977: 7-18) for a good 
presentation of Chomsky's (1970) view of the differences between 
'derived nominals' and 'gerundive nominals". 
(29) Interrupted arrows indicate that the one component has access to 
the information in the other, but is not directly related to it. 
(30) Lexical insertion rules take items from the dictionary of words and 
insert them in the "appropriate slots in structures representing the 
underlying constituent structure of particular sentences" (Halle 1973: 9). 
(31) They are, of course, also sensitive to the information present in the 
phrase structure markers they operate on. 
(32) The transformationa list position is adopted by Lakoff in, mainly, his 
book IrregularitTin Syntax (1970). The transformationa list position 
is noý fully dealt with here due to the lack of space and, also, due' 
to the fact that the adherents of this position advocates the treatment 
of nominalisation, and, by implication, compounds and derivational 
phenomena, in a syntactic and not. a lexical manner. 
(33) It is, of course, possible to derive more than one entity from an 
underlying lexical item. 
(34) The transformation involved in this case is the nominalisation 
transformation. 
(35) jackendoff regards this as a crucial criticism of the trans formationalist 
position. However, he does not fully and clearly explain his argument. 
(36) It is not very difficult to imagine contexts in which these items may 
assume the status of compounds. 
(37) jackendoff does not offer any explanation of what is meant by the 
'unnaturalness' or 'artificiality' of a grammar with respect to compounds. 
(38) It is not at all clear how one can test for 'learnability' as a criterion 
in jackendoff Is lexicalist theory. Consequently, since jackendoff's 
full-entry theory is to a large extent based on this criterion, we may 
say that this theory does not fully permit empirical testing. 
(39) jackendoff (1975: 642) points out that "all aspects of this form are 
traditional except for the "entry number", which is simply an index 
permitting reference to a lexical entry independent of its content" . 
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(40) jackendoff (1975: 642) points out that "the entry number is 
arbitrary and the semantic representation is a fudge for some 
complex of semantic factors". 
(41) The two way arrow may be read as the systematic relation 'is 
lexically related to'. The rule as a whole can be read as "A lexical 
entry X with such-and-such properties is related to a lexical entry 
W with such-and-such properties. 
(42) The lexical entry for 'decision' is reduced "to a cross reference to 
the related verb plus a reference to the [redundancy rules] 
(Jackendoff 1975: 643). 
(43) In my view, this claim is completely vacuous since there Is no 
acceptable methodology in transformational grammar for testing the 
empirical 'truth' or 'falsity' of such a claim. 
(44) jackendoff does not, however, rule out the first solution. 
(45) The treatment of these compounds in the full-entry theory appears to 
be no more than a notational variant of Lees' treatment of them in his 
book The Grammar of English Nominalisations. 
(46) This is perhaps a strong claim, at least as far as redhead is concerned, 
since this so-called compound roughly means a person with red hair. 
(47) No 'evidence', apart from that emerging from the full-entry theory 
itself, is given, or referred to, by Jackendoff to support his claim 
about the nature of creativity in grammar. 
(48) This cannot be regarded as valid evidence for the claim Aronoff 
states in the preceding sentence, since this 'evidence' is based on 
the assumption that the elements which occur in many words in 
languages are morphemes. However, it is this assumption, i. e. 
the assumption that the elements below the word level are morphemes, 
which stands in need of demonstration. In other words, Aronoff's 
evidence seems to be based on the very assumption this evidence is 
said to support. 
(49) In treating the word as the minimal linguistic sign, Aronoff (p. 10) 
states that the "most extended and formalised argument ... in favour 
of this position is given by Hervey and Mulder 1980 ". As 
shall be seen in Chapter V, Hervey and Mulder do not advocate this 
position, either explicitly or implicitly. The minimal linguistic 
sign in axiomatic functionalism is the moneme, and not the word. 
(50) No specification of the content of the concept of naturalness is given 
by Aronoff. However, it seems that, as employed in this context* 
this concept has the same content as the notion "descriptive adequacVI. 
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/(51) It is not at all clear how and why the recognisability of the 
morpheme can be regarded as a justification for the sort of 
"broadening" Aronoff suggests for this concept. 
(52) Aronoff does not indicate what "lg" in this rule stands for. 
(53) In a paper entitled "Labrador Inuttut (Eskimo) and a Theory of 
Morphology" (1982), L. Smith (p. 221) points out that Aronoff 
"draws his conclusions about morphological word formation rules 
( ... ) from the facts of Indo-European languages, represented by English". Smith examines Aronoff's theory from the point of view 
of the "polysynthetic structure" of Labrador Inuttut. Smith points 
out that, although Aronoff's theory "provides an excellent first 
approximation to universal aspects of word formation ... additional 
analysis of non-Indo-European languages is likely to result in ... 
substantive refinements and modification" (P. 242). The reader 
may refer to this paper for Smith's data and arguments. This 
paper came to my attention long after this chapter had been written 
and typed. 
(54) This point is of a tentative nature due to the lack of a fully-fledged 
treatment of English under the word-based theory. 
(55) Lyons (1977: 77-78) states that "whether creativity is a property 
of languages or a characteristic feature of the use made of languages 
by particular speakers and writers on particular occasions is debatable. 
Whatever one may decide about this question, creativity as it 
manifests itself in the metaphorical use of lexemes or their unusual, 
but stylistically effective, combination, clearly depends upon the 
semantic structure of the language system, and it has traditionally 
been of great concern to the semanticist". 
(56) Uhlenbeck (n. d. (b): 166-167) points out that "not all new words" 
formed on the basis of "improductive formations" are made "on purpose". 
He further adds: "Sometimes they are made out of ignorance and are 
simply errors. However, in most cases, new words of this type are 
consciously made with the intention to create some sort of special 
effe ct. Poets, writers and in general all people who have a strongly 
developed linguistic awareness, and who might be called players of 
language games ( ... ) such as journalists, writers of commercials or 
advertisements, entertainers, cabaret artists and even sometimes 
linguists, are especially creative in this respect". 
(57) The only notable exception to this is Hockett's (1958) brief discussion 
of productivity as a design feature of language. 
(5 8) See footnote (18) for the different degrees of productivity recognised 
by Botha in transformational grammar. 
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(59) The expression 'the native speaker-hearer' is vague in transformational 
generative grammar due to the fact it is not at all explicit or clear 
what 'the' in the above expression refers to or, roughly speaking, 
'defines'. In a similar fashion, the expression 'a native speaker 
hearer' is not ideally informative, since it leaves it open whether 
'a native speaker-hearer' is 2, ay native speaker-hearer, or a native 
speaker of a particular type, e. g. literate ones. The precise 
specification of the referents of these expressions is of crucial 
importance from the point of view the task of testing transformational ist 
grammar. 
(60) If competence in transformational grammar is to be interpreted as the 
'linguistic knowledge oý the native speakers', then a concept of 
competence approximating that of Saussure's 'langue' will be set up. 
Strictly speaking, this competence will be viewed as the logical 
product of the Icompetences' of the individual native speaker- 
listeners in a speech community. In other words, competence under 
this interpretation would be a collective phenomenon which falls 
within the scope of a social -psychology-orientated type of linguistics. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
WORD AND PARADIGM MORPHOLOGY 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WORD AND PARADIGM MORPHOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
. Hockett's paper "Two Models of Grammatical Description" (1954) 
is a ! classic'. in the field of morphology. In this paper, Hockett gives 
a semi-formal presentation of what he dubs 'item and arrangement' and 
'item and process' models of grammatical description. He, also contrasts 
these two models in terms of their descriptive adequacy and generality 
or universality, i. e. their ability to apply to all types of languages. 
One of the short-comings of this paper, as Hockett himself admits, is 
the absence of any comparable treatment of the traditional grammarians' 
model which he dubs 'word and paradigm' grammar; he (ibid: 210) writes: 
"Quite apart from minor variants of IP and IA; or models 
that might be invented tomorrow, there is one model which 
is clearly distinct from either IA or IP, and which is older 
and more respectable than either. , 
This is the Word and 
Paradigm (WP) model, the traditional framework for the 
discussion of Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, and a good many 
more familiar languages. It will not do to shrug this 
frame off with the comment that it is obviously insufficiently 
general, incapable of organising efficiently the facts of a 
language like Chinese. As yet we have no completely 
adequate model: WP deserves the same consideration here 
given to IP and IA. The writer offers his apologies for not 
having worked such consideration of WP into the present 
paperil. 
The lack of any treatment of word and paradigm, either by Hockett, 
or by any of his contemporaries, in the five years following the 
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publication of the afore-mentioned article prompted Robins to publish 
his paper "In Defence of WP" (1959) to rectify this anomaly. Robins 
(ibid: 116-117) describes the situation which prompted him to publish 
his paper as follows: 
"Hockett mentions WP only to refer it, almost 
apologetically, to a possible separate consideration 
at a later date. .. It is the feeling of the present 
writer that this consideration of WP as a valid model 
of grammatical description is long overdue, since 
neither Hockett, nor any one else seems as yet to 
have taken up the suggestion made by Hockett ... " 
Robins' paper is another 'classic' in the field of morphological 
studies. In this paper, Robins deals with some of the defects of the 
traditional word and paradigm model, and he presents what he regards 
as the salient features of a 'modern' word and paradigm model of 
grammatical description. However, the bulk of this paper is given over 
to the task of comparing this new model, in general terms, with item and 
arrangement and item and process, with the result that very little 
discussion of the structure, or organisation, of this model, the nature of 
its major notions and the criteria for establishing them is given. These 
gaps in this early presentation of word and paradigm are taken care of 
by Robins in his book General Linguistics: An Introductory Survey (1964). 
At the same time, i. e. the early sixties, the British linguist 
P. H. Matthews was working on the inflectional component of a 
generative word and paradigm grammar. - This research resulted in a 
series of papers (see bibliography), but the major work in which'the 
model for this component is presented is his book Inflectional Morphology 
(1972). 
356 
A word of warning is necessary here. As shall become clear 
later in this chapter, Matthews' model differs vastly from that of 
Robins in terms of its scope, general character and orientation, to the 
extent that the one model can be studied independently of the other 
from both the historical and logical point'of view. However, these 
two models agree, mainly, with respect to their treatment of the 'word' 
as the upper limit of morphological description. It is primarily this 
agreement which justifies their treatment as two different interpretations 
of the 
-same 
basic Idea, this idea being the traditional grammarians' 
grammatical model. In what follows I shall, for convenience sake, 
refer to these two 'interpretations' as word and paradigm I (Robins) and 
word and'paradigm II (Matthews). 
The aim of this chapter is to deal with these two models from the 
point of view of their internal organisation and underlying theoretical 
foundations. Prior to that, however, I shall, for the sake of completeness, 
give a brief explanation of the main features of the traditional word and 
paradigm model. I shall also deal-with what might be regarded as the 
'reason' behind the neglect of this model in the neo-Bloomfieldian era, 
especially as this era is universally regarded as the hey-day of morphology 
in modern linguistics., 
2. Word And Paradig : Tlýe Traditional Model 
The traditional grammarians' approach for studying the grammatical 
structures of languages may be 'legitimately' regarded as a 'model of 
grammatical description' in Hockett's (1954: 210) sense of this term, 
that is "as ýa frame of reference within which an analyst approaches the 
grammatical phase of a language and states the results of his investigations. " 
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It is not my intention here to give a critical assessment of the 
theoretical consistency and descriptive adequacy of this model, as 
these two issues have been extensively dealt with in modern linguistic 
literature. 
(1) 
My aim here is simply to highlight some of the deftning 
features of this approach, particularly those which are relevant to the 
general goal of this chapter. 
One of the most striking features of traditional word and paradigm 
grammar is its treatment of the 'word', in its normal sense, as the focal 
and central unit not only in grammatical description, in the narrow sense, 
but also in other areas of linguistic description, e. g. lexicography and, 
1, what might be loosely called, phonology. As Lyons (1968: 194) puts it, 
the word is "the unit par excellence. of traditional grammatical theory". 
Trýditional grammarians divide the field of grammar, in the 
narrow sense, into two main areas or sections: 'syntax' and 'inflection' , 
to which they add a third, minor one, called 'derivation' or 'word- 
formation'. Whereas syntax deals -with the structure of grammatical 
constructions above the word level, inflection deals with, the changes 
that take place in the forms of words for the purpose of expressing their 
relations to other words in syntactic constructions. Such changes in 
the forms of words are normally handled under the familiar headings of 
declension and conjugation. 
Two methods are employed for dealing with the inflectional 
changes in the forms of words in a language. 'The first method is that 
of exemplary paradigms, that is "the use of the paradigms of particular 
words I as exemplars or specimens ... for sets of 
I 
words 
I in general". 
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(Matthews 1974: 68). For example, the paradigms-of the'verbs 
'to finish' and $to sing' may be regarded as exemplary paradigms for 
certain types of weak and strong verbs in English, respectively. Unique 
paradigms may also be established. A unique paradigm, for example the 
paradigm of the verb 'to be' in English, is a paradigm which does not 
serve as a point of reference, or standard, for the paradigms of any set 
of words in the language. 
, ýProcess-type rules constitute the second method 
for dealing with 
the inflectional changes in the forms of words. - 
In terms of this method 
we may, for example, specify the inflectional relation between 'sing' 
and its past tense form 'sang' by means of an operation of vowel change, 
according to which the i in 'sing' is replaced by p, in 'sang'. Matthews 
(1974) states that this method is used very little in traditional 
grammatical theory. 
Derivation deals with the formation of words from other words or 
'roots'. This may be exemplified by the formation of adjectives from. - 
nouns (foolish <---fool), nouns from verbs (worker<. -work), or 
adjectives from verbs (deplorable( deplore) in a traditional grammar 
of English. But, as has been indicated above, derivation is not accorded 
the same status in the over-all design of language as either syntax or ,- 
inflection. This feature of traditional word and paradigm grammar is 
thought to result from the inability of this model to recognise any structurally 
significant unit below the level of the word. Because of this, Lyons 
(1968: 194) considers the recognition of derivation in traditional grammar 
to be "theoretically inconsistent"; he writes (ibid. ): 
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"That any space at all is allotted to derivation 
in traditional grammar I is an awkward, and 
theoretically inconsistent, gesture in recognition of 
the fact that some words can be analysed into 
components even if the rules in the main body of the 
grammar have nothing to say about the function and 
distribution of these components. " 
The Neqlect Of Word And Paradigm In The Neo-Bloomfieldian Era 
As has been previously mentioned, the neo-Bloomfieldian era is 
generally regarded as the hey-day of morphological studies in modern 
linguistics. To illustrate the importance of morphology in linguistic 
theory in this period Matthews (1974: 3) points out that "In joos' 
well-known Readings in Linguistics I (an anthology of American writings 
from 1925 to 1956) eight of the items selected for 1940 to 1950 are 
concerned predominantly or exclusively with morphological questions: 
this compares with about twelve for phonology, at most five for syntax 
and none for semantics". In spite of this, word and paradigm grammar 
was almost completely neglected, at least on the American continent. 
The aim of this section is to provide some rationalisation for this 
non-accidental neglect of the model concerned. 
The main underlying reason behind the neglect of traditional word 
and paradigm grammar in the neo-Bloomfieldian era appears to be the 
clash between this model and the dominant neo-Bloomfieldian approach 
with respect to points of methodology, scope and internal structure. 
As far as the methodological clash is concerned, the following 
observations may be made. Whereas traditional grammar is basically 
prescriptive in its general orientation, the neo-Bloomfieldian approach 
is descriptive in nature; whereas traditional grammar is almost completely 
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pre-occupied with the written forms of language, the neo-Bloomfieldian 
approach is primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the spoken 
forms only; whereas traditional grammarians normally carry out the 
task of describing a non-classical language "by imposing on it a 
framework found suitable, 6r assumed to be suitable, for another 
language, usually one carrying cultural prestige, such as Latin or Sanskrit" 
(Robins 1964: 163), the neo-Bloomfieldians insist on describing each 
language in its own terms; whereas traditional grammarians base the 
definitions of their grammatical categories and notions "on alleged types 
of meaning, or on notional, conceptual or philosophical'categories" 
(ibid. ), the neo-Bloomfieldians insist on defining their grammatical 
notions mainly by reference to criteria of form and distribution, and 
without any reliance on philosophical or notional factors; and, whereas 
traditional grammar sanctions the employment of process-type rules in 
accounting for the inflectional structure of a language, the neo- 
Bloomfieldian approach purports to be, at least in principle, completely 
static. 
With regard to the clash in scope, it may be pointed out that 
whereas traditional grammar is generally thought to be suitable for 
dealing with inflectional languages only, and not with other types of 
languages, particularly isolational ones, the neo-Bloomfieldian approach 
is thought, or claimed, to be applicable - or, at least, to have the 
potential of being applicable - to any type of language. Whether this 
claim about the generality, or universality, of the neo-Bloomfieldian 
approach is warranted or not will not concern us here. 
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In terms of its internal structure, the traditional word and 
paradigm model differs from the neo-Bloomfieldian approach in that 
it fails to recognise any structurally relevant unit below the word level. 
In other words, not only does traditional grammar regard the word as the 
central unit in grammar, but it also regards it as the minimal grammatical 
entity. This view of the organisation of the grammatical portion of 
language differs from the one advocated by the neo-Bloomfieldians. 
According to the neo-Bloomfieldian view, the morpheme is the minimal 
grammatical unit, and the word is no more than a unit In the hierarchy 
of grammatical units from morýheme to sentence. On the basis of this, 
it may be pointed out that the failure of traditional word and paradigm to 
recognise the morpheme as the'minimal grammatical entity appears to 
have been a major factor behind the neglect of this model, in the neo- 
Bloomfieldian era. As Robins (1959: 119) states: 
"It was certainly a weakness in the classical 
grammarians, and in many other writers who followed 
their example, that they barely recognise any 
grammatical unit below the level of the word, and 
certainly never set out with any rigour the establishment 
of the morphemes of a language. " 
Word and paradigm grammar also differs from the dominant item 
and arrangement approach advocated by the neo-Bloomfieldians in that 
it does not display the same 'conceptual neatness' as that displayed by 
the latter. Whereas item and arrangement aims to account for the entire 
grammatical portion of the language in terms of items and their arrangements 
relative to each other, traditional word and paradigm proposes to account 
for the same phenomenon by means of items, and both arrangements and, 
to a limited extent, processes. This lack of. conceptual neatness in 
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traditional word and paradigm may, perhaps, be regarded as one of the 
factors which led to the neglect of this model in the neo-Bloomfieldian era. 
The above attempt to account for the neglect of traditional word 
and paradigm In the neo-ploomfieldian era is, as has been indicated 
above, based on the assumption that it is the differences in character 
between this model and the then dominant item and arrangement approach 
which, perhaps, are responsible for the creation of the situation we are 
concerned with in this section. My reason for adopting this assumption 
is that it seems to hold the best promise of offering a rational and fruitful 
explanation of the historical phenomenon we are interested in. 
(2) 
4. Word And Paradigm 1, 
4.1 Word And Paradigm I As A Formal Grammar 
One of the striking features of word and paradigm I is its 
dependence on criteria of form in defining its grammatical notions and 
categories, both in theory and description. By virtue of this property, 
word and paradigm I may be regarded as a 'formal' grammar. According 
to Robins (1964: 182) formal grammar "is grammar that both in theory and 
in method is concerned solely with the observable forms, structural 
functions, and interrelations of the components of sentences or stretches 
of utterances. " This property of word and paradigm I is I inked with the 
view that linguistics is "an empirical science dealing with observed 
phenomena, and that 
[grammar I deals with a particular part of these" (ibid. ). 
The above property is taken to mean that semantic considerations 
are not relevant in the definition of grammatical units or in the procedures 
adopted for identifying them in description. By implication, this attitude 
which is manifested by the absence of any reliance on semantic 
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considerations in the definition of, for example, the notion word appears 
to follow from the Bloomfieldian oreintated view according to which 
meaning cannot be properly regarded as part of the scope of linguistics 
as an empirical, observational science. Whereas form can be observed 
and its properties and functions systematically accounted for in an 
empirically relevant sense, meaning does not lend itself to such a 
treatment., Robins (ibid. ) supports this view by the fact that "many 
elements and cate-gories that must be recognised in grammatical anlaysis 
defy the ascription of any plausible semantic function to them as 
individual components. " He exemplifies this situation by the bound 
root '-ceive' in English which occurs in the words 'deceive' I 'receive', 
$conceive', etc., but which cannot be assigned any semantic function. 
Robins, however, does not explain what he understands by the 
term 'meaning', nor does he justify his above-mentioned rationale 
concerning the fact that meaning cannot be empirically dealt with in a 
systematic fashion. Furthermore, he does not tell us why such elements 
as 1-ceive' in English, which cannot be "assigned any plausible semantic 
function" in that language, "must be recognised" in a grammatical analysis 
of that language. If the necessity to recognise such elements in a 
grammatical description of English is theoretically motivated, then the 
afore-mentioned argument in support of the irrelevance of semantic 
information to grammatical analysis suffers from the logical f'allac; of 
adducing as evidence in support of the view it purports to sUpport a state 
of affairs which, logically speaking, ýemerges from this view itself. If, 
on the other hand, meaning must be excluded from the realm of grammatical 
studies because such purely formal elements as 1-ceive ' "must be recognised" 
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in a grammatical description of English by virtue of the fact that they 
are 'inherent features' in the grammatical portion of that language, then 
this argument is no more than a metaphysical assumption, due to the 
fact that there is no acceptable, or valid, independent methodology for 
testing the empirical correctness of the claim that elements of the above 
type are inherent features of English. 
The above arguments *against advocating the irrelevance of 
semantic information in grammatical theory and analysis should be seen 
for what they are: they are not intended to put forward the opposite view 
that 'meaning', under some interpretation of this term, is an essential 
feature of grammatical theory and description, but that Robins fails to 
offer a satisfactory explanation of the basis of the position he advocates. 
This position may, however, be no more than a reaction against the 
traditional grammarians' attempt to define grammatical categories and 
word-classes on the basis of philosophical, conceptual and notional 
criteria. 
4.2 The Place Of The Word In Grammar 
The treatment of the 'word' as the central unit in grammar is, 
perhaps, the most important feature of all word and paradigm models, 
including, of course, word and paradigm I. Another important feature 
of the latter approach and, also, word and paradigm II is the division of 
grammar into two sections: morphology and syntax, with the former 
dealing with word-structure and the latter with the structure of grammatical 
constructions above the word level. Robins (1959: 118-119) expresses 
these two features as follows: 
365 
"The salient difference between WP and the other two 
models [- i. e. IA and IP ] is the centrality it accords to 
the word as a fundamental unit in grammar as a whole and 
as the basic unit of syntactic structure. IA and IP both 
start from the morpheme as the minimal grammatical 
element and also as the basic syntactic unit, passing 
through the word as relatively unimportant, and , 
consequently regarding the traditional division between 
morphology and syntax as unnecessary or even misleading. 
This division, with morphology covering the formation of 
words and syntax the structure of sentences stated 
principally in terms of the relations between words and 
word, groups, remains central to WP, in contradistinction 
to both the other two models. " 
The success of word and paradigm I in establishing the 'word' 
as a fundamental and unique -entity in grammar, and in consistently 
maintaining the distinction between morphology and syntax in the manner 
indicated in the above quotation, hinges on the ability_of this model to 
provide a set of criteria which can, uniquely and unequivocally, delimit 
(3) 
stretches of speech-that correspond to words in the written language 
To establish whether or not word'and paradigm I succeeds in achieving the 
above goals, I shall examine, in terms of the afore-mentioned restriction, 
the grammatical criteria and phonological markers of word identity in this 
model. 
4.3 Features Of The Word As A Gram'matical Unit 
Robins proposes two sets of features for defin ing the word as a 
grammatical unit: the grammatical criteria and the phonological markers 
of word identity. The features in each set are logically independent of 
each other, and the grammatical criteria are said to be logically independent 
of the phonological markers and vice versa. However, by virtue of the 
fact that the word is a grammatical, and not a phonological, unit, the 
phonological markers are said to be of secondary importance in the 
estaýliShment of word identity. 
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The aim of this section is to deal with the features'of the word 
as a grammatical unit. Roughly speaking,, these features may be 
considered as an answer to the question: "How shall we define a unit 
intermediate in rank between the morpheme and the sentence and one 
which will correspond fairly closely with our intuitive ideas of what is 
a 'word', these intuitive ideas being supported by the conventions of 
the orthographic tradition? " (Lyons 1968:, 201). 
4.3.1 Grammatical Criteria Of Word-Status 
Robins proposes three major criteria of word -status. They are: 
(1) the word as the 'minimal free form' or 'smallest sentence unit'; 
(2) the word as an 'internally cohesive' unit; and (3) the 'non-recursivity' 
and 'non-extensibility' of the word. In what follows, each one of these 
criteria will be assessed in terms of its ability to serve as a basis for 
isolating all and only stretches of elements in spoken utterances that 
correspond to what are traditionally called words, i. e. words in 
orthographic records. 
4.3.1.1 The Word As The Minimal Free Form 
Bloomfield's criterion of the word as the 'minimal free form' is 
generally regarded in the literature as the most famous attempt in modern 
linguistics at providing a basis for the isolation of words in spoken 
utterances. This criterion of word identity presupposes a prior 
d istinction between 'free' and 'bound' forms in grammar. A bound form 
is a linguistic form which cannot constitute a whole utterance by itself 
in normal language use, for example the 'plural' in bo . In DOYS 
contradistinction, a free form is a linguistic form which can constitute 
a whole utterance by itself in normal language use, for example yesterda . 
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In terms of this distinction and the specification of 'free form' it leads 
to, the word may be defined as the smallest linguistic form which can 
constitute a self-contained utterance by itself, in normal language use. 
And since an utterance in general linguistic usage is said to realise a 
sentence, the word may alternatively be characterised as the "smallest 
sentence unit" (Matthews 1974). 
It is a platitude of modern linguistics that the "minimal free 
form" criterion of word identity cannot serve as a basis for the exhaustive 
specification of all stretches in spoken utterances which the linguist 
would wish to establish as words by virtue of their correspondence to 
words in the written language. This may be illustrated by considering 
the applicability of this criterion to the linguistic forms the and a in 
English. Whereas these two linguistic forms have the status of words 
in written English - witness their property of being written with spaces 
on both sides in orthographic records in English - they, nevertheless, 
cannot be established as words in spoken English on the basis of the 
above criterion, due to the fact that neither of them can be said to 
constitute a whole utterance by itself in normal language use. 
To rectify this defect in the "minimal free form", criterion, 
Bloomfield, as well as Robins, propose the criterion of distributional 
parallelism as a supplementary criterion to the former one. According to 
this criterion, the linguistic forms the and a can be established as words 
in spoken English because they are distributionally parallel to the 
linguistic forms this and that which are said to satisfy the criterion of 
"minimum free form". 
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Two main problems, one theoretical and one descriptive, arise 
from the fortification, so to speak, of the criterion of "minimal free 
form" by the criterion of 'supplementary distribution. The theoretical 
- problem concerns the status of 'minimal free form' as a criterion of 
word-identity proper. We may state this problem as follows: if it is 
truly the case that the "minimal free form" is a criterion of word status 
in languages, and if it is also the case that this criterion is logically 
independent of all other grammatical criteria of word identity, then it 
readily follows that this criterion must be capable of serving as a basis 
for the identification of all and only those stretches in spoken language 
which correspond to words in its written counterpart. Now, by supplemen 
this criterion by the criterion of distributional parallelism, Robins, as well 
as Bloomfield, admits that the criterion of "minimal free form" is not a 
criterion 6f word-identity proper, i. e. in the full sense of the term 
'criterion' as a defining feature of each and every member of the set it is 
intended to characterise. 
The descriptive problem concerns the fact that the criterion of 
distributional parallelism establishes as words certain stretcheý of spoken, 
utterances which neither satisfy the criterion of "minimal free, form" nor 
correspond to words in the written language. For instance, the linguistic 
forms -er and -est in the complex linguistic forms prettie and pretties 
can be established as words in English on the basis of their distributional 
parallelism with the words more and most in more pretty and most pretty, 
respectively, though they cannot be established as such on the basis of 
the criterion of "minimum free form", or on the basis of their correspondence 
to words in written utterances. This boils down to saying that the 
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supplementary criterion of distributional parallelism is not adequate 
enough for achieving the goal it is designed to achieve. 
Oddly enough, the inadequacy of "minimum free form" as a 
criterion of word-identity is recognised, albeit implicitly, by the author 
of this criterion. Bloomfield (1976: 179) admits that "in the case of 
many languages ... it is impossible to distinguish consistently, on the 
one hand, between phrases and words, and, on the other hand, between 
words and bound forms. " This view is to a large extent shared by Robins 
(1964) and Matthews (1974). However, this does not prevent these 
linguists from treating the "minimum free form" as a criterion of word 
identity; their attitude is neatly expressed by Matthews (ibid: 161) as 
follows: 
"the 'minimal free form' is regarded with misgiving 
by many linguists. Nevertheless as a characteristic 
of words as a class (and as one criterion by which they 
are recognised) it is beyond dispute. " 
4.3.1.2 The Criterion Of Internal Cohesion 
The criterion of the word as an internally cohesive unit may be 
broken down into three suý-criteria: 'positional mobility', 'fixed ordering' 
and 'uninterruptability'. Positional mobility is taken to refer to the ability 
of the word to occur in different positions in syntactic constructions. 
This contrasts with (a) the rigid structure of the word, i. e. the fixed 
ordering of its grammatical constituents or components, and (b) the 
impermissibility of inserting grammatical elements within word structure, 
i. e. its uninterruptability. 
One defect of the above properties of the word, which make up 
the criterion of internal cohesion, Is that they do not apply only to those 
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grammatical elements in spoken language which may be established as 
words on the basis of their correspondence to words in the written 
language. Positional mobility applies as much to grammatical elements 
that are ordinarily treated as words as it does to, for instance, phrases. 
In the following examples, the phrases a hoy and the Sirl enjoy the same 
degree of positional mobility as the words Tohn and Mary: 
(1) A boy kissed the girl. 
The girl kissed a boy. 
(2) John kissed Mary. 
Mary kissed John. 
The same situation holds for the property of fixed ordering. For example, 
the ordering of the constituents of the phrases the boy and the qirl is as 
fixed as those of the grammatical elements driver and boys which are 
ordinarily treated as words. Similarly, the morphemes 'plural' and 
Icomparative' in English are as uninterruptible as the grammatical elements 
'boy' and 'girl' which are ordinarily regarded as words. 
In addition to this, fixed ordering and un-interruptability exhibit 
the defect of not being able to characterise all grammatical elements in 
spoken utterances which may be established as words on the basis of 
their correspondence to words in the written language. For instance, the 
contrastive ordering of the constituents of the following entities, which 
qualify as words in spoken English on the basis of their correspondence 
to words in, the written language, demonstrates that the property of fixed 
ordering, does not apply to all entities that are ordinarily regarded as words: 
2ýut-let, let-out, cart-horse, horse-cart, Rhot-ýLun, qun-shot and pack-ice, 
i2e-2gck (Matthews 1974: 164). 
(4) 
Similarly, the grammatical element 
drinking, which may be established as a word in spoken English on the 
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basis of its status as such in written ýnglish, may be divided into the 
components drink and ing between which the elements '-ing and eat' may 
be inserted to yield the well-formed construction drinking andeating 
The fact that '-ing and eat' do not constitute a well-formed string in 
English is' not relevant here, as due to the absence of a well-defined 
methodology for establishing grammatical units, including words, in 
word and paradigm I we cannot rule out the above inserted elements on 
grounds of ill-formedness. 
The preceding discussion provides sufficient empirical evidence 
to Justify the conclusion that the criterion of 'internal cohesion' cannot 
be regarded as a criterion of word identity in the proper sense of the term 
criterion, i. e. as a defining property of all and only those segments of 
spoken utterances which correspond to words in the written language. 
4.3.1.3 Non-Recursivity And Non-Extensibility As Criteria Of Word Status 
Non recursivity as a criterion of word-status means that it is not 
permissible within word structure to employ any grammatical constituent 
or component more than once. For instance, driver and weakness may be 
regarded as words because neither of them can tolerate the occurrence of 
any of their constituent morphemes more than once in their structure. 
Non-extensibility as a criterion of word-status means that words, 
in comparison with other types of grammatical construction, particularly 
sentences, cannot be extended beyond a certain limit. Whereas sentences 
can, in principle, be extended ad Infinitum, words cannot. 
The main problem with these two properties is that they do not 
constitute criteria of word-identity in the proper sense of the term 
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' criterion'. This follows from the fact that, to apply these two 
properties in the intended manner one must have prior knowledge of , 
which entities in the spoken language constitute words. In other words, 
by virtue of the fact that these so-called properties of the word 
presuppose the very 'knowledge' or 'information' they are intended to 
establish, they are characterised by circularity and, therefore, they 
cannot be said to constitute criteria of word-identity in the proper sense 
of the term criterion. 
Another problem exhibited by the property of non-recursivity is 
that it does not completely characterise all grammatical elements in 
spoken language which may be established as words on the basis of 
their correspondence to words in the written language ý,, ----Matthews (1974: 
165) illustrates this problem by the recursivity of the morphemes -ation 
and -ise in the words sensationalisation and organisationalise in English, 
respectively. He (ibid. ) also points out that this property does -not hold 
to any large extent in such languages as Turkish wherein morphemes tend 
to recur in the structure of words.. Nor, obviously, does it hold in 
languages which are characterised by the phenomenon of reduplication. 
4.3.2 Phonological Markers Of Word-Status 
The phonological markers of the word are regarded as logically 
secondary to the grammatical criteria of the word mentioned above. The 
main reason behind this is the fact that the word in word and paradigm I 
is considered as, first and foremost, a grammatical, and not a phonological, 
unit. This explains why phonological features of word-identity are 
referred to as markers and not as criteria in this model. It also partly 
explains why Robins refrains from giving a definite set of such features as 
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phonological markers of word-status in all languages, or even in those 
languages which are thought to be particularly well-suited for description 
in terms of the model concerned, for example Latin. By implication, 
word and paradigm I adopts the view that the set of phonological markers 
of word-status must be defined for each language separately. Phonological 
markers of this type may be features of 'stress', 'vowel harmony', 'Juncture' 
or any other such features which may be found to be relevant in a language 
to which word and paradigm I is to be applied. 
Another reason behind the decision not to treat the phonological 
markers as criteria of word-status is that there is no guarantee that a 
given phonological marker in a given language, will always apply to all 
grammatical units in spoken utterances which may be established as words 
on the basis of their correspondence to words in the written language. 
As we have seen above, this argument applies equally well to the 
grammatical properties of the word, though this does not prevent Robins 
from treating these properties as criteria in the proper sense of the term. 
Phonological markers may not always agree with so-called 
grammatical criteria of the word. In such cases, the phonological 
marker or markers involved will be discarded, i. e. regarded as 
methodologically irrelevant from the point of view of the delimitation of 
words in the language concerned. This position is thought to be 
consistent with the view that the grammatical criteria are primary, and 
the phonological markers are secondary in the identification of words. 
The following quotation from Robins (1964: 198) illustrates the point 
under consideration here: 
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"It must be remembered that phonological -features 
of [word status ], relevant as they are in the languages 
that exhibit them, are, of necessity, logically secondary 
considerations in the establishment of grammatical word 
units. They are seldom, Af ever, entirely in agreement 
with the grammatical criteria over the whole of the 
vocabulary of a language, and where there is conflict 
between grammatical criteria and ... phonological 
-features normally co-inciding in delimiting the same 
stretch of speech, the grammatical criteria must be 
allowed to carry the day ... A unit or a category must be established and defined by criteria from the same level 
of analysis as that at which it will subsequently be used. 
If the word is to be employed as a basic unit of grammatical 
description, both in morphology and syntax, grammatical 
criteria are the primary ones in its delimitation. " 
The main trouble with the phonological markers of word status is 
not, strictly speaking, that they do not constitute legitimate considerations 
in the definition and establishment of words, as grammatical units, in 
word and paradigm I, but that they are considered to be relevant when 
they are in agreement with the logically prior so-called grammatical 
criteria, and are regarded as irrelevant when they clash with them. By 
adopting this stance Robins is guilty of trying to have his cake and eat it. 
4.3.3 Properties Of The Word: A Conclusion 
The preceding discussion of what Robins calls the grammatical 
criteria of word status shows that these criteria do not define the entire 
set of grammatical units, in spoken utterances, which may be independently 
established as words on the basis of their correspondence to words in the 
written language. This discussion also reveals that some of these 
so-called grammatical criteria sometimes apply to grammatical entities in 
spoken utterances which are not regarded as words in the traditional sense 
of this term. In other words, the grammatical properties of word-status 
in word and paradigm I do not specify all and only that set of grammatical 
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units in spoken utterances which may be established as words on the 
basis of their correspondence to words in the written language. By 
implication, this means that the grammatical properties concerned do not 
constitute a sufficient set of conditions of word identity and, therefore, 
they cannot be considered. as criteria in the proper sense of the term. 
Robins' so-called grammatical criteria appear to be no more than rules- 
of-thumb for the establishment of words in languages. 
As has been indicated above, the incorporation of ýphonological 
features as markers of word status is methodologically awkward. This 
follows from the fact that these markets arelhought to present confirming 
evidence of word status when'they are in agreement with the logically 
prior so-called grammatical criteria, but are discarded when they clash with 
them. 
From what has been said above, it is clear that word and paradigm I 
fails to offer a rigorous definition of its "central" and "fundamental" 
grammatical unit which is the word. As will be explained below, this 
failure has serious repercussions for two of the major characteristic 
features of this approach, namely the morphology versus syntax 
distinction and the notion of paradigm. 
4.4 The Notion Morpheme In Word And Paradigm I 
It has been previously mentioned that, according to Robins 
(1959,1964), one of the serious weaknesses of the traditional word and 
paradigm model is its failure to establish a morpheme-like unit as a 
relevant grammatical unit below the word level. Robins (1964: 202) 
regards this feature of the traditional model as particularly surprising in 
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view of "the pre-occupation of grammarians throughout antiquity and 
the, Middle Ages with the morphological aspectýof grammar". 
I To overcome this weakness' of its predecessor, word and 
paradigm I establishes the morpheme as the minimal grammatical unit. 
Though morphemes may have meaning, in some general sense of this 
term, meaningfulness is not regarded as a defining feature of the 
morpheme in this approach. This means that word and paradigm I adopts 
what might be called a formalist view of the morpheme. This view of the ý 
morpheme is adhered to by transformational generative grammar, particularly 
Aronoff's word-based theory, and also by the stratificationalists, whose 
'lexon', is a formal entity. However, Robins (ibid: 214) regards the 
statement of the meanings of the morphemes in a language, wherever 
possible, as an "important part of the description of a language, though 
this is carried out only after the morphemes have already been established 
and. classified in purely formal terms-, " 
Each morpheme in a language is said to be- manifested by one or 
more exponents. Exponents of morphemes are called allomorphs, though 
Robins , employs the term morpheme to refer sometimes to the allomorph of 
a morpheme. Allomorphs are said to be either phonologically, or 
morphologically conditioned, in the normal senses of these two terms. 
The statement of the exponency relation between morphemes and their 
allomorphs is dealt with in a special section of the grammar, called 
morphophonology. 
The procedure for the identification of morphemes, in the 
structural sense, in word and paradigm I consists of two operations. Th ei 
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first operation is the establishment of the set of morphs in the language. 
This operation is carried out by "comparing word-forms with one another 
and noting the recurrent pieces that compose them" (ibid: 202). Thus, 
the plural allomorph Isl is established by comparing the word-forms of, 
for example, the words cap : caps, cat : cats, park : _parks, etc. 
The second operation consists of the groupment of related morphs as 
exponents, i. e. allomorphs, of morphemes in the language. Complementary 
distribution is the only criterion given by Robins for carrying out this task, 
though he seems to think that this criterion is not fully adequate on its 
own. 
By excluding 'meaning' as a factor in the identification of 
morphemes, Robins, while maintaining consistency with the formal nature 
of word and paradigm I (section 4.1), deprives this approach of an 
important methodological criterion in the execution of the above task, 
since, without this criterion, the groupment of, particularly, derivationally 
significant morphs as members of one and the same morpheme cannot be 
'satisfactorily' carried out. This may be exemplified by the morphs -ist 
and -er in. violinist and piper, respectively. Without reference to 
Imeaning', these two morphs cannot, strictly speaking, be justifiably 
established as exponents of one and the same morpheme in English - the 
fact that these two morphs are in complementary distribution is not a 
sufficient condition for treating them as exponents of the same morpheme, 
since if 'complementary distribution' was a sufficient criterion, then it 
would be acceptable to treat, for example, -ist in violinist and -able in 
changeable as different morphs of one and the same morpheme. 
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To this criticism we may add the fact that since the notibn 'word' 
is an ill-defined notion in word and paradigm I, it follows that the 
process of establishing morphs in a language by "comparing word-forms 
of words 
I 
with one another" is not, logically speaking, a precise one. 
4.5 The Notions Morpheme And Category In Word An Paradigm I 
As used in the title of this section, the term morpheme is used 
to refer to what is generally called morph or allomorph in modern linguistic 
literature. According to Robins (1964: 264), the concepts morpheme and 
grammatical category are "quite different concepts". He characterises 
the difference between these two concepts as follows: "The morphemic 
[i. e. allomorp*hic]compositiori of words is decided by comparing them 
with other partially similar words; the number of grammatical categories 
involved in a word is decided by the number of separate derivational 
formations and syntactic relations that are or may be marked in sentences 
by its morphological form". Examples of grammatical categories in 
languages are the different types of case, gender, and number in, say, 
Latin nominals. 
The relationship between categories and morphemes may be 
expressed as follows: categories are said to be marked by morphemes, or, 
alternatively, morphemes are said to mark grammatical categories, A 
grammatical category may be marked by one or more morphemes, and a 
single'morpheme may mark several categories at one and the same time. 
Cases of the latter type are referred to as 'cumulation', which tends to be 
prevalent in so-called inflectional languages. Robins illustrates this 
phenomenon by considering the Greek example / andrelros/, meaning 'brave'. 
He (ibid. ) points out that: 
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"one may recognise a morpheme /-os/ [in this example] 
by which three grammatical categories are indicated: 
masculine gender, by concord with masculine noun, 
nominative case, by syntactic relationship with the 
main verb of the sentence, and singular number by 
concord with a singular noun and with the verb also 
marked by singular number. " 
From what has been said above, it may be concluded that there 
is a close resemblance between the notion grammatical category in word 
and paradigm I and the notion morpheme in the structuralist sense. In 
the same manner that a morpheme is said to be realised by a set of one 
or more morphs, a grammatical category is said to be marked by a set of 
one or more morphemes, i. e. morphs. As a matter of fact, all grammatical 
units that may be regarded as grammatical categories in, say, a, 
description of Latin, can be referred to as morphemes, in the sense 
mentioned in the previous section, but, perhaps, not vice versa. This, 
of course, implies that certain morphemes in a language may not be treated 
as grammatical categories. 
This discrepancy, despite the fact that derivational formations 
are referred to as grammatical categories, sometimes appears to be related 
to the general word and paradigm I convention according to which the term 
grammatical category is predominantly employed to refer to inflectionally 
significant morphemes in languages, i. e. to those morphemes that partake 
in paradigmatic sets. As such, grammatical categories constitute one 
type of morpheme, the other two types being the so-called derivational 
formations and root morphemes. 
We have now reached a point in our discussion where we can give 
a more precise interpretation - than the one givenat the outset of the 
preceding section - of the view that word and paradigm I recognises the 
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Imorpheme' as a grammatical unit below the word level. According to 
this interpretation, the term morpheme in this context designates both 
the morpheme in the structuralist sense and the morph. 
4.6 The Notions Root And Aff ix I Word and Paradigm I 
The distinction root versus affix in word and paradigm I, which 
is relevant to morphemes in the structural sense and, by implication, 
to their allomorphs, is partly dependent on a logically prior distinction 
between 'free' and 'bound' morphemes. Robins (1964: 206) defines a 
free morpheme as a minimal grammatical unit which "may constitute a 
word (free form) by itself", and he defines a bound morpheme as a 
minimal grammatical unit which "must appear with at least one other 
morpheme, bound or free, in a word". These two types of morpheme may 
be exemplified by boy and -er in driver, respectively. 
Robins (ibid. ) characterises the root as "that part of a word 
structure which is left when all the affixes have been removed". He 
also adds that a root morpheme may be either bound or free, and that 
root morphemes are "potentially limited in number in a language ... ". 
An example of a bound root morpheme in English is -ceive in'receive, 
and of a free root morpheme, boy in boyhood. 
Affixes are bound morphemes. Though the number of affixes 
varies from one language to another, they constitute a small number, in 
comparison with roots, in languages. As Robins (ibid. ) states, a ff ixe s 
are "limited in number ... and they may be exhaustively listed". With 
respect to their grammatical function "some affixes serve to differentiate 
the paradigm forms of variable words, containing a common root", while 
"others recur in the formation of a large number of polymorphematic words 
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together with a large number of different root morphemes" (ibid. ). 
With respect to their distribution in relation to roots in word structure, 
affixes may be classified into three categories: prefixes, infLxes and 
suff ixes. As this classification of affixes into positional sub-types is 
(6) 
well-known in the literature, I shall not deal with it any further here. 
The above distinction between 'root' and 'affix' in word and 
paradigm I is not a satisfa*ýtory one from the methodological point of view. 
This springs from the fact that although all free morphemes in word 
structure have the status of roots, not all bound morphemes function as 
affixes, e. g. ceive in perceiv . As has been said above, bound morphemes 
may function either as roots or as affixes in word structure. Due to this 
factor, some additional criterion or criteria must be provided for 
distinguishing between those bound morphemes which function as roots 
in word structure and those that function as affixes. Neither the 
statement that root morphemes tend to be more numerous than affbc 
morphemes in languages, nor the statement that root and affix morphemes 
play grammatically different functions in the morphological structure of 
languages can be said to furnish such a criterion, due to the fact that 
such a would-be criterion presupposes the very distinction it purports to 
establish and justify - i. e. it begs the question. 
Moreover, since the distinction root versus affix makes reference 
to the notion word, via its dependence on the free versus bound morpheme 
dichotomy, and since, as has been shown previously in this chapter, the 
notion word is an ill-defined notion in word and paradigm I, it follows 
logically that the distinctton presently under consideration rests on vague 
and inexact foundations. 
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4.7 The Notion Paradigm In Word And Paradigm I 
Two types of word are recognised in word and paradigm I: variable 
and invariable ones. Robins (1964: 196) characterises variable words 
as "those in which ordered and regular series of grammatically different 
word forms are found, wherein a part remains relatively constant and the 
variations in the other parts are matched by variations in other words". 
Examples of variable words in English are the verbs 'finish' and 'walk', 
which have the grammatically different word forms finish, finishes, 
finishing, finished and walk, walks, walking, walked, respectively. 
Examples of this type of word in the nominal word category are 'rat', 'dog, 
and 'bus' which have the following grammatically different word forms: 
rat-Lats, dog-ýýs, and bus-buses,, respectively. 
In contradistinction, invariable words are words which do not 
exhibit the above property of having grammatically different word forms. 
Examples of invariable words in English are now, even, since seldom, etc. 
The notion paradigm, which is characterised as an "ordered and 
regular series of grammatically different word forms", is, clearly, closely 
connected with the notion 'variable word' - in the sense that paradigms in 
a language are always paradigms of variable words. The common and 
recurring part of the grammatically different word forms which constitute 
a single paradigm may be called the base. In terms of analysability into 
grammatical components, the base of a paradigm may be either simple or 
complex. A simple base is called a root and a complex one is called a 
stem. These two types of base may be exemplified by finish in the 
paradigm finish, finishes, finishing, finish and by worker in the paradigm 
worker and workers, respectively. The stem worker in the latter paradigm 
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consists of the two constituent morphemes work, a root, and -er, 
a sufftx. ý However, the root of a' stem is, logically speaking, different 
from the root of a simple base of a given paradigm. 
Each member of a given paradigm, except for the one, if any, 
formally corresponding to the base of that paradigm, is said to contain 
an affix which formally differentiates it from all other members, i. e. 
word forms, of the paradigm concerned. The member of a given paradigm 
that corresponds to the base from the formal point of view is 
differentiated from all other members of the same paradigm by zero, i. e. 
the absence of an affix. The following paradigm of the variable word 
'walk' consists of the grammatically different word forms walk, walks. 
walking, walked, which are derived from the base walk by (a) an 
identify-operation, 
(7) 
symbolised by zero 0, in walk, and (b) by the 
suffixation of -s, -: ing, and -ed in the remaining three members of this 
paradigm, respectively: 
'walk' 
s 
ag 
-edýj 
walk 
walks 
walking 
walked 
Though the above examples are all drawn from the inflectional 
portion of the English language, Robins (195 9) does not exclude the 
possibility of extending the same treatment to the derivational section 
of the grammar of this language or, of course, any other language. 
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He (ibid: 125 126) states that "derivational formations with a given 
base form can .... be set out in paradigms, though these are mostly 
less regular and offer more variation 
Ethan inflectional ý paradigms] as 
between individual bases in the -classes involved". - Nonetheless, Robins 
says nothing about the possibility of setting up derivational paradigms in 
his book. General Linguistics : An Introductory Sury2y (1964). 
Derivaiional paradigms, if allowed, are regarded as being different 
and distinct from inflectional ones. The basis of this distinction appears 
to be partly related to a presumed difference in the regularity of inflectional 
and derivational paradigms. The nature of this 'presumed difference' is, 
however, not clear because Robins fails to offer any explanation of the 
concept of regularity. 
The distinction between Inflectional and derivational paradigms 
appears also to be related to the much wider distinction between 
tnflectional and dertvattonal phenomena, in grammar. The valtdtty of the 
former distinction is, therefore, partly dependent on the validity of the 
latter one. But since, as will be shown in the next section, the 
distinction between inflection and derivation in grammar cannot be 
consistently maintained in word and paradigm I, it follows that the basis 
of the distinction between inflectional and derivational paradigms in this 
approach is highly suspect. 
The notion of identity operation, whose descriptive relevance is 
implicitly recognised in word and paradigm I, seems to be no more than 
(8) 
an instrumentalist device, whose purpose is to preserve the consistency 
of this approach with respect to its claim that the members of the, 
385 
Paradigm of a given variable word are all derived from the base form 
posited for that paradigm. Not only is this notion inconsistent with 
the data-orientated and realist character of word and paradigm I, but it 
is also set-theoretically unwarranted, being comparable to a morpheme ý- 
which is always realised or manifested by zero 1,9P. Moreover, it is 
not also clear how word and paradigm I proposes to account for the 
difference between this operation and the zero operation which would be 
employed in the derivation of sheep (pl. ) from the base form sheep, in 
the paradigm of the variable word 'sheep'. 
4.8 Inflection And Derivation_In Word And Paradigm I: 
One of the divisions which is generally established in the field 
of morphology is that between inflection and derivation. 
(9) 
Robins 
considers this division as'one of the salient features of word and paradigm I. 
However, he does not assign to it the status of an absolute dichotomy; 
a twilight area between these two sections of morphology is said to exist. 
One important difference between inflectional and derivational 
formation in grammar is that whereas the former tend to "uniquely determine 
and restrict the grammatical functioning of the resultant word form" in 
larger grammatical constructions, the latter tend to "produce a form 
substantially the same for grammatical purposes as a root form or as a 
simple or more underlying form" (Robins 1964: 257). 
This difference may be illustrated by considering the plural 
formative -s, and the negative formative un-, in English. The suffixation 
of the ýplural formative -s to certain nouns in English results in the 
production of grammatical units which do not have the same 'privileges 
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of occurrence' as their singular counterparts, e. g. boy boys. Thus, 
(the) boys but not (the) boy, can occur with the verbs sleep eat, are 
. 
playing, etc., Conversely, only (the) boy, but not (the) boys, can 
occur with sleep , eats, is playing, etc. On the basis of this agreement 
phenomenon, the plural formative -s in English may be established as an 
inflectional one. 
In contradistinction, the prefixation of the negative formative un- 
to a particular sub-class of the class of adjectives in English results in 
the derivation of grammatical units which have the same 'privileges of 
occurrence' as their 'positive' counterparts, e. g. kind unkind. This 
may be illustrated by the constructions kind man : unkind man., kind men 
unkind men in which the adjectives kind and unkind can replace each other. 
On the basis of distributional sameness, the grammatical formative un- 
may be established as a derivational one. 
But the above feature of derivational formations does not apply to 
all grammatical formatives in, say, English which are generally regarded 
as derivational ones. An example of such a derivational formative in 
word and paradigm I is the agentive -er in English. It is demonstrably 
the case that the affixation of this formative to verbs results in the 
derivation of grammatical units which do not share the same privileges 
of occurrence as their roots or underlying forms, e. g. drive : driver. 
Another difference between inflectional and derivational formations 
in word and paradigm I concerns the 'fact' that whereas the former tend 
to be word-class maintaining, the latter tend to be word-class changing. 
On the basis of this difference, the plural formative -s in English may be 
established as an inflectional one, because its affixation to underlying 
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forms'results in the production of grammatical units that belong to the 
same word class to which these forms belong ', eýg. cat : cats 
(noun). 
In contradistinction, the formative -ness in English is regarded as a 
derivational one, because It results in the derivation of grammatical 
units whose word class is different from that of their underlying forms, 
e. g. happy (adjective) : happiness (noun). The same situation holds 
for the agentive formative -er. 
However, not all formatives that word and paradigm I treats as 
derivational formatives in English satisfy the above condition or property 
of being word-class changing. For instance, the negative formative un-, 
which is treated as a derivational one in this approach, fails to satisfy 
this property, e. g. important (adjective) : unimportant (adjective)., 
It is also clear from the above discussion that the preceding two 
features clash with ea'ch other in their classification of formatives. For 
example, whereas'the negative formative un- may be established as a 
derivational one by reference'to the first feature of derivational formations 
above, it must be established as an inflectional formative in terms of the 
second feature of inflectional formatives. 
It might, however, be pointed out that the above criticisms are 
not valid ones, due to the fact that what I have called features or 
properties are not criterial in nature, but are mere tendencies of inflectional 
and derivational formations. In the face of such a possible objection, 
we may point out that if what I have called features above are not defining 
properties of inflectional versus, derivational formations, then it readily 
follows that, from the point of view of formulating a formal and precise 
theoretical framework, the division in the field of morphology between 
inflection and derivation is an ad hoc and unwarranted one.. By implication, 
4ý 
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this means that the distinction between inflectional and derivational 
paradigms (c. f. 4.7) is an ad hoc and unwarranted one, too. 
Derivational formatives differ from inflectional ones in terms of 
the capacity'Of the former, but not the latter, to co-occur in one and the 
same ývord. They'also differ from each other in terms of their position 
of occurrence in relation to each other in one and the same word. Robins 
(1964: 261) expresses this point as follows: "where inflections and , 
derivations involving affixes occur in the same word, the inflections 
appear on the rim of the word rather than inside it, i. -e. as initial prefix 
or final s uff ix. " 
One important shortcoming of the preceding contrastive features of 
inflectional and derivational formations is that, their 'proper' or intended 
application in linguistic description depends upon a prior knowledge of 
which formatives in the language are derivational ones, and which are 
inflectional. Such knowledge, as has been explained above, cannot be 
consistently established on the basis of the first two features dealt with 
previously. Now, by requiring in advance the very knowledge they are 
intended to secure, the two features under consideration here suffer from 
the logical fallacy of petitio principit 
Moreover, since these two features make reference to the, notion 
'word', and since this notion, as has been demonstrated previously in this 
chapter, is an ill-defined one, it follows that the features concerned must 
harbour some vagueness and lack of precision. 
In terms of the second set of contrastive features above, the 
formative un-, in unkind, and -s-, in spoonsfu , must be established as 
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inflectional and derivational formatives, respectively. In s pite of 
this, the above formatives are universally classified in descriptions 
which presuppose this set of contrastive features as derivational and 
inflectional ones, respectively. The reason behind this appears to be 
the fact that the formative -s- is assignable to a grammatical category 
in English, namely number, but un- is not. 
Inflectional and derivational formations are also contrasted in 
terms of their 'regularity' or 'generality'. Robins (ibid: 26) points out 
that "inflections are much more regular and general In their forms and 
occurrences than derivations". But, since the 'proper' application'of 
this feature in linguistic description presupposes a prior knowledge of 
which formatives in the language are inflectional ones, and which are 
derivational, and since the other features do not yield such knowledge 
consistently, it follows that the above feature (a) suffers from the logical 
fallacy of petitio_principii and (b) it is not descriptively workable. It 
may also be pointed out that this feature is not applied consistently in 
description. This situation may be illustrated by the treatment of the 
formative -, ness in English, e. g. happy : happiness, as a derivational one, 
despite the fact that this formative is highly 'regular' in terms of its 
form and its frequency. 
It may be concluded from what has been said above that word and 
paradigm I methodology for distinguishing between inflectional formations 
and derivational ones cannot serve as a descriptively logically legitimate 
basis for achieving this goal. The methodology suggested by Robins is' 
not a methodology proper, but merely a list of rules-of-thumb. 
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4.9 Morphology And Syntax In Word And Paradigm I 
It has_ been previously mentioned that the division of grammar 
into morphology and syntax is one of the most important salient features 
of word and paradigm I. In this respect, word and paradigm I d'iffers from 
both item and arrangement and item and process, as these two models are 
presented by Hockett (1954). 
The division of grammar into morphology and syntax in word and 
paradigm I is based on the view that the word is a central and unique type 
of grammatical unit. The search for so-called grammatical criteria to 
define the word, and the employment of phonological markers to help 
isolate words in spoken utterances, reflect the centrality and uniqueness 
of the word as opposed to other types of grammatical unit, for example the 
'phrase', 'clause' and 'sentence'. In comparison with these types of 
grammatical unit, the word is characterised by the fixity of its internal 
structure. It is this feature, above all other so-called grammatical 
criteria of word identity, that underlies the division of grammar into 
morphology and syntax. 
Morphology in word and paradigm I deals with the internal structure 
of words, employing such notions as morpheme, morph, grammatical 
category, paradigm, root, affix, stem, etc. Syntax, on the other hand, 
deals with the internal structure of higher grammatical units from phrase 
to sentence. The difference between these two sections of grammar 
extends to the type of descriptive statement employed in each section to 
account for the phenomena which lie within its own scope. Thus, whereas 
I processes' are employed to deal with the Internal structure of words, 
larrangement' is used to account for the grammatical structure of units 
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above the word level, i. e. sytactic constructions. Robins (1959: 134) 
expresses this difference as follows: 
"Process and arrangement both have their place in 
a grammatical description. Process is most naturally 
applicable to the morphological formation of words, and 
arrangement to the syntactical relations (not linear order, 
though this is often, in varying degrees, a mark or 
exponent of syntactical relations) of words as members 
of classes bearing specific grammatical categories in 
constructions. " 
It is clear from the above quotation that word and paradigm I is 
neither a wholly static, nor a wholly dynamic model of grammatical 
description, but a mixture of both. From the point of view of syntax,. 
it is a static model; and, from the point of view of morphology, it is a 
dynamic one. This characterisation of word and paradigm I clashes with 
Robins' (1959) view according to which this model is closer to item and 
process than it is to item and arrangement. 
Finally, since the division of grammar into morphology and syntax 
is based on the notion word, and since this notion, as has been shown 
above, is not a well-defined notion in mrd and paradigm I, it follows that 
the morphology versus syntax division is an, ill-defined and vague feature 
of this approach. 
4.10 Word And Paradigm I: Final Remarks 
The preceding discussion of word and paradigm I shows that this 
approach lacks the precision and explicitness which are essential conditions 
for the establishment of any framework for linguistic description as a 
grammatical model proper. Evidence of this is the inability of this model 
to distinguish explicitly between the three different senses in which the 
term is used, i. e. what Matthews (1972,1974) calls the Ilexeme', the 
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$grammatical word' and the 'word form'. Further evidence of this is the 
failure of this model to provide a rigorous set of grammatical criteria for 
the identification of words in spoken utterances. The characterisation 
of inflection, derivation, morpheme, grammatical, category, affix, root 
and the division of grammar into morphology and syntax furnish more 
evidence to substantiate the afore-mentioned conclusion. 
This lack of precision may be attributed, at least in part, to the 
eclectic nature of word and paradigm I. The incorporation of the 
structuralist notion 'morpheme', alongside the traditional notion 
'grammatical category', in this model illustrates this point. Instead of' 
treating grammatical categories as a sub-type of morphe6e, Robins behaves 
as though these two notions are, logically speaking, distinct from each 
I other. - As'a result of this eclecticism, word and paradigm I is rendered 
a-consistent in certain places. 
The universality of word and paradigm grammatical models as 
descriptive tools for dealing with the structure of all languages - 
regardless of whether they are agglutinative, inflectional or isolational - 
has been often questioned, e. g. (Hockett 1954), Matthews -(1972,1974). 
Robins (1959) seems to hold the view, albeit implicitly, that word and 
paradigm I is not particularly well-suited for dealing with the morphological 
structure of non-inflectional languages, and, to a lesser extent, -, 
derivational phenomena in general. In this respect, word and paradigm I, 
and, as shall be seen later in this chapter, word and paradigm II, differ 
from the three other approaches dealt with in this thesis. The restricted 
nature of word and paradigm models, as opposed to the universal character 
of other grammatical models, will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
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Finally, word and paradigm I lacks any satisfactory indication of 
its methodological and epistemological foundations. Robins (1964) 
points out that word and paradigm I follows the inductivist philosophy of 
science, 
(10ýut he offers no explanation of the exact nature of this method. 
That such an explanation is crucial for a proper understanding and 
evaluation of the underlying foundations of word and paradigm is clear 
from the multiple and different interpretations of this approach of 
scientific inquiry (c. f. Chapter 1). From the point of epistemology, 
word and paradigm I adopts a predominantly realist, perhaps phenomenalist, 
attitude towards its descriptive statements. In certain cases, notions of 
an instrumentalist nature are employed, e. g. identity-operation. The 
main purpose behind such notions, albeit an implicit one, is to preserve 
the consistency of word and paradigm I and to render it descriptively 
workable (c. f. 4.7). 
S. Word And Paradigm II 
The label word and paradigm II, employed here for the lack of a 
better term, refers to the model of inflectional morphology proposed by 
the British linguist P. H. Matthews. Matthews deals with this model in 
a series of papers (1965(a), 1965(b), 1967,1970) and, also, in his two 
books: Inflectional Morpholog :a theoretical study based on aspects of 
Latin verb conjugation (1972) and MorphologX: an introduction to the theory 
of word structure (1974). The following discussion of word and paradigm II 
is almost entirely based on the first book above, due to the , fact that this 
work contains the most fully-fledged statement of this model. 
As far as its scope is concerned, word and paradigm Il is restricted 
to the inflectional phenomena of the class of inflectional languages in the 
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traditional interpretation of this term, e. g. the inflectional phenomena 
of Latin. This dotible restriction of word and paradigm II is based on 
considerations of descriptive appropriacy. A discussion of this point 
-will be given later in this chapter. 
S. 1 Linguistic Theory And Its Components 
Matthews (1972: 7) characterises linguistic theory as a "system 
or assemblage of constructs" which incorporates the following three 
components or sections: a model of description, an explicit rule system 
and an evaluation procedure. 
briefly dealt with below. 
Model Of Description- 
Each one of these components will be 
According to Matthews (1972), a linguistic theory must posit a 
model of description in, essentially, the sense specified by Hockett 
(1954: 210), i. e. in the sense of a "frame of reference within which the 
I 
analyst app-roaches a language and states the results of his investigations". 
Matthews (ibid: 7) spells out this rather general characterisation of the 
notion model by considering it as a "specification of certain types of unit 
and of certain relations which, will obtain'between 
[such I units in 
any relevant description". By means of such units and relations, the 
linguist tries to account for the relevant structural features of the phenomena 
under investigation. 
A. model of description must satisfy the criterion of being well-defined, 
i. e. its units and relations must be explicitly and rigorously established. 
It must also be definite in form at any given moment in its application, 
though, in principle, it remains permanently open for revision and 
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amendation. As Matthews (ibid: 8) points out, "a model may be 
amended or qualified whenever some feature leads to unacceptable 
consequences. " Whether a given descriptive result is acceptable or 
not is decided by reference to the evaluation criteria adopted by the 
theory. I shall deal with these criteria later in this chapter. 
S. 1.2 The Rule System 
In addition to a model of description, a linguistic theory must 
specify a formalised and appropriate rule-system whose task is to account 
for the phenomena which lie within its own scope. This rule-system 
comprises both a specification of the precise format of grammatical rules 
and of the precise way in which such rules are to be interpreted" (Matthews 
1972: 10). By virtue of this rule system, word and paradigm II is 
considered as a generative theory, in both a narrow and a wide sense. 
In its narrow sense, the term 'generative' refers to "any set of rules - or 
formalised statements about a language - which may be interpreted as 
defining, specifying, or 'generating' some particular set of formal objects" 
(ibid: 9). In its wide sense, the term generative refers to a "commitment 
to precision" (ibid. ). A generative grammar in-the latter sense does not 
require any external aids, such as the reader's knowledge of the language 
being dealt with, or his knowledge of other languages, for its interpretation. 
Matthews expresses this by saying that "all that one should need in order 
to understand [such a grammar I is a knowledge of its formal structure and 
of the abstract principles on which its rules are constructed" (ibid: 10). 
A linguistic theory must provide the following information 
concerning the rules of its rule-system. Firstly, it must specify their 
place and function with respect to other rules of a grammar. Second, it 
I 
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must provide the exact format in which the rules of the rule-system are 
to be written or formulated. Each rule of inflectional morphology in word 
and paradigm II consists of at least three, but sometimes four, components. 
The reference and operand components, which are obligatory features of 
all inflectional rules, are regarded as "simply lists of categories which 
define a pair of positions ..: respectively, the positions of the form to 
be derived and the form which it is to be derived from" (Matthews 1972: 12). 
In other words, the reference and operand components of the generative 
rules of the rule system specify the output and input of each such rules, 
respectively. The third obligatory component of inflectional rules is 
called the operation component. The function of this component is to 
specify the exact nature of the operation involved in deriving the 'output' 
of a given rule-from its input. An inflectional rule may also have an 
optional compbnent, called the limitation component. The function of 
this component is to express context- s ens itivity, i. e. the restriction of 
the application of a given rule to a certain context. An example of a rule 
employing all four components will be given later in this chapter. 
As has been previously mentioned, a procedure for interpreting 
the rules of the rule-system as "part of a generative mechanism" (ibid: 13) 
must be provided. The function of this generative mechanism in word and 
paradigm II is to convert the grammatical representation of words -into 
phonological representation. I shall refrain from dealing with this 
procedure any further as this will take us far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1.3 Criteria For Evaluating Morphological Descriptions Or Solutions 
According to Matthews, the third component of a linguistic theory 
is the evaluation procedure. The evaluation procedure consists of a set 
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of criteria whose purpose is to discriminate and choose between 
competing descriptions or solutions that are formulated in accordance 
with the theory. However, Matthews (1972: 15) points out that the 
"formal nature of suchEan] evaluation 
Emeasure I is ... far from clear. 
One of the evaluation criteria considered by Matthews is the 
criterion of formal economy. This criterion may encompass a variety 
of factors, such as the "overall number of rules 
Ein 
a grammar] , the 
total number of distinct symbols (symbol types), the total number of 
symbols which make up the individual rules ('symbol tokens'), the average 
length of rules (e. g. the arithmetical average of the number of symbol 
tokens" (ibid. ). Matthews points out that the formal economy of 
competing grammars may be calculated on the basis of all these factors, 
or in terms of a sub-set of this set of factors. However, Matthews 
refrains from assigning 'numerical values' to these individual factors, or 
from arranging them in terms of their relative importance, though such 
information is crucial for the proper application of this criterion in 
assessing the merits of competing grammars. 
The second evaluation measure considered by Matthews is the 
criterion of economy of derivation. This measure does not directly 
concern competing descriptions as whole units, but individual competing 
analyses or solutions in a description formulated on the basis of the theory. 
This criterion may be explained as follows: of two or more competing 
solutions or analyses, the one which employs a smaller number of rules 
to account for the morphological structure of a word or set of words is 
regarded as a better solution. 
The third evaluation criterion of grammars in word and paradigm II 
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is generality. According to this criterion a "description a is preferable 
to [a] description b, if, 
Esay I, 
an individual rule in a is applied to 
more cases, on average, than an individual rule in b"' (ibid: 17). It is, 
however, not clear how this criterion interacts with, i. e. may be weighed 
against, the first two criteria. The same may be also said about the 
'interaction' of the first two criteria with each other and with this criterion. 
5.2 Criteria For Assessing Morphological ýheories 
In the preceding section I have dealt with the measures for 
evaluating two or more competing morphological descriptions or solutions , 
in word and paradigm II. In this section, I shall deal with the method 
proposed by Matthews for evaluating morphological theories. - This section 
will also provide the basis of the decision to restrict the scope of word 
and paradigm II in-the manner specified in section (5) above. 
5.2.1 Adequacy 
Adequacy is universally regarded as a vital factor in the evaluation 
of linguistic theories, including, of course, morphological ones. Roughly 
speaking, adequacy means that a linguistic theory must be able to serve 
as a self-contained and well-defined basis for the construction of grammars 
which account for all and only the relevant data that lie within the scope of 
the theory, in a certain manner. Linguists are not, however, anywhere 
near having full agreement as to the exact nature of the adequacy criterion, 
In spite of this situation, the transformationalist specification of this 
criterion is generally treated, especially in dynamically orientated'models 
of grammatical description, as the most sophisticated proposal available 
to us 0 
(12) 
Accordingly, Matthews treats this specification as his point 
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of reference in ascertaining the value of adequacy as an evaluation 
measure in the realm of morphological theory. 
According to the transformationalists, a theory is said to be 
observationally adequate if it accounts only for the observable data of 
acceptable texts or utterances. A linguistic theory is said to achieve 
descriptive adequacy if all grammars based on it can be shown to account 
for the observed linguistic material as well as the intuitive analyses of 
such material by the native speakers. 
Matthews expresses the view that adequacy in the descriptive sense 
is too strong a goal for morphological theories, particularly those of the 
word and paradigm type. He (1972: 21) points out that "there is nothing 
in the current literature which suggests that 'adequacy', in the field of 
morphological analysis, can profitably be interpreted as anything more 
than adequacy in an 'observational' sense. " This follows from the fact 
that "there is. no evidence that speakers have the slightest 'tacit knowledge, 
of sandhi-rules, 'basic forms' of suffices 
[etc. I` which are employed in 
morphological theories of the word and paradigm II type (ibid. ). 
Matthews further argues that if adequacy in the field of 'ý 
morphological theory Involves nothing more than observational adequacy, 
it follows that "the problem of 'accounting for the data' becomes strictly 
trivial" due to the fact that "no serious proposal can be rejected strictly 
on empirical grounds" (ibid. ). ' 
Now, by virtue of the fact that descriptive adequacy plays no part 
in the evaluation of competing morphological theories, and since 
observational, adequacy is an easily attainable goal in morphological 
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description, it is reasonable to assume that other criteria for evaluating 
such theories must be provided. One such criterion is the simplicity 
criterion. 
S. 2.2 The Simplicity Criterion 
It is a platitude of modern linguistics that if two or more competing 
theories are internally consistent and equally adequate, 
(13) 
then the 
simpler theory will be regardýd as preferable. While Matthews accepts 
the intrinsic validity of this view, he, nevertheless, argues that the 
notion of simplicity is far too vague to function as a deciding factor in 
the resolution of the issue presently under consideration in the field of 
morphology. To support his position, Matthews mentions some of the 
problems associated with the definition of the notion of simplicity. 
The, first problem mentioned by Matthews concerns the weighing of 
"the simplicity of descriptions, on the one hand, against the intrinsic 
simplicity of the theory, on the other" (i972: 22). Though linguists, 
generally, seem to prefer simplicity in descriptions to simplicity in the 
theory presupposed by those descriptions, it is not obvious how much 
complexity they are ready to tolerate in their theories to achieve the goal 
of setting up maximally simple descriptions. In spite of the fact that 
this issue is generally recognised in the literature, no attempt has been 
made, to the best of my knowledge, to suggest an answer for it. However, 
this is not surprising due to the highly complex nature of this issue. 
The second problem mentioned by Matthews is that of the exact 
definition or interpretation of the concept of simplicity itself. He (ibid: 23) 
states that simplicity is not a "unitary or indivisible concept. Many 
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factors are involved and a system which is simple in one respect may 
well be more complicated in another. " 
As far as linguistic theories are concerned, the simplicity measure 
may involve such factors as the number of levels postulated by a theory 
for dealing with the structure of human languages, the degree of parallelism 
between these levels and the type of rule-system'. inýthe wide sense of 
the term, implied by the the6ry concerned. In addition to the problem of 
weighing such factors of simplicity against each other, the linguist must 
provide an acceptable definition of the notion 'level' to render the task 
of assessing the simplicity'claims of competing theories scientifically 
feasible. 
As far as linguistic descriptions are concerned, the simplicity 
measure may involve such factors as the number of symbols, symbol 
tokens, rules and the length of rules. These different factors must be 
balanced against each other if the criterion of simplicity in the context of 
linguistic descriptions is to be established and applied in a rigorous fashion. 
Matthews (1972: 24) states the main difficulty facing any attempt 
to establish simplicity as an evaluation measure as follows: "the problem 
of balancing simplicity of theories' against 'simplicity of description' is 
... compounded by the problem of balancing different types of simplicity 
In either case. " In spite of this, simplicity is still regarded as an 
"intuitively quite legitimate" measure in the evaluation of theories and 
descriptions. What Matthews (ibid: 26) wants to guard against is the 
attempt to 
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"conclude that problems of linguistic analysis can 
be resolved deductively by the application of 
10ccam's razor'. 
(14) It is indeed 'vain to do with 
more what can be done with fewer'; but more what? 
It is easy to compose some measure of 'simplicity' 
which is logically feasible; but to do so is to invite 
a problem of meta meta criteria at a third, still more 
abstract, level. Why should one choose that verstdn 
of 'simplicity' rather than another? " 
To sum uP, the above discussion is intended to demonstrate that 
the choice between competing morphological theories cannot be decided 
on the basis of 'simplicity'. There are two main reasons behind this. 
On the one hand, 'simplicity' is not a well-defined notion in the field of 
linguistic theory. On the other hand, any attempt to define simplicity 
is thought to raise questions of logical and empirical justification. 
Consequently, the choice between competing theories must be decided on 
a still weaker basis. This basis is provided by the criterion of 
appropriateness. 
5.2.3 The Criterion Of Appropriateness 
Matthews' investigation of the measures of adequacy and 
simplicity leads him to the conclusion that the "choice of one theory or 
another will have to rest on some other weaker basis -a basis, this is to 
say, which is at once more sophisticated but more uncertain than that 
which is commonly implied in the linguistic literature" (1972: 26). As 
has been mentioned above, this basis is provided by what Matthews calls 
the criterion of appropriateness. 
To explain his view, Matthews starts with the linguistics truism 
according to which the aim of linguistics is to construct maximally 
appropriate linguistic theories. A maximally appropriate linguistic theory 
is a theory which enables the describer to set up linguistic descriptions 
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that, demonstrably,. account for all the observationally given information 
concerning the object or objects of study. If it proves to be the case 
that the requirement of setting up theories of this type clashes with the 
requirement of generality, i. e. the requirement that a-linguistic theory 
must be able to apply to all human languages, then this clash must be 
resolved, in favour of the criterion of appropriateness. 
Matthews argues that such a clash occurs when dealing with the 
inflectional phenomena of Latin, in general, and with aspects of Latin 
verb conjugation, in particular. He points out that phenomena of the 
above type have, observationally speaking, their own peculiar 
characteristics or features - e. g. cumulation and overlapping exponence 
- which, upon investigation, cannot be accounted'for in a maximally 
appropriate manner by the well-known universal models of morphological 
description 'item and arrangement' and 'item and process', or their 
extensions in stratificational grammar and transformational generative 
grammar, respectively. Such phenomena, he argues, require a special 
model of grammatical description which is designed specifically for the 
purpose of dealing with them in a maximally appropriate'manner, i. e. 
which is capable of capturing all the observationally given information 
concerning them. Word and paradigm II is said to be Just, such a model. 
However, two points must be borne in mind here. First, word an Id 
paradigm II cannot, empirically speaking,. be criticised for its inability to 
apply, in a maximally appropriate manner, to'either the inflectional, or 
non-inflectional morphological phenomena of non-inflectional languages. 
This, of course, follows directly from the fact that word and paradigm II, 
is a restricted model of inflectional morphology, operating exclusively in 
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the context of inflectional languages. Secondly it is'not clear whether 
or not Matthews rules out the possibility - either from the logical, or the 
empirical point of view, or both - that a universal linguistic theory, 
whether actual or potential, can account, in an appropriate manner, for 
the class of phenomena which fall within the scope of word and paradigm II. 
In other words, it is not obvious whether Matthews' argument in favour of 
a restricted theory, as opposed to a universal one, for dealing with the 
afore-mentioned phenomena has an absolute or a relative value. If it 
is the former, then Matthews is guilty of having reached his conclusion 
on shaky inductivist grounds, i. e. on the basis of an investigation of a 
small number of extant linguistic theories. Furthermore, even if it was 
the case that Matthews had investigated all extant linguistic approaches 
and found them defective for realising the goal he set himself, this would 
not, logically speaking, constitute a valid basis for reaching the conclusions - 
he advocates, due to the fact that the set of possible universal linguistic 
theories is, in principle, an infinite one. In addition to, this, if it is the 
case that Matthews' position is an absolutist one, then his, argument is 
circular in nature, i. e. it offers an inductivist justification for an 
inductively arrived at generalisation (c. f. Chapter I, Section-3.3). 
Matthews' argument for a restricted morphological theory of the 
type mentioned above suffers from another logical defect, 'namely the lack 
of due consideration of the importance of theory or point of view, no matter 
how latent it may be, in the formulation and launching of observational 
statements. By being theory-dependent, observational statements have 
a relative, and not an absolute, value. This, of course, means that what 
may be regarded as valid observational statements, about a given object, 
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under one point of view may not be established as such, qua content, 
under a different point of view. In other words, what may be regarded 
as special characteristic fdatures of a given set of objects under a 
particular point of view may not be given the same status under a different 
point of view (c. f. Chapter I, Section 3.4.4). 
If we now apply what has been said in the previous paragraph to 
Matthews' argument for a restricted morphological theory of the afore- 
mentioned type, then we may say that what Matthews regards as the special 
characteristic features of the inflectional phenomena of Latin are theory- 
dependent and, therefore, are of a relative nature. By implication, such 
features may not be regarded as relevant features of Latin under a different 
point of view,, and, therefore, Matthews' conclusion about the nature of 
the theory to be applied to the afore-mentioned type of phenomena may 
be considered as irrelevant. The crux of the matter, however, is that 
Matthews' conclusion concerning restricted linguistic theories is based 
on a circularity. This may be explained as follows: since the so-called 
characteristic features of the inflectional phenomena of Latin are theory 
dependent, and due to the fact that it is these features which are said to 
suggest the need for a restricted, theory of inflectional morphology, it 
follows that the requirement of providing a restricted theory is theory 
dependent. And since it is reasonable to assume that the initial implicit 
theory is, a posteriori, restricted, it follows that Matthews' argument for 
a restricted theory is circular. 
Another important defect, ' though not a logical one, in Matthews' 
argument for an inflectional theory of the restricted type is the lack of an 
explicit and precise definition of the notions 'inflectional phenomena' and 
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'inflectional language'. As has been indicated in section 4.8 above, the 
notion 'inflectional phenomena' is not a well-defined one in the post- 
theoretical sense. This is also true of 'inflectional language'. 
(15) 
. Consequently, the scope of word and paradigm II cannot be said to be 
precisely defined. Naturally, this state of affairs is bound to lead to 
elasticity and vagueness in the application of this model. 
The same situation more or less holds for the notion 'appropriateness'. 
On the one hand, the employment of the terms 'illuminating' and 
@naturalness', to replace the terms 'being appropriate' and 'appropriateness' 
respectively, does not advance our understanding of the criterion of 
appropriateness to any appreciable extent; this follows from the fact 
that the terms 'illuminating' and 'naturalness' thbmselves stand in need 
of further explication. On the other hand, the specification of factors 
(16) 
which render a given morphological theory inappropriate, though 
useful from the point of view of generally delimiting the notion of 
appropriateness, does not, for obvious reasons, lead to a precise 
explication of the nature of the criterion presently under consideration. 
One factor which is said to result in rendering a given morphological 
theory inappropriate is that the theory concerned "inhibit IS] generalisations 
to some extent" (ibid: 27). In dealing with this factor, Matthews fails to 
take account of the crucial role of the theory in delimiting the intension, 
though not the extension, of the set of generalisations that are possible to 
formulate about the language being investigated. Furthermore, he fails to 
give any indication of the extent to which a theory may inhibit 
generalisations before it can be said to be inappropriate. 
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Another factor which is said to render a given theory 
inappropriate is arbitrariness, artificiality or ad hocness. This means 
that a given morphological theory will be regarded as inappropriate if 
it results in the construction of grammars which contain solutions that 
cannot be "rationally argued". The problem with this interpretation of 
ad hocness is that it is rather vague and not fully informative. 
Finally, if we were tb carry Matthews' arguments concerning the 
desirability of restricted morphological theories to their logical conclusion, 
then it may, perhaps, turn out to be the case that there will be as many 
different $theories', in the sense of particular descriptive frameworks, as 
there are (a) human languages, and (b) describers. Strictly speaking, 
the concept of a linguistic theory in the proper sense would, in such a 
state of affairs, be redundant. Not only would such a state of affairs 
be highly unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of explicating the nature of . 
the phenomenon that is human language, but it would also defeat the 
very aim which Matthews sets himself, 'namely the setting up of 
restricted morphological theories. 
S. 2.4 Criteria For Assessing_ Morphological Theories: Final Remarks 
Matthews' appropriateness -based argument for the restricted 
nature of word and paradigm II suffers from both logical and methodological 
' (17) defects, It also suffers from an ad hoc attempt to rest the choice 
between different types of morphological theory on one factor only, namely. 
the measure of appropriateness. There is no reason why the basis of the 
afore-mentioned choice should not involve, in one form or another, the 
measures of adequacy and simplicity - despite the fact that the latter 
measure is a problematical one. Matthews also fails to take note of 
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the important fact that even-if it were the case that a universal theory 
may not be as appropriate as a restricted one,,, this is more than 
compensated for by the fact that a theory of the former type is far 
superior in terms of its ability to serve as a basis for explicating the 
nature of the phenomenon that is human language - at least under a 
certain interpretation of universal linguistic theory. 
Finally, the restricted nature of word and paradigm II seems to 
be related to the fact that the notion word, which is the corner-stone of 
this model, cannot be defined precisely in a universally applicable manner. 
One suspects that it is this feature of the 'word', coupled with its 'tyranny, 
so to speak, which underlies the argument for the restricted nature of 
word and paradigm II. If this is the case, then the argument in support 
of the restricted nature of word and paradigm II is no more than an 
attempt to rationalise a theoretically pre-held position. While, in itself, 
this is an acceptable procedure, it is not acceptable within the presumed 
context of word and paradigm II. This follows from the fact that it is 
the argument from appropriateness which, albeit implicitly, is supposed 
to Justify the postulation of the word as a central unit of grammar and'not 
vice versa. 
S. 3 The Structure Of Word And Paradigm II 
Matthews distinguishes two levels of word structure: the level of 
morpholexics, or the morpholexical level, and the level of morpho phonemics, 
or the morphophonemic level. The aim of word and paradigm II is to 
provide a framework for relating these two levels to each other, thus 
accounting for the morphological structure of words in the inflectional 
portion of such inflectional languages as Latin. Before giving a brief 
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discussion of these two levels, it will be necessary to explain some 
of the notions employed by Matthews in achieving the. afore -mentioned 
goal or aim. 
S. 3.1 The Terms 'Word' And 'Category 
It has been previously mentioned that one of the short-comings 
of traditional word and paradigm grammar and, to a large extent, word 
and paradigms I is the absence of an explicit specification of the range 
of senses encompassed by the term 'word. Matthews recognises this 
defect, aiRd he tries to overcome it by explicitly listing and labelling the 
three senses in which the term 'word' is used idword and paradigm models. 
In its first sense, the term 'word' refers to what Matthews 
appropriately designates as the 'word-form', i. e. the phonological 
representation of the phonological form of the word as a grammatical unit 
(sense III). As will be explained later, word-forms constitute the output 
of the morphophonemic level. 
In its second sense, the term 'word' refers to the abstract lexical 
element to which the members of a paradigm, i. e. words as grammatical 
entities, are said to belong. The word in this sense is no more than a 
classificatory label for a paradigm, and it corresponds to what is called 
the 'underlying form' in traditional word and paradigm grammar and the 
'base' in word and paradigm I. Matthews refers to the word in this sense 
as 'lexeme' and he adopts the convention of representing lexemes by 
capital letters. 
In its third, and most important, sense the term 'word' designates 
the notion 'word' in its capacity as a grammatical unit which occurs as a 
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constituent in grammatical constructions. It is in this sense that the 
word is said to be a central and unique entity of gr4tmmar, marking the 
boundary between morphology and syntax in word and paradigm I. It ý, 
is also the word in this sense that is said to have the grammatical and 
phonological features attributed to it by Robins (1959,1964). Matthews 
(1972,1974) reserves the term 'word' to refer to this third sense of'the 
term 'word'. 
The above three senses of the term word may be illustrated by 
the following example from English: the phoneme sequence /s Ze 
constitutes the word-form of the word 'sang' which is the past tense of 
the lexeme SANG. 
A similar treatment is accorded to the term 'category' in word and 
paradigm Il. Matthews points out that this term is three way ambiguous; 
it is used to refer to (a) word-classes, such as 'Noun', 'Verb', 'Adjective', 
etc.; (b) morpheme-classes, such as 'Aspect', 'Case', 'Tense', 'Person', * 
etc.; and (c) to particular morphemes or features of such morpheme 
classes, e. g. 'Perfective Aspect', 'Past Tense', '3rd Person', etc. To 
resolve this ambiguity, Matthews proposes the employment of the terms 
$category', 'morpho-syntactic categoryl. and 'morpho-syntactic property' 
to refer to the three afore-mentioned senses of the term category, respectively. 
Except for the notion word in the third sense, 
(18) 
none of the 
above-mentioned notions is explicitly defined in word and paradigm II. 
Matthews' remarks concerning these notions are exemplicative explanations 
and not definitions. It may, however, be argued that the above-mentioned 
notions are defined in terms of the grammatical rules that are used to 
operate on them, i. e. in an operational manner. But, the validity of 
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such an argument would be highly dubious. On the one hand, some of 
the rules operate on two or more notions, thus failing to serve as a 
basis for defining each one of these notions singly and exclusively. 
On the other hand, the operational nature of such a mode of definition is 
more apparent than real. This follows from the fact that there are no 
independent operations outwith the grammatical rules of word and 
paradigm II for defining the above-mentioned notions (c. f. Chapter I, 
section 3. (1) ). This lack of definition of the notions concerned is not 
. consistent with the commitment to precision in word and paradigm II, 
which commitment is circumscribed by the view that this model is a 
generative one in the second sense of the term mentioned above 
f. 5.1.2). 
S. 3.2 Word And Paradtgrý II : Basic Terms And Relations . 
The inflectional component of word and paradigm grammar II 
contains the following basic terms and relations. 
(19) 
W "A set of Lexemes L, 
A set of morphosyntactic properties P, 
A set of morphosyntactic Categories C, and 
(iV) A relation T ('IS A TERM IN'), 
with range C and domain included in P". 
The relation (T) is subject to the following conditions:. 
(a) "no morphosyntactic property may be assigned to more than 
one morphosyntactic category" and 
'each (morpho-syntactic) category must be assigned at least 
two properties". 
The inflectional component will also contain: 
"a set of words W, 
where each word may be characterised in terms of two further 
relations, 
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(Vi) A relation B, CBELONG TO'), 
with domain W and range L, 
(Vii) A relation Q, ('Has THE PROPERTY'), 
with domain W and range P". 
The following restrictions apply to the relations (B) and (Q): 
(C) "no word may be assigned to more than one lexeme", and 
(d) "no word may be assigned more than one property from the 
same morphosyntactic cateqpr. y"'. 
Finally, the model will postulate the following phonological 
elements and relations: 
(viii) "A set of phonemes 
and on this basis 
A set of word-forms X_ýL 
(where) Cý6 E is Ia set of continuous sequence over 
A relation R ('IS A REALISATION OV), 
with domain. C". % and range W". 
A word-form may be the realisation of two or more different words, 
and a word may have two or more different realisations. 
S. 3.3 Morpholexics 
The field of grammar in word and paradigm II contains two 
separate but inter-related sections: morphology and syntax. Morphology 
deals with the 'internal' characteristics of grammatical words, whereas 
syntax deals with their external features of deployment in larger 
grammatical constructions. More precisely, the function of syntax is - 
to generate "a set of abstract representations of sentences 
I 
whose 
I terminal. 
elements will include a set of words (expressed by lexeme-symbols with 
morphosyntactic Property-symbols as 'subscripts'), accompanied, perhaps, 
by aI set of particles" (Matthews 1965(a): 140). 
(20) 
T, he , oth . er sections 
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of the grammar, excluding semantics, provide a series of bridges 
between syntax and phonetics, thus mapping syntactic representations 
onto their phonetic manifestations. Morphology is just one such bridge 
on the route between syntax and phonetics, and it has the special 
function of mapping syntactic representations of the type mentioned above 
onto their phonological representation. 
(21) 
Thi s is carried out in two 
major stages: the morpholexical stage and the morphophonemic one, 
which constitute the two 'levels' of the inflectional component of word 
and paradigm II. In this section, I shall deal only with the morpholexical 
level. 
The morpholexical structure of a word-form is said to be'wholly 
derivational in character, i. e. to be susceptible to specification by the 
application of a finite set of different types of rule to. primary and, 
whenever relevant, intermediate forms which are called roots and stems, 
respectively. The format of these rules and the procedure of interpretation 
associated with them will not concern us here, as this will take us far 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The role of morpholexics is to provide a framework or mechanism 
in terms of which the syntactic or 'grammatical' representation of a 
grammatical word may be related to, or paired off with, the morphophonemic 
representation of the word concerned. In addition to the' set of 
morpholexical rules, this mechanism consists of: 
(a) a list of all roots in the inflectional portion of the language; 
(22) 
this information is supplied by the lexical section of-a'word and paradigm II 
which specifies the roots of all lexemes and specifies "the membership of 
any inflectional classes to which the rules may refer" (Matthews 1972: 174); 
and 
(b) a Finite State Machine which specifies the sequence of operations 
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involved in delimiting the set of basic word-forms. 
Matthews (ibid: 170) exemplifies this mechanism by the Latin 
forms -a, la-. b-. E- . 
ýa, reg-tu: r : g, a. -b: 7su: r- reg- 71: reg-R, 
rump-jo, ru: p-!:, which are among the forms specified by the list of 
roots reg, la. *b, rup and the Finite State Machine schematized below: 
suff ix 
s Uff ix s 
S 
infix nasal 
lengthen root 
For example, the sequence of operations: 
suffix S, suff ix i 
that are involved in deriving reg-. E-Li: from the root reg may be obtained 
by starting from the initial state, symbolised by (S 0 
), taking the second 
transition to the first state (S 1) and finally taking the transition to 
(S 
3)' 
Each trahsition*is specified by an operation or morpholexical rule in the 
rule system. The sequence of these rules, or their order of application, 
is specified by the grammar. 
suffix u: r- 
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Each rule consists of at least three components: the operation 
component, the reference component and the operand component (c. f. 
section 5.1.2) which respectively correspond to (i) an individual 
transition in the finite state machine, (ii) the state resulting from the 
transition and (iii) the state preceding the transition. 
'Morpholexical rules must, wherever required, specify the 
conditions under which they apply. This feature of such a rule is 
expressed either by incorporating a set of morpho-syntactic properties 
in the reference component of a given rule, or by incorporating such 
Pi6Perties'in the operand component, or by a limitation component in the 
manner explained earlier in this chapter. 
Finally, the derivational rule, 
(23) 
in morpholexics must satisfy 
the following conditions: 
(1) the condition of completeness: this condition means that 
derivational rules in morýholexics must supply at least one realisation 
for every word in the syntactic representation generated by the syntactic 
component'of a word and paradigm grammar II; 
(2) the condition of non-redundancy: this condition means thafthere 
should be no cases where the same realisation is arrived at by two or' 
more different routes in a word and paradigm grammar II; and 
(3) the condition of exhaustive tnterpretibility: this condition means 
that it must be possible, according to the interpretation procedure of the 
rule system, 
(24) 
to trace a finite path from any stage in the derivation 
back to the root-symbol. 
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S. 3.3.1 The Relation Of Morpholexical Exponence 
One of the grammatical relations defined in morpholexics is 
that of morpholexical exponence. The definition of this relation is 
dependent on a prior definition of the notion formative. A formative is 
defined as "any complex of phonological elements or phonological 
features which is present after the application of a given operation, but 
was not present before it" (Matthews 1972: 185). - For instance,, the 
phonological feature /i: / in /ru: pi: / is a formative which results- from 
the rule associated with the operation that affixes i: to the root rup in the 
finite state machine schematized in the preceding section. - Similarly, 
the lengthening of the vowel of the root rup is said to be a formative, 
since it results from the rule associated with operation "lengthen root- 
vowel" in the finite state machine. These two formatives differ from each 
other in the sense that whereas the former is a segmental formative, the 
latter is a non-segmental one. The basis of this distinction is too 
obvious to warrant any explanation. 
Matthews (ibid. ) defines the notion of morpholexical exponence, 
which he symbolizes by E, as follows: "for a given word W and word form 
W (where U) is a realisation of W), L (formAtive) E (IS AN, 
EXPONENT OR PARTIAL EXPONENT OV) p if and only if: 
UO has the property p, 
f is a part of a formative, defined by the application of some 
operation 0, 
(111) 0 is selected by a derivational rule r. where r has .2 as one of 
the 
properties in its reference component. " 
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5.3.4 Morphophonemics: 
-It is very difficult to give a concise and systematic explanation 
of the level of morphophonemics in word and paradigm II, due to the 
fact that Matthews' discussion of this part of his theory is sporadic and 
inconclusive in character. Generally speaking, the function of 
(25) 
morphophonemic rules is to map the morphophonemic representation 
of word-forms, which is provided by the morpholexics, onto their phonemic 
representation in the phonology. In other words, the function of the 
morphophonemic level is to provide the relevant methodological framework 
for converting the morphophonemic representations of word-forms, 
generated by the morpholeýcics, to phonemic representations. 
In carrying out the above task, morphophonemic rules perform a 
number of operations, referred to by the term sandhi., Sandhi operations 
may vary from a simple concatenation of elements in the morphophonemic 
representation, to complete-fusion of forms where segmentation into neat 
discrete sequences of phonological forms is not descriptively possible. 
The boundary between morpholexics and morphophonemics in a 
given grammar is established by reference to the criteria of descriptive 
appropriateness and naturalness. This means that phenomena are dealt 
with on that level of the inflectional component where their treatment 
proves to be most appropriate. Generally speaking, however, 
morpholexical rules deal with such phenomena as affixation, reduplication 
and modification; rules of this type are thought to be arbitrary in their 
application. In contradistinction, morphophonemic rules deal with cases 
of assimilation and fusion, and they are thought to apply in a manner which 
is said to be "essentially motivated or non-arbitrary" (Matthews 1972: 215)-, 
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i. e. they express generalisations which often have some general 
phonetic explanation in the language. 
4 Word And Paradigm II: Final Remarks 
Matthews' (1972) exposition of his theory of inflectional 
morphology, to which I have referred as word and paradigm II, is 
extremely difficult to follow. In his major work on this theory, i. e. 
Inflectional Morphology_ (197 2), Matthews attempts to explain his theory 
by, in part, considering it in relation to other approaches of morphological 
description, item and arrangement, stratificational grammar, item and 
process and transformational generative grammar. While this method of 
exposition has the advantage of setting word and paradigm II in its proper 
context, i. e. the context of relevant linguistic theories, it often leads 
the discussion away from the central issue of the nature of the theory 
concerned. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that Matthews asks 
more questions than he tries to answer, and by the fact that he argues 
every point to destruction, but without, in most cases, reaching any 
definite conclusion. As a result of this it is very difficult to establish 
the nature of word and paradigm II in a satisfactorily precise manner. 
The division of the sub-field of grammar, in the narrow sense of 
this term, into morphology and syntax is considered as one of the most- 
important features of word and paradigm II, so much so that Matthews 
(1965) regards any grammar which preserves this division as a word and 
paradigm grammar. This division is drawn in terms of the special 
character of the word, which acts as the upper limit of morphology and 
the lower limit of syntax. This implies that rules, of the inflectional 
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component in a word and paradigm grammar II must apply'within the, 
limit of the word. It also implies that these rules must conform to 
the condition of being purely morphological in nature, i. e. they make 
reference only to the morphological notions, whether units or. relations, 
of the theory. 
In addition to its role as a point of reference for the demarcation 
between morphology and syntax, the word plays a vital role, albeit 
indirectly, in the argument for restricted morphological theories and in 
delimiting the scope of word and paradigm II to the class of inflectional 
languages. Clearly, everything hinges on the ability of this model to 
provide relevant grammatical criteria of word-status which can serve as 
a basis for the identification of words in languages of the afore-mentioned 
type. The features of word-status provided by Matthews (1972) are more 
or less the same as those given by Robins (1959,1964) and discussed 
earlier in this chapter (section 4.3.1-4.3.2). It is not my intention here 
to discuss these criteria, as they have been dealt with before in their 
universal character. Suffice it to say here that Matthews himself admits 
that these criteria do not consistently and exhaustively apply to words in 
Latin. 
Beyond its obvious effect on the methodological status of the 
morphology versus syntax division, and, likewise, its effect on the 
restriction of word and paradigm II to inflectional languages, the above 
admission by Matthews serves as counter evidence to the claim that the 
model concerned is a generative theory, in the wider sense of the term 
@generative' mentioned in section 5.1.2 above. The generative character 
of word and paradigm II is more in the nature of formulisation than 
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formalisation, since, in many instances, it involves clothing ill-defined 
concepts in seemingly formally tight language. Examples of this 
procedure are the statements involving the concepts of lexeme and 
morpho-syntactic category and property (c. f. section S. 3.1). 
Though Matthews concentrates on such issues as the criteria 
for evaluating morphological descriptions and theories, and on the nature 
of a generative morphological theory, he omits to give proper consideration 
to the methodological and epistemological foundations of his theory. In 
this respect, word and paradigm II, as well as word and paradigm I, differ 
from the three other morphological approaches dealt with in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, word and paradigm II seems to adopt a predominantly 
inductivist philosophy of science. This feature of word and paradigm II 
is manifested in the manner in which Matthews arrives at his conclusions 
and general principles from observations about, and discussion of, the 
phenomena he deals with. Epistemologically speaking, word and 
paradigm II is of a predominantly realist nature; however, it sometimes 
employs instrumentalist notions, e. g. the notion of identity-operation 
(c. f . section 4.7), to preserve the condition of theoretical consistency 
which all good scientific theories must satisfy. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
For this point the reader may consult Crystal (1971), Lyons (1968) 
and Palmer (1971). 
(2) The fact that item and arrangement was a new model might have 
been a factor behind its popularity. 
(3) This is an alternative, albeit rather loose, formulation of the 
question posed by Lyons (1968: 201) and given at the end of the 
next section. 
(4) Matthews (1974: 164) points out that in some language, for example 
Turkish, entities which are thought of as words have "a potentially 
contrastive ordering of formatives". 
See Palmer (1971) for a discussion of this point. 
(6) For this classification the reader may refer to Bloomfield (1976), 
Nida (1949) and Sapir (1921). 
(7) Matthews (1974: 121) defines an identity operation as "an operation 
whose output is identical with its input". He (ibid. ) exemplifies 
such an operation by the derivation of the "Present Tense of SAIL... 
from the appropriate root sail, the Singular of MAN from man the 
Present Tense as well as the Past Participle of COME from come, and 
so on", 
(8) Strictly speaking, the notion of 'ordering' in the above definition of 
paradigm is nothing but an instrumentalist notion. The reader may 
consult Saussure (1974: 1271 for a similar criticism. 
(9) The discussion in this section is relevant for morphology in 
transformational generative grammar. 
(10) See Chapter 1 for a discussion and a critique of the different types 
of induction. 
On the basis of this we may say that word and paradigm 1 adopts,, 
albeit implicitly, an eclectic epistemological stance. 
(12) See Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax for a discussion of 
these criteria; see also section 6.3.1, chapter III for a discussion 
of these criteria in the "full-entry theory". 
(13) Of course, under the same interpretation of adequacy. 
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(14) Such a procedure is adopted by stratificational grammar. 
(15) The notion of 'inflectional language' appears to be based on the 
well-known classification of languages into: agglutinative, 
inflectional and isolational. 
(16) Matthews (1972) employs this procedure in his delimitation of the 
concept of 'appropriateness'. 
(17) Though Matthews does not talk about consistency as an evaluation 
procedure, there is no reason to believe that consistency is not 
regarded as an evaluation measure in word and paradigm II. 
(18) Matthews fails to offer a rigorous set of criteria for delimiting all 
and only the words even in Latin (see Matthews 1972: 96-103). 
(19) See Matthews (1972: 160-65) for this formulation. 
(20) The following example from Matthews (1965(a): 140-41). will 
illustrate this point: "The syntactic representation of [the] sentence 
I Satis din vel naturae vixi vel gjoLiaeý would be some sort of 
structure, or set of structures, which unites the words NATURA 
DAT 
(ive), sg, 
GLORIA DAT, s g, and 
VIVO P (er) f (ective), FIN, 
Pr(sent-) I (ndicative), I, sg, A with the particles Satis and Din 
and two tokens of the particle Vel. By assigning this representation, 
the syntactic rules would indicate that there is at least one 
grammatical utterance (e. g. the sentence cited) which corresponds 
to such a configuration of elements". 
(21) Matthews (1965: 141) illustrates morphological rules by reference to 
the example in fn. (17) as follows: ". .. one set Of morphological 
rules would indicate, specifically, that Satis is realised by satis, 
Vel by vel and Din by din; a further set might indicate, when taken 
together, that NATURA DAT, sg and 
GLORIA DAT, sg are realised 
by 
naturae and gloria ; and a whole series of rules would amount to the 
statement that VIVO Pf, FIN, Pr I, I, sg A 
is realised by vixi". 
(22) Concerning the list of roots - called lexical entries in Matthews 
(1965(a) - Matthews (ibid: 149-50) writes: the lexical section 
will be a simple list of lexical entries. Each entry is in part a 
statement of the syntactic (or syntactic and semantic) properties of a 
particular lexeme or particle: thus an entry for English LOVE would 
indicate that it is a verb, specifically a transitive verb, that it 
collocates with animate subjects, that it has HATE as an antonym, 
and so forth. If the entry is for a particle a representation of its 
base form may also be included: if it is for a lexeme we require 
that it should include a representation of the root and a list of 
morphological classes". 
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(23) As far as the ordering of derivational rules is concerned, Matthews 
(1972: 196) states that the set of such rules is "not simply a set 
of derivational rules, but a set of separate rule groups, each of 
which consists of a series of derivational rules ... ". 
(24) For the interpretation procedures of the morpholexical and 
morphophonemic rule-systems the reader may consult Matthews 
(1972: 175: 182) and (252-259) respectively. 
(25) The format and interpretation of these rules will not concern us here. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
MORPHOLOGY IN 
AXIOMATIC FUNCTIONALISM 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MORPHOLOGY IN AXIOMATIC FUNCTIONALISM 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the morphological section 
of. the theory of axiomatic functionalism, and its methodological and 
epistemological foundations. The first extensive public exposition of 
this theory came in 1968 in Mulder's book Sets and Relations in Phonology 
An Axiomatic Approach to the Description of Speech. The term %xiomatic' 
in the sub-title of this book designates one of the chief methodological 
features of this theory, namely the employment of the axiomatic method 
of theory construction in the presentation of the set of axioms and 
definitions that constitute the theory. As axiomatic systems are, by 
their very nature, deductive, it follows that the deductive method of 
logical inference constitutes another important element in the methodological 
armoury of axiomatic functionalism. From the set of axioms and 
definitions explicitly listed in the theory, a very large set of theorematic 
statements can be derived by applying rules of logical inference'* -Theorems, 
of course, may in turn serve as premisses from which further theorematic 
statements can be derived by, again, applying the same rules of logical 
, inference. The application of the axiomatic method of theory construction 
in the setting up of axiomatic functionalism will be dealt with later in this 
chapter. Prior to this, however, I shall concentrate briefly on other 
defining features of this approach. 
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2. - Deduction In Axiomatic Functionalism 
Deduction is generally opposed to induction. 
(1) 
A prevalent, 
mode of characterising the difference between these two types of 
inference runs as follows: while in deduction 
(2) 
particular statements, 
called 
'conclusions, 
are derived or inferred from general, universal ones, 
called premisses, the opposite is the case in induction. I have dealt 
with induction extensively in the first chapter, so I will not deal with 
it any further here. My intention in this section is to show that the 
above prevalent mode of characterising deduction does not constitute 
an adequate account of the form and nature of those inferences that are 
said to be deductive by logicians and philosophers of science. As a 
result of this, I hope to be able to throw some light on the nature of 
deduction in axiomatic functionalism. 
To demonstrate the above point, let us consider the following 
examples of types of valid deductive argument: 
Premise I: All humans are mortal. 
Premise II : Socrates is human. 
Conclusion : Socrates is mortal. 
(ii) Premise I: All humans are animals. 
Premise II : All animals are mortal. 
Conclusion : All humans are mortal. 
(iii) Premise I: If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal. 
Premise II : Socrates is human. 
Conclusion : Socrates is mortal. 
The above examples illustrate the only three types of valid 
deductive inference that are recognised in standard text books of logic, 
e. g. Copi (1978). ý In the first example, only the first premise is a 
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universal statement. In the second -example, all three statements, i. e. 
the two premisses and the conclusion, are universal statements. Th is 
contrasts with the third example in which all three statements are 
particular, non-universal statements. 
On the basis of these remarks, it may be concluded that the 
characterisation of deduction mentioned at the beginning of this section 
cannot be further from the truth, i. e. from the situation which actually 
holds in deduction. It is, logically speaking, not possible to have a 
deductive inference in which all the premisses are universal statements 
or propositions, and in which the conclusion is a particular one. It also 
goes without saying that it is not logically possible to have a deductive 
inference in which all the premisses are particular statements, but in which 
the conclusion is a universal one, as such an inference would not be 
deductive, but inductive. 
Finally, the criterion for assessing the validity of deductive 
inferences is not the empirical 'truth' of the statements, whether premisses 
or conclusions, which constitute them, but the logical necessity with 
which the conclusions follow from the premisses of such inferences. An 
inference in which the conclusion follows from the premisses by logical 
necessity is said to be a valid deductive inference, whereas one in which 
it does not is said to be an 'invalid' deductive inference. Copi (1978: 35) 
sums up the essential character of deductive inferences as follows: 
"We characterise a deductive argument as one whose conclusion is claimed 
to follow from its premisses with absolute necessity, this necessity not 
being a matter of degree and not depending in any way upon whatever else 
may be the case". This characterisation of deduction accounts for what is 
meant by deduction in axiomatic functionalism fully and completely. 
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Function In Axiomatic Functionalism 
Another salient feature of axiomatic functionalism is its adoption 
of the functional point of view as its criterion of relevance. The terms 
'function', 'functional' and 'functionalism' are used in a variety of 
senses in the literature to characterise different approaches to modern 
linguistics, but a discussion of these different senses will not concern 
us here. All we are interested in in this chapter is the precise 
interpretation and significance of the functional principle as a criterion 
of relevance in axiomatic functionalism, together with an indication of 
the precursors of this principle in those approaches which axiomatic 
functionalism may be said to presuppose historically. 
The functional principle, though not so designated, is one of 
the corner-stones of Saussurean linguistics. Saussure's (1970: 120) 
statement "in language there are only differences" beautifully captures 
the spirit of this principle. This principle is also found at work in the 
approaches of Prague school linguistics and glossematics. It, is, 
however, Martinet who gave this principle its most famous formulation, 
expressed by the statement "function is the criterion of linguistic, 
reality" (1960: 5). 
As it stands, Martinet's dictum cannot be fully acceptable to 
axiomatic functionalists who place a great deal of emphasis on the 
relevance of considerations of epistemology and scientific methodology 
in theory-building. To begin with, Martinet does not offer a satisfactory 
explanation of what is meant by 'linguistic reality' in his above-cited 
dictum. Nor does he give a fully explicit and precise explanation of 
what is meant by the pair of terms 'function' and 'functional' in his approach. 
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Axiomatic functionalists believe that these two weaknesses in 
Martinet's dictum, which pertain to questions of epistemology and 
scientific methodology, must be remedied, if the functional principle 
is to serve as a fully-fledged principle in functional linguistics. 
To obviate the first difficulty, Mulder treats the functional 
principle not as a criterion of linguistic reality, but as a criterion of 
linguistic relevance. To overcome the second difficulty, Mulder defines 
'functional' as "separately relevant to the purport of the whole of which 
it is a part" (1980(c): def 12), the purport being communication by 
conventional means. According to this interpretation of functionality, 
a functionally relevant entity in a semiotic system, including human 
language, of course, is said to be functionally distinctive; the'notion 
distinctive function is defined as "the set of commutations in which a 
semiotic entity may partake" (ibid: def. 7a3), and commutation, in turn, 
is defined as "alternation between semiotic entities (or 'zero' and 
semiotic entities) in functional opposition as immediate constituents in 
a given context" (ibid: def 7a2). 
Under this interpretation of functionality, only those features of 
speech which are deemed to be relevant for the purposes of communication 
by conventions are accounted for, or dealt with. Non-functional features 
of speech are not regarded as'relevant, though, of course, they may be 
interesting in themselves, or may be established as relevant under a 
different point of view. An example of a non-functional feature is the 
parasitic phonetic form 
[t ] inEmints] - mince - in the speech'of 
speakers of Southern English. By saying that [t] in the phonetic string 
I mints I is a parasitic phonetic element, which is not phonologically, 
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and, therefore, linguistically relevant, axiomatic functionalists do 
not deny that it is a speech segment, i. e. an 'objectively' observable 
entity, or that it is part of the speech-phenomena of Southern English. 
What is meant by saying that 
Et] in the above phonetic string is a 
parasitic feature is that it is not, from the point of view of the functional 
principle, a linguistically relevant entity. Since the presence of I t] 
in the above string is automatically entailed by the context, this entity 
is not separately and independently relevant to the purport of the whole 
of which it is a part and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a functional 
feature. 
In contradistinction, the phoneme A/ in /tin/ is a functionally 
. distinctive entity in English because it is "functionally relevant to the 
purport of the whole of which it is a part", i. e. /tin/. This can be 
easily demonstrated by applying the commutation test to it, and observing 
whether its opposition to other entities, or to its own. absence, symbolised by 
'0, can result in a change of the message associated with /tin/. That 
this is demonstrably the case may be shown by commuting A/ with /p/ 
and Isl to yield /pin/ and /sin/ respectively, or with 'jP to yield 
/idin/ which, i. e. the resultant entities, all have different messages 
linked with them from that linked with /tin/. 
The functional principle, in its capacity as a criterion of relevance, 
is a crucial factor in the delimitation of the scope of the theory of axiomatic 
functionalism. By delimiting the type of data the theory aims to account 
for, the functional principle 'delimits' the nature of the descriptions which 
result from the application of the theory to them. The importance of a. 
well-defined point of view, i. e. a criterion of relevance,, to and in, any 
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scientific theory, whether linguistic or not, cannot be over-emphasised. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that the possession of a 
well-defined point of view by a theory is sufficient to make the theory 
concerned a 'good' linguistic theory. The 'existence' of a well-defined 
point of view is just one factor which makes a given linguistic theory a 
'good' theory. Other factors, e. g. consistency, explicitness, precision, 
etc. -play a crucial role 
in rendering a linguistic theory a 'good' theory. 
4. , The Relationship Between Linguistic Theory, Linguistic Description 
And Speech-Phenomena 
According to Mulder, s pee ch -phenomena, or rather fields of 
s pee ch -phenomena, are logically independent of both'the theory and the 
descriptions which result from the application of the theory to them, in 
the sense that the theory may have never existed or may have never been 
applied to them. _ In other words, 
for their existence the s pee ch- phenomena 
of, say, English are not dependent on the existence of linguists and/or 
linguistic theories, nor are they dependent on the existence of any 
description of them on the basis of the theory. By implication, the 
pre-descriptive patterning conventions which 'govern' speech phenomena 
are independent of both the theory and the descriptions which result from 
its application to individual fields of such phenomena. 
Linguistic theory, in turn, is logical, ly independent of speech- 
phenomena. If all speech -phenomena were to disappear tomorrow, this 
would not affect the status of the theory as a theory in its own right. 
True, such a theory would be 'vacuous' from the descriptive point of view, 
in the sense that it would cease to serve as a tool for description, and, 
therefore, would not be susceptible to evaluation in terms of adequacy. 
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But such-! vacuity' would in no way. affect the status of a theory as a 
formal theoretical system. 
The theory is also logically independent of any observations 
about s pee ch- phenomena or any descriptions of fields of such phenomena, 
in the sense that it is not logically derived from them. By implication, 
the theory lacks a logical source or origin and it is non-inductive - by 
virtue of this feature, the theory avoids the problem of circularity which 
characterises inductive ly-ba s ed theories. In a linguistic theory of the 
axiomatic functionalist type, questions concerning the construction of the 
theory, i. e. the activity of constructing the theory, pertain not to the 
logic but to the psychology of scientific discovery and, therefore, they 
need not concern us at all (c. f. Chapter I Sections 2,3.9.2 and fn 1). 
However, the theory is not completely divorced of all 'reality', since 
speech-phenomena, or experience of such phenomena, play a logically 
unspecified, and inherently unspecifiable, role in the theory-construction 
phase. 
Furthermore, the theory is not logically derived from any prior 
set of premisses, because if this was the case, then the theory would be 
no more than a special case of some other more comprehensive theory. By 
implication, the theory, as a self-contained- whole, cannot be said to have 
a 'historical' source to which it can be traced logically, though the work 
of other linguists and any previous versions of the same theory may play 
an important role in its construction. 
The absence of any logically traceable source for the theory may 
be referred to, after Hjelmslev, as the arbitrary nature of the theory or, 
simpIy, its arbitrariness. It is, however, necessary to point out 
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immediately that (a) the arbitrariness of the theory is tempered by its 
appropriateness, i. e. its ability to serve as a basis for the construction 
of descriptions which are required to satisfy certain evaluation 'criteria',, 
and (b) arbitrariness is different from ad hocness. Ad hocness is 
generally regarded as a property of linguistic descriptions, analyses or 
solutions. An ad hoc linguistic description is characterised by analyses 
or solutions which are not based on the theory, but which are of an 
auxiliary nature, in the sense that they are included in such a description 
to account for what may be called, for the lack of a better term, 
frecalcitrant' phenomena or data. 
Considered from the point of view of its goal or purpose, the 
theory may be characterised as a tool, or an instrument, which can be 
applied to yield descriptions of any chosen field of speech-phenomena 
which lies within its own scope - the scope being 'defined' by the point 
of view or criterion of relevance. The fields of speech-phenomena are 
. unlimited in number, and the selection of any one of them for description 
on the basis of the theory, at a given moment in time, is governed by 
purely practical considerations, including the condition of accessibility 
to the phenomena. Accessibility to the phenomena can be achieved 
either via a personal knowledge of the 'language' from which the speech- 
phenomena are drawn, or by working with informants or other means, such 
as written texts, especially in the case of so-called dead languages. 
As a tool for description, the theory may be said to provide the 
describer with the 'conceptual' framework and the methodological armoury 
for describing any select, field of speech-phenomena., The theory must, 
therefore, be precisely formulated and rigorously stated so that the 
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, 
describer, be it the author 6f the theory himself, 
-or 
any otherllnýulst, 
. 
can apply it without having to appeal to his Intuitions, -or 
to aM other" 
extra -theoretical considerations or factors, in arriving at and justifying 
. 
the descriptions he sets up In addition to this, the theory must be 
self-contained and complete *so that descriptions, of the premisspd nature 
can be supplied on its basis'without having to introduce or appeal to any 
auxiliary assumptions, whether'tacit or explicit. 
As has been indicated above, a description results from the 
application of the theory to a select field of speech-phenomena. From 
this it is clear that a given description is logically dependent on both 
the theory and the field of speech-phenomena which it aims to describe. 
In other words, there cannot, from the axiomatic functionalist point of 
view, be a description without both a theory and a given field of speech- 
phenomena. Without the former, a description is not logically- possible, 
and without the latter, a description is not empirically and logically 
possible. Mulder (1980(b) ) schematises the relationship between the 
theory, descriptions and fields of speech-phenomena as follows: 
Description of German speech-phenomena 
of German 
Description of French 
1-111 speech-phenomena 
of French 
Description of speech-phenomena 
Linguistic f Parisian French of Parisian French 
D 
heory Theory 
Description of Dutch s pee ch -phenomena- 
of Dutch 
-D 
escription of Chinese 
I speech-phenomena- [ 
, _ 
of Chinese 
Description of Hottentot s pee ch -phenomena 
of Hottentot 
etc, etc. 
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If we Interpret the arrow in the above diagram as 'implies' or 
'pre-supposes', then we may say that there is a one-to-one relation of 
unilateral implication between each description and the field of speech- 
phenomena it describes. We may also say that there is a one-to-many 
relation between the theory and the descriptions which result from its 
application to the select fields of speech-phenomena. Each description 
implies both the theory and a given field of speech-phenomena. The 
possibility of a description without both the theory and a given field of 
speech-phenomena is ruled out. The absence of any arrows between the 
theory and the fields of speech -phenomena signifies the mutual logical 
independence which holds between them, as has been explained earlier 
in this section. 
A linguistic description of a particular field of s pee ch- phenomena 
does not account for every single object or feature in that field; rather, it 
deals only with those features, within this field, which are considered 
to be relevant under the theory. This situation may be further 'explained 
I 
by noting that though the extension of a particular field of speech-phenomena 
is not specified, or determined, by the theory, the type of phenomena to be 
dealt with, and their relevant aspects, are. Only those features which 
are said to be functional in a particular field of speech-phenomena are 
considered as legitimate targets for description under the theory. This 
relationship between fields of s pee ch- phenomena and the theory is 
accounted for, albeit indirectly, in the above diagram. 
The above diagram does not account for the dynamic and. 
evolutionary aspect of the relationship between descriptions and the 
(4) 
theory. There is no doubt that descriptions may affect the theory, in 
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the sense that they may suggest certain revisions in the theory. The 
exact nature of this feed-back from descriptions to theory will not 
concern us here. It is, however, worth mentioning that such a feed-back 
is a normal situation in the field of sCientif ic -inquiry, and that it is 
not necessarily of an inductive nature. 
Finally, Mulder draws a sharp line between the theory, on the 
one hand, and the descriptions based on that theory, on the other. He 
points out (1980(d): 67) that "this Es ituation obtains] because linguistics 
Is not concerned with the description of ONE universe - all speech-phenomena 
(taken as a whole) - but. with a virtually unlimited number of PARALLEL 
(5) 
universes This sharp distinction between theory and description 
is regarded by Mulder as one of the main salient features of the 
methodological foundations of axiomatic functionalism. 
S. The Speech-Phenomena 
According to Mulder, speech-phenomena alone constitute proper 
objects for description in axiomatic functionalism. Though Mulder has 
changed his mind, 
(6) 
sometimes quite radically, concerning certain 
issues in 'his' approach, his position concerning the status of speech- 
phenomena as the only proper objects for description in axiomatic 
functionalism has remained un-altered since the publication of Sets and 
Relations in Phonology in 1968. His statement (1968: 19): "What I, as 
a pure linguist, am describing and explaining is speech' is as true of his 
current position, concerning the matter presently under consideration, as 
it was of his position in 1968. 
Mulder's insistence that only speech-phenomena, and not 
intuitions about such phenomena, constitute proper objects for description 
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in linguistics sets the axiomatic functionalist approach apart from 
the majority of contemporary approaches, especially non-European ones. 
In transformational generative grammar, both speech-phenomena proper 
and intuitions about such phenomena are regarded as legitimate objects 
for 'description' in linguistics. 
(7) 
This difference between these two 
approaches results from their radically different theoretical views 
concerning the nature of linguistics as a discipline. judging the one 
approach solely by the standards of the other is, in my opinion, a 
dangerous and futile exercise. 
The term 'speech-phenomena' in axiomatic functionalism does 
not directly refer to actual speech-events which take place in space and 
time, but to records of such events, i. e. to protocol statements which 
record such fleeting speech-events. In other words, the term 'speech- 
phenomena' does not immediately refer to concrete speech-events or 
objects, but to abstract models which stand in some relation of isomorphism 
to such events or objects. It is to be expected that in the course of 
reducing speech-events to speech-phenomena, by arresting them, as it 
were, some distortion might take place. ý This is an inevitable situation, 
and one that a linguist has to learn to live with. 
According to axiomatic functionalism a linguistic description-is 
always adescription of a particular field of s pee ch -phenomena and not of 
a language, A language 
-X 
is said to emerge, or to be esta . blished by, a 
description of speech-phenomena of X. Thus, the Arabic language, for 
example, is no more than a hypothetical model established by a description 
of the speech-phenomena of Arabic. This amounts to a denial, from a 
logical point of view, of the objective existence of languages, independently 
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of thedescriptions of particular fields of speech -phenomena from which 
these languages emerge. According to axiomatic functionalism, a 
linguist does not start from a language in descTiption, but he 'creates' 
I 
a language, as a hypothetical model, by description. In this respect, 
axiomatic functionalism differs from almost all modern linguistic 
approaches, except, perhaps, Hjelmslev's glossematics. 
(8) 
The above axiomatic functionalist view of the nature of human 
language as a hypothetical construct cannot be logically faulted, for it 
appears to be entirely consistent with the underlying premisses and 
assumptions on which it is based. ' However, we may distinguish between 
language in this sense - which I shall call, for the lack of a better term, 
the post-descriptive sense - and language in the pre-descriptive sense. 
In terms of the latter sense, we may say that the term 'a language -XI 
refers to the 'patterns' or 'conventions' which the members of the speech 
community of X 'appear' to employ in the production and comprehension 
of linguistic utterances when communicating with each other by the medium 
of speech (or, for that matter, writing). Whether these 'patterns' or 
'conventions' form a system, in the full sense of the term, and whether 
they are of a psychological, linguistic, neuro-linguistic, or whatever 
nature is entirely irrelevant when talking about language in this sense. 
What is relevant in this context is that it seems reasonable to assume 
that when two members of a given speech-community communicate with 
each other by the medium of speech they appear to do so with systemacity, 
and not in a haphazard fashion. It also seems reasonable to assume that 
without positing the notion language in the pre-descriptive sense, or a 
similar notion, we will not be*able to explain the 'manifest' communicative 
systemacity mentioned above in a non-theoretical rational manner. Nor 
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will we be able to talk about the speech-phenomena of X, prior to a 
description of those phenomena, in a legitimate manner. 
However, a word of warning is necessary here. The linguistls* 
language, i. e. language 
_in 
the post-descriptive sense - cannot be said 
to be materially identi6al With language in the pre-descriptive sense, or 
vice versa. This follows from the fact that since language in the 
pre-descriptive sense is not open to frontal attack, either by direct or 
indirect observation, one cannot establish identity between it and a 
language in the Post-descriptive sense without introducing meta physicalism, 
in the Popperian sense (c. f. Chapter 1, section 3.9.1), into one's approach. 
As an instance of this view, we may say that though we can talk about the 
Arabic language in the pre-descriptive sense, the assumption that the 
Arabic language in this sense is identical with the Arabic language in the 
post-descriptive. sense., or vice versa,, is, logically speaking, 'a 
non-sequitur. However, the possibility of such an establishment of 
identity between the two objects 'language' being realised in the future 
cannot, from the logical viewpoint, be ruled out. 
Finally, the term 's pee ch -phenomena I in axiomatic functionalism, -. 
is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. As axiomatic functionalism is a 
semiotically-based theory, and since the vast majority of semiotic systems 
which fall within its own scope do not manifest themselves by vocal 
means - for example, the systems of traffic signs and Morse Code, it 
follows that the term 'speech-phenomena' is not ideally suited, for 
obvious reasons, to designate the manifestation phenomena of such systems. 
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6. The Theory 
1 Introduction 
In section (3) above I have dealt with the axiomatic functionalist 
theory from the point of view of its aim as a tool, or an instrument, 
which can be used for setting up descriptions of an unlimited number of 
fields of s pee ch- phenomena., The aim of this section is to deal with 
this theory from the point of view of its content, i. e. the type of 
statements it contains., 
The axiomatic functionalist theory contains two types of 
explicitly listed statement: axioms and definitions. Five of the axioms 
in the theory are by Mulder, and the one dealing with semantics is by 
his principal collaborator, Hervey. The set of axioms and definitions 
constitute the basic premisses or principles of the theory. Theorems 
are derived from these basic premisses and other theorems by applying 
normal rules of deductive inference. However, theorems are not listed 
in the theory. As there is a virtually unlimited number of such statements, 
listing them all in the theory becomes a practical impossibility. 
The term 'postulate', which appears in the title of the works which 
embody the axioms and definitions of axiomatic functionalism (Mulder 
1980(c), Hervey 1980(c) ), is used to refer to the set of axioms and 
definitions, i. e. to all "non-theorematic theoretical statements" (Mulder 
ib id: 4 0). 
Mulder's postulational method differs from that of Bloomfield 
(1926) in three major respects: in terms of its goal, in terms of the 
organisation of the postulates and in terms of the epistemological status 
of the postulates. Whereas Bloomfield treats the postulational method 
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as a methodological tool for stating "every descriptive or historical 
fact" (ibid: 153) explicitly and rigorously, Mulder regards this method 
as a means for setting up a coherent, self-contained and well-defined. 
theory. " Whereas Bloomfield posits a large number of assumptions (77) 
interspersed with definitions, Mulder posits a small number of axioms, 
each one of which functioning as a point of reference for a set of 
relevant definitions. Finally, whereas Bloomfield's postulates are 
statements of an empirical nature, Mulder's postulates are of a 'formal' 
nature: the axioms are non-empirical and the definitions are stipulative. 
(9) 
Because-of these differences, Bloomfield's and Mulder's applications of 
the postulational method must not be confused with each other. 
6.2 The Axioms 
Axioms are sometimes defined as statements whose truth is 
self-evident. This view of the nature of axioms was adopted by 
Aristotle in ancient times. Such a view of axioms is adopted, in modern 
times, by Allwood and his colleagues, who define an axiom as "a sentence 
E in the logical sense of this term 3 the truth of which is taken for granted" 
(1977: 103). The insistence on self-evidence as a criterion of axioms is 
part and parcel of the attempt to provide a Justification for axioms as 
statements in a theoretical system. 
(10) 
This attitude is reflected in the 
following attempt to provide a Justification for axioms 'in axiomatic 
functionalism (Hervey 1980(a): 35): 
"... there are certain relative considerations in 
the light of which axioms may be regarded as, in some 
sense, "reasonable". There are two considerations 
here: an a priori one and a posterior one. We may 
expect an axiom to be a p7iýri "reasonable" in that it 
does not impose an impossible load on our credulity. 
i 
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This simply means that an axiom should put forward 
a proposition that is sufficiently "self-evident" not 
to be in flagrant contradiction with principles that 
common-sense tells us to be valid in general". 
However, intellectual self-evidence cannot, logically speaking, 
be regarded as a defining feature of axioms. By implication, axioms do 
not have to produce their certificate of truth, or self-evidence, by appeal 
to intuitions. To begin with, the insistence on self-evidence as a 
criterion of axioms is incompatible with the main aim of an axiomatic 
system in modern axiomatics, which is to make things precise and 
explicit. Moreover, as Blanche (1966: 10) points out, "the feeling of 
obviousness is unreliable and its domain varies according to the intellectual 
outlook of different people". For instance, the Euclidean axiom "The whole 
is greater than its parts" may hold for many ordinary people, and even, for 
some scientists, but for mathematicians th is axiom holds only for finite 
sets, and not for infinite ones. It may also be pointed out that if self- 
evidence is insisted on as a criterion of axioms, statements which are 
treated as axioms in many axiomatic systems would not qualify as axioms 
proper. For example, under this interpretation of axioms the axioms of 
axiomatic functionalism cannot be regarded as axioms proper, because none 
of them can be shown to satisfy the above-mentioned criterion. 
(11) 
In modern axiomatics, axioms may be conceived of as statements which 
introduce the basic propositions of an axiomatic theory. Unlike theorems, 
which are also statements of, not in, the theory, axioms have no logical 
source or origin. They differ from definitions, the other type of primitive 
statements in an axiomatic theory, in their formal character. Whereas 
definitions are statements which express equivalence between a definiendum 
and a definiens, axioms do not. This difference between axioms and 
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definitions may be illustrated by the first axiom and the first definition 
of axiomatic functionalism (Mulder: 1980(c) );, 
Axiom A: "All features in semiotic sets are functional"" 
Def Ia : "Functional" for "separately relevant -to the purport of 
the whole of which it is a part". 
Axioms In an axiomatic theory are, though ultimately interrelated 
to each other, logically independent of each other. This follows fror4 the 
requirement that axioms have no logical source or origin. As a result of 
this property it is possible to discard one or more axioms ih an axiomatic 
theory without having to completely discard the rest, and also without 
affecting the consistency of the remaining axioms with each other. 
Another feature of axioms is that, in themselves, they are, strictly 
speaking, scientifically meaningless statements. Their 'meanings' are 
fixed by the chains of definitions attached to them in the theory. 
With respect to empiricism, axioms are of two types: those which 
have empirical content and, therefore, invite criticism,, though perhaps 
only indirectly via their consequences, on grounds of empirical 'truth' 
or 'falsity'; and, those which have no 'existence postulate' and, the I refore, 
cannot be evaluated on grounds of empirical truth or falsity.. The latter 
type of axioms normally occur in the so-called formal sciences, for 
example logic, and in some branches of mathematics, and the former 
one in the so-called non-formal, or empirical, sciences, for example * 
phys ics. 
The axioms of axiomatic functionalism are of the formal type 
mentioned above. By implication, they do not have any empirical c6ntent 
and, therefore, do not invite assessment on grounds of empirical truth or 
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falsity. They also lack any logical source or origin, and are logically 
independent of each other. The basic propositions they put forward 
lack any intellectual self-evidence, as the first axiom mentioned above 
illustrates. The only legitimate justification which may be provided 
for the axioms pertains to their role as an integral part of a theoretical 
system whose appropriateness as an instrument for yielding descriptions 
of fields of speech-phenomena can be assessed in terms of a set of 
conditions called the evaluation criteria (c. f. section 7). 
6.3 The Definitions 
The definitions constitute the second type of non-theorematic 
statement that are listed in the theory of axiomatic functionalism. 
According to Mulder (1980(b) ), the definitions have a specific role to 
play in the theory: (a) they define all the non-primative terms in the 
theory, regardless of whether they occur. In the axioms or in other 
definitions, and (b) they introduce notions In the theory. An example 
of a definition, which defines a non-primitive term 'in the axioms is that 
of the term 'functional' mentioned in the preceding section. An example 
of a definition which defines a term in another definition is that of the 
term 'morphology' (ibid: Def 2a 3b) as a "complex unordered plerological 
system" the term "morphology" occurs in the immediately preceding 
definition. Finally, an example of a definition which Introduces a notion 
in the theory is that of the term 'clause' (ibid: Def 20a) as a "potential 
constituent (perhaps the only one) of a sentence". 
The chain of definitions in an axiomatic theory constitutes what 
is generally called the semantics of an axiomatic system. The function 
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of the semantics of the theory is to reduce all non-prtmitive terms in 
the theory to primitive ones. . The process of defining terms in the 
theory is brought to a close only at that stage in the construction of the 
theory where no further definitions are thought to be required, i. e. at 
that stage where the process of providing further definitions of terms in 
the theory is thought not to result in any better 'understanding' of the 
theoretical system as a whole. The justification, or rationale, for 
stopping-the process of defining terms at some appropriate point in the 
course of constructing an axiomatic theoretical system is neatly' 
expressed by Blanche*' (1966: 12) as follows: 
"We define one term by other terms, the latter in 
their turn by others, and if we are to avoid infinite 
regress we have to stop at some undefined terms ... 
These, irreducible terms constitute, to use a comparison 
of Russell's, a sort of ... alphabet: being the ultimate 
elements out of which definitions are constructed, they 
enable us to spell out, or unpack, the defined terms, 
while remaining themselves indefinable". 
Primitive terms in axiomatic functionism fall Into two categories: 
(a) those which, for want of a better label, may be called 'intuitive' terms, 
and (b) those which, though not defined in the theoryAtself, are defined 
In some other discipline pre-supposed by the theory, for example 'naive- 
set'theory. Examples of terms belonging to the first category are 'of', 
gin', 'unit, 'relation', 'message, 'convention', 'communication'. 
'interpretation', etc. Examples of primitive terms belonging to the second 
category are 'set', 'member, 'class', 'disjunct', etc. which receive their 
definitions in set-theory. The decision to treat certain terms in the theory 
as primitiveterms in the first sense mentioned above is, essentially, an 
arbitrary one, though it is motivated by certain common-sense consideratiohs 
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such as the transparency of such terms. That the theoretician has to 
rely to some extent on an appeal to the 'common-sense' or 'lexical' 
intuitions of his readers is a logically inescapable fact which the 
scientist has to accept and learn to live with. As Russell (in Copi 1978: 
126) says: "Since all terms that are defined are defined by means of other 
terms, it is clear that human knowledge must always be content to accept 
some terms as intelligible without definitions in order to have a starting 
point for its definition". Frege (ibid. ) reiterates the same point: "It is 
certainly praiseworthy to try to make clear to oneself as far as possible 
the sense one associates with a word. But here we must not forget that 
not everything can be defined". However, the theoretician must be 
prepared to define an 'intuitive' term if it is 'felt' by specialists in the 
field that the term concerned is not sufficiently intelligible intuitively. 
As far as terms in the second category are concerned, the 
theoretician must specify which discipline, or disciplines, they belong to, 
and he must also satisfy himself that they are defined precisely for his 
purposes in the discipline (s) concerned. The decision not to define terms 
in this category in the theory itself is based on considerations of convenience 
and economy of presentation. , 
Definitions in axiomatic functionalism are definitions in the 
technical sense of this term. They are, first, definitions of symbols, i. e. 
terms, and not of things or objects, in the wide senses of these two terms. 
A phoneme in a given language may combine with other phonemes, and it may 
have two or more realisations occurring in definable contexts; it may be 
said to be 'analysable' into one or moAre distinctive features and to belong 
to a given commutation class, etc; but it is not a 'thing' which has a 
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meaning for us to define, since the above features of phonemes emerge 
from the descriptions of which they are parts and, by implicatio, n, from 
the theory which is presupposed by these descriptions. Secondly, each 
definition in axiomatic functionalism is a bi-unity of & definiendum, the 
term or symbol to be defined, and a definiens the symbol or group of 
symbols which spell out the semantic import of the definiendum in the theory. 
Axiomatic functionalist definitions are all of the stipulative type. 
In Lewis Carrol's Alice Through The Looking Glass., Humpty Dumpty 
demanded that words were to mean what he stipulated or declared that 
they should mean. He did not concern himself with what a speech I- 
community had meant by some word, but established what a word was to 
mean when he used it. This procedure for defining terms, though an 
extreme one, is essentially of a stipulative character. 
By stipulative definition is meant the explicit, self-conscious and 
arbitrary setting up of a meaning relation between a given definiendum and 
its defintens. The following quotation from Copi (1978: 137-38) neatly 
sums up the nature of stipulative definitions: 
"A symbol defined by stipulative definition did not 
have that meaning prior to being given it by the definition. 
Hence, its definition cannot be regarded as a statement 
or report that the definiendum and the definiens have the 
same meaning. They actually will have the same meaning 
for any one who accepts the definition, but that is 
something which follows the definition rather than a fact 
asserted by it. A stipulative definition is neither true , 
nor false but should be regarded as a proposal or resolution 
Ao use the defiendum to mean what is meant by the 
definiens, or as a request or command. In this sense a 
stipulative definition is directive rather than informative. 
Proposals may be rejected, resolutions violated, requests 
refused, commands disobeyed, and stipulations. ignored, 
but none of them on that account is true or false. So it 
is with stipulative definitions". 
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Definitions in axiomatic functionalism fully satisfy the 
conditions of stipulative definitions set out in the above quotation. 
A definition in the axiomatic functionalist theory is not a report of some 
prior and established meaning-association between a given definiendum 
and its definiens even when these two relata of a definition may have the 
appearance of being identical to the relata of some other definition 
elsewhere in the literature. For example, though Mulder's definition 
of, the phoneme as "a simultaneous bundle of distinctive features" has 
the appearance of being identical with the definition of the phoneme in 
jakobson (1956), this appearance of identity is more apparent than real. 
Mulder's concept of the phoneme is vastly different from that of jakobson, 
due to the fact that his interpretation of the symbols 'simultaneous' and 
'distinctive features', which occur in the above definitions, are different 
from the interpretations given to them by jakobson; but I will not go into 
this matter here. 
By virtue of being stipulative, definitions in axiomatic functionalism 
cannot be evaluated on grounds of empirical 'truth' or 'falsity'. For 
example, Mulder's definition of language as a "semiotic system with 
double articulation" cannot be said to be either empirically true or factually 
false. Such a definition is no more than a proposal to use the definiendum 
to mean what is meant by the definiens. In other words, this definition 
establishes an arbitrary convention, whereby a meaning-association is 
established between the definiendum and the definiens. This property of 
axiomatic functionalist definitions tallies with the formal nature of its set 
of axioms. 
However, to say that stipulative definitions cannot be judged on 
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grounds of empirical truth or falsity does not mean that there is no 
standard by which definitions of this type may be judged or evaluated. 
Put differently, the statement that stipulative definitions are arbitrary, 
free and relative to the theory in which they are a part does not mean that 
dny stipulative definition, or set of such definitions, in a given theory 
is as good as any other. Stipulative definitions must satisfy the 
following two conditions: 
(i) they must be precisely and clearly formulated; a definition which 
does not satisfy this condition is said to be vague and scientifically 
useless; and 
(ii) they must not use their definienda in their definientia; definitions 
which fail to meet this condition are said to be 'circular' or 
'tautologous', e. g. if 'distinctive feature' in a given theory were 
defined as 'feature which is distinctive' then such a definition would 
be said to be a 'circular' or 'tautologous' definition. 
It is quite easy to establish whether or not the set of definitions in 
axiomatic functionalism satisfy the second condition stated above. By 
testing each one of the definitions separately, we can establish whether 
or not the definition concerned fulfils this condition. Having carried out 
this test for the set of definitions in axiomatic functionalism, I can report 
that none of the definitions violates this condition. 
By contrast, it is not so easy to establish whether or not the 
definitions in the theory satisfy the first condition. Since the judgement 
concerning this issue must rest on the performance of the theory as an 
instrument for yielding descriptions which are required to satisfy certain 
evaluation criteria, particularly the criteria of adequacy, it follows that 
the test for this condition is part and parcel of the test for assessing the 
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adequacy of the theory. Now, as any positive judgement concerning 
the adequacy of the theory must, for logical reasons, remain hypothetical .. 
in nature, it follows that any positive judgement to the effect that the 
definitions satisfy the first criterion given above must remain hypothetical 
in nature too. This boils down to saying that every test for the adequacy 
of the theory must be construed as, indirectly, a test for the ability of 
the definitions to satisfy the first condition for assessing stipulative 
definitions. 
The definiendum of a stipulative definition does not have to be a 
new term, e. g. a coinage. The theoretician is, in principle, free to 
use old as well as new 'terms' to serve as definienda in his system or 
chain of stipulative definitions. However, a useful procedural guide-line 
for selecting terms as defienda for stipulative definitions may be formulated 
as follows: try not to upset established terminology in the relevant field of 
study, and strive to use as few coinages as possible. But no theory can, 
strictly speaking, be criticised for not adhering to this 'methodological" 
guide-line. 
6.4. The Axiomatic Method And Axiomatic Functionalism 
In the previous two sections I have dealt with the two types of 
basic or primitive statement that are explicitly listed in the theory of 
axiomatic functionalism, as this theory is presented, mainly, in Mulder's 
"Postulates" (1980(c) ). The aim of this section is two-fold: to outline 
the advantages of the axiomatic method in theory construction, and to 
examine the organisation of axiomatic functionalism by reference to 
conditions which all axiomatic systems must satisfy. 
449 
The chief virtue of the axiomatic method of theory construction 
is that it forces the theoretician to state his assumptions and premisses 
explicitly, clearly and rigorously. 
(12) 
As a result of this, an 
axiomatically constructed theory enables the scientist to proceed 
systematically in his conduct of scientific inquiry. It also enables 
workers in the relevant field of study to test and evaluate the results 
based on the theory in a fairly easy manner. By insisting that a theory 
be definite and 'final' in form, the axiomatic method makes it impossible 
for any new assumptions to be smuggled into the theory without being 
recognised for what they are: "a modification and therefore a revision of 
theEtheory concerned] " (Popper 1959: 71). By virtue of its explicitness, 
rigour and necessarily deductive nature, an axiomatic theory enables the 
theoretician to keep a check on the consistency of his theory fairly easily. 
And, because of the logical independence of the axioms from each other, 
the axiomatic method enables the theoretician to reject or modify any one 
of the axioms in his theory without having to reject or modify the entire 
set of axioms. In addition to this, because of the necessarily deductive 
and transparent nature of an axiomatic theory, it is possible to investigate 
fairly easily all mutual dependencies between statements in such a theory 
so that if any modification of the theory is required, it can be affected 
exhaustively in the entire chain of statements involved. 
The birth of modern axiomatics as a method of theory constructio n 
is to a large extent marked by a fundamental shift of emphasis, from the 
well-known criterion of factual 'truth' to criteria of logical organisation 
and presentation in the evaluation of theories of this type. Consequently,, 
the realisation of the above advantages of the axiomatic method depends 
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on whether or not a given axiomatic theory satisfies certain 'organisationall 
criteria; these criteria include: 
(13) 
(a) the explicit enumeration of all the primitive terms in the theory, 
(14) 
either by listing them at the outset of the theory, or by listing the 
primitive terms relevant for each axiom and its supporting chain of 
definitions before the axiom concerned. The rationale behind the 
emphasis on this condition in the construction of an axiomatic 
theory derives from the requirement that such a theory carries with 
it an explicit indication of what its author is asking his fellow 
scientists to take for granted, or to accept in advance. The 
methodological value of this condition is that it cuts meaningless 
discussion of the theory to a minimum, and it renders the task of 
evaluating the theory economical; and 
(b) the explicit enumeration of all and only the set of primitive statements 
of, the theory. The rationale behind the emphais on this condition is 
that of ensuring that the theory, both as a theoretical system and as a 
descriptive tool, is final in form at any one moment of dealing with it, 
and, therefore, is not open to immunisation. 
If we examine axiomatic functionalism in the light of the above two 
conditions, we will find that this theory fails to satisfy both of them. 
However, the first flaw, i. e. the failure of axiomatic functionalism to 
satisfy the first condition, is not a serious one, since it can be easily. 
rectified by isolating all the primitive terms in the theory and, then, listing 
them, adopting either of the previously mentioned methods. Whether or 
not all terms falling into this category, particularly 'intuitive' ones (cofe 
Section 6 . 3), will be acceptable as primitive terms proper by workers in 
the field is, however, a completely different matter. I shall. not discuss 
this point any further here, since such a discussion would take us far 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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The failure of axiomatic functionalism to meet the second 
criterion springs from the fact that Mulder's "Postulates" (1980(c) ), 
which embodies his part of this theory, contains a large number of 
lexplanations' that are not, strictly speaking, a formal component of 
the theory concerned, i. e. they are neither axioms nor formal definitions 
1 
(15) 
of the theory. Yet these explanations are an integral part of the 
theory, 
(16) 
as may be shown by the following two statements: 
(i) some explanations contain non-theorematic statements which are 
an essential component of the theory from the point of view of its 
purpose as an instrument for description. This situation may be 
exemplified by the following delimitation of I neutral isation' 
following definition (7a3): "Suspension of opposition in given, 
contexts, and governed by those contexts, is, called neutralisation"; 
following Hjelmslev (1969), 1 shall call sugh delimitations operative 
definitions; and 
(ii) some explanations contain information which is crucial for the proper 
understanding of the theory in its capacity as a tool for setting up 
descriptions of languages. Examples 
' 
of such explanations are those 
which follow definitions (17a) , (1 7b) and (21). 
(17) 
Remove such 
explanations, and a serious impairment in our understanding of the 
notions with which they are associated will occur. 
On the basis of these two statements, we may now launch the following 
arguments: 
(1) if the explanations are not to be regarded as part of the axiomatic 
functionalist theory, then 
(a) by virtue of point (i) above this theory cannot be 
legitimately said to constitute an ideally fully-fledged 
and self-contained framework for yielding descriptions 
of the 'intended' type - though this problem may be partly 
overcome by establishing all operative definitions as 
formal stipulative definitions; and 
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(b) by virtue of point (ii) above, the theory cannot be 
legitimately said to constitute an ideally fully explicit 
and, therefore, fully-fledged framework for yielding 
descriptions of the 'intended' type; 
(2) if the explanations are to be regarded as an integral part, of the 
theory, then 
(a) by virtue of the fact that explanations, particularly of 
type (ii) above, are not formal in character, the theory 
cannot be said to be ideally fully-explicit; and 
(b) the theory can no longer be said to consist only of axioms and 
definitions - unless, of course, explanations are converted 
into, perhaps, definitions. 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may . be concluded 
that, as it stands, the theory of axiomatic functionalism does -not ideally 
satisfy the two requirements of an axiomatic system mentioned above, 
particularly the second one. By implication, axiomatic functionalism, 
cannot be legitimately said to reap in full the advantages which accrue 
from the employment ofthe axiomatic method in theory construction. 
7. The Description 
It has been previously mentioned (section 4) that, according to 
axiomatic functionalism, a description results from the application of the 
theory to a select field of speech-phenomena. This, of course, means 
that a particular description implies both the theory and a given field of 
speech-phenomena. By saying that a description presupposes the theory, 
axiomatic functionalists imply that the description concerned must be 
Justified by, or based on, the theory "as otherwise it is arbitrary, and, 
therefore, scientifically speaking, meaningless" (Mulder 1980(b): 25-26). 
And by saying that a description presupposes a particular field of speech- 
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phenomena, axiomatic functionalists imply that the field of speech- 
phenomena concerned gives rise to descriptive models which can be 
mapped onto, i. e. can be said to be isomorphic with, certain's egments 
of the s pee ch -phenomena under investigation. The exact nature of this 
'mapping' relation is determined by the theory including, of course, its 
theorems of scope. Descriptive models are not objects or entities in 
the speech-phenomena of the language they aim to describe. Such models 
are Justified by the theory in the sense that they are said to correspond 
to meta-models in the theory, for instance the notions 'phoneme', 'moneme', 
'plereme', 'syntagmi, etc. The notion descriptive model may be exemplified 
by the phoneme /b/, or the signum 'plural', in Arabic which correspond. 
to the meta-models 'phoneme' and 'moneme' respectively. 
In addition to models, a description is said to contain labels 
which are mere nomenclatures for generalising classes within a description. 
Examples of labels in, say, a description of Arabic are such things as 
'verb', 'transitive verb', 'intransitive verb',, $noun'l 'adjective', 'etc'. 
Labels in descriptions are language-specific in the sense that they are 
established for each language separately. The fact that the same symbol, 
say, 'adjective', is used as a label in two or more descriptions of different 
fields of speech-phenomena does not, from the logical point of view, 
constitute a valid basis for inter-linguistic generalisations or comparisons. 
The status of labels in the axiomatic functionalist approach is neatly 
summed up as follows by Mulder (1980(a): 7): 
0 
"They (i. e. labels) are mere "ettcLuettes" that are stuck 
onto generalising classes of descriptive objects. The 
device of labelling is mainly of a simplificatory and 
administrative nature, and it is internal to the description. 
As a language is a system "ou tout se tient" (Saussure: 
Cours), one should be extremely careful in proceeding from 
labelling to inter-linguistic genera lisations , let alone to the 
establishment of linguistic generalisations". 
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However, 'labelling' is not a haphazard and totally uncontrolled 
enterprise. In attaching a label to a group of 'objects' in a description 
one should, as far as practically possible, respect the methodological 
convention, according to which established terminology must not be upset., 
Logically speaking, there is nothing wrong with employing the symbol 'noun' 
as a label for a groupof linguistic objects that are normally designated by 
the label 'verb' in a description of, say, English. But such a, procedure 
would be inadvisable from the viewpoint of the comprehensibility of 
descriptions. 
It also seems advisable, in phonology, to refer to phonological 
features by labels which give an indication of the phonetic realisations of 
these features, though this may not always prove possible. Su ch 
phonetically motivated labels establish a direct and immediate link between 
the phonological forms they designate and phonetic data. Adherence to 
this methodological convention in phonology should, however, be seen for 
what it is: it does not represent an attempt to base phonological analyses 
on phonetic grounds, but it aims to reflect the 'phonetic plausibility' of 
the linguistically based phonological analyses, whenever this proves to 
be possible. 
The above two methodological conventions, of what might be called 
the strategy of labelling, in description, are not based on the theory, let 
alone derived from it in any logical sense. The rationale behind these 
conventions derives from the fact that they are motivated by factors 
pertaining to such common-sense considerations as 'ease of understanding 
of descriptions' and respect for the generally accepted meanings of labels 
and their 'empirical' content. 
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The organisation of a description is not an intrinsic property 
of that description. It is, logically speaking, a purely arbitrary matter,, 
though it may be motivated by certain practical considerations and/or 
by the organisation of the theory or that part of the theory it pre-supposes. 
For example, though a describer may, if he so wishes, discuss 
arch i-phone met before he discusses and presents phonemes and distinctive 
features in a language, it is far more preferable to deal with the latter 
two types of descriptive models before dealing with the former, due to 
the fact that the meta-model archi-phoneme in the theory makes reference 
to the meta-model distinctive feature and, by implication, the phoneme. 
In other words, a description which deals with distinctive features and 
phonemes before dealing with archi-phonemes may be said to be better 
organised than its opposite because it reflects what might be called, for 
, 
the lack of a better term, the 'hierarchical organisation' found in the 
theory. 
(18) 
Such a description is also preferable to its opposite because 
it would be easier to understand. This follows from the fact that it is 
generally easier to understand an account of a particular state of affairs if 
the 'antecedents' of that state of affairs are dealt with before its 
#consequences', in some loose sense of these two terms, rather than 
vice versa. 
Let us now consider the methodological status of descriptive 
statements. According to axiomatic functionalism, all statements in a 
description are empirical hypotheses, in the established sense of this 
term. 
(19) 
The essential requirement for hypotheses is that they must be 
capable of being tested by confronting them with the data they aim to 
describe or account for. If the test succeeds, i. e. if empirical counter- 
evidence to what the hypothesis asserts about the data it aims to account 
456 
for is found, then we say that the hypothesis concerned has been 
refuted. Once a hypothesis has been refuted, then, strictly speaking, 
it ceases to be a hypothesis proper, and, therefore, must be discarded. 
If all attempts to refute a hypothesis fail, then the hypothesis concerned 
is said to be corroborated. A corroborated hypothesis is an unrefuted, 
though in principle, refutable descriptive statement. A description 
contains only hypotheses of this type. 
Direct confrontation with the data is not, however, the only 
available procedure for testing hypotheses. A given hypothesis may be 
tested indirectly by testing all its logical alternatives. If the describer 
succeeds in refuting all logical alternatives of a hypothesis, then we can 
say that the hypothesis concerned has been corroborated. If, however, 
he fails to refute one of them, then the hypothesis concerned will be said 
to have been refuted. 
Regardless of the procedure or method adopted by the describer, 
one thing must never be lost sight of: it is the fact that every hypothesis 
in a description must be precisely formulated in terms of the theory, since 
it is the theory which provides us with the theoretical framework for 
interpreting and testing the hypothesis concerned. This, in turn, shows 
the importance of a precise and fully-explicit statement of the theory, as, 
I 
without such a statement, the task of testing the description in the above 
manner cannot be carried out in a scientifically acceptýible manner. 
To sum up, every hypothesis in the description must make reference 
to empirical phenomena. A statement in the description which does not 
meet this condition cannot be tested by either of the methods mentioned 
above, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a hypothesis proper. -A 
statement in the description which is not covered by the theory is 
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scientifically meaningless as a descriptive statement. Such a statement 
cannot be regarded as a hypothesis in the technical sense of the term 
because it cannot be properly interpreted and tested. 
8. The Evaluation Of The Theory And Descriptions 
I have previously dealt with the axiomatic functionalist view of 
the nature and aim of linguistic theory and the descriptions which are 
based on it. The aim of this section is to deal with the axiomatic 
functionalist methodology for evaluating the theory and descriptions. 
According to Mulder (1980(b) ), a good linguistic theory must 
satisfy three conditions or requirements: consistency, adequacy and 
simplicity. These conditions or requirements are said to have the status 
of hypotheses; but to distinguish them from hypotheses in descriptions, 
Mulder refers to them as meta -hypotheses. The meta-hypotheses are not 
hypotheses within the theory itself - for the theory is said to have no 
'existence postulate' - but are hypotheses about the theory. Whether or 
not each one of these meta-hypotheses can be regarded as a hypothesis 
proper will be dealt with in the course of the following discussion. 
Consistency is a purely logical criterion of theory evaluation. It 
means that all statements explicitly listed in the theory, and all statements 
which may be logically derived from them, must be compatible (i. e. 
consistent with each other). This is not the same as saying that all 
statements which belong to the theory must not be inconsistent with each 
other. This follows from the fact that two statements which are not 
inconsistent with each other in a given theoretical system are not 
necessarily consistent with each other, for they may still be a-consistent 
with each other. In other words, the requirement that all statements of 
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the theory must be consistent with each other rules out as inadmissable 
not only cases of inconsistency in the theory, but also cases of 
a-consistency. , The trouble with an inconsistent theory is not that it 
is useless as an instrument for description, for it may be used for this 
purpose within certain limits, but that any two contradictory statements 
may be derived from it. And the trouble with an a-consistent theory is 
that it is not, strictly speaking, a theory at all, but a mere collection of 
unrelated statements and concepts. An a-consistent 'theory' is more like 
a heap of bricks than a structural organisation or arrangement of bricks. 
It directly follows from this that an a-consistent theory cannot serve as a 
valid basis for deductive inferences. In the same manner that the two 
unrelated statements "All men are mortal" and "All dogs have tails" cannot 
serve as premisses in one and the same deductive inference, due to the 
fact that no deductively valid conclusion can be derived from them, the 
statements in an a-consistent theory cannot serve as legitimate premisses 
for valid deductive inference, for exactly the same reason. This boils 
down to saying that a-consistency is ruled out as inadmissable in the 
axiomatic functionalist approach because it is not compatible with the 
requirement that the theory be deductive in nature. 
According to axiomatic functionalists, the theory as a whole, and, 
by implication, every statement which belongs to it, be it a primitive 
statement or a derived one, carries with it the meta-hypothesis of 
consistency. By implication, two statements in the theory are said to 
be inconsistent if one contradicts the other, i. e. if the one is. the true 
negation of the other. A-consistency arises when statements in the theory 
cannot be related as integral parts of the theory either directly or indirectly. 
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The statement that the theory is consistent is a hypothesis in 
the proper sense of the term. First, it has an empirical content in the 
sense that it makes a claim about an observable 'phenomenon', this 
phenomenon being the theory itself as a system of statements. Secondly, 
this statement can be refuted by confronting it with either cases of 
inconsistency or a-consistency. Thirdly, since inconsistency and 
a-consistency are well-defined notions in logic, it follows that we know 
the exact conditions under which the above hypothesis can be refuted. 
This latter condition is of crucial importance in deciding whether a 
tentative hypothesis is a hypothesis proper or not. 
Now, if all attempts to refute the hypothesis that the theory is 
consistent fail, then we may say that this hypothesis is corroborated, 
though, in principle, it remains refutable. In other words, the consistency 
of the theory can never be finally proved or permanently established, but 
always remains hypothetical. This is exactly what axiomatic functionalists 
mean when they say that the theory, and every statement which belongs to 
it, carries with it the meta-hypothesis of consistency. 
The previous remarks concerning the meta-hypothesis of 
consistency in relation to the theory apply to the descriptions that are 
based on it. According to axiomatic functionalists, the description as a 
whole, and, by implication, every statement in it, carries with it the 
meta-hypothesis of consistency. The statement that the description is 
consistent is a hypothesis in the proper sense of the term. It can be 
refuted by counter evidence of inconsistency and/or a-consistency in the 
description, but it can never be finally proved. If all attempts to refute 
this hypothesis fail, then we may say that it has been corroborated, though, 
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in principle, it remains refutable. In other words, the consistency of 
the description can never be permanently established, but always remains 
hypothetical. This is exactly what axiomatic functionalists mean by the 
- statement that the description and every statement in it carries with it 
the meta-hypothesis of consistency. 
Let us now consider the requirement of simplicity in relation to 
both the theory and the descriptions which are based on it. According to, 
Mulder (1968: 20), simplicity is "very much a 'humane' E matter] - It is 
sometimes a matter of taste, but between great simplicity and great 
complexity there is a large area within which sensible people will agree 
as to what is simple and what is not". However, as a "general rule" in 
evaluating the simplicity of descriptions, Mulddr (1980(b): 21) states that 
"there should be no redundant elements in a description, and the number 
and complexity of statements it contains, should be reduced as much as 
satisfying the condition of consistency and adequacy ( .... ) allows". 
And, in discussing the simplicity of the theory In relation to the simplicity 
of the descriptions which are based on it, Mulder (ibid: 21) points out 
that "because of the one-to-many relation between theory and descriptions, 
it may be economical to sacrifice some simplicity in the theory, if this can 
lead to a greater simplicity in the descriptions based on it". 
The above remarks concerning the requirement of simplicity in 
axiomatic functionalism amount to nothing more than a rough and general 
explanation of this notion. The reference to "taste" and to the common- 
sense of people in assessing simplicity, coupled with the lack of any 
explanation of what is meant by "redundant elements" and "complexity 
of statements" in descriptions support the afore-mentioned view. In 
461 
addition to this, the statement that "it may be more economical to 
sacrifice some simplicity in the theory, if this can lead to a greater 
simplicity in the descriptions based on it", is, scientifically speaking, 
meaningless, due to the fact that the notion simplicity is not precisely 
defined either in the realm of the theory or the descriptions based on it, 
(20) 
Consequently, it may be pointed out that the axiomatic functionalist 
requirement of simplicity does not constitute a meta-hypothesis proper. 
Though the statement that 'The theory, or a given description based on it, 
is simple' makes reference to an observerable phenomenon, this statement 
cannot be regardedas a proper hypothesis because it does not presuppose 
a precise frame of reference in terms of which it can be interpreted and 
. 
legitimately tested. 
Finally, let us deal with the requirement of adequacy in relation 
to, first, the theory, and, secondly, to the descriptions based on it. 
According to axiomatic functionalists, the theory as a whole, and, by 
implication, every statement that belongs to it, carries with it the meta- 
hypothesis of being adequate. And the theory is said to be adequate if 
it succeeds in fulfilling its function as an instrument for yielding 
descriptions which satisfy the requirements of consistency, simplicity 
and adequacy# 
(22) 
under the two*previous interpretations of the first two 
4 
notions. But since the requirement of simplicity cannot be regarded as a 
(meta-) hypothesis proper, for the reasons outlined above, it follows that 
the requirement of adequacy in relation to the theory cannot be legitimately 
regarded as a (meta-) hypothesis, in the full sense of the term. 
One factor in the adequacy of descriptions is their external 
consistency with the theory, in the sense that every statement in a 
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description must be ultimately justified by, or based upon, the theory. 
The importance of this requirement cannot be over-emphasised, since it 
is the theory that acts as a framework in terms of which the descriptive 
statements can be precisely interpreted and meaningfully tested. With3Ut 
the backing of the theory, descriptive statements are, scientifically 
(23) 
speaking, meaningless, and, therefore, untestable. 
The adequacy of descriptions in relation to the phenomena that 
lie within their own scopes encompasses the following considerations: 
"full-coverage of data", "detail of data" and "material adequacy" (Mulder 
1980(b) ). Whereas "full-coverage of data" pertains to considerations of 
'width' in descriptions, "full-detail of data" pertains to consideration of 
'depth' of analysis. It is worth pointing out, however, that these two 
considerations are, to a large extent, determined by the theory, particularly 
its criterion of relevance and other theorems of scope. 
Material adequacy is rather more complicated. Mulder's (1980(a): 
12-13) most comprehensive explanation of this adequacy factor is give*n 
below in its entirety: 
" [Material adequacy] means the consistency of 
descriptive statements with the data as observed. 
Inconsistency in this respect amounts to a refutation 
of the descriptive statement in question. That is, 
every descriptive statement ultimately stands or falls 
with its being materially adequate. Material adequacy 
has the last and decisive word in this approach, which 
emphasises again the fully empirical and realistic nature 
of the suggested methodology. However, as to the nature 
of the activity called "observation", we have to realise 
, 
two things: (a) it is by its very nature subjective and 
impressionistic; in linguistics, unlike in some natural 
sciences we have no recourse even to methods of reducing 
this to a certain extent, and (b) we actually observe the 
totality of an event rather-than an aspect of this totality. 
That is to say, we simultaneously observe the whole of a 
sentence - utterance, not, say, just its syntactic or 
phonological aspect. In fact, some aspects, including 
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those just mentioned, cannot be isolated by purely 
observational means. The only aspects that can to 
an important extent be isolated within the event are 
its phonetic shape, and its communicative value, i. e. 
its message. We may, therefore, say that the phonetic 
and "meaning bearing" aspect, have a greater 
protocolising potential than have other aspects relevant 
to the functionalist. Consequently, the material 
adequacy of descriptive statements related to other 
aspects can sometimes only be indirectly examined by 
simultaneous reference to the protocolising aspects. 
In practice this means that phonological statements have 
to be rejected if they conflict with phonetic observations 
and phonetic descriptive statements, or with consequences 
of these, whereas grammatical statements, e. g. about 
syntactic structures, have to be consistent with what we 
know to be, -axid have, perhaps, described as being, the 
meaning of the construction in question. If there is 
inconsistency, and one's protocolising observations and 
the ensuing statements (hypotheses) are sufficiently 
corroborated, the statement in question, about not 
directly observable phenomena, has to be considered 
as being refuted by indirect reference to the data. It 
is, therefore, truly a matter of corroborating the material 
adequacy of one's statements, however indirect this may 
be". 
There are two points I would like to make in connection with the 
role of observation, the activity and its results, in material adequacy. 
First, Mulder's (1980(a): 13) statement that observation is "by its very 
nature subjective and impressionistic" highlights one consideration which 
must be borne in mind in assessing the role played by observation in 
testing the material adequacy of descriptions. Observation is not 
infallible; it may seriously err sometimes. 
The second point concerns the fact that observation presupposes 
a point of view or something in the nature of a theory, i. 'e. it is a 
'theory-ladden' activity (c. f. Chapter I, Section 3.4.4). Now, by virtue 
of the fact that the theory leads observation by the nose, as it were,, it 
follows that only observations which are pertinent to the point of view 
and scope of the theory can play a role in assessing, or testing, the 
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material adequacy of descriptions. In other words, the theory delimits, 
in an important and crucial sense, the kind of observations which can, 
be employed in assessing the material adequacy of the descriptions 
based upon it. Only observations about functional features, of the 
speech-phenomena, and other theory-determined aspects of such 
phenomena, can legitimately serve as empirical evidence in testing the 
material adequacy of descriptions, and, by implication, individual 
statements in such descriptions. Descriptions, and the theory upon 
which they are based, cannot be harmed by empirically 'correct' 
observations about the s pee ch -phenomena if such observations fall 
outside the scope of the theory. The same situation holds for the other 
two considerations of adequacy in descriptions. 
On the basis of what has been said above it may be concluded 
that adequacy in relation to descriptions, and, by implication, to the 
theory Is a highly determined evaluation measure in axiomatic 
functionalism. In other words, by virtue of the fact that adequacy is to 
a large extent a the ory-de term ined evaluation measure, it follows that it 
has a relative and not an absolute value in assessing descriptions and the 
theory upon which they are based. Clearly, it is within this contextýonly 
that the following statement by Mulder (1980(a): 12-13) can be properly 
understood: "Material adequacy has the last and decisive word [in ] 
axiomatic functionalism Ewhich emphasises]... the fully empirical and 
realistic nature of the suggested methodology". 
Finally, the criterion of adequacy in relation to descriptions 
appears to. be a (meta-) hypothesis proper, The statement that a given 
description is adequate has, it seems, the status of a 'proper hypothesis. 
465 
Such a statement has an empirical content, in the sense that it makes 
a claim about a particular state of affairs holding between the descriptive 
statements in a description and the field of speech-phenomena investigated, 
and it is interpretable in terms of the afore-mentioned specifications of 
the three considerations of adequacy mentioned above. Consequently, a 
statement of this type is empirically testable. If all attempts to refute 
this (meta-) hYPothesis fail, then we may say that it has been corroborated, 
though it remains, in principle, refutable. In other words, the adequacy 
of descriptions can never be permanently and finally established, but it 
always remains hypothetical. This is exactly what axiomatic functionalists 
mean by the statement that the description and every statement in it carries 
with it the meta-hypothesis of adequacy. 
9. Some Remarks Concerning The Epistemological Foundations Of 
Axiomatic Functionalism 
Mulder's view concerning the epistemological status of the theory 
in axiomatic functionalism has changed radically since the publication of 
his book. Sets and Relations in Phonology in 1968. In this work (p. 7), 
Mulder states that "a theory may be roughly characterised as an internally 
consistent set of hypotheses and hypothetical models, together with 
indications towards the interpretation of those models in the explanation 
and understanding of given data and in the generation of new data on the 
basis of the theory" (emphasis ours). In more recent work, Mulder 
(1980(a), (b) ) adopts the view that descriptions only are hypothetical. 
The theory, following glossematics, is said to be arbitrary in the sense 
that none of the statements or theoretical models it contains has existence 
(24) 
postulate. This, of course, implies that the theory in axiomatic 
functionalism cannot be assessed on grounds of empirical 'truth' or 
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'falsity'. The "formal" nature of the axioms (c. f. Section 6.2) and the 
" stipulative" character of the definitions (c. f. Section 6.3) are but part 
and parcel of this view of the epistemological basis of the theory. 
Hervey (1980(a) ) calls this view of the epistemological basis of the 
theory the "abstract" view. 
Following Hjelmslev's glossematics, the arbitrariness of the 
theory in axiomatic functionalism may be said to be tempered by its 
appropriateness or adequacy, i. e. its potential to serve as a basis for 
yielding descriptions which satisfy the requirements of consistency, 
adequacy and simplicity. In addition to this, since adequacy in relation 
to descriptions concerns the statements in descriptions in their capacity 
as descriptive or empirica hypotheses, it follows that it is via its 
requirement'of adequacy that the theory gains its empirical relevance, 
though this empiricism is not an empiricism of content. 
Hervey's (ibid. ) view of the axiomatic functionalist theory as an 
"abstract" construct does not, in my opinion, provide an adequate and 
insightful explanation of the epistemological foundations of this theory. 
On the one hand, this view does not account for the fundamental 
epistemological difference between the theory as a non-empirical 'deductive 
calculus' or 'frame of reference' and the descriptions as self-contained 
sets of empirical hypotheses. This follows from the fact that descriptions 
can also be characterised as "abstract" constructs, though they are (a) 
far less removed from the world of concrete speech-events than the theory 
itself, and (b) far more removed from this world than the abstract protocol 
statements which record the occurrence of such events. The abstract 
nature of descriptions derives from the fact that models in descriptions, 
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as well as labels, for that matter, are "structures that apply to 'isolated' 
sections of speech. They can in fact be said to be more or less 
isomorphi with those sections of speech" (Mulder, 1968: 8). Obviously, 
the difference between the theory, descriptions and speech-phenomena in 
terms of 'abstraction' is a difference of degree and not of kind, and, 
therefore, it cannot serve as a valid basis for characterising the 
epistemological difference between them as an arbitrary frame of reference, 
hypbthetical models and observational statements, respectively. On the 
other hand, the above view cannot be easily interpreted in terms of the 
traditional epistemological frame of reference dealt with in sections 4.4.2.3 
in the first chapter of this thesis. 
However, we may make the following points concerning the 
epistemologfcal foundations of the axiomatic functionalist theory in terms 
of this frame of reference: 
(1) Axiomatic functionalism does not adhere either to phenomenalism or 
naive-realism in either the theory or descriptions. 
(2) The theory in axiomatic functionalism does not adhere to the brand 
of realism advocated by Popper. According to Popper, the theory is 
a set of empirical hypotheses which can be refuted by counter-examples 
from the field of phenomena they aim to describe and explain. In 
axiomatic functionalism, the theory cannot be tested empirically. By 
implication, "empirical data can never . .. weaken the theory itself 
but only its applicability" (Hjelmslev 1969: 14). Mulder attributes 
this difference in opinion concerning the epistemological status of 
the theory to the fact that axiomatic functionalist philosophy of 
science, unlike Popper's hypothetico-deductivism, establishes a 
sharp distinction between theory and descriptions. 
(3) The'theory in axiomatic functionalism is instrumentalist in nature. 
This is based on the fact that the theory is said to lack an 
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'existence postulate', i. e. empirical content, and, therefore, 
does not admit evaluation on factual grounds. However it is not 
clear whether this theory belongs to fictionalism or sceptical 
instrumentalism. 
(25) 
The instrumentalist characterisation of 
scientific theories as "inference tickets", or "leading principles", 
in terms of which factual statements about the universe of phenomena 
can be formulated and interpreted applies fully to the theory in 
axiomatic functionalism. 
(4) Similarly, the view that the statements formulated in terms of an 
instrumentalist theory can be tested empirically applies to descriptions 
under the axiomatic functionalist approach. The fact that axiomatic 
functionalist descriptions are said to be hypothetical in nature does 
not mean that they adhere to Popperian realism, due to the fact that 
the axiomatic functionalist, unlike the Popperian realist (c. f. 
Chapter 1, section 4.1.4), does not uphold the chief realist doctrine 
according to which the ultimate aim of the scientist is to find a "true 
descriotion of the world". 
10. The Three Sub-Theories Of Axiomatic Functionalism 
I have previously dealt with the theory in axiomatic functionalism 
from the point of view of its methodological character, criterion of 
relevance, aim, content, i. e. the type of statements it contains, and its 
epistemological foundations. The aim of this section is to give a brief 
outline of what Mulder calls the three sub-disciplines or sub-theories of 
the axiomatic functionalist theory: the 's ignum -theory', 'systemology' 
and 'semantics'. Whilst Mulder is totally responsible for the development 
of the first two sub-theories, 'semantics' has been developed by Hervey 
in close collaboration with Mulder. 
The signum-theory constitutes the back-bone of the axiomatic 
functionalist theory. As Mulder (1978: 190) states, "the (signum)-theory 
provides the ontology, without which no real science can exist". The 
. 
469 
role of the signum theory is to establish all the ontological distinctions 
that are relevant to the theory as a whole. These ontological 
distinctions are developed by the "successive and repeated" 
(27) 1 
application of the notions 'member-to-class', 'distinctive function' and 
'self-containedness', starting with the notion image which Is characterised 
as a 'Imodel of the unique form of a single realisation" (Mulder 1980(c): 
Def 22). "A particular natural class of images Is a phonetic form. A 
part icular phonetic form with a particular distinctive function is an 
allophone. A self-contained class of allophones is a phonological form. 
A particular phonological form with a particular distinctive function is an 
allomorph, and a self-contained class of allomorphs is a signum" (ibid: 41). 
It is obvious from this presentation of the ontological distinctions that 
neither considerations of complexity - i. e. whether elements are simple 
or complex - nor considerations of the types of relation holding connection 
with complex elements - i. e. whether the relations between the constituents 
of complex elements are tactic or non-tactic - play any role in the 
establishmdnt of ontological distinctions by the signum theory. 
Systemology deals with the internal deployment of linguistic 
objects, I. e. with their "analyticity and combinability" (Mulder 1980(a): 14). 
It is divided into two areas or sections: phonology and grammar. 
Phonology is in turn divided into phonematics,, phonotactics and para- 
phonotactics, and grammar is in turn divided into morphology, syntax and 
para-syntax. Closely, connected with these two areas or sections within 
systemology are 'allophony' and 'allomorphy' which deal with the 
realisations of all phonological forms and signa, respectively. However, 
fallophony' and 'allomorphy' are not sub-parts, of systemology, which deals 
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with the structural features of language only. 
There are two types of inter-lock within systemology: (a) 
a system may provide the forms of the entities of another system, or 
(b) a system may provide. the basic elements of the other system. The 
first type of interlock holds between phonology and grammar, whereby 
the former system is said to provide the latter with the phonological 
forms of the allomorphs of signa. And the second type of interlock is 
said to hold between (i) phonematics and phonotactics, whereby the 
former system is said to provide the latter with its basic elements, i. e. 
the phonemes; and (ii) between morphology and syntax, whereby the 
former is said to provide the latter with its basic elements, i. e. the 
pleremes. 
Semantics deals with the external deployment of signa, i. e. with 
their "actual meaningful use in communication" (Mulder 1980(a): 14). The 
distinction between sign and symbol within signum is also developed here 
by applying the notion 'denotation' to signum. By virtue of the fact that 
semantics is concerned with the external deployment of signa, and by 
virtue of the fact that grammatical entities may correspond to, or coincide 
with, signa in axiomatic functionalism, it follows that there is a very close 
connection between semantics and the grammatical sub-part of the 
systemology. However, this relatedness between semantics and grammar 
neither implies, nor justifies, the setting up of grammatical analyses on 
the basis of semantic criteria, notions or analyses or vice versa. In 
other words, grammatical analysis must not be based on semantic criteria, 
though the latter play a crucial role in the adequation of such analyses. 
The class-to-member operator, which Mulder employs in defining 
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the notions 'phonological form' and 'signum', does not serve as a 
fully-fledged basis for dealing with those phonological forms and signa 
that consist of two or more allophones and allomorphs, respectively, 
due to the fact that it fails to provide a framework that is intrinsically 
capable of allowing the linguist to state the contexts of occurrence of 
(28) 
such entities. From a purely set-theoretical point of view, a class 
can be legitimately defined extensionally by merely listing its members. 
In linguistics, such an extensional definition would not be descriptively 
adequate, due to the fact that one of the requirements of a descriptively 
adequate specification of a class of the above type is the statement of 
the context of occurrence of the members of the class concerned. 
11. Morphology In Axiomatic Functionalism 
The iollowing is a list of the definitions directly relevant to 
morphology in axiomatic functionalism (Mulder 1980(c) ): 
"Morphology" for "complex unordered plerological system" (Def. 2a3b). 
"System for "self-contained set of features with a common purport" (Def. lb). 
"Self-contained" for "representing all relative dependencies of its members 
as members of the set in question" (lbl). 
"Features" for "elements, analytical properties of elements, or relations 
between elements" (Def. lcl). 
"Plerological system" for "system of signa" (Def. 2a3d). 
"Signum" for "semiotic entity with both form and information -value (Def. 2a). 
U-Signum (formally defined as E&C, or as txx *1 {P3 X) pI Rs & SxR 
for "the conjunction of a particular expression and a particular contente 
which mutually imply one another". This is an alternative definition to 
the preceding one, i. e. Def. 2a (Def. 24). 
"Expression (symbolised E, formally defined as [p3 xRsx)" for 
II a particular self-contained class of one or more phonological forms [ p) 
each member f in its capacity of standing in a relation with a distinctive 
function s" (Def. 24a). 
(29) 
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"Content (symbolised C, formally defined as sxRIp 3x Ps for "a 
Particular distinctive function s, in its capacity of being the particular 
distinctive s of each member of a particular class of phonological forms 
jp3 " (Def. 24b). 
"Entity" for "element or discrete disjunct'analytical property of element" 
(Def. lc2). 
"Information-value" for "specific set of potential interpretations" (Def. 2). 
"Sign" for "signum with wholly fixed conventional information-value" 
(Def. 2al). 
"Symbol" for "signum with not wholly fixed conventional information-value, 
i. e. to which a temporary Item of Information-value can be attached by a 
definition" (Def. 2a2). 
"Proper symbol" for "symbol with partially fixed conventional information- 
value" (the latter being partially dependent on occasional definitions of an 
explicit or tacit nature). Examples are to be found in algebra', symbolic 
logic, etc. All proper names are proper symbols" (Def. 2a2a). 
"Nonce-symbol" for "symbol with no fixed conventional information-value" 
(the latter being wholly dependent on occasional definitions of an explicit 
or tacit nature) (Def. 2a2b). 
"Complex system" for "system with combinations of elements" (Def. 4b). 
"Unordered system" for "complex system without ordering relations 
between elements" (Def. 01). 
"Ordering relations" for "asymmetrical relations between entities in 
combinations". "This does not necessarily refer to linear or other spatial 
ordering, as this is a matter of "realisation" ". (Def. 6a). 
"Relations of simultaneity" for "symmetrical relations between entities in 
combinations". 11... Only functional criteria can be brought to bear in 
deciding whether a relation is symmetrical or not" (Def. 6b). 
"Plereme" for "self-contained (by definition: simultaneous) bundle of one 
or more momenemes as its immediate (and at the same time: ultimate) 
constituents" (Def. 8bl). 
"Morphological complex" for "complex plereme". A complex plereme is 
a morphological complex as opposed to a syntactic ( ... ) complex. A 
complex plerological entity (i. e. signum is either morphologically 
or syntactically complex (Def. 8b2). 
"Moneme. " for "minimum morphological entity". This implies 
Nminimum grammatical entity" (Def. 8b3). 
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With respect of analysability, pleremes are either simple or 
complex. A simple plereme, for example "live" in the syntagm "the boys 
live In town", is a bundle of one moneme only, i. e. the moneme "live" 
which also occurs as a constituent in the complex plereme "lived" as in 
"the boys lived in town". By calling "live" in the first syntagm a ýplereme , 
and "live" in "lived" a moneme, we are, of course, implying that, 
grammatically speaking, these two entities are different grammatical 
entities. 
- 
A complex plereme, for example "lived" above, is a morphological 
complex, i. e. a bundle of two (or more) monemes in a relation of 
morphological simultaneity to each other. Whereas pleremes may be 
either simple or complex, monemes are, by definition, always simple. 
By implication, simple signa may correspond to either pleremes or 
monemes in grammar. 
According to axiomatic functionalists (Mulder and Hervey 1980(a) ) 
the task of morphological description is a very simple and straightforward 
one. It consists of (a) specifying and listing the set of monemes of a. 
language and (b) predicting the set of complex pleremes of the language. 
In addition to this, a morphological description normally contains 
statements of allomorphy, i. e. statements which specify the allomorphs 
of morphological entities and state their distribution or contexts of 
occurrence. Mulder (19 80 (c) : Def. 24a 1) def ines the notion allomorph 
as "a particular phonological form member of a particular class of 
phonol ogical forms jp3, in its capacity of standing in a relation with a 
particular distinctive function s". In formulaic terms, allomorph may be 
represented as pxRs 
x, where 'px' stands for a particular phonological form, 
'sx' for a particular distinctive function in grammar, and 'R' for the relator 
between the two. 
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The allomorphs of a particular signum must, by definition, all 
have the same distinctive function. Moreover, no two or more allomorphs 
of a given signum may always and only occur in the same context of 
occurrence - because if they did, then they would not be variants of one 
and the same signum, but comýletely different signa. In other words 
what are traditionally referred to as free variants in grammar are, according 
to axiomatic functionalism, not allomorphs of one and the same signum, 
but different signa which stand in a relation of synonymy to each other. 
In contradistinction, no two or more allomorphs of a given sign 
may have the same phonological form. Failure to adhere to this condition 
in linguistics results in setting up two different allomorphs in what is 
demonstrably one and the same allomorph. 
With respect to their contexts of occurrence, allomorphs of a 
given signum are either combinatory - sometimes called contextual - 
variants, or partial combinatory variants. Combinatory variants are 
mutually exclusive with respect to their contexts of occurrence, whereas 
partial combinatory variants may share some, but not all,, of their contexts 
of occurrence. 
(30) 
Axiomatic functionalism allows the establishment of zero 
allomorphs as realisations of signa, for example the zero allomorph of 
the plural signum in "sheep (pl. )". However, the establishment of zero 
allomorphs is subject to the condition that no signum can have zero 
allomorphs only as its entire set of allomorphs. 
Phonological forms of allomorphs may be manifested in a variety of 
ways. They may be discrete, continuous strings of one or more phonemes, 
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e. g. /iz/ of the allomorph "/iz/ PR plural" in churches; or they may be 
replacives, e. g. "/a/-I/e/" in man-vs Men; or they may be subtractives, 
e. g. the subtraction of /f/ in French "Ilbý; I, -, lb3fl". 
In some cases, the phonological forms of allomorphs may be 
expressed in terms of distinctive features for reasons of Simplicity or 
economy. For instance, instead of representing the plural moneme in 
English by two separate allomorphs 'Vfý, v-S/" 
(31) 
and "/G Sl" 
i. n the pairs of words, knife : knives (pl. ) and mouth : mouths, respectiVely, 
the describer may represent it by one allomorph only, employing distinctive 
features in part, thus: "/Unvoiced #- Voiced - Sl". This results in some 
simplification in the description, as the number of allomorphs will be 
reduced by one. 
11.1 The Notion Zero Allomorph In Axiomatic Functionalism 
The notion 'zero allomorph' is emýloyed in theoretical discussions 
of allomorphy in axiomatic functionalism, for example Mulder and Hervey 
(1972), and is also extensively used in two morphological descriptions 
I 
based on this theory, namely Ashkuri (1979) and Munla (1981). The aim 
of this section is two-fold: first, to show that this notion is not justified 
by the axiomatic functionalist theory, as this theory presently stands 
(Mulder-1980(c) ); and secondlY to show that the utilisation of this notion 
in descriptions based on axiomatic functionalism results in a serious 
problem in this approach. However, these two points are inter-twined 
with each other. 
The demonstration of the first point is rather simple and straight- 
forward. It is that 'zero allomorph' is not covered by the axiomatic 
functionalist definition of the notion morph as "a particular phonological 
476 wl 
form. p , -member of a particular class of phonological forms 
Ip10 
in its capacity of standing in a relation with a particular distinctive 
function s" (Mulder 1980(c): Def. 24al). According to axiomatic 
functionalism, the phonological form of an allomorph must be stated in 
terms of phonological features, but since the phonological form of a 
zero allomorph cannot be legitimately said to be a phonological feature 
proper - witness the fact that it would be absurd to assign the form of a 
zero allomorph to any type of phonological feature in axiomatic 
functionalism -At follows that the notion zero morph is not Justified under 
the axiomatic functionalist theory. By implication, if a description which 
claims to be based on axiomatic functionalism employs the notion zero 
morph, then the description concerned cannot be said to be justified by 
the theory, Le. to be-"externally consistent" with it. Consequently, 
insofar as the afore-mentioned descriptions utilize the notion-zero 
allomorph, these descriptions cannot be said to be fully "consistent" with 
the axiomatic functionalist theory. 
To demonstrate the second point, we must refer to the first type 
of interlock mentioned in section (10) above. According to this type of 
interlock, phonology and grammar interlock with each other in the sense 
that the former provides the latter with the phonological forms of its 
entities. This interlock is not a direct one, but is effected via allomorphy. 
Now, if a given linguistic description which claims to be based on axiomatic 
functionalism utilizes the notion 'zero allomorph', then it must be the case 
that the phonology associated with such a description must be able to 
provide some phonological feature or features to allow us to express the 
phonological form of such an allomorph. But since, as Mulder and Hervey 
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(1972: 33) themselves admit, 
(32) j zero' Ilis ... not a phonological 
feature", it follows that the phonology cannot be said to provide fully 
the phonological forms of the entities of grammar via allomorphy. 
Moreover, since, as Mulder (1981: 239) states, phonological forms 
11can be either distinctive features, or phonemes, or phonotagms, or 
para-phonotactic entities, or para-phonotactic features", and since 
phonology is said to provide grammar with the phonological forms of its 
entities, it follows that if 'zero' were to be treated as a phonological form, 
then 'zero' should be classifiable as a member of one of the above types 
of phonological forms. If zero were established as, say, a phoneme in 
a language, this would be absurd due to the fact that such an entity, could 
not be said to satisfy the following criteria of phonemes: (a). distinctiveness, 
(b) analysability in terms of distinctive features and (c) isomorphism with 
anything in the universe of phenomena, either directly or indirectly. 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may be concluded 
that the notion 'zero allomorph' is incompatible with the concept of 
phonology envisaged by the axiomatic functionalist -theory, and also, the 
notion interlock in the sense mentioned above. Consequently, the 
utilisation of this notion in descriptions based on axiomatic functionalism 
renders such descriptions ad hoc, i. e. "externally inconsistent" with the 
theory on which they claim to be based. 
11.2 The Morphology Versus Syntax Distinction In Axiomatic ]Functionalism 
It has been previously mentioned that grammar in axiomatic 
functionalism is divided into three sub-systems: morphology, syntax and 
para-syntax. Morphology and syntax are closely related to each other in 
the sense that the former provides the latter with its basic entities, i. e. 
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the pleremes. The aim of this section is to give a brief discussion of 
the basis of the distinction between these two sub-systems of grammar, 
especially as the distinction between them is invoked in the axiomatic 
functionalist methodology for morphological analysis. 
Roughly speaking, American structuralist approaches which 
distinguish between a morphology and a syntax in grammar, for example 
Nida (1949) and Hocked (1958), base that distinction primarily on units 
rather than relations. More specifically, the distinction between these 
two areas of grammar in such approaches is based on the special status 
of the 'word' as a 'natural' barrier or boundary betwee'n'them. This mode 
of distinguishing between morphology and syntax is strongly advocated in 
more recent literature by the two word and paradigm grammarians (c. f. 
Chapter IV) R. Robins (1959,1964) and P. H. Matthews (1972,1974). 
The axiomatic functionalist approach for distinguishing between 
morphology and syntax in grammar is fundamentally different from the 
preceding one: it is based on relations rather than units. More 
specifically, the distinction between morphology and syntax in axiomatic 
functionalism is based on a fundamental difference between the types of 
constructional relations which are said to characterise each one of these 
sub-systems of grammar, and not on the 'existence' of a special type of 
unit which sets them apart. 
Mulder (1980 (c): Def. 2a3b) def ines morphology as a" complex 
unordered plerological system", and he (ibid: Def. 2a3c) defines syntax as 
a "complex ordered plerological system". An unordered system is defined 
as a "complex system without ordering relations between Cits3 elements" 
(ibid: Def. 01), and an ordered system Is defined as a "complex system 
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with ordering relations between [its] elements" (ibid: Def. 4b2). 
Ordering relations are defined as "asymmetrical relations between 
entities in combinations" (Def. 6a). The opposite of ordering relations 
are relations of simultaneity, which Mulder (ibid: Def. 6b) defines as 
11symmetrical relations between entities in combinations". In deciding 
whether a given relation in a particular context or complex is one of 
ordering or simultaneity only functional criteria are taken into consideration. 
Such things as linear ordering are regarded as a matter of realisation. 
Strictly speaking, the distinction between morphology and syntax 
in axiomatic functionalism is not necessarily based on the distinction 
simultaneous versus ordering relations. While it is true that all 
morphological complexes are characterised by relations of simultaneity, 
it is not true that all syntactic complexes are characterised by ordering 
relations. Relations of simultaneity also hold between constituents in 
syntactic combinations, typically in cases of co-ordination. This implies 
that the existence of ordering relations between constituents in grammatical 
combinations is only a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the 
establishment of such combinations as syntactic complexes. The relevance 
of this point to the axiomatic functionalist methodology for morphological 
analysis will become clear later in this chapter. 
A both necessary and sufficient condition for specifying syntactic 
complexes, and, by implication, syntax as opposed to morphology, is the 
existence of tactic relations between constituents in grammatical complexes. 
Mulder (ibid: Def. 7c3) defines tactic relations as "constructional relations 
(whether ordering or not) between syntagmatic entities, as immediate 
constituents in combinations". In grammar, such relations are called 
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syntactic relations. Syntactic relations, "are not necessarily 
syntagmatic (i. e. ordering) Erelations] but they are between syntagmatic 
entities" (ibid. ). The following set of definitions further explain. s the 
afore-mentioned conditions and will lay the foundations for our discussion 
of the axiomatic functionalist methodology for morphological analysis: 
"Syntagmatic entity" for "entity capable of standing in ordering relations 
with other entities or having zýn internal structure such that it is capable of 
containing - as constituents - entities capable of standing in ordering 
relations with other entities" (Def. 7b2). 
"Syntactic entity" for "sytagmatic entity in grammar" (Def. 7d). 
"Syntactic relations" for "tactic relations in grammar" (Def. 7dl). 
"Constructional Relations" for "relations between immediate constituents" 
(Def. 7f). 
"Constituents" for "entities (of the same, kind, i. e. of the same level of 
abstraction) in self-contained combinations" (Def. 7fl). 
"Immediate constituents" for "constituents that are not constituents of 
constituents within the combination in question" (Def. 7fla). 
"Ultimate constituents" for "the last analytical entities of a self-contained 
combination of entities" (Def. 7flb). 
11.3 The Axiomatic Functionalist Criteria And Methodology For 
Morphological Analysi 
The aim of this section is to give a brief explanation of (a) the - 
axiomatic functionalist criteria for morphological analysis (Hervey and 
- (33) Mulder 1980), and (b) the methodology employed in testing for each 
one of these criteria in morphological descriptions. However, before 
carrying out this task, the following points concerning these criteria as a 
whole must be mentioned: 
(1) The criteria for morphological analysis to be discussed below concern 
signs only. Symbols, which are the other sub-category of the category 
signum, fall outside the scope of these criteria, due to the fact that ' 
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these criteria are formulated in terms of the semantic notion 
'denotation', as will become obvious later in this chapter. 
(2) The criteria are said to be theorematic in nature, i. e. they are 
derived from the relevant set of axioms and definitions in the theory. 
(3) The criteria are said to constitute a set of both "sufficient and 
necessary" conditions for morphological analysis. In other words, 
they are considered as a self-contained and exhaustive set of 
conditions which all morphological complexes in a language must 
satisfy. 
(4) The criteria serve as a basis for W distinguishing proper signs from 
pseudo- or non-signs in a set of tentative signs, (ii) distinguishing 
between simple and complex signs in a set of proper signs and (iii) 
distinguishing between morphological and syntactic complexes in a 
set of complex signs. 
11.3.1 Criteria For Morphologi I Analysis 
To qualify as a morphological complex, a complex sign must satisfy 
the following set of ordered criteria: 
(I) It must be a self-contained potential constituent in at least one 
higher or larger complex sign in the language. 
(3 4) As a notion in the 
theory, morphological complex is defined as a simultaneous bundle of two 
or more monemes. An equivalent definition of morphological complex in 
the theory is "minimum syntagmatic entity". Since all minimum syntagmatic 
entities are by definition potential constituents, it follows that all 
morphological complexes in a language must be potential constituents, 
(II) It must consist of at least two constituent signs. For logical 
reasons, a tentative morphological complex cannot be regarded as a complex 
sign proper unless it contains at least two elements which can be 
legitimately identified as signs. 
(III) The constituents of a morphological complex must all be monemes, 
By virtue of being a simultaneous bundle of two or more signs, the immediate 
constituents of a morphological complex must be at one and the same time 
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its ultimate constituents. If, therefore, in a given complex sign it can 
be shown that one of the valid immediate constituents is itself a complex 
sign, then the complex sign in question must be a syntactic complex, and 
not a morphological one. 
(IV) For the complex in question to qualify as a morphological complex 
proper, the relation(s) between its constituents must be (a) relation(s) of 
functional simultaneity. 
11.3.2 Methodology For Morphological Analysis In Axiomatic Functionalism 
The aim of this section is to deal with the axiomatic functionalist 
(35) 
methodology for testing whether, for a given set of tentative grammatical 
elements, the preceding conditions are met or not, i. e. whether or not each 
member of such a set can be duly established as a morphological complex. 
I shall explain this methodology by considering the following set of tentative 
morphological complexes: 'man are, 'boy', 'played' (past tense), 
'blackboard', 'butterfly', 'flower show' and 'butterfly-net'. 
11.3.2.1 The First Criterion 
Commutation is the sole procedure by which we test whether or not 
a tentative grammatical element is a self-contained potential constituent in 
at least one higher complex sign in the ianguage it is said'to belong to. 
Mulder (1980(c): Def. 7a2) defines commutation as "alternation between 
semiotic entities (or 'zero' and semiotic entities) in functional opposition as 
immediate constituents, in a given context". For example, the identity of 
the sign "plural" in "boys" can be established by commutating it with at 
least one other sign, for instance " -ish" or "-hood", or with its own absence, 
which is referred to as zero. Of course, it must be possible to establish 
"boy" in the above grammatical entity as a sign in its own right, because 
unless itis possible to establish each of the tentative'constituents of a 
qrammatical entity-as a sign, none of them can be established as a s! qn. 
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Applying the above test to the examples in the afore-mentioned 
set of tentative grammatical entities, we notice that each one of them, 
except for 'man are', fulfills the condition of being a self-contained 
potential constituent in a higher complex sign, thus: "the clean school,., 
I "boy", "blackboard", "butterfly", "flower show", "butterfly-net" I A? 
and "he stayed -- 
t 'played" I here yesterday". The tentative grammatical 
element "man are" cannot be established as a self-contained potential 
constituent in English. In the syntagm "the sons and daughters of a man 
are his offspring", the signs "man" and "are" do not,, as a combination, 
constitute a well-formed, or self-contained, potential constituent in 
English, and, therefore "man are" cannot be regarded as a grammatical 
entity in that language. 
11.3.2.2 The Second Criterion 
Again, commutation is the procedure by which axiomatic 
functionalists test whether or not a given sign satisfies the condition of 
analysability into at least two constituents which can be duly established 
as signs. * In carrying out this test, the describer must avoid pseudo- 
analysis, that is analysis on either purely intuitive grounds, or on 
historico-linguistic factors or on features of form alone. The requirement 
to avoid pseudo-analyses of the above types springs from the fact that 
such analyses are not compatible, with the structuralist, synchronic and 
signum-orientated nature of axiomatic functionalism. 
One important condition which must be observed in testing for 
the second criterion is this: unless each one of the tentative constituents 
of a given sign can be established as a sign proper, none of these tentative 
constituents can be established as a sign. This boils down to saying that 
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analysis with a residue is ruled out as being unacceptable in axiomatic 
functionalist morphology. In this respect, axiomatic functionalism differs 
from the other three approaches dealt with in this thesis. 
To qualify as a fully-fledged sign, each tentative constituent 
sign in a tentative complex sign must fulfil the following both sufficient 
and necessary condition: '(a tentative constituent sign in a tentative 
complex sign must occur, in at least one other duly established and 
relationally equivalent complex sign, with the same form, or a. combinatory 
variant of that form, and the same denotation or semantic import'. In 
testing for this condition, all other tentative constituent signs, in the 
complex sign in question, and, the semantic import(s) of the relation(s) 
between them must be held constant. 
The denotation of a complex sign, regardless of whether it is a 
morphological or a syntactic complex, is said to be a function of the 
denotation of its constituenf signs and the semantic contribution(s) of the 
constructional relation(s) between them. Constructional semantics, that 
is semantics of constructional relations in grammar, is hardly developed in 
axiomatic functionalism. It is, therefore, to be expected that any 
chara cterisation of the semantic import of -the ý relation (s) between the 
constituents in a complex sign will be of a very general nature. . Hervey 
and Mulder (1980: 127) express the semantic role of the constructional 
relation(s) in a complex sign as follows: "the denotation of the complex 
sign bears some relation to the denotation of each of the immediate 
constituents [in tha t 's ign] 
(3 5) 
On the basis of this, we may say that the denotation of every 
constituent sign in a complex sign bears some semantic relation to the 
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denotation of the other constituent sign(s) in the same complex sign, 
and vice versa. Now, given a complex sign'P, which consists of the 
constituent signs a and b in some grammatical relation,, then it is possible 
-to represent the complex sign concerned, with respect to' its semantic 
import, - by the following scheme: 
p 
a R b 
denotation of which bears some denotation of 
a relation to b 
denotation of which bears some denotation of 
b relation to a 
We have now reached a stage in our discussion whereby we can 
state formally the full *commutation procedure'for testing whether or not caýgi ven 
tentative complex sign P consists of, say, the two constituent signs -(a) and 
(b): 
(1) in order to establish (a) as a valid constituent sign of P, we must 
find another complex sign, _Z1, consisting of 
the constituents (b), or 
a combinatory variant of (b), and (c)., which is relationally equivalent 
to P. and in which (a) can be shown to commute validly with (c); 
(2) in order to establish (b) as a valid constituent sign of P, we must find 
another complex sign, P2, consisting of the constituents (a), or a 
combinatory variant of (a), and (d), which is relationally equivalent 
to P, and in which (b) can be shown to commute validly with (d). 
The information given in the above two points may be schematically 
represented as follows: 
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Pi 
cRb (or its 
com. binatory variant) 
denotation of which bears some denotation of 
C relation to b 
denotation of which bears some denotation of 
b relation to c 
P2 
a (or its R 
combinatory variant) 
denotation of which bears some denotation of 
a relation to d 
denotation of which bears some denotation'of 
d relation to a 
To show how this test works, I shall apply it in detail only to 
one member in the set of signs proper given above, namely the sign 
"flower show". Let us launch the hýpothesis that this tentative 
morphological complex consists of the constituent signs "flower" and 
"show". To test whether or not "flower" and "show" are signs proper in 
the tentative morphological complex "flower show", and, by implication,, 
whether or not this tentative morphological complex itself is a proper 
complex sign, we apply the following commutation procedure: 
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P: "flower show" 
"flower" R "show" 
denotation of "flower" 
(36) 
which bears some 
(blossom of a plant) relation to 
denotation of "show" which bears some 
(display or exhibition) relation to 
denotation of "show" 
(display or exhibition) 
denotation of "flower" 
(blossom of a plant) 
car show" 
qcar" R "show" 
denotation of "car" 
(a self-propelled road 
vehicle designed to 
carry passengers., 
especially one with 
four wheels that is 
powered by an internal 
combustion engine) 
denotation of "show 
(display or exhibition) 
which bears some denotation of "show" 
relation to (display or exhibition) 
which bears some denotation of "car" 
relation to (a self-propelled road 
vehicle designed to 
carry passengers, 
especially one with 
four wheels that is 
powered by an internal 
combustion engine) 
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P2 ': "flower girl" 
fl owe r if * "garden"' 
denotation of "flower" 
(blossom of a plant) 
which bears some 
relation to 
denotation of "garden" 
(an area of land normally 
adjoining a house for 
growing X) 
denotation of "garden" 
(an area of land normally 
adjoining a house for 
growing X) 
which bears some 
relation to 
denotation of flower 
(blossom of a plant) 
The above test demonstrates that the tentative morphological complex , 
"flower show" is a complex sign proper, which consists of the constituent 
signs "flower" and "show". 
By applying this test to the tentative morphological complex "boy", 
we find that it is not analysable into two or more smaller signs. -We 
therefore conclude that "boy" is not a complex sign, but a simple one, 'and,, 
consequently, it cannot be established as a morpholoýical complex. 
The. tentative morphological complexes "blackboard" and 
"butterfly" cannot be established as complex signs proper because they 
fail to satisfy the second criterion, i. e. analysability Into, two or more 
signs. The attempted analysis of "blackboard" into the tentative 
constituents "black" and "board" breaks down on the identification of 
"black" as a proper constituent in "blackboard". In other words, the 
attempted analysis of "blackboard" into "black" and "board" cannot bý-- 
regarded as a valid analysis, since it is not possible to identify "black" 
in this example as a fully-fledged sign anywhere else in the English 
language. From the semantic point'of view, the element "black" in 
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"blackboard" cannot, for example, be identified with the plereme 
"black" in the complex sign "black board", or with the moneme "black" 
in the complex sign "blackish". The first element "black" cannot be 
said to denote the colour property "black" which is denoted by "black" 
in "black board" and "blackish"- The similarity between the first 
element "black" and the other two grammatical entities "black" is only a 
formal similarity, and not a formal-semantic one. 
Now, that "black" in "blackboard" cannot be identified as a 
sign in its own right, it follows that 
* "board" cannot be identified as a 
sign either. This automatically follows from the condition that unless 
each tentative constituent sign in a tentative complex sign can be 
established as a sign, none of the tentative constituents in such a sign 
can be established as a sign. By implication, the tentative complex 
sign concerned cannot be established as a complex sign proper. 
Consequently, "blackboard" must be established as a simple sign. 
A similar situation holds for the tentative morphological complex 
" butterfly" . The attempted analysis of "butterfly" into "butter" and "fly" 
breaks down on the attempted identification of "butter" in this example 
as a fully-fledged sign. Despite its formal similarity to "butter" in, 
say, "expensive butter", the element "butter" cannot be identified with 
it from the semantic point of view. In other words,, if the describer were 
to identify * "butter" in, "butterfly" with "butter" in "expensive butter", 
then he would be wrongly identifying a purely formal entity with a 
grammatical entity proper. 
Now that "butter" in "butterfly" cannot be validly established as 
a sign in its own right, it follows that the tentative constituent sign 
*"fly" 
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cannot be established as a sign either. 
(37) 
Consequently, the 
tentative complex sign "butterfly" is not a complex'sign, but a simple 
one, and, therefore, it cannot be established as a morphological complex 
proper. 
(38) 
The remaining two tentative morphological complexes "played" 
and "butterfly-net" can be showm to be fully-fledged complex signs. The 
tentative constituent "play" in "played" validly commutes with "stay" to 
yield "stayed", and the tentative constituent sign "past tense" validly 
commutes with its own absence to yield "play" (verb). Similarly, the 
tentative constituent sign "butterfly" in "butterfly-net" validly commutes 
with "fishing" to yield "fishing-net", and the tentative constituent sign 
"net" validly commutes with its own absence to yield "butterfly". These 
commutations demonstrate that "played" and "butterfly-net" are fully-L 
fledged complex signs. 
11.3.2.3 The Third Criterion 
The test for the third criterion is quite simple. If, fora given 
tentative morphological complex, it can be shown that one of its duly 
established immediate constituents can befurther analysed into two or 
more smaller constituents on a lower level of analysis, then the complex 
sign concerned must be established as a morphological complex, and not 
a syntactic one. This follows from the theorematic condition according to 
which the immediate constituents of a morphological complex must be, at 
one and the same time, its ultimate ones. 
It must be noted, however, that if all the immediate constituents 
of a tentative morphological complex are demonstrably simple signs, i. e. 
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ultimate constituents, it does not necessarily follow that the complex 
in question is a morphological complex. - This springs from the fact that it 
is possible to find syntactic complexes in which the immediate constituents 
are all simple signs, i. e. ultimate constituents. ý The decision as to 
whether a complex sign whose immediate constituents are its ultimate ones 
is a morphological complex or not can only be decided on the basis of the 
fourth criterion. 
If we apply this test to the remaining (duly) established complex 
signs "played", "flower show" and "butterfly-net", we find, that none of 
their immediate constituents, established on the basis of criterion II, can 
be further analysed into two or more smaller signs. It follows from this 
that none of the above complex signs can, at this stage, be established 
as a syntactic complex. But neither can they be established as 
morphological complexes. The decision as to whether each one of these 
complex signs is a morphological or a syntactic complex depends on whether 
the constructional relation between its constituents is a relation of 
morphological simultaneity or a syntactic one, respectively. 
1.3.2. - 4 The Fourth Criterion 
Having demonstrated that "played", "flower show" and 
"butterfly-net" each consists of two simple signs only, we are'now faced 
with the task of establishing whether or not each one of these signs is a 
morphological complex. The aim of this section is to explain the axiomatic 
functionalist testing procedure for securing this knowledge. 
According to Hervey and Mulder (1980), no direct, positive evidence 
can be adduced for demonstrating that a complex sign is a morphological 
complex. Consequently the axiomatic functionalist methodology for 
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establishing whether or not a complex sign is a morphological complex 
is not based on trying to find positive, evidence for a relation of 
morphological simultaneity (i. e. non-tactic relation) between the 
constituents of such a sign, but on "attempting to find, and finding or 
failing to find, evidence of syntactic relations between the constituents 
of a complex sign" (Hervey and Mulder 1980: 131). 
(39) 
Hervey and Mulder (ibid. ) distinguish two types of evidence as 
regards any complex sign: external evidence and internal evidence. 
By external evidence is meant evidence for the "nature and type" (ibid. ) 
of a, complex sign based on the behaviour of that sign as a self-contained 
potential constituent in higher complex signs, i. e. on the behaviour of 
the complex sign concerned as a syntactic entity in higher constructions. 
By internal evidence is meant evidence as to the "nature and type" of a 
complex sign based on the kind of relation or relations which hold(s) 
between its constituents. 
External evidence is essential for demonstrating that a given 
tentative sign is a potential constituent (Criterion I), but it yields no 
positive evidence as to the type of relation which holds between the 
constituents of that sign. This, of course, means that external evidence 
cannot be employed in deciding whether a duly established complex sign 
is a morphological or a syntactic one. Therefore, everything hinges on 
internal evidence. 
If it can be shown that the constituents of a complex sign stand 
in a relation of functional asymmetry to each other, I. e. ordering relation, 
then this is sufficient, though not necessary, proof for demonstrating that 
the complex in question is a syntactic, and, therefore, not a morphological 
493 
II complex. Hervey and Mulder call the procedure for testing this 
condition the reversibility, or permutation test. The general format of 
this test may be expressed as follows: if by reversing the constituents 
(a) and (b) in the complex sign P, while holding the relation constant, 
we arrive at a complex Pi which is demonstrably different from P, then 
this is sufficient proof that P is a syntactic, and not a morphological,, 
complex. It is, incidentally, also sufficient for demonstrating the P, 
is a syntactic complex. 
If, however, the above condition is not satisfied, i. e. if the 
attempted test of reversibility breaks down, it does not follow that the 
complex sign in question is a morphological complex. As has been 
mentioned above, the demonstration of a relation of functional asymmetry 
between the constituents of a given complex sign is only a sufficient, 
and not a necessary, condition for establishing the complex in question 
as a syntactic complex. 
The second type of procedure for testing whether or not the 
constructional relation between the immediate constituents of a complex 
sign is syntactic may be called the "commutation with a syntagm" test. 
If it can be shown that at least 2ne of the immediate constituents of a 
complex sign proper stands in syntactic position in the complex sign 
concerned, then this is sufficient proof that this complex sign is a 
syntactic, and not a morphological, complex. The 'commutation with a 
syntagm' test is designed to establish whether or not such a situation holds 
ý-for a given complex sign, by trying to commute at least one of its immediate 
constituents with a duly established syntagm, while holding the rest of the 
context constant. If the test yields a positive result, i. e. if it proves to 
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be possible to commute at least one immediate constituent in a given 
complex sign with a syntagm, then this Is sufficient proof that the 
complex sign in question is syntactic and not morphological. However, 
only if the following both sufficient and necessary criterion 
(40) 
is 
satisfied does the describer conclude that a given complex sign is a 
morphological complex (ibid: 135): 
"P is a simultaneous bundle of monemes a and b 
(simple signs), if and only if none of the constituents 
(from immediate to ultimate) of any valid commutant of 
a or b in P, stanýd-s demonstrably- in a position with 
respect to any other constituent in the same complex". 
Let us now apply the above testing procedure to the three remaining 
complex signs: "played", "flower show" and "butterfly-net"* Reversibility 
applies only to "flower show". By reversing the ordering of the 
constituents "flower" and "show" in this complex, we derive the complex 
-sign "show flower" which is different in terms of its communicative 
function. This constitutes sufficient proof that the relation between the 
constituent signs "flower" and "show" in "flower show" is a relation of 
functional ordering, and, therefore, that the complex "flower show" is a 
syntactic and not a morphological complex. 
By applying the 'Commutation with a syntagm' test to "butterfly-net" 
we can show that the 'constituent sign "butterfly" commutes with the syntagm 
"butterfly and fishing" to yield the functionally different complex sign 
"butterfly and fishing net". And since the immediate constituents of this 
new syntagm are not its ultimate ones (see analysis below), it follows that 
this complex is a syntactic complex, and,, by implication, that the complex 
sign "butterfly-net" is a syntactic, and. -not a morphological, complex: 
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butterfly and fishing // net 
butterfly / /and fishing 
and // fishing 
Neither of the constituents of the complex sign "played" can 
commute with a syntagm. This is sufficient proof that the relation (R) 
between its constituents is not a tactic, but a non-tactic relation, and, 
therefore, that the complex sign "played" is not a syntactic, but a 
morphological one. 
11.4 Axiomatic Functionalist Morphology: Further Examples 
The aim of this section is to consider the axiomatic functionalist 
criteria and methodology for morphological analysis further by applying 
them to the following set of examples: "assistant", "assistants", 
"changeable", "changeability" and "unkind". Each one of these examples 
will, at this stage in the analysis, be considered as a tentative 
morphological complex. 
, 
It can be shown by commutation that each one of the above tentative 
morphological complexes satisfies the criterion of being a self-contained 
potential constituent in at least one higher complex sign, thus: "the 
tnice,., 
unkindl [participant,. assistant , assistants 
I in the pool", 
, 
"the Inice, -. changeable) weather", and "the 
[variability" changeability 
of the weather". 
Let us first consider the tentative morphological complexes "assistant", 
"changeable" and "unkind" by applying to them the remaining three criteria 
of morphological analysis. Let us hypothesise, in terms of the second 
criterion, that each one of the above tentative complexes consists of two 
immediate constituents only, as follows: 
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"assist" R "ant"... 
participate" R 'Rant" 
"assist" R Sd 
(2) "change" R "able" 
"drive" R "able" 
"change" R 
(3) 'sun" R kind" 
un'@ R important" 
R kind" 
The third criterion is also satisfied. The constituent signs of 
each one of the above tentative morphological complexes are all simple 
signs. In other words, the immediate constituents of each one of the 
tentative morphological complexes concerned are at the same time its 
ultimate constituents. 
By applying the fourth criterion to the above tentative 
morphological complexes we can show that (a) "assistant" and "changeable" 
are morphological complexes, and (b) "unkind" is a syntactic complex. 
The demonstration of point (a) above follows from the fact. that neither the 
reversibility test, nor the commutation with a syntagm test can yield any 
positive result to refute the hypothesis that the relation (R) between the 
constituents of the tentative morphological complexes concerned is a 
non-tactic relation. The demonstration of point (b) follows from the fact 
that it is possible to commute "kind" in "unkind" with the syntagm 
"important but kind" to yield the construction "unimportant but kind" - as 
in "unimportant but kind man" - whose immediate constituents are not its 
ultimate ones, as the following analysis shows: 
un / important but kind 
important but kind 
but / kind 
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The fact that the reversibility test does not positively apply 
to "unkind" is immaterial, due to the fact that this test is only a 
sufficient, and not a necessary, one. 
Let us now consider the tentative morphological complexes 
"assistants" and "changeability" by applying to them the last three 
criteria for morphological analysis. Let us hypothesise, in terms of 
the second criterion, that each one of these tentative morphological 
complexes consists of three immediate constituents, as follows: 
s ing" R 11 er's R" plural 
change" R "able" R 11 ityll 
For this hypothesis to be corroborated, we must be able to show 
that each one of the above constituent signs can commute with at least 
one other sign, or with its own absence 'e, while keeping the rest of 
the context constant. That this condition is not satisfied for each of 
the above tentative morphological complexes may be shown by the 
following attempted commutations: 
(1) "assist'k R "ant" plural" 
"assist" R "ant" id 
participatd' R "ant" R "plural" 
"assist" R? R 11 plural" 
(2) "change" R "able" R 11 ityll 
"change" R "able" R4 
"refute" R "able" R to ityls 
"change" R? R to ityll 
I It is obvious from the above two attempted commutations that the 
tentative'analyses of "assistants" and "changeability" directly into three 
constituents breaks down on the identification of "ant" and "able" as valid 
t 
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immediate constituents In these two grammatical entities, respectively. 
However, the identity of "ant" and "able" as fully fledged signs 
in the tentative morphological complexes "assistants"and "changeability" 
is beyond dispute. These two entities occur with the same form and the 
same semantic import in other grammatical constructions in the language, 
e. g. "consultants" and "advisability". Moreover, the denotations of 
"assistants" and "changeability" areg demonstrably, fully recoverable on 
the assumption that "ant" and "able" are fully-fledged signs in these two 
tentative morphological complexes respectively. Also, there is no reason 
to believe that "ant" and "able" in "assistants" and "changeability" are, 
qua sign-identity, different from the fully-fledged signs "ant" and "able" 
in "assistant" and "changeable". 
On the basis of this, and by virtue of the fact that "assistant" and 
"changeable" are well-formed grammatical constructions, we may conclude 
that, in terms of analysis into immediate constituents, "assistants" and 
11 changeability" have the following structure: 
"assistant" R 11 plural" 
" changeable" R 11 itylk 
And since "assistant" and "changeable" can be further analysed into 
"assist" "ant" 
" change" R "able" 
it follows that the immediate constituents in "assistants" and "changeability" 
are not the ultimate constituents, and, by imPlication, that "assistants" 
and "changeability" are not morphological complexes, but syntactic ones. 
The establishment of "unkind". "assistants" and "changeability" 
as syntactic complexes is not important from the point of view of a 
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morphological description of English, or from the point of view of the 
goal of the theory as an instrument for yielding descriptions, but it has 
far reaching consequences on the syntactic analyses of English that have 
been proposed so far (Mulder 1980(h) and, also Hadj-Mohamed 1980), 
especially as many of these analyses are wrongly based on the implicit 
assumption that certain so-called derivational grammatical entities are 
monemes and not pleremes, e. g. "ation" in "modernisation" . "list" in 
listructuralist", and "al" in "educationalist". 
To illustrate this point, let us consider the axiomatic functionalist 
model for the plural nominal governed syntagm in English (Mulder 1980(h): 
154): 
article 
numeral 
adjective 
supplemen! 
nominal 
(42) 
In terms of this model, the following plural nominal governed syntagm 
"the three unkind assistants in the pub" may be accounted for as follows: 
[the ] 
[threej 
[unkind] 
[in<- (the--: %pub) 
assistants 
But such an analysis is inadequate because it fails to take account 
of the fact that both "unkind" and "assistants" are syntactic, and not 
morphological complexes. This, of course, means that this model must 
be modified to enable it to account for the above, and similar, syntactic 
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phenomena. Other models must also be modified to account for 
syntactic phenomena in English that have hitherto been treated as 
morphological. It is, however, not my intention here to pursue this 
point any further, as this will take us far beyond the soope of this thesis. 
11.5 Morphology And Semantics In Axiomatic Functionalism 
It is clear from the previous discussion of the criteria for 
morphological analysis in axiomatic functionalism that these criteria, 
insofar as they are formulated by reference to the notion 'denotation', are 
semantically-orientated. The aim of this section is to give a brief 
discussion of the 'legitimacy' of adopting a semantically-orientated 
procedure of analysis in grammar. 
It has been previously mentioned that 'semantics' and 'systemology' 
are autonomous sub-theories or disciplines of the axiomatic functionalist 
theory. By virtue of the fact that morphology is a sub-part of the grammatical 
section of the systemology, it follows that morphology and semantics are 
autonomous components of the theory of axiomatic functionalism. 
The difference between semantics and the grammatical section of 
the systemology, and, therefore, the basis of their autonomy from each 
other, may be expressed in this manner: whereas semantics deals with the 
denotations of wholly- conventiona I signa, regardless of their function in 
grammar, and, also, regardless of whether they are simple or complex 
elements, grammar deals with the constructional properties of signa, i. e. 
with their analysability and/or combinability in syntax and morphology, 
regardless of whether they are signs or symbols, 
(43) 
This characterisation 
of the difference between semantics and grammar, including, of course, 
morphology, indirectly expresses the connection between them, which is 
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the fact that they are both interested in signa, though semantics is 
only interested in a sub-set of those, i. e. signs. 
The mutual autonomy of grammar and semantics from'each other 
I 
means that the notions and entities in these two components of the 
axiomatic functionalist theory, and, also, in the descriptions based 
upon them, must, logically speaking, be kept distinct from each other. 
By this is meant that, grammatical, including morphological, notions and 
entities must be primarily defined and established on the basis of 
grammatical criteria only, and, similarly, semantic notions and entities 
must be primarily defined and established on the basis of semantic 
criteria only. Certain correspondences between grammatical and semantic 
entities in description may be established, but such correspondences are 
between entities already established as grammatical and semantic entities 
(in relevant descriptions) on the basis of grammatical and semantic 
criteria, respectively. 
However, it should not be concluded from this that semantics is 
not relevant to grammatical, including morphological, description. On 
the contrary, semantic considerations play a vital role in the material 
adequation of grammatically-based grammatical analyses . 
(44) 
In other 
words, grammatical descriptions, and, by implication, statements in such 
descriptions, must be shown to be consistent with what the linguist has 
set up as the denotational import of the phenomena which lie within their 
own scope. Grammatical descriptions which fail to satisfy this requirement 
are said to be inadequate, and, therefore, must be rejected. 
judged in terms of the above frame of reference, it may perhaps be 
said that the formulation of the axiomatic functionalist criteria of 
morphological analysis by direct reference to the semantic notion 
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'denotation' in the manner explained previously cannot be said to be 
a theoretically 'legitimate' or 'warranted' procedure. In other words, 
insofar as morphology, which is part of grammar, is autonomous from 
semantics, and insofar as grammar and semantics are said to be independent of, 
though related to, each other, it follows that the dependence of morphology 
on semantics in Hervey and Mulder (19 80) is an unwarranted procedure in 
axiomatic functionalism. 
12. MorphologY In Axiomatic Functionalism: Final Remarks 
In the previous discussion, I have mentioned that the theory, as 
a formal system, consists of axioms and definitions which imply theorems 
(Section 6). It has also been mentioned in a different context (Section 10), 
that the theory consists of three sub-theories or disciplines, namely the 
Isignum theory', Isystemology' and 'semantics'. In addition to such 
statements which characterise the 'content' of the theory, there are two 
types of statement concerning the theory as a structure in its own right: 
(a) statements which spell out the evaluation measure of the theory, and 
(b) statements which explain the methodological foundations of the theory. 
These two types of statement differ from the former ones in that they are 
about the theory as a theoretical system and descriptive tool, and not 
about what is In the theory as a theoretical system. 
In terms of what has been said above, and to avoid any possible 
confusion about what the theory in axiomatic functionalism is, I propose 
the following terminological distinctions: 
(1) the application of the term 'approach' to cover W the 'methodological 
foundations' of the theory (see below) and the descriptions which are based 
upon it, (ii) the 'evaluation measure', and (iii) the 'theory'; 
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(2) the application of the term 'theory' to refer to the 'deductive 
calculus' - i. e. the set of axioms, definitions and theorems - which 
defines the 'model' for descriptions, i. e. the 'signum theory', 
1systemology' and 'semantics'. 
The above terminological distinctions should be seen for what 
they are: they are not an attempt to modify axiomatic functionalism, but 
an attempt to suggest a general framework in terms of which we can discuss 
axiomatic functionalism economically. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
The nature of the difference between deduction and induction has 
also been dealt with in Chapter III, Section 8.1. 
(2) See Hjelmslev's Prolegomana to a Theory of Languag for this view 
of deduction. 
(3) See Mulder (1968) for a full discussion of parasitic features, 
(4) The same situation holds for the nature of the relationship between 
the fields of speech-phenomena and their descriptions under the 
theory. This, by no means, suggests a fault in * 
the diagram given 
by Mulder as the situations under consideration here do not fall 
within its scope. 
(5) There is no reason to believe that this situation does not obtain in 
other natural sciences, e. g. physics. However, I shall refrain 
from dealing with this point here as such a treatment will take us 
far outside the scope of this thesis. 
(6) This point may be illustrated by Mulder's views concerning the It 
epistemological nature of axiomatic functionalism (c. f. Section (9) 
for this point). 
(7) A brief discussion of this point and its methodological implications is 
given in Chapter VI, Section 3. 
(8) The most fully-fledged statement of this feature of axiomatic 
functionalism may be found in Mulder (1979). 
(9) See Section (6.3) for the notion 'stipulative definition'. 
(10) Concerning the axioms in axiomatic functionalism, Mulder (1980(b): 23) 
writes: "The initial justification for [the axioms] is that they seem 
reasonable and acceptable to others, and their further justification is 
that they are assumed, in the absence of refutation, to be appropriate". 
It is not clear to the present author how to reconcile this statement 
with the view expressed by Mulder (1980(a): 6) that axioms, as is the 
case with other types of statement in the theory, have no "existential 
postulate". 
(11) None of the following axioms by Mulder (1980(c) ) can be reasonably 
said to be self-evident: 
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Axiom A: "All features in semiotic sets are functional". 
Axiom B: "Semiotic systems contain simple, and may contain 
complex unordered or complex ordered signa and figurae". 
Axiom C: "Figurae may have para-cenotaCtic features and signa 
may have para-syntactic features". 
Axiom D: "All semiotic'systems contain sentences". 
Axiom E: "There may be a' many-to-rone relation between realisation 
form and figurae (allophony), and between cenological 
form and signum (allomorphy), and vice versa (homophony 
and homomorphy respectively)". 
(12) Bloomfield (1926: 153) states that "the postulational method Can 
further the study of language, because it forces us to state explicitly 
whatever we assume, to define our terms, and to decide what things 
may exist independently and what things are interdependent ... 
Certain errors can be avoided or corrected by examining and 
formulating our ( ... 
) assumptions and defining our ( ... ) terms"; 
he also adds that "the postulational. method saves discussion because 
it limits our statements to a defined terminology". 
(13) The reader may consult Blanche"' (1966) for a more comprehensive 
discussion of these conditions. 
(14) This procedure is employed by Pike (1976) in "Toward the Development 
of Tagmemic Postulates". 
(15) Explanations are also employed by Hervey (1980(c) ) in the process 
of giving an 'interpretation' to his semantics axiom: "Signa may be 
realised an unlimited number of times (in actual communication),, 
each resulting utterance denoting a denotation which may belong to 
a potentially infinite denotation clause". 
(16) Concerning the organisation and content of his theorye Mulder (1980(b): 
24) states: ". .. We may not wish the -initial presentation of a 
theory 
to be overloaded with definitions, so even some of those whose . 
necessity we can foresee at a given stage may be rather incorporated 
in explanations of a less formal kind accompanying formal definitions" 
(emphasis ours). The words 'initial presentation' in the above 
quotation seem to refer to the 1968 presentation of Mulder's theory in 
his book Sets and Relations in Phonology - In this presentation, 
explanations are separately listed and numbered. Axiom A has one 
explanation associated with it, and axiom B has three explanations 
associated with it. 
(17) Definition (17a) is "contrastive para-cenotactic features" for "features 
with the sole function of groupment over and above cenotactic 
groupment". The explanation which follows this definition (given 
below) is, in my opinion, crucial for our understanding of this definition 
as an element in a theoretical system in its capacity as a descriptive 
instrument: Explanation " Econtrastive para-cenotactic features are: ] 
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features that give form and unity to cenotactic (phonotactic) 
complexes as such (i. e. form over and above the inherent form 
of the cenotactic entities themselves). Typical examples are 
"Juncture", and normal unit-accent, e. g. so-called "word accent", 
"word-group or phrase accent", -etc. Juncture, especially when 
not always realised by "pause", is frequently a function of accent. 
To be distinguished from unit accent, which - after Martinet -I 
prefer to call "contrastive accent", is "connotative stress" and 
other features fulfilling the same function, which may be considered 
as (usually non-discrete) features of an auxilliary semiotic system 
used to draw attention to specific parts of an utterance, at the co , 
st 
of others, and so adds connotation to the denotation, which remains 
constant. Examples of connotative stress are seen, for example in 
the difference between "he hit him". "he hit him" and "he hit him" 
(the stressed parts are [underlined 3 ), vZ_ich have the same 
denotation, but which are different as to connotation. Of as imilar 
nature, and often occurring in conjunction with 
, 
the former, is what 
one might call "connotative modulation" which usually takes the 
form of pitch-modulation, similar in appearance to, but to be 
distinguished from, the phonetic forms corresponding to intonation". 
Definition 21 is: "Ellipsis" for "realisation of a syntagm, such that 
one or more of its constituents are not realised at the utterance level" 
As with the explanation attached to the former definition, the 
following explanation is crucial for the 'correct' application of the 
theory in description, e. g. the rule-of-thumb for identifying ellipsis 
and the distinction between 'ellipsis' and'conflation: 
Explanation: "ellipsis belongs to realisation, rather than to the form 
of a signum. It does not have to be accounted for, except at the 
utterance -level, and the phenomenon can therefore be ignored in 
syntax, i. e. in syntax one regards the constituents as being present. 
Still it is sometimes difficult to recognise ellipsis for what it is. 
The following are mere rules-of-thumb for solving the problem. In 
the first place, it is typical for ellipsis that the message would not 
be affected if the "missing" element(s) were to be reincluded. 
Consider "John eats" versus "John eats soup". The addition of "soup" 
may change the message, if only by making it more specific, and 
"John eats" is, therefore not elliptical. An utterance such as "John 
hit, and Peter pushed him" 
, 
is elliptical. In the first place it 
satisfies the necessary condition just mentioned,, i. e. the addition 
of "him" after "hit" cannot change the message. A second necessary 
condition for ellipsis is satisfied as well, i. e. without the "missing" 
element it is not a well-formed syntagm. That is "John hit" is not a 
syntactic constituent. To describe it as: 
(john-Mit )<-land Peter pushed) 
( 
him 
would imply that "John hit" alone commutes with the whole, which in 
its turn would imply that "John hit" is well-formed. This is obviously 
not the case. The above two necessary conditions, taken together,, , 
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constitute a sufficient condition for regarding utterances as 
elliptical from the syntactic point of view. Compare this with 
"young elephants and monkeys" in the sense of "young elephants 
and young monkeys". The first necessary condition is fulfilled, 
but not the second. The part "elephants and monkeys" i. e., 
"elephants<---Eand ( monkeys] ", is syntactically well-formed, 
and so is the whole of young---> Celephants <-Candf--monkeys] 
I should like to add a third necessary condition for recognising 
true ellipsis, i. e. the missing element(s) should be unequivocally 
recoverable. Otherwise one might also include such cases as, 
e. g. "No, not a cow, a horse", as an answer to, say, "Did he 
buy a cow? " It is clear that the criterion of unequivocal 
recoverability is not satisfied here. There is little point in 
recognising a separate type of ellipsis, to be called, perhaps, 
11sentential" ellipsis. It would even be absurd to call it ellipsis, 
as a legitimate question would then be: "Wýat does it stand for? " 
The answer to this could then only be that it can stand for any number 
of different sentences, e. g. "No, what he bought was not a cow, 
but a horse", "No, he did not buy a cow, but a horse", etc. This 
exposes the absurdity of the question by the absurdity of the answer. 
At the sentential level, we must, therefore, consider ellipsis to 
play no role at all, and the only analyses possible at that level are 
one into constituents, the clauses, and one into base and para- 
syntactic features. It is, as I said, irrelevant at the sentence 
level whether the base corresponds to a well-formed realisation of 
a syntactic structure. It is only at a different level, i. e. the 
syntactic one, that ellipsis becomes an issue, and from the point 
of view of that level we may say that it is merely a matter of "defective" 
realisation of a syntactic entity as an utterance. The fact that, in 
normal communication, all realisation 2resupRoses utterances of 
sentences, is, analytically speaking, irrelevant. There is no 
reason why one could not recognise the realisation of something to 
be not well-formed at one level, but perfectly well-formed at another. 
After all, a similar discrepancy may occur between phonological and 
grammatical well-formedness, morphological and syntactic well- 
formedness, syntactic and semantic well-formedness etc. In this 
theory -I should like to stress this - the syntactic and the sentential 
levels are regarded as entirely different levels. The latter occupies 
an important position in the whole of linguistic analysis, because 
all realisation, as I said already, presupposes sentences, and actual 
sentences (but not necessarily the abstract sentential level) ýave, 
therefore, constantly to be referred to, especially when decisions as 
to matters of identity (on all other levels) are concerned. It is, 
indeed, via sentences that the ultimate identity of any semiotic 
feature is to be established, but once established such a feature has 
become a member of its proper inventory of features, and is, from that 
moment onwards, independent of the sentence utterances it may be 
instanced in. In order to avoid a common confusion, it should be 
noted that there are no ill-formed entities in language, I. e. "well- 
formedness" or "not well-formedness", is always a matter of 
realisation with respect to a particular level of analysis, not of 
entities at the level in question. As true ellipsis Is such a common 
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feature, and in many cases even the realisational norm, rather 
than the exception, one might'wish to have a formal notation for 
constructions such as "John hit and Peter pushed him". Such a 
notation could be: 
John hit 
Peter 
a nd pushed 
(Eg 
him 
)I 
the box indicating the suppressed part in the realisation. One 
might be tempted to call ellipsis: "conflation", were it not that 
this term is equally applicable to such cases as "young elephants 
and monkeys", when meaning "young elephants and young monkeys". 
In the case of conflation, covering both the latter case and ellipsis, 
the element that could have been inserted without affecting the 
message is clearly separately relevant to the denotation of the 
whole. But in the case of ellipsis this is directly the case, 
whereas in the other cases the conflation is a function of the 
semantic import of the syntactic structure, or of the denotation of 
some of the parts or both, i. e. the conflation is ultimately a 
matter of semantics. That is, suppressed "him" in "John hit and 
Peter pushed him" has full and separate denotational force, and we 
can, therefore, truly say that structurally it is there, but. that it is 
suppressed in realisation. In "young elephants and monkeys", 
7'young" determines the whole complex "elephants and monkeys", 
i. e. "Young --- o, (elephants *-Candf-monkeys"j)" and, therefore 
everything in it. We cannot say here that anything is "suppressed". 
Compare this with the other reading of "young elephants and monkeys" 
(i. e. monkeys young and old) which can syntactically be represented 
as " (young--., %, elephants)e, ýandt. -monkeys)" which does not involve 
conflation". 
(18) The two descriptions would, however, be equivalent qua content. 
(19) Mulder (personal note) no longer adheres to the established 
interpretation of hypotheses. This point will be dealt with In his 
'forthcoming' book Outline of Axiomatic Functionalism which has 
not been consulted by the present author. 
(20) With respect to the role of simplicity in the evaluation of scientific 
explanations, Copi (1978: 472) writes: "simplicity ... is a very 
difficult term to define. Not all controversies are as straightforward 
as the Ptolemaic - Copernican one, in which the latter's greater 
simplicity consisted merely in requiring a small number of epicycles. 
And of course "naturalness" is an almost hopelessly deceptive term - 
for it seems much more "natural" to believe that the earth is still 
while the apparently moving sun really does move. ... Simplicity Fas an evaluation criterion] is an important and frequently decisive 
one, but it is vague and not always easy to apply". This feature 
of simplicity is also emphasised by Matthews (1972) in hig extensive 
discussion of the evaluation of linguistic theories and description 
(c. f. Chapter IV, Section S. 2.2). 
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(21) However, it should not be concluded from this that "simplicity" 
in some general and loose sense, has no role to play as a 
consideration in the evaluation of the theory and the descriptions 
based upon it. What I am objecting to here is the treatment of 
simplicity as a (meta) hypothesis. 
(22) Mulder (1980(a): 12) gives the following diagram to represent the 
evaluation measures (the arrow to read as 'implies', the broken 
arrow as 'implies. potentially'): 
I Appropriateness of theory I 
FeasibUity of 
point of view 
\ 
consistency II adequacy II simplicity 
of theory of theory of theory I-I. I. III 
100V I %% *-.. 
, L. --* IV Itki 
consistency adequacy simplicity 
of of of 
descriptions descriptionsi descriptions 
full coverage II detail of II material 
of data II data I ladequacy 
(23) The term consistency is employed in three different senses in 
axiomatic functionalist literature: (a) to refer to a particular state 
of affairs pertaining between (i) statements in the theory and (ii) 
statements in a description; (b) to refer to a particular state of 
affairs holding between the theory and the descriptions based on it, 
on the one hand, and between descriptions and the phenomena they 
describe, on the other; and (c) to designate a particular state of 
affairs holding between the "representation devices" employed in 
descriptions and the theory presupposed by those descriptions 
(Mulder 1980(h): 151). The present author prefers to restrict the 
term consistency to the first sense mentioned above, due to the 
fact that this is the only type of consistency which holds between 
statements of the same level of abstraction. This is, however, a 
matter of terminological preference. 
sio 
(24) 1 have also previously employed the term 'arbitrary' to designate 
the fact that the theory has no logical source or origin. 
(25) Axiomatic functionalism, i. e. the theory, seems also to satisfy 
the characterisation of conventionalism (c. f. Chapter I, Sections 
3.10 and 3.11). 
(26) The notion 's ignum' and other related notions are defined in 
Section 11. 
(27) The expression "successive and repeated" employed by Mulder 
(1980(c): 41) is rather unfortunate because it may be taken to 
mean that the ontology is infinite. 
(28) This criticism applies to all approaches which treat the phoneme 
and the morpheme (moneme) as classes of allophones and allomorphs 
respectively. For a fuller discussion of this point, the reader may 
consult Lamb (1964) and Matthews (1974). 
(29) Mulder, nowadays, does not distinguish between distinctive function 
in phonology and distinctive function in grammar. The most explicit 
indication of this is given in the introduction to the "Postulates" 
(1980(c): 41), though this change is not incorporated in the 
"Postulates" as this definition illustrates. Under this more recent 
interpretation of the 'distinctive function' operator, it is not clear 
how one would bridge the gap between phonology and grammar. 
(30) For this type of allomorph, and the'different types of allomorph 
found in English, the reader may refer to Muala (1981). 
(31) The/S/Is an archi-phoneme representing the *uspension of 
opposition between the phonemes Isl and /z/ in English. For a 
full discussion of the notion. archi-phoneme in axiomatic functionalism 
the reader may refer to Mulder (1968). 
(32) Mulder and Hervey (1972: 33) write: "We have said that a p, member 
I, is a phonological form, i. e. a phonological feature of a cla ss jp 6 
which often, iA its turn, is a complex of phonological features. 
This is, of course, not entirely correct, as also 'zero' may be a 
member of such a class, and this is, of course, not a phonological 
feature. One should actually say that. R is a phonological form or 
feature, or - in the case that. 2 is a member of -and one of 
the members of t. 2 ) is 'zero' - 'p' may be 'zerPý! 
(33) Hervey and Mulder's "Pseudo-Composites and Pseudo Words" was 
first published in La Linguistique, Vol. 9,1973, pp. 41-69, prior 
to the first public presentation of Mulder's and Hervey's "Postulates" 
at the First International Colloquium of Functionalist Linguistics held 
at Groningue, Holland. The version included in Mulder and Hervey 
(1980) is a slightly revised version, as may be established by 
comparing this version with its predecessor. Not only are the 
criteria for morphological analysis embodied in this paper easily 
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traceable back to Mulder's "Postulates" as they presently stand, 
but these criteria are also referred to by Mulder in his discussions 
of the boundary between syntax and morphology in axiomatic 
functionalism and the implications of that distinction in linguistic 
description (Mulder 19 80 (g), (h), (i) ). 
(34) Hervey and Mulder (1980: 123) add the proviso that a morphological 
complex must be a self-contained potential "unless ... it is 
inherently maximum on the level in question". 
(35) Mulder (personal note) no longer regards this methodology and the 
criteria it is intended to test for as a fully adequate statement of 
the morphological section of his theory. His ideas on this matter 
will be incorporated in his forthcoming book Outline of Axiomatic 
Functionalism. 
(36) Hervey and Mulder (1980: 127) point out that this constitutes only 
a "partial" and inexhaustive characterisation of the semantic role 
of the constructional ielations between the immediate constituents 
of any complex sign. 
(37) The 'denotations' given in this discussion are actually 'rough 
semantic glosses' and not denotations proper. 
(38) This follows from the fact that unless each tentative constituent 
in a tentative complex sign can be established as a sign proper, 
none of them can be established as a sign. 
(39) Hervey and Mulder (1980) call entities of this type "fossils". 
(40) The following procedure is employed in description: the describer 
hypothesises that a complex sign is a morphological complex, and 
he tries to refute this hypothesis by showing that the complex 
concerned is a syntactic complex. If all attempts to show that 
the complex sign concerned is a syntactic complex, then the 
describer concludes that it is a morphological complex, i. e. the 
hypothesis that the complex sign is a morphological complex is 
corroborated. It goes without saying that this corroborated 
hypothesis remains, in principle, refutable. 
(41) This criterion constitutes a condition for attempted refutation. 
(42) 'As to the connection between morphology and syntax in description, 
Mulder (1980(g): 150) states: ".. . it is by criteria from plerematics (morphology) that we are able to present a syntagm as a string of 
pleremes, i. e. that we can establish simultaneity, rather than 
ordering relations, between constituents, or even analysability 
itself (tee Hervey and Mulden 'Pseudo-composites and pseudo- 
wordO). What we start off with, i. e. that which we must accept 
as given when we begin to analyse syntactically, is a duly identified 
syntagm, presented as a. duly justified string of pleremes". 
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(43) The shape ]-* signifies parallel determination. Mulder 
(1980(c): Def. l4b) defines parallel determination as "complex 
tactic relation such that two or more peripheral immediate 
constituents are sub-ordinated to the same nucleus, but it 
cannot be ascertained that they are so in different ways". 
The brackets stand for 'expansion', which Mulder (ibid: 
Def. 13c) defines as "immediate constituent that commutes with 
zero's, 
(44) See Hervey (1980(b) ) for the only treatment of the relation 
between grammar and semantics in axiomatic functionalism. 
(45) In arriving at this conclusion I have benefited a great deal from 
discussions with J. W. F. Mulderand M. Lamb of the. University 
of Ulster. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to deal briefly with 
the residual problem of static and dynamic models of grammatical, 
particularly morphological, description. Its second aim is to compare 
the morphological theories previously dealt with, in terms of the following 
factors: universalism, cognition and methodology. 
Static And Dynamic Models 
Generally speaking, linguistic theories, and, particularly, the 
grammatical components of such theories, may be classified into 
different types according to whether they are static models, or dynamic 
ones, or both. These three types of theory may be represented by., 
axiomatic functionalism, transformational generative grammar and word 
and paradigm I, respectively. Static-dynamic models of linguistic 
description are of two sub-types: (a) those that employ these two modes 
of linguistic description in one and the same component of their descriptive 
framework, as, for example, in certain versions of item and arrangement 
morphology (see Hockett 1954), and (b) those that employ these two modes 
of linguistic description in different components of their descriptive 
framework, e. g. the application of 'processes' and 'arrangements' in the 
morphological and syntactic sections of word and paradigm I, respectively. 
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It is not my intention here to deal with the legitimacy of 
employing these two different modes of linguistic description in. one and 
the same descriptive framework, as this will take us far beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say here that, this procedure 
sometimes leads to logical contradictions, as is evidenced by the 
incompatibility of a process description of morphological phenomena with 
the standard definition of the morpheme as a discrete unit in item and 
arrangement morphology, which definition is adopted, in broad outline, 
by some dynamic models, e. g. word and paradigm I. 
However, the third category of linguistic theories mentioned 
above, i. e. the static-dynamic one, can be safely ignored here due to 
its irrelevance from the point of view of the morphological approaches 
dealt with previously in this thesis. As far as these approaches are 
concerned, only two categories can be established: static models and 
dynamic ones. Stratificational grammar and axiomatic functionalism 
belong to the first category, while transformational generative grammar, 
and the two word and paradigm models belong to the second category. 
It is more difficult to give a positive delimitation of static 
models of linguistic description than it is to give such a delimitation of 
dynamic ones, 
(2) 
1 shall, therefore, specify static models negatively 
as those models which do not employ process-type modes of description, 
i. e. as non-dynamic models. By contrast, dynamic models are models 
which employ processes for expressing linguistic structure or phenomena. 
process may be specified as an instruction to change X into Y, i, e, 
to change what occurs to the left of the arrow into what occurs to the 
right of the same arrow. 
(3) 
The arrow 
(4) 
symbolises the operation carried 
sis 
out by the process, whether it is affixation, reduplication, modification, 
subtraction (see Nida 1946), or any other type of operation specified 
by a given linguistic theory. Each process clearly consists of at least' 
three components: the input, the output, and the operation., These 
components are crucial in the sense that they are necessary elements 
in the specification of processes as descriptive tools. A process implies 
these three components, and each component implies the other components 
and the process. In other words, it is not possible to have a process 
without having these three components, or to have any one of these 
three components without having the other components and the process. 
In certain cases, a process may have a limitation component whose 
function is to restrict the application of the process to a particular 
context (c. f. Chapter IV Section S. 1.2). In such instances, the 
limitation component is an integral part of the process concerned. 
Processes are of different degrees of 'sophistication'. They may 
be of a simple type, found in Sapir (1921), Nida (1946) and Robins (1959, 
1964) or an elaborate one found particularly in the work of'Chomsky and 
his fellow transformational is ts. Moreover, even in the work of Chomsky 
and his disciples we may distinguish between transformations and other 
types of process rules. These different types of processes are too 
familiar in the literature to warrant any explanation or illustration here. 
The main aim of this section is to deal with the dissatisfaction 
expressed by some linguists concerning the application of processes in 
synchronic linguistics, particularly in the field of synchronic 
morphological theory. Some linguists, for example Hockett (1954), 
Lamb (1966) and Lockwood (1972) hold that processes are not compatible 
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with synchronic linguistics conceived of as a discipline whose task is 
0 
to provide a framework for dealing with language states. 
(6) 
Others 
for example Botha (1968), hold that the justification and motivation behind 
the employment of processes as descriptive tools lies in the fact that they 
are far superior to the static 'arrangements' or 'relations' employed in 
static models from the point of view of adequacy and economy or 
simplicity of descriptions* 
(7) 
Linguists who advocate this view support 
their position by the observation that processes can express linguistically 
significant generalisation which, to say the least, are only clumsily 
dealt with under the rival approach. Thus, the argument goes, the 
advantages which accrue from the descriptive utility of processes in 
linguistic descriptions far outweigh whatever doubts or misgivings there 
may be concerning the epistemological legitimacy of such processes in 
synchronic linguistics. 
Before dealing with this controversy any further, I would like to 
mention two points. First, unlike the epistemological legitimacy of 
processes, the epistemological legitimacy of the descriptive tools employed 
in static models is never questioned. Secondly, the terms 'generative' 
and 'non-generative' are often employed to refer to dynamic and static 
models, respectively. The motivation behind this springs from the fact 
that generative models, in the traditional use of this term, are invariably 
process, dynamic models, whereas non-generative ones are static ones. 
However, if the term 'generative' is taken in one of its technical senses, 
i. e. in the sense of 'explicit' (Matthews 1972), then there is,, logically 
speaking, no reason why an 'explicit' static model should not be regarded 
as a generative one. For this reason, I shall adhere to the 
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traditional labels dynamic versus static in dealing with the issue under 
0 
consideration here. 
It is generally accepted that process rules are the 'natural' 
vehicle for expressing the diachronic facts of languages. Within this 
context, the operation specified by a given process is temporally 
significant, in the sense that it purports to describe actual linguistic 
change in a real time span. Put differently, within diachronic linguistics 
what occurs to the left of the arrow in a process rule is temporally prior 
to what occurs to its right, i. e. the input of a diachronic process rule 
and its output belong to different stages in the evolution of a language. 
This temporal interpretation of process rules is deeply entrenched in the 
minds of some linguists to the extent that they cannot but approach 
synchronic process rules from the point of view of this temporal 
interpretation. 
(8) 
This position may be illustrated by the following remark 
from Hockett (1954: 211): "IA has been formulated at least in part because 
of a feeling of dissatisfaction with the 'moving-part' or 'historical 
analogy' implicit in IP". 
To understand why many neo-Bloomfieldians seem to have 
approached the task of interpreting synchronic process rules from the 
point of view of their older and more established diachronic counterparts, 
we must consider the status of the synchrony versus diachrony dichotomy 
in this approach, together with its predominant 'God's truth' epistemological 
orientation. In the afore-mentioned approach, this dichotomy is treated 
as an essentialist (c. f. Chapter I Section 4.1.2) and absolute dichotomy, 
and not, primarily, as a piece of methodological engineering and 
manipulation, whose purpose is to enable the linguist to deal with 
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linguistic phenomena in terms of the practical consideration of the 
'division of labour. Essentialism also manifests itself particularly 
in the treatment of synchronic descriptions as bodies of statements 
which are said to capture the inherent features of the data that lie within 
their own scope. In the light of this, it may be pointed out that the 
neo-Bloomfieldians' dissatisfaction. with process rules in synchronic 
descriptions seems to spring from the fact that (1) if such rules are to, 
be temporally interpreted, then (a) this would be tantamount to a 
de struction of the synchrony versus diachrony dichotomy, and (b) it 
would result in 'illegally' injecting a temporal element into what is a 
static phenomenon; and (2) if such rules are not to be given a temporal 
interpretation, then these rules cannot be said to be structurally or 
linguistically real, and, therefore, they must be treated as mere 
descriptive devices. This state of affairs may be illustrated by the 
following quotation from Hockett (ibid: 211): 
"For example ... , if it be said that the English 
past tense form baked is 'formed' from bake by a 
'process' of 'suffixiation', then no matter what 
disclaimer of historicity is made, it is impossible 
not to conclude that some kind of priority is being 
assigned to bake as against either baked or the 
suffix. And if this priority is not historical what 
is it? Supporters of IP have not answered that 
question satisfactorily". 
It is clear from what has been said above that the stumbling block 
for the neo-Bloomfieldians vis-'a'-vis the notion of process rule springs 
from the requirement that this notion be non-temporally interpreted in a 
s tru ctura list-rea list framework, which does not endanger the status of 
the synchrony versus diachrony dichotomy as an important principle of 
modem linguistics. 
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For process rules to be interpreted as proper realist notions, 
the following two conditions must be satisfied: (i) the input, the 
operatidn, and the output - including the limitation component in cases 
where this'component is present - must all (be shown to) describe or 
refer to actual features which obtain in the objects they purport to account 
for; and (ii) where two or more such rules are involved, the ordering 
between them must describe features inherent in the objects these rules 
aim to account for. If these two conditions are not met, then the realist 
interpretation of a given process rule or set of two or more rules cannot 
be said to be a legitimate one. 
If process rules are to be interpreted as instrumentalist notions, 
then the above two conditions are considered to be irrelevant. Under 
such an interpretation, process rules, including, of course, their input, 
output, operations and environmental restrictions wherever appropriate, 
together with their ordering relevant to each other, are merely descriptive 
conveniences whose aim is to yield 'predictions' which can be judged on 
grounds of accuracy only. In other words, process rules, instrumentally 
interpreted, attribute no reality to the states of affairs they express - 
including their components and the ordering which holds between the rules 
themselves. The best illustration of this instrumentalist interpretation 
of process rules is given by Bloomfield (1976: 213), who, in dealing with 
the plural linguistic forms knives, mouths and houses of knife. mouth 
and house, respectively, writes: 
"We can describe the peculiarity of these plurals 
by saying that the final Cf, jý, sl_of the underlying 
singular is replaced by Cv, t, zj before the bound 
form is added. The word "before" in this statement 
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means that the alternant of the bound form is the 
one appropriate to the substituted sound; thus, One 
plural of knife adds not [-s3 but &z] : "first" 
the [-f ] is replaced by E-v] and "then" the 
appropriate alternant E-zj is added. The terms 
"before", after, first, then" and so on, in such 
statements, tell the descriptive order. The actual 
sequence of constituents and their structural order 
(. .. .) are a part of the language, but the descriptive 
order of grammatical features is a fiction and results 
simply from our method of describing forms; it goes 
without saying for instance, that the speaker who says 
knives does not "f irst" re pla ce the Cf] by [ v3 and 
"then" add L-z] , but merely utters a form (knives 
which in certain features resembles and in certain 
features differs from a certain other form (namely knife)". 
Let us now consider the epistemological status of process rules 
in transformational generative grammar and in the two word and paradigm 
models dealt with previously, in terms of the framework outlined above. 
In the former theory, we may distinguish between two types of process 
rules: instrumentalist and mental is t-real ist ones. Instrumentalist 
process rules are employed in Syntactic Structures. Rules in this model 
have the status of mere descriptive conveniences and, therefore, they 
are not required to meet the two conditions of realist process rules given 
above. In other words, by virtue of the fact that process rules in 
Syntactic Structures are instrumentalist in character, it follows that 
neither their components, nor the ordering which holds between them, are 
of an epistemologically realist character. The rules in this model and 
the ordering between them have the same epistemological status as 
Bloomfield's rules and their descriptive order. 
The evaluation of the process rules in Syntactic Structures is 
part and parcel of the evaluation of the grammar of which they are a part. 
A grammar of this type is evaluated, mainly, in terms of its ability to 
generate all and only the entire set of grammatical sentences in the 
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language which falls within its own scope, in a simple and revealing 
fashion. Whether or not this test can be carried out in a scientifically 
acceptable manner is, however, an entirely different matter which will 
not concern us here. 
Process rules in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax are. by 
implication, mental ist-rea I ist in character. However, as has been 
argued in Chapter III, Section 8.3 this view of the epistemological 
status of process rules in transformational grammar does not satisfy the 
first condition mentioned above. This conclusion Is mainly based on 
the fact that transformational generative grammar does not offer any 
legitimate test for investigating the empirical truth or falsity of the 
mentalist nature of its rules. This argument also applies to the ordering 
between the rules, if we approach transformational generative grammar 
from the point of view of the mentalist interpretation of this theory 
advocated by Katz (c. f. Chapter III, Section B. 1). If, however, we 
restrict ourselves to Chomsky's (1965) view of the ordering between the 
rules (c. f. Chapter III, Section 8.3) then this ordering is merely an 
instrumentalist notion. Clearly, no matter what interpretation of the 
epistemological status of transformational generative grammar is advocated, 
the process rules in this theory, and the ordering between them, cannot 
be said to be realist proper. 
Turning to the epistemological status of process rules in the two 
word and paradigm models, it has been indicated in Chapter IV that, 
albeit implicitly, these two models adopt a realist interpretation of their 
underlying epistemological foundations. This attitude is clear from 
Robins' view (1964) that word and paradigm I is restricted to observable forms 
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only, and that this model follows the inductivist philosophy of science. 
As far as word and paradigm II is concerned, the predominantly realist 
nature of this model is reflected in its inductivist bias, and in its 
adoption of'observational adequacy in its (naive) inductivist interpretation 
as the only valid evaluation criterion in'the field of morphological theory. 
The restriction of the scope of these two models to observable forms 
means, of course, that these two models are not mentalist in character. 
The realism of these two models is of what may be called the 
'structuralist' type. 
(9) 
According to this view, a linguistic descriptio n 
aims to account for the structure present in, or underlying, linguistic 
utterances. This, of course, implies that the process rules and the 
ordering between them, particularly in word and paradigm II, must 
satisfy the two conditions of realism given above. However, it is not 
clear how this information can be secured, or how the test implications 
of a realist interpretation of process rules, which implications are 
embodied in the afore-mentioned conditions, can be refuted. In other 
words, since the two word and paradigm models do not specify an 
acceptable methodology for establishing that both the process rules they 
imply-particularly the priority they assign to one part of the rule over the 
otheF-and the ordering which obtains between them, are structuralist- 
realist in nature, it follows that both the rules and the ordering between 
them cannot be said to be realist proper. In addition to this, it may be 
pointed out that these two models sometimes employ process rules, which 
have all the characteristics of an instrumentalist notion, for example the 
notion of identity-operation or process (c. f. Chapter IV, Section 4.7). 
On the basis of what has been said above, it may be concluded 
that none of the dynamic models dealt with in this thesis succeeds in 
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giving a proper, i. e. testable, realist interpretation of both process 
rules and the ordering between them. Ilowever, this does not mean that 
such an interpretation may not be found in the future. It may also be 
concluded that process rules are fully compatible with an instrumentalfst 
interpretation of linguistic theories and grammar. 
To sum up, with respect to providing a realist interpretation of 
process rules, modern linguistics has not significantly progres , sed beyond 
1954, the year in which Hockett (1954) raised his famous question: "And 
if [the expressed by a process] is not historical, what is it? " priority 
[ 
The answer is yet to come. 
Untversalism And Cognitton 
In addition to the classification of the previously discussed 
morphological theories into static versus dynamic approaches, these 
theories may be further classified in terms of the two distinctions: 
restricted versus universal theories and cognitive versus non-cognitive 
theories. Except ior word and paradigm II and, perhaps, word and 
paradigm I, all approaches discussed in this thesis are of the universal 
type, i. e. they aim to deal with all human languages. 
(10) 
As far as 
cognition is concerned, stratificational grammar and transformational 
generative grammar are cognitively orientated, whereas word and paradigm 
I, word and paradigm II and axiomatic functionalism are non-cognitively 
orientated. 
Matthews' suggestion (1972) for setting up restricted morphological 
theories in linguistics is motivated by considerations of appropriateness in 
description. According to Matthews, none of the universal morphological 
theories he examines in his book Inflectional Morphology (1972) - namely, 
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traditional item and arrangement and item and process models, 
0 
stratificational grammar and transformational generative grammar - can 
appropriately deal with all aspects of Latin verbal morphology. His 
suggestion is also intimately linked with the view that the 'word, is a 
central unit of grammar, which sets apart two types of grammatical 
structure in language: syntactic structure and morphological structure, 
with the former dealing with grammatical constructions above the word 
level and the latter with the internal structure of words. 
Matthews' argument for restricted morphological theories thus 
seems to be based on the view that universal morphological theories 
cannot, in principle, yield appropriate descriptions of the phenomena 
they purport to explain. This follows from the fact that such theories 
are, by their very nature, excessively general. It also follows from the 
fact that not all languages can be shown to contain words, or to be capable 
of being fruitfully described in terms of words. In what follows, I shall 
briefly examine the methodological legitimacy of Matthews I, position. 
In addition to the fact that Matthews does not investigate the 
whole gamut of extant linguistic theories prior to reaching his conclusion, 
it may be pointed out that his conclusion seems to be nothing more than an 
inductively based generalisation. This raises an important problem of 
Justification; however, since the question of the Justification of induction 
has been dealt with at some length in Chapter I of this thesis, I shall 
refrain from dealing with it here. Suffice it to say, that Matthews' 
conclusion is open to the same criticism outlined therein. 
Matthews' argument is also open to the charge of being based, 
albeit implicitly, on the logically untenable view that unadulterated 
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observational information is available to the scientist without the 
intervention of a theory or point of view, no matter how embryonic this 
theory or point of view may be. What Matthews regards as 'facts' of 
Latin verbal morphology are, by logical necessity, 'theory dependent' 
(c. f. Chapter I, Section 3.4.4). Consequently, there is no reason why 
the appropriateness of another theory should be assessed in terms of the 
ability of this theory to capture these so-called facts. Appropriateness, 
which is most highly prized by Matthews, is a function of the interplay 
between the phenomena, on the one hand, and the theoretical framework 
applied in dealing with the phenomena, on the other, no matter how 
implicit this framework may be. 
This criticism also applies to the centrality of the 'word' as an 
argument for establishing restricted morphological theories. The fact 
that the 'word' is said to have the status it does in Matthews' approach 
is something which emerges from that approach, and not vice versa. 
'Words' are not given to the linguist in advance, but are established by 
him by an act of theory intervention. Moreover, there is no empirical or 
logical reason why a language, in the pre-theoretical or descriptive sense 
of the term, should or should not have words. The statement that a given 
language has words, and its opposite, are theory-de pendent. As long as 
linguists continue to impute to language in the pre-descriptive sense 
properties which emerge from their descriptions and theoretical frameworks, 
and as long as they fail to provide methodologically sound tests for 
establishing whether. or not the imputed properties are intrinsic properties 
of language in this sense, linguistics will not succeed in ridding itself of 
a lot of scientifically meaningless theorizing, which theorizing more often 
than not borders on the metaphysical. 
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If we add to what has been said above, that neither of the two 
word and paradigm models discussed in Chapter IV succeeds in providing 
a precise specification of the notion 'word!, then we may conclude that 
neither the case for restricted morphological theories, nor, conversely, 
the case against universal morphological theories, is conclusively 
settled. In the light of this, there is no reason why linguists should 
abandon their universal morphological theories in favour of restricted ones. 
As a matter of fact, amongst the many advantages which universal linguistic 
theories have over their restricted rivals is their ability to serve as a 
basis for comparisons between languages, or, at least, to provide a 
relatively stable terminological currency which may be employed in 
discussing languages., 
As far as cognition is concerned we may say that, roughly speaking, 
a- cognitive linguistic theory is a theory whose aim is to account for 
human language as a psychologically real entity and which imputes such 
an epistemological status to the descriptions or grammars which are constructed 
in accordance with it. To be fully and properly cognitive, a theory must 
not include any notions or constructs which are said to lack psychological 
validity, and its test implications must satisfy the condition of 
methodological feasibility. The same conditions must also be satisfied by 
any grammar which is constructed in accordance with such a theory. 
Considered in the light of these two conditions, we may say that 
neither of the two purportedly, cognitively orientated approaches dealt 
with in this thesis, i. e. stratificational grammar and transformational 
generative grammar, nor any of the grammars based on them that I have 
consulted, can be said to satisfy the above two conditions. On the one 
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hand, they contain notions which are purely instrumentalist in nature 
(c. f. Chapter II Section S. 4 and Chapter III, - Section 7). On the other 
hand, they fail to specify a methodology for testing their empirical 
implications (ibid. ). 
However, the above remarks should be seen for what they are: 
they are not intended to show that cognition is intrinsically unsuitable 
as a goal for linguistic theory, but that none of the theories that claim to 
be cognitively orientated, including the two dealt with in this thesis, 
succeeds in dchieving its goal. The pursuit of cognition is an important 
goal in linguistics, but this should not lead us to regard what could be 
no more than a set of speculations about human language and its organisation 
as a scientifically valid account of this phenomenon. 
The above criticisms of cognitive linguistic theories also apply to 
the structuralist-realist models of word and paradigm I and word and 
paradigm II (c. f. Section 1). Axiomatic functionalism escapes these 
criticisms because of its instrumentalist nature. 
3. Final Remarks. 
The morphological theories previously dealt with may also be 
compared from the, point of, view of their methodological and epistemological 
foundations. Of these theories, axiomatic functionalism may be singled 
out for credit because of the attention in pays to these two issues. In 
this respect, it is well and truly in the Hjelmslevean tradition, with which 
it shares its rejection of inductivism as a method of scientific inquiry. 
By virtue of its avowedly non-inductivist character, axiomatic functionalism 
is methodologically directly opposed to the two word and paradigm models, 
particularly word and paradigm I, which are inductively based. 
0 
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However, there is very little discussion, of the methodological. 
foundations of the latter two models in the relevant -literature. A similar 
situation holds for stratificational grammar and transformational generative 
grammar. These two models are not, however, inductivist in character. 
But this does not mean that they are deductivist. The theory in these 
two approaches, unlike in axiomatic functionalism, appears to be no 
more than a collection of constructs or notions that are loosely connected 
with each other. Moreover, more often than not,, these notions are not 
well-def ined. This lack of a precise definition of theoretical notions 
is also characteristic of the two word and paradigm models. 
Stratificational grammar and, to a large extent, transformational 
generative grammar apply the method of modelling in setting up linguistic 
descriptions or grammars. The essence of this method is to set up a 
model which generates all and only the output generated by the 
observationally inaccessible, but cognitively real', - inherent language 
system. An additional premise in this approach is that the closer the 
behaviour of the model approximates that of the native speaker, the closer 
the internal structure of this model is said, to represent the inner structure 
of the inherent language system. However, this method of investigation 
would only be legitimate if there existed an acceptable test for refuting 
the emprical implications of the models it leads to. In the absence of 
such a test, the modelling method cannot, logically speaking, be said to 
be scientifically legitimate. Furthermore, the modelling method suffers 
from the logical fallacy of asserting the antecedent. 
Stratificational grammar is superior to the other approaches dealt 
with previously in one important respect: though all these approaches treat 
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simplicity as one of their evaluation measures, only stratificational 
grammar succeeds in proposing a methematically precise formulation of 
its interpretation of this measure. The stratif icationa list simplicity 
criterion may invite a question of justification in view of the cognitive 
orientation of this theory, but its status as a precisely formulated 
evaluation criterion is beyond dispute. In this respect, stratificational 
grammar vastly differs from axiomatic functionalism, -whose simplicity 
measure does not merit the label . 
(meta-) 'hypothesis', due to the fact 
that it is not a well-defined one. 
Transformational generative grammar differs from the other 
approaches dealt with above in its'treatment of the native speaker-hearer's 
intuitions not only as data to be accounted for, but also as a crucial 
factor in assessing the adequacy of grammars and, indirectly, of the 
theory they imply. In his excellent discussion of the methodological 
status of intuitions in transformational generative grammar, Botha (1968: 70) 
states that the term 'int'uition. 1 is iised in this approach in three 
methodological contexts: 
1. "The linguistic intuition of the native speaker is said to constitute 
part of the (primary) data to be explained by particular transformational 
grammars. 
2. The intuition of the transformational linguist is considered as being a 
"heuristic device" for arriving at rules, grammars, concepts, etc. 
3. The linguistic intuition of the native speaker is regarded as an 
independent criterion for testing the predictions made by 
transformational grammars, i. e. it serves as an objebtive standard 
for the evaluation of a transformational rule". 
It is sometimes argued that because transformational generative 
grammar treats linguistic intuitions as part of the data it aims to explain - 
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the other part being the usual linguistic utterances - this theory has a 
wider scope than many of its rivals, and, therefore, may be said to be 
superior to them in this respect. This certainly is a powerful argument. 
But for this argument to carry full weight, transformational generative 
grammar must satisfy the condition of providing a scientifically acceptable 
methodology for eliciting the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker. 
The lack of such a methodology in transformational grammar means that the 
above advantage of this theory cannot, logically speaking, be said to be 
realised. Furthermore, in view of the absence of such a methodology, 
the employment of linguistic intuitions as a "heuristic device" often 
opens the door to introspection, and to the treatment of the linguistic 
intuitions of the linguist as a native speaker as a substitute for the 
linguistic intuitions of the native speaker or speakers. 
Finally, it is clear from the previous treatment of the 
morphological theories that have been dealt with in this thesis that the 
field of morphology is in a 'confused state'. ''However, this situation is 
not unique to this branch of linguistic theory. A similar situation holds 
in phonology, syntax and semantics, which, with morphology, constitute 
the main components of core-linguis tics. 
In morphology, differences of scope, theoretical and descriptive 
framework, methodology and epistemology are abundant. This, in itself, 
is not necessarily a sign of the 'confusion' which has been said to- 
characterise this branch of linguistic theory. Differences of approach 
within a given discipline are sometimes a sign of health and vigour within 
that discipline. However, when differences reach such an all-pervading 
position within any one discipline, to the extent that no 'scientifically 
meaningful' dialogue can effectively take place between the adherents of 
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rival approaches or trends in a given discipline, differences can no 
longer be construed as a sign of health and vigour, but as a sign of 
'confusion' and 'fragmentation' within the discipline concerned. This 
diagnosis is not only applicable to morphology within core-linguistics, 
but also to the other branches of this discipline, as has been indicated 
earlier. 
In its relatively short history as a modern discipline, linguistics 
suffered too much, and for too long, from pre-mature and over-hasty 
linguistic theorizing. The hasty, albeit implicit, attempts to transform 
linguistics into a-mature science, on par with other mature sciences, 
often led to strong, but unsubstantiated claims, about the 'true$ state of 
our discipline with respect to its status as a science. One of the aims 
of this thesis is to show that, judged from the point of view of their 
methodological and epistemological foundations, many of these approaches 
leave a lot to be desired. The only notable exception to this is axiomatic 
functionalism; for, despite our criticisms of this approach, it stands out 
for the attention it pays to its underlying methodological and epistemological 
foundations. 
What is required in the field of morphology, and, similarly, other 
branches of core -linguistics, is a 'period for reflection', to'digest the 
findings of modern (and ancient) linguists, with a view to charting an 
over-all picture of the field, to enable us to establish the 'true' state of 
our discipline. What is also required is an attempt to devote more 
attention to questions of methodology and epistemology. In this thesis, 
I have tried to carry out the first task, though in a limited fashion, in the 
field of morphology, and, also, I have tried to provide a methodqlogical 
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and epistemological framework for carrying out this task properly, 
thus satisfying the second point mentioned abov6. 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
Ki used in this thesis, the term 'static' does not imply any 
pejorative connotations. My use of this term is almost the same 
as that of Hockett in his paper "Two Models of Grammatical 
Description". It is significant to note here that Hockett-type 
linguistics is of the static type. 
(2) Hall, Jr (1965) likens a "thorough -going" item and process 
description to a guide book and a through going item and arrangement 
description to a geographical map. 
(3) This specification of a process rule applies to the traditional type 
of such rule, e. g. X-XY. - Other types, e. g. the redundancy rules 
in jackendoff's full-entry theory, are not covered by this delimitation. 
(4) Though not all processes are expressed in this manner in the 
literature, for example Halle's (1973) bracketting rules, the majority 
of processes are, or are easily, reducible to such a type of rule. 
(5) For the limitations of thes'e process as descriptive devices in 
linguistic descriptions, the author may consult Uhlenbeck (1962). 
(6) Stratif icationa lists are the most critical group of modern linguists 
of the employment of process rules in synchronic linguistics. Lamb 
(1965: 35) states: "The process way of thinking is similar to that 
indulged in by many people who believe that man is descended from 
the ape. The more advanced view is of course that man and the ape 
are descended from a common ancestor which was not the same as 
e ither. The same type of misunderstanding is involved in the 
familiar view that Latin and Greek (and other Indo-European 
languages) are descended from Sanskrit. Similarly, beginning 
students in linguistics, when given their first exercise in comparative 
reconstruction from forms in two related languages, commonly try to 
derive the forms of language A from those of language B or vice versa, 
even after having been told that their job is to provide reconstruction 
for a proto-language that is not the same as either A or B". Lamb 
(ibid. ) gives the following reasons for his rejection of process 
descriptions: 
(a) their lack of reality 
(b) the directionality of the rules they contain 
(C) they lead to the establishment of an indefinitely -large number of 
levels which are no more than "periods in a fictional time span" 
(ibid: P. 36); and 
W they "impose a need for artificial ordering of the rewrite rules" 
(ibid: 3 9). 
However, not all stratificationalists partake in the criticism of 
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processes. Algeo (1977) regards both 'process' statements and . 'arrangement' as metaphors or fictions (see Hall, jr (1965) for this 
view also). He (ibid: 9) writes: "Both process and arrangement 
descriptions are metaphors. There may be valid grounds for 
preferring one metaphor to the other, but these grounds cannot be 
that either metaphor represents language as it 'really' is. Both 
are fiction ... the choice between the two forms of statement is 
probably made most often on aesthetic grounds. It would seem 
that every little girl or boy born into our world alive is not only a 
little liberal or else a little conservative, but also a little 
Heraclitean or else a little Parmenidean. If he is a born 
Heraclitean, he loves becoming and grows into a Transformationa list. 
If he is a born Parmenidean, he is enamoured with Being and is 
realised on the adult stratum as Sydney Lamb". 
(7) This point is implied by Hockett in his paper "Two Models of 
Grammatical Description". 
(8) See Lamb (1966: 36) for a brief discussion of this point. 
(9) Roughly speaking, the term 'structuralist' is an ill-defined term in 
linguistics. Some Istructuralists', typically naive-realists, 
believe that the structure they establish captures the inherent 
structure that is latent in the phenomena they describe. This 
position is adopted by Hockett (1948: 270-71) who writes: 
[The purpose of the linguistic scientist] in analysing a language 
is not to create structure, but to determine the structure actually 
created by the speakers of the language. For the scientist, then, 
'linguistic structure' refers to something existing quite independently 
of the activities of the analyst: a language is what it is, it has the 
structure it has, whether studied and analysed by a linguist or not". 
This attitude towards the epistemological status of linguistic 
structure is also adopted by Martinet (1975(b) ). Martinet 
distinguishes between the model set up by the linguist and the 
structure present in language, and then he (ibid: 46) goes on to say 
that ". .. the model is not the structure, for the structure is always 
in the object, latent as it were but only if latent is not opposed to 
real. The best that can be expected of a model is that it represents 
the structure exactly, and it will do so if the scholar has succeeded 
in correctly disentangling the latencies involved and has not tried to 
force them into a pre-fabricated model found on the set of a priori 
Ideas currently in fashion". 
This naive-realist interpretation of structuralism is not, however, 
the only interpretation of structuralism found in the literature. In 
certain approaches, e. g. axiomatic functionalism, the adoption of 
a structuralist point of view does not imply any naive-realist 
epistemology of the type mentioned above. 
(10) One of the (meta-) criteria for evaluating grammatical models which 
Hockett (1954) advocates is that of 'generality'. Hockett (ibid: 232) 
points out that a "model must be GENERAL: it must -be applicable to 
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any language, not just to languages 
here, the term $universalism' means 
preceding quotation from Hockett. 
of a certain type". As used 
what 'general' means in the 
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